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Brief Abstract:  Thomas De Quincey’s involutes inform metaphysical thought on memory and 
language, particularly concerning multiplicity and the virtual, repetition and difference. When 
co-opting the mathematic and mechanic involute in Suspiria de Profundis, De Quincey generates 
an interdisciplinary matrix for the semiotics underpinning his philosophy of language and theory 
of memory and experience. Involutes entangle and reproduce. De Quincey’s involute exposes the 
concrete and actual through which all experience accesses the abstract or virtual. The materiality 
of their informatics and technics provides a literary model and theoretical precursor to a 
combination of archive and systems theory. The textuality of involute system(s)—both De 
Quincey's mind and narrative—accommodates the intersections: archive recognizes proliferating 
layers of re-inscription or a system of discursivity and systems observes the self-regulation of 
processes and signals/messages in communication. De Quincey's involutes, as a method, 
transform memory and experience into involute texts: texts invested in the form and layered 
reading processes of fragmenting and sedimenting data within the strata of memory storage, 
actively sorted, re-fragmented, reiterated.  
 
 Thomas De Quincey’s coining of involutes parses as a metaphysical concept foundational 
to his theory of memory and his philosophy of language. By historicizing De Quincey’s 
nomenclature in the mathematics and mechanics of his moment—particularly geometric 
concerns—I locate the parameters of his concept as structuralizing the processes of language and 
memory. The result is a proto-post-human prior to the digital-technological age. De Quincey 
informs his own concept through related yet distinct figures: the palimpsest, the caduceus, the 
network (or spider-web), and the archive. I argue De Quincey provides a juncture between 
memory hardware and its operating system or software, language, through his own 
narratological exploration of semiotics and virtuality. De Quincey’s involute, as a basic unit of 
experience, exposes the technics of involutes as reinforcing the concrete and actual through 
which all experience accesses the abstract or virtual.   
 In Suspiria de Profundis Thomas De Quincey “coin[s]” “involutes” as the “perplexed 
combinations of concrete objects” of experience. He demonstrates these “compound experiences 
incapable of being disentangled” through the narrative structure of his essay (centered on 
exploring a childhood moment of “contracted” time). The essay traces his system(s) of 
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remembrance, excavating successively the “endless strata” of memory “not displaced” in “the 
simultaneity” of “the deep memorial palimpsest of the brain”—a storage system of sorting and 
assembling. His attempt renders, in effect, an involuted structure:  “The situation of one escaping 
by some refluent current from the maelstrom roaring for him in the distance, who finds suddenly 
that this current is but an eddy, wheeling round upon the same maelstrom.” Incorporating 
philosophy, archaeology, geometry and mechanics (among other disciplines), De Quincey’s 
involute philosophy underscores a unique cyclicality of experience, encoding, and (re-)iteration: 
post-/modern concerns address these ideas across similar disciplines.  
 As a method for new media and technics, involute theory analyzes digital works and 
experiences invested in the fragmenting and sedimenting of data in layers of memory storage, 
actively sorted, re-fragmented, reiterated. Moreover, involutes are most germane to new media 
texts, such as video games, in which the compound text itself stores/sorts fragmented memory 
data and experience (re)-inscribes a text consisting of iterations actualizing virtual textual 
memory. In analyzing texts suspended in lines of differentiation, “involutes” engage texts as a 
virtual discourse system, foregrounding multiplicity and repetition (or for video games, play and 
replay: the save option). This dissertation will be a resource for De Quincey’s metaphysical 
ideas, attuned to his awareness of cross-disciplinary advances, which merits further discussion in 
Romanticist scholarship, and also will offer a method for system-archive literary-textual 




































Everything means something, otherwise nothing would(n’t) mean anything. 
 
 
This dissertation blossomed and flourished under the direction of Alan Vardy, whose breadth of 
knowledge directed growth and subtle pruning through refracted illumination. Alan Vardy’s 
capacity for recall, his memory not unlike Thomas De Quincey’s own marvel, offered a living 
model for my work. Without an advisor alert to the varied areas intersecting in this project, this 
dissertation would never have come to fruition. The idea for this project germinated out of the 
scholarly direction Vardy provided in my first work on De Quincey’s “Savannah-La-Mar” and 
its architectural and temporal themes. De Quincey's involutes rooted in my earlier groundwork 
with David Greetham, pursuing new media theories, textual scholarship, and the range of theory 
concerned with language and the text. Alexander Schlutz’s insights into metaphor, philosophy, 
and literary theory assisted in grafting the project’s engagement of systems and virtuality. Matt 
Gold’s attention to media and textuality trimmed and shaped the final form of this dissertation. I 
trust Thomas De Quincey's involute may continue to fascinate others as much as his concept 
does for me. To all those directly and indirectly connected to my time on this project, you all 
contributed in ways beyond knowing—and I am grateful for each and every. To the one who 
journeyed with me from the beginning, providing a nurturing working environment, thoughts of 
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Even the inarticulate or brutal sounds of the globe must be all so many languages 
and ciphers that somewhere have the corresponding keys—have their own 
grammar and syntax; and thus that the least things in the universe must be secret 
mirrors to the greatest. 
  —Thomas De Quincey, “Infant Literature” (1851-1852), 741 
   
 
Rather than providing strictly poetic expression in his sublime textuality, Thomas De Quincey’s 
expansive sense of utterances invites a provocative reading of the world’s contents as 
communicative and articulate. De Quincey’s claim expresses a Foucauldian sense of discourse: 
“discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that 
is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence,” or, in other words, 
signification with an intended and signified meaning.2 The context of De Quincey’s observation 
is his childhood fascination with a literary passage involving geomancy, yet his lingering 
reflection on the passage conveys his preoccupation with semiotic inquiry. He positions language 
as guide for understanding or at least recognizing patterning, particularly sequence and series,3 
while accepting the possibility that the underlying meaning, and potentially even the signifying 
                                                          
1. Thomas De Quincey, Autobiographical Sketches: Vol. I: Chapter III: “Infant Literature”, The Works of Thomas 
De Quincey, in 21 Volumes, eds. Fredrick Burwick and Grevel Lindop. (London, England: Pickering & Chatto: 
2000-2003), Vol. 19, 68-77; 74. I reference this edition throughout; after an initial note directing to any shifts in 
Volume, all successive De Quincey quotations will have in-text citations for conciseness.  
 
2. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge; and, The Discourse on Language, transl. A. M. Sheridan Smith, 
(1972; repr., New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 107. The translation is of the original French, L’Archéologie du 
Savoir, Éditions Gallimard, 1969. Foucault’s study grants analysis key presuppositions, including that statements 
possess layered usage or remanence (rémanence) and residual (rémanent) traces, and that their possession too of 
“additivity” must also take into account “recurrence”; enouncements, Foucault distinguishes as the collective whole 
of larger statements (123-5). Foucault stresses the language as an interdiscursive system, a comparable formulation 
for which I suggest involutes provide a concrete structure.  
 
3. Foucault, 111: further, on the signifying structure of language, Foucault argues that “[t]he statement is not just 
another unity – above or below – sentences and propositions; it is always invested in unities of this kind, or even in 
sequences of signs that do not bey their laws (and which may be lists, chance series, tables); it characterizes not 




structure of the patterns themselves, may remain sealed from decryption. He aptly conveys the 
idea of elusive understanding through his ongoing apprehension of his own readerly intrigue. De 
Quincey provides this understanding in his “Infant Literature” discussion,4 located within his 
Works’s “Autobiographical Sketches” that amalgamates the first section of Suspiria de 
Profundis.5 In so appropriating “The Affliction of Childhood” there, De Quincey draws attention 
to Supirira de Profundis’s key underpinnings of literature and language that inform the core 
subjects of his study: memory and dreams. Suspiria is the focus of this dissertation. I pursue De 
Quincey’s linguistic framework as a basis for his theory of memory, which in turn informs his 
“human system”—all hinging upon his neologism, involutes.  
 Apprehending the complexity of Thomas De Quincey’s involutes, I argue, is central to 
appreciating the text in which he presents the metaphysical concept: Suspiria de Profundis is a 
model of applicable theory and methodology for today’s disciplines. As De Quincey identifies 
the sounds of the universe as languages and ciphers, he opens his understanding and philosophy 
of the mind to language studies and communication systems. Several of his analytical features 
merit attention: 1. foregrounding of linguistic metaphors; 2. applying order, through linguistic 
analogies, to chaos; 3. accepting unknowable parallels between systems of communication. 
Linguistic analogies may be well worn, yet De Quincey appears to voice a semiotic sense of 
                                                          
4. Published in essay form in 1851-52, his Autobiographical Sketches cover the period from 1790-1803; “Infant 
Literature” concerns, specifically, 1795-1799, for his age range of 5-9 years. Grevel Lindop’s edition of Confessions 
of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writings. (1998; repr., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) brings the 
pertinent texts into conversation: Suspiria de Profundis and “The English Mail-Coach.”  
 
5. Thomas De Quincey’s Suspiria de Profundis is located in Vol.15 among Articles from Blackwoods’s Edinburgh 
Magazine and Taits Edinburgh Magazine, 1844-1846; The Works of Thomas De Quincey, 126-204. The links and 
exchanges, as noted by the editors when introducing the publication and textual history, between Suspiria and his 
Autobiographical Sketches are complex: “This copy (=MS B) is now in the manuscript collection of the Pierpont 
Morgan Library, PML 5097 (see Vol. 2, p. 1 of this edition). In preparing the text of Autobiographic Sketches for 
SGG, De Quincey removed pages for the sections subsequently reprinted as ‘The Affliction of Childhood', 'Dream-
Echoes of these Infant Experiences', and 'Dream-Echoes Fifty Years Later’ in SGG (see Textual Notes for details of 
De Quincey's alterations): “‘The Daughter of Lebanon,’ originally written for 'Suspiria', was first published in SGG 
as a pendant to Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1856)” (126). 
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communicative texts as well as their production within larger systems of thought. Not as readily 
adopted (or analyzed) as other terms and concepts of his (such as subconscious) or his fellow 
Romantics, involutes takes the forefront in my study. Literary scholarship’s merger of 
historicism and an appeal to current interdisciplinary theory directs my goal of positioning De 
Quincey’s concepts within the concerns of his period while tracing his ideas along the 
developments of germane theoretical avenues: these include archive, systems, and virtuality. The 
present study joins recent discussions of post-modern qualities in De Quincey’s work6 by 
appreciating the continuing relevance of his ideas. His individual philosophy combines elements 
quite of his time—particularly tied to science, mathematics, and technology.7 Suspiria de 
Profundis also generates a matrix for current theory and literary methodology.  
 De Quincey’s investment in language extends the sense of grammar and syntax to 
literature (his analyses recognize the role of affect, generic properties, and readerly responses). 
Literature exists in a reciprocal relationship with language (in terms of structure, processes, and 
interfacing). De Quincey privileges the written word, the inscribed text. Just as expansive as his 
sense of discourse is De Quincey’s post-modern sense of the text as any item that can be 
communicated, read, analyzed, and so forth. De Quincey’s decoding analogy (“ciphers”, “keys”, 
“secret mirrors”) accepts that abstract matter enables signs (“sounds of the globe”) to assign 
relations to objects and subjects (and other statements or enouncements, “so many languages”) 
                                                          
6. The most relevant are Markus Iseli’s discussion of cognitive unconscious and Joel Faflak’s examination of 
romantic psychoanalysis; see, respectively:  Markus Iseli, Thomas De Quincey and the Cognitive Unconscious. 
(London: Palgrave Machmillan, 2015)., and Joel Faflak, Romantic Psychoanalysis: The Burden of the Mystery. 
(Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2008). See additionally, John B. Beer, Romantic Consciousness: Blake to 
Mary Shelley. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).; and, Brecht Groote, "The Palimpsest as a Double 
Structure of Memory: The Rhetoric of Time, Memory and Origins in Thomas De Quincey and Thomas Carlyle". 
Orbis Litterarum 69, 2 (2014): 108-133. 
7. Contributing to this trend is the recent collection of essays concerning the sciences and internal states, the psyche, 
the emotions, see: Joel Faflak and Richard C. Sha, Romanticism and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press., 2016). 
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that in turn constitute sequences and systems of meaning (“have their own grammar and 
syntax”). De Quincey appeals to linguistics in order to discuss literary experiences but also 
memory and remembrances, in effect reading them as texts. Here, in “Infant Literature” (as well 
as moments of Suspiria) he investigates the nexus: memories of experiencing literature. His 
explanation foregrounds linguistic metaphors as a means to apprehend chaotic organization, 
suggesting, moreover, that external linguistic influences impact internal imaginative 
organization. Equally significant for my study, these adult ruminations arise from repeatedly 
reassessing his perplexity during his nursery years. Repetition is a key feature of De Quincey’s 
theory of memory and experience. He corresponds the most significant issues of his childhood 
(and its repercussions on his mental faculties) to literature and literary associations he shared 
with his sister, Elizabeth, before her death; the compounding of these factors is the focus, in 
more ways than one, of his Suspiria de Profundis—and the following dissertation.  
The core subject of Suspiria de Profundis is the experience of memory, which De 
Quincey examines in various ways. His terminology and metaphors, his art of memory or 
mnemotechnics, position him at a nexus of past traditions of philosophy, seminal contemporary 
developments in mathematics and sciences, and at the cusp of computational and digital 
technologies. Rather than categorized only with other memory theories, De Quincey’s ideas 
require parsing in terms of language, phenomena of experience, and the nature of reality. His 
interests in language and its media of conveyance welcome examination through conceptual 
metaphor theory, with its semiotic underpinnings. Relatedly, new media studies opens up the 
concepts of media and the text, in order to understand the material textuality of De Quincey’s 
remembrances and memory. De Quincey’s human system is one of interacting, and sometimes 
counteracting forces, he embodies in the language and form of Suspiria. This dissertation 
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deploys key premises of modern organization of systems and operational memory—found in 
computer science, manifold mathematics, relativity or quantum mechanics, and information 
theory—to suggest that common loci are found in Suspiria De Profundis. Memory and narrative 
serve to archive the processes of the mind. De Quincey’s ideas on memory appear in defense of 
his narrative explorations of past experiences, post hoc for his Confessions yet offering a 
provocative blueprint for its sequel Suspiria. Naturally enough for a wordsmith, De Quincey’s 
default conceptual domain is language (“in the imagery of my dreams, which translated 
everything into their own language”), yet he attempts “interpretation”8 or self-analysis of 
childhood lexical-cognitive associations impacting his experiences and memory in ways relevant 
to narratological and discourse theories. 
De Quincey’s memory of experiencing a passage in the tale of Aladdin initiates his 
expansive textuality as a global network of ciphered utterances. The similarities between the 
more complete study of memory De Quincey pursues in Suspiria de Profundis and this moment 
in “Infant Literature” consist in organizational associations9 as well as content, particularly due 
to the means by which he arrives at it: “other experiences of mine of the same class [. . .] I had 
shared with my sister Elizabeth” (72). He addresses three “special and exceptional cases” of 
                                                          
8. Though the figure appears in both “The Apparition of Brocken” and “Savannah-La-Mar”, as a separate Suspiria 
portion added posthumously in 1891, “The Dark Interpreter,” opens with the quote: “Oh, eternity with outstretched 
wings, that broodest over the secret truths in whose roots lie the mysteries of man—his whence, his wither—have I 
searched thee, and struck a right key on thy dreadful organ!’” See: “The Dark Interpreter,” The Posthumous Works 
of Thomas De Quincey, 2 Vols., ed. Alexander H. Japp (London: William Heinemann, 1891), 7-12. The opening 
image parallels the caduceus and dreaming apparatus. The Interpreter receives ample attention, typically in 
psychoanalytical veins, such as Joel Faflak’s (see previous two notes, including John B. Beer, 2012). My focus, 
however, is on the figure as modelling literary or textual interpretation (rather than psychoanalysis). De Quincey 
deploys the linguistic sense as one feature of the processes he recognizes within memory and his narrative process: 
“I am now undertaking […] as to the true interpretation of these final symptoms” (133). 
 
9. Suspiria de Profundis and the “Autobiographical Sketches” found in De Quincey’s collected Works include a 




literary effect for him alone, exhibiting his “individuality of mental constitution” (70).10 Suspiria 
de Profundis, published slightly earlier, begins with nursery experiences impacting (and even 
injuring) his mental faculties, including linguistic associations, in order to explore the mental 
faculty of memory. Due to the numerous trajectories of the serialized (and somewhat 
fragmented11) essay, Suspiria offers a far more complex model of analysis than that present in 
“Infant Literature”—the latter model is one examining literature, the former examines the mind 
influenced by it. It is worth following his concise literary analysis for parallels in content and 
methodology elsewhere in Suspiria. He examines his childhood intrigue (somewhere between 
the age of 5 and 6)12 over the passage and “the sublimity which it involved as mysterious and 
unfathomable, as regarded any key which I possessed for deciphering its law or origin” (73). The 
adult De Quincey presumably has the means for analysis the child lacked. De Quincey’s 
examination resembles semiotic and post-structural readings, attempting to understand the 
sublimity he felt, as a child, surrounding a passage in the tale of Aladdin and his lamp.  
                                                          
10. De Quincey further expands yet crystalizes the importance of analogy, transfiguring, and arrogate, all of which 
are vital to “the individuality of mental constitution” (70-1): “Something analogous to these spiritual transfigurations 
of a word or a sentence, by a bodily organ (eye or ear) that has been touched with virtue for evoking the spiritual 
echo lurking in its recesses, belongs, perhaps, to every impassioned mind for the kindred result of forcing out the 
peculiar beauty, pathos, or grandeur, that may happen to lodge (unobserved by ruder forms of sensibility) in special 
passages scattered up and down literature. Meantime, I wish the reader to understand that, in putting forward the 
peculiar power with which my childish eye detected a grandeur or a pomp of beauty not seen by others in some 
special instances, I am not arrogating more than it is lawful for every man the very humblest to arrogate, viz., an 
individuality of mental constitution so far applicable to special and exceptional cases as to reveal in them a life and 
power of beauty which others (and sometimes, which, all others) had missed.” De Quincey, as I argue, aligns the 
role of reader and literary text to provide for the space of interface as one of new and compound textuality. 
 
11. Alexander Regier, Fracture and Fragmentation in British Romanticism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). Regier demonstrates the period’s propensity to rupture and segment, which I apply toward De 
Quincey’s sense of memory as well. 
 
12. De Quincey, 71: “The first case belongs to the march (or boundary) line between my eigth and ninth years: the 
others to a period earlier by two and a half years. But I notice the latest case before the others, as it connected itself 
with a great epoch in the movement of my intellect.” The first, concerns an Aesop fable, though of importance is the 




While De Quincey destabilizes meaning through the arbitrariness of representations, he 
notes cognitive organization from these meaning-making systems of signification. The magician 
in the story has the “demoniac gifts” to “disarm Babel itself of its confusion”; the magician 
performs geomancy capable “of reading in [Aladdin’s] hasty movement an alphabet of new and 
infinite symbols; for in order that the sound of the child’s feet should be significant and 
intelligible, that sound must open into a gamut of infinite compass” (74). The philosophical and 
mathematical infinite resonates with his other interests as well. The scope the magician surveys 
and the discernment required for this feat fascinate De Quincey: “the innumerable sounds of 
footsteps that at that moment of his experiment are tormenting the surface of the globe; and 
amongst them all . . . he distinguishes the peculiar steps of the child Aladdin” (73). De Quincey 
offers, in this musing over the magician who “applies his ear to earth” in search of Aladdin, a 
broader challenge than actually seeking keys to unlock a secret code of existence or meaning 
(73). De Quincey applies “alphabet” and “symbols” to theorize the cognitive processes 
underlying the magician’s geomancy, thereby suggesting that even sounds translate into visual-
linguistic signification, so strongly does language (and vision) govern thought processes. The 
process of translation “distinguishes the steps of Aladdin” into “new and infinite symbols” (75). 
The magician must not only hear, but see, and read chaos into an order “significant and 
intelligible.” Aladdin’s “movement” consists of a complex image: “The pulses of the heart, the 
motions of the will, the phantoms of the brain, must repeat themselves in secret hieroglyphics 
uttered by the flying footsteps” (75). De Quincey blurs the distinction between mind and body by 
distinguishing the brain from the will; likewise, he separates the heart from the will, as if the 
will—thought, intent, or deliberate action—is something integrally interconnected yet separate 
from the body. De Quincey celebrates converting these pulses, motions, and phantoms into 
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covert, stylized pictographs (“secret hieroglyphics”) transmittable by treading the conduit of the 
earth. Certainly these interdependent systems such as languages and signification are key factors 
in the imagery of De Quincey’s description, but there is more at work here. This enouncing and 
readable mind-body complex hints at De Quincey reconciling external influences and individual 
imagination (along the lines of marrying Locke’s affective cognition with the Romantic 
imagination of Wordsworth). The internalization of language, including appropriating and 
coopting it, offers the medium for apprehending and processing all sensory data and experience. 
“Infant Literature” implicates the type of literature but also the type of reading: “All this, by rude 
efforts at explanation that mocked my feeble command of words, I communicated to my sister; 
and she [. . .] felt the passage in the same way as myself, but not, perhaps, in the same degree” 
(74).  His sense of cognitive organization, application to interdependent systems, accepts the 
reciprocal influences of imaginative expression and external factors, namely visual-linguistic 
childhood models. The list of transmitted data is quite revealing: phantoms implicate the visual 
and revivifying influences imprinted through experience, motions suggests movement and the 
process of action, and pulses adds plurality or dynamism to the life—interestingly the noun can 
also refer to seeds, specifically edible ones of leguminous plants, 13 which are another key image 
De Quincey uses for germinating influences in his mention of “involutes of human sensibility” 
(73).14 De Quincey opens his “Infant Literature” section with the seemingly paradoxical 
                                                          
13. Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “pulse, n.”. Oxford University Press. (The abbreviation OED will appear 
in successive notes.) “Cultivated for food (peas, beans, lentils, etc.),” De Quincey may not intend the horticulural 
denotation; however, it nevertheless draws an interesting connection to his deliberate use elsewhere for generative 
properties, particularly concerning his caduceus.  
 
14. His mention of involutes here further links the overlapping content of “Infant Literature” with the portion of 




chronology of latent understanding: “‘The child,’ says Wordsworth, ‘is the father of the man;’15 
thus calling into conscious notice the fact else faintly or not at all perceived, that whatsoever is 
seen in the mature adult, blossoming and bearing fruit, must have pre-existed by way of germ in 
the infant . . . [which] once was latent” (68). He recognizes that what resonated then, and what he 
can read into or through the memory, is a latent germ of cognizance. De Quincey’s investment in 
literature and language allows him multiple examinations at once: he studies literary effects by 
analyzing his own reactions, but, even more so, he attempts tracing linguistic associations for 
their lingering impressions on the mind, the predisposed cognition that facilitates literary effects. 
Literature and language provide model systems for reciprocal impact between external 
influences with internal processes: for De Quincey these include archiving experience, 
interpreting remembrances, and translating or recollecting the past into thought, his process of 
assessing “mysterious and unfathomable” impressions on memory (73). De Quincey sets three 
elements—visio-linguistic experience, memory, cognizance—here, as a trajectory toward 
deconstructing his own memories. De Quincey’s rather post-modern methodology aims to 
apprehend his own experience of reading. He excavates his memory, through layers of reflection, 
to the early moments of incomprehension: “one solitary section there was of that tale which fixed 
and fascinated my gaze, in a degree that I never afterwards forgot, and did not at that time 
comprehend” (73). Besides suggesting a post-modern appreciation of discourse and text, his 
analysis of Aladdin’s tale discusses key factors of experience and memory in a direct application 
to his coinage of involutes in Suspiria de Profundis. This dissertation aims to thoroughly 
examine his involutes, suggest their metaphoric/linguistic associations, trace his involutes of 
                                                          
15. The passage, as noted in Works, is from Wordsworth’s “My heart leaps up”; also De Quincey utilizes the 




memory, and offer involute analysis as a term for the methodology De Quincey introduces: 
memory and experiences are texts for analysis. 
 
Involutes and Suspiria de Profundis 
 
De Quincey’s involutes and the modeling of them that Suspiria de Profundis provides 
lend literary studies an example of tandem theoretical frameworks combining into a unique 
system. Delineating Thomas De Quincey’s interests reveals the important intersections he 
facilitates, perhaps due to the difficulty of disentangling the fields from his essentially 
interdisciplinary discussion. Crosscutting the parallel yet separate areas of semiotics, cognition, 
and memory reveals shared points of inquiry and provides a means of appreciating his 
compositional or narratological methodology as well as his philosophy of the mind: both 
interrelate and stem from his study of the “involutes of human sensibility” (73). De Quincey’s 
sense of the sublime occupies discussions elsewhere; instead, I’ll pursue the narrating De 
Quincey’s dismissal of it: he explains, in “Infant Literature” that his younger self did  
obstinately persist in believing a sublimity which I could not 
understand. It was, in fact, one of those many important cases 
which elsewhere I have called involutes of human sensibility; 
combinations in which the materials of future thought or feeling 
are carried as imperceptibly into the mind as vegetable seeds are 
carried variously combined through the atmosphere, or by means 
of rivers, by birds, by winds, by waters, into remote countries.16 
 
Involutes, De Quincey’s concept and coining of which direct this dissertation, can be partially 
grasped in this passage as the “combinations” of germinating influences on individuals. Just “as 
vegetable seeds are carried” by innumerable avenues, means, and all “imperceptibly into the 
                                                          
16. De Quincey, “Infant Literature,” Autobiographical Sketches: Vol. I, Ch. III, 73. 
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mind,” involutes are part of a systematic transmission in an intangible communications network. 
The organic and natural imagery belies an ordered disorder that may appear comprehensible 
despite its subsystems, processes and routines remaining ineffable or untraceable. From such a 
premise poised between 20th Century semiotics and social theory, De Quincey exceeds a typical 
Romantic sensibility: experiences do not strictly imprint on an individual, they require parsing, 
deciphering, processing or analysis by some internal(-ized) system(s) already in place in the 
mind. Higher order cognition may seem apparent while lower order “combinations” and 
transmissions operate “imperceptibly.” De Quincey dedicates particular attention to translation 
and interpretation as key sub-processes or sub-routines in the human system; translation of 
experiences occurs in dream-language and interpretation of remembrances takes the form of a 
companion-reader he calls the Dark Interpreter. He offers as hardware the faculty of memory, the 
apparatus of dreaming, and palimpsest of the mind to encrust involute combinations; yet the 
program, software (perhaps even wetware), or operational language is language.  
Involutes enter the mind as the materials—specifically “combinations”—that form “the 
materials of future thought and feeling.” Post-modern discourse resonates with the same 
imperceptibility of natural avenues for humans internalizing and becoming products of cultures 
and environments, seed migration; detailed operations may be imperceptible, though larger 
processes are recognizable. The passage in the tale of Aladdin is such a “case” of involutes: 
something more complicated than the simple sublimity of the text. The pursuit of these thoughts 
brings De Quincey to overtly link his interests in “literature jointly with philosophy,” offering 
something of a metaphysics of both: his methodology recognizes the “dark sublimity” in the 
powers of the mind, capable of deciphering or navigating the “mighty labyrinth of sounds, which 
Archimedes, aided by his arenarius, could not sum or disentangle” (75, 74). Disentangling, or 
12 
 
rather the inability to disentangle, factors into his coining of involutes in Suspiria. By accepting 
these premises of involutes, this case of Aladdin’s decoding magician, influence—plant the 
seed—De Quincey might credit with the concepts that facilitate his theory of involutes. De 
Quincey’s attention to linguistics and cognition certainly celebrates literature’s potency in the 
use of metaphor and for a wealth of metaphors. De Quincey is keen to recognize a reciprocal and 
interdependent relationship with the mind and the world. Taking into account De Quincey’s 
sense that involutes germinate into future comprehension not only sanctions what might 
otherwise seem anachronistic in deciphering his own memories, but relies on connecting his 
current interests and ways of thinking with those resonant aspects in the childhood experience 
recorded in the text. 
Though the child fathers the man, De Quincey recognizes, so too, the issue of thwarted 
growth or detrimental impacts on development: “But not, therefore, is it true inversely—that all 
which pre-exists in the child, finds its development in the man” (68). Suspiria de Profundis 
explores the injuries from the trauma of Elizabeth’s death and a moment of contracted time, 
injuries to the mental faculty he associates with opium (ab)use. “Rudiments and tendencies, 
which might have found, sometimes by accidental, do not find, sometimes under the killing frost 
of counter forces, cannot find, their natural evolution”; to extend his horticultural analogy, 
experiences fertilize or stunt the child’s latent possibilities (68). “Infancy, therefore, is to be 
viewed, not only as part of a larger world that waits for its final complement in old age, but also 
as a separate world itself,” De Quincey asserts, distinguishing childhood as a separate but 
interrelated system, “part of a continent, but also a distinct peninsula” (68).  Childhood and 
childhood memories become their own text, become infant literature. The germ or seed of 
childhood could be considered virtual, in a Deleuzian sense, making the adult man just one 
13 
 
actuality. This sense of mathematical and philosophical manifoldness, issuing from Riemann and 
Bergson, applies to De Quincey’s sense of experience and memory, literature and language, his 
involutes and philosophy of mind. The united principles of virtuality connect systems principles 
and archive through related ideas of fragmentation, inscription, difference and repetition.  
“Through dreams, and the dreadful resurrections that are in dreams,” the past revives, re-
produced, re-interpreted, re-actualized (449).17 My discussion of Suspiria de Profundis includes 
the separately published tangent, “The English Mail-Coach” for demonstrating involute textual 
analysis in action. The “fugues and the persecution of fugues” occurring in “The English Mail-
Coach” showcase the tensions of dual (and dueling) systems, interacting and communicating, 
coupled and operating in tandem (449). The agitations of the human system are only the more 
evident exacerbated by opium and the impact of his nursery afflictions. The informational 
processing of the human mind-body at stake for De Quincey is one that permits the text of the 
mind to exceed even the text he renders it through. The spontaneous emergence, “only that at the 
last, with one motion of his victorious arm, he might record and emblazon the endless 
resurrections of his love,” completes the narratological, dreamed and immemorial self-
organization of the involute self from the seeming chaos of the spiraling, layered, entangled 
characteristics of memory, (re-)experience, and narrative (449). De Quincey’s selects the 
involute, with its mathematic and practical gear application, and reinforces the mechanical 
apparatuses at work in the mind/brain. Between the materiality of informatics and the semiotics 
of virtuality, De Quincey maps the human system with the involute, carving out a post-human 
                                                          
17. De Quincey, “The Vision of Sudden Death”, in Articles for Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 1849, in The 
Works of Thomas De Quincey, Vol. 16: Articles from Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, 1947-9. London, England: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2003), 449. These passages are the final ones of “The Vision of Sudden Death,” the second half 
of “The English Mail-Coach” (in Lindop’s edition, pages 399-428; 429-450), originally published anonymously in 
Blackwood’s, LXVI, October 1849, reprinted in De Quincey’s 1851 Miscellaneous Essays; see further details on the 
publication history in the notes preceding it this edition (401-8).  
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adaption of digital-cyber mechanisms with only the available technics of his time. Ultimately, 
the mechanisms he offers for ordering thought and reality—involutes—expose the ordered 
disorder or dynamic systems behind the processes of human phenomena. 
 
Rendering Memory and Involute Analysis: Archive, System, and Virtuality 
 
 By rendering memory I mean to bring readers into a view of De Quincey’s strategy to 
understand what we remember and how we relate memories—and relate to our memories—by 
examining the cognitive-linguistic processes that influence experience and involutes of memory.  
Rather than follow the avenue of cognitive science that Markus Iseli brilliantly advances in 
Thomas De Quincey and the Cognitive Unconscious,18 my analytical trajectory aims to connect 
involutes through De Quincey’s nascent theorizing of archive, systems, and virtuality.  
 When introducing Suspiria de Profundis as a sequel to his Confession of an English 
Opium- Eater De Quincey expounds the relationship of narrative form to the law or impetus for 
his written works, namely Confesssions and its “sequel” Suspiria. He claims his involuted 
composition is meant to resemble a “caduceus.” While narrative theory informs my approach to 
Suspiria de Profundis, the conglomerate and fragmentary form also speaks to metaphor 
studies/discourse analysis. My study draws a model from De Quincey’s own attentiveness to the 
cognitive metaphors he employs, the relationship between his visual-linguistic experiences, and 
the struggle with language or, indeed, the battle of philosophy in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s sense of 
the “bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language” (Investigations, §109).19 For 
                                                          
18. See note 6, above. 
 
19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. Georg Henrik von Wright. 




background on linguistics, semiotics, narratological and discursive concerns I form a nexus of 
related ideas between theorists bridging these fields, often directly or indirectly discussing sign, 
metaphor, and narrative (Max Black, Umberto Eco, Mark Johnson and George Lakoff,  I. A. 
Richards and Charles Ogden, Paul Ricoeur)20—some of which also participate in the 
conversation on archive (Derrida, Michael Foucault)21. Without an established term for the 
concept he explores, De Quincey coopts involutes and coins a new definition (even cited in the 
Oxford English Dictionary)22—the aim of this dissertation is to fully explain the implications of 
his deliberate selection.  
The appropriateness of Aladdin’s tale from Arabian Nights deserves some attention as it 
connects the theories of archive, systems, and the virtual in memory. Calling De Quincey, “the 
most Scheherazadean of English Writers,” Judith Plotz compares him with Borges and their 
shared “infinite and labryrinthine spirit of the Arabian Nights.”23 Suspiria de Profundis offers a 
microcosm of De Quincey’s oeuvre. It traces his system(s) of remembrance, excavating the 
“endless strata” of memory “not displaced” in “the simultaneity” of “the deep memorial 
palimpsest of the brain”—a storage system of sorting and assembling. His attempt renders, in 
                                                          
20. Additional titles might be referenced within chapters, however, most noteworthy for this discussion is as 
follows: Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1981).; Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (1986; repr., Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2000).; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980; repr., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006).; C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the 
Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. Ed. Bronislaw Malinowski and F. G. 
Crookshank (1927; repr., Mansfield, CT: Martino Publishing. 2013).; and, Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: 
Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (1976; repr., Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1979). 
 
21. Both concerned with discourse and language in their own ways, each offers a connection to the ideas of archive: 
Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge; and, The Discourse on Language. trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith 
(1972; repr., New York: Pantheon Books, 2010); and, Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. 
trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 
22. Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “involute,” Oxford University Press, January 2017. 
 
23.  Judith A. Plotz, “In the footsteps of Aladdin: De Quincey's Arabian nights,” The Wordsworth Circle, 
Philadelphia, PA. 29 (2), (Spring 1998): 120-126, 120. See Plotz’s expanded work, In the footsteps of Aladdin: De 
Quincey's Arabian nights. (New York: Dept. of English, New York University, 1998). 
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effect, an involuted structure: “The situation of one escaping by some refluent current from the 
maelstrom roaring for him in the distance, who finds suddenly that this current is but an eddy, 
wheeling round upon the same maelstrom” (176, 132). I address the contents of Suspiria in the 
broadest form (including “The English Mail-Coach”), primarily attending to the later 
collected/complete published forms, concerned by the fact that these pieces at one time or 
another fit together (according to both De Quincey and others). The underlying themes or 
connecting nodes interest me: De Quincey’s sections and subjects branch out from one childhood 
memory as if each successive episode is a type of recognition, kinesis, or prolepsis that offers a 
way to access the traumatic moment. Closely related to discursive systems is the interdependence 
of open systems in systems theory (Roman Jakobson and Niklas Luhmann).24 A related concept 
within systems theory, applicable for information and thermodynamics, concerns entropy, the 
decline into disorder or loss of thermal energy for work within a system. Neg-entropy suggests 
that open systems feed into one another to maintain energy level and allow the system to 
correctly function. The fragmentary nature of De Quincey’s writing—and the interlocking 
subjects and themes—permit rearrangement as if his works function as interdependent and open 
systems. His writings become a type of perpetual motion machine, generating meaning-making 
even in the seeming arbitrariness of their editorial arrangements. That he could shuffle the 
contents himself suggests he recognized these connections, and that they in some way 
represented the fluid arrangement experiences and memories also hold in his mind.  
                                                          
24. Among the many works of Luhmann see: Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990); and Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory. transl. Peter Gilgen, ed. Dirk 
Baecker. (Cambridge, UK:Polity, 2013). Similarly, for Jakobson, see: Roman Jakobson, "Closing Statement: 
Linguistics and Poetics," in Style in Language, ed. Thomas Sebeok (1960; repr., Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
1978).; Roman Jakobson and Moris Halle, Fundamentals of Language. (1971; repr., Boston: De Gruyter, 2010).; 
and, Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature. ed. Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy. (Cambridge, Mass: 




In form, the shifting contents of Suspiria (as well as his collected writings), regardless of 
collection, adheres to Joel Faflak’s sentiments in his review of the Grevel Lindop’s recently 
expanded Works of De Quincey: “far from consolidating his critical identity . . . [the edition] 
confronts us with that identity’s profoundly indeterminate nature” in the “palimpsest” of De 
Quincey’s writings.25  Uncertainty and indeterminacy of modern physics, privileging the role of 
the observer in directing reality, permeate post-modernity and speak too to the ability of De 
Quincey’s fragments to generate meaning through their juxtapositions. Media discussions in this 
dissertation range from scholars of Romanticism to media (Joel Faflak and Richard Sha, N. 
Katherine Hayles, Matthew Kirschenbaum, Gavin Lucas, Jussi Parikka, and Norbert Wiener).26 
  De Quincey’s serialized essay as it exists (compositionally and in time/space and 
editions) models the theory De Quincey conceives of memory and narrative. For complete 
engagement of involutes beyond the purely mathematic, I appeal to the akin philosophical 
principles of simultaneity, multiplicity/virtuality, and repetition of Henri Bergson, Gilles 
Deleuze, and, more recently, Manuel DeLanda.27 De Quincey’s sense of memory as “immortal 
                                                          
25. Joel Faflak, “Re-Collecting De Quincey,” Romanticism on the Net, 40: November 2005: 
http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/012465ar. Faflak’s “review-essay” details the scholarly necessity of The Works of 
Thomas De Quincey, as formulated by the general editor, Grevel Lindop (21 Volumes. London: Pickering and 
Chatto, 2000-2003). 
 
26. I refer mainly to the following primary titles: Joel Faflak and Richard C. Sha, (ed.) Romanticism and the 
Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2016).; N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: 
Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).; Matthew 
Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms: New Media and the Forensic Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012).; 
Gavin Lucas, Understanding the Archaeological Record. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).; Jussi 
Parikka, A Geology of Media. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).; and, Norbert Wiener, 
Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1947; repr., Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. 
Press, 2014). 
 
27. For Bergson, the main works include: Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson (1910; repr., Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001).; Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, 
trans., Arthur Mitchell (1911; repr., Mineola, NY: Dover 1998).; Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans., Nancy 
M. Paul and W. Scott. Palmer (1911; repr., New York: Zone Books, 1994).; and, Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: 
An Introduction to Metaphysics. trans. Mabelle L. Andison (1946; repr., Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2007). 
For Deleuze, see: Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Barbara Habberjam and Hugh Tomlinson. (1966; repr., New 
York: Zone Books, 1988).; Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. trans. Paul Patton (New York: Continuum, 
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impresses” that “seem to be displaced, but [are] not displaced,” evokes the virtual memory of 
computer systems, fragmented data and the interrelationship of random-access memory and 
solid-state storage (even digital forensics). His mathematical and philosophical interests in time, 
“simultaneity,” like Henri Bergson’s durée, play a key role in his sense of involutes: “the 
simultaneity of arrangement under which the past events of life, though in fact successive, had 
formed their dread line of revelation” (176).28 The key concept De Quincey adds is his theory of 
involutes; he invokes the geometrical concept to align with his conceptual shaping of the 
memorial palimpsest, yet coins the term to define experiences, their encoding/inscription, as well 
as the processes of re-experiencing memories.  
But beyond making observations about how language and memory interact, a reading of 
Suspiria de Profundis invites us to consider the play between De Quincey’s recognized 
associations as influencing the episodes he recalls and his recollection shaping the memories he 
renders in narrative. Related to memory and its complex relationship with time found in the 
Bergson-Deleuze philosophical vein, both archive and system theories appreciate commensurate 
dynamics in repetition, particularly between message and meaning. Archive is relevant for both 
literal and metaphoric concepts of memory. For Derrida, archive is a process of re-inscription, 
which, for memory here, records the remembrance over the memory.  
Again, De Quincey’s memory of Aladdin demonstrates a useful example. This 
palimpsestic process appears to play a role in his re-collection of it. As Plotz concludes, De 
                                                          
1994). And for DeLanda, see: Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013). 
 
28. This discussion of time is central to the narratological time of the essay but also of De Quincey internal memory-
text. In my third chapter I explore this in detail, particularly concerning the water-clock, the clyseydra De Quincey 




Quincey’s explanation of the opening of the tale “resembles no version current in his lifetime.”29 
Archive theory, crucial for approaching De Quincey ideas of memory, recognizes proliferating 
layers of re-inscription or a “system of discursivity.”30 Joining with systems theory, that observes 
the self-regulation of processes and functions/actions (or signals/messages in communication, a 
related field), the social and informational applications of systems and archive might be 
redirected onto a material component: texts and textuality of memory. For information systems, 
feedback loops help maintain the ratio of signal to noise, maintaining the information, the 
message. Yet, the sense of a Freudian archive theory—Derrida’s model—permits reading the 
inscribed remembrance for the significance of the memory.  
De Quincey compares the brain to a palimpsest; moreover, he reads memory as if it is a 
type of text. He links episodes through cognate images/imagery, often most affecting through 
conceptual contradictions, particularly summer/death and remembering the unrememberable: 
“countless are the mysterious hand-writings [. . .] which have inscribed themselves successively 
upon the palimpsest of your brain; and like [. . .] light falling upon light, the endless strata have 
covered up each other in forgetfulness [. . .] They are not dead, but sleeping” (176). Each 
remembrance accessing or activating memory’s apparatus, down to the sighs from the depths of 
the palimpsest, becomes an iteration or actuality of the virtual memory experience. The germ, the 
memory, the experience, the involute is further compounded, encrusted, with each remembrance.  
De Quincey’s essay demonstrates involutes as the literary (and narratological) precursors 
to the interdisciplinary principles of archive and system—particularly because involutes unify 
concepts otherwise examined by each theory in isolation—and proves invaluable for literary-
                                                          
29. Plotz, 1998a, 121. 
 




textual analysis. And just as Confessions rendered these relationships in the narratological form 
of a “caduceus,” Suspiria’s fragmentary nature seems appropriate to the law and subject of the 
work. In an effort to address his lexical and conceptual location within a metaphoric framework 
that impacts virtuality and generates rhizomes, uncertainty or indeterminacy, and neg-/entropy, 
this dissertation unfolds a poetics of memory: a series of imaginative patterns that shape modern 
representations of memory, narrative, and ultimately thought. As part of a crucial 
interdisciplinary turn to memory as a text, this dissertation argues Thomas De Quincey’s 
exemplary mnemonic loci apply to interdisciplinary concepts by thinking in involutes.   
 
Involute Analysis in Action: Analyzing Time and “The English Mail-Coach” 
 
 Suspiria establishes time as a principle of organization for De Quincey, evident as he 
elaborates its relevance both in his present narrative’s system and his internal system. Motion 
and agitations stem from his childhood affliction. The human network “overruled all obstacles 
into one steady co-operation,” resembling De Quincey’s previous descriptions of both self and 
narrative (409). The involute of the mail-coach, its turbulence as a specific self-replicating 
machine (an involute) issues an immediate ring of associated connotations—additional chains 
emanate outward from each node. The implication reconciles chaos and order, rather than 
establishing disorder as an antagonist. To survey the elements within the scholarship of chaos 
and order, the interdisciplinary aims of Hayles provides an accessible view that also 
accommodates the two opposing approaches to chaos/order in ways quite useful for De Quincey. 
Additionally, DeLanda’s sense of “The Actualization of the Virtual in Time” offers another view 
to reconcile dynamic and non-linear or heterogeneous continuums as a plane of consistency—
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and recognize De Quincey’s application of involutes as not only a philosophy but a method of 
analysis. 
 The involute, first as a theory, then the core component of De Quincey’s philosophies of 
language, narrative, time and memory—and the interconnection of these systems—provides a 
methodology for examining “The English Mail-Coach.”31 In it, De Quincey returns to the 
memory archive as, to employ Parikka’s phrase, a dynamic and temporal network. The mail-
system offers a communications backdrop to the transit (and transitory) systems the coach and 
De Quincey travel. The added complexity of recollections and dreams assists to model duration, 
the expanding of time and its experience/representation. De Quincey’s fascination with 
movement and travelling through time and space establishes the focus of “The English Mail-
Coach,” based upon his own travels on it, the most notable of which culminates in a “dream-
fugue” concerning the uncertain fate of an encountered vehicle. The suspended fate of the female 
figure, her indeterminate state, embodies De Quincey’s temporal focus as a participant in each 
level of the memory-text. De Quincey’s systems have archeological tendencies but more 
complexity than strata. De Quincey’s involutes in memory and narrative—like language—share 
the qualities of self-generation (or autopoeisis, in systems’ terminology) and recursion (related to 
the Foucauldian linguistic sense). De Quincey’s involute systems operate with inter-discursivity 
and intra-discursivity. 
 His impulse to revisit the sequence to locate a relationship between the order and disorder 
of the system, which he describes in organic functioning, invites reading the study as a juncture 
                                                          
31. Though I refer to the collected Works, both the edition by Lindop (Lindop, 2008 [1998]) of Confessions of and 
English Opium-Eater and Other Writings, and Robert Morrison’s new edition (2013) with his own introduction and 
notes, maintain the sequence of key texts in relation to each other (Confessions, Suspiria, and “Mail-Coach”), only 
removing Lindop’s inclusion of “On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth.” (De Quincey’s essay, a noteworthy 
piece of literary criticism, and arguably related to the object of Suspiria.) Regardless, both editions follow Suspiria 
de Profundis with “The English Mail-Coach,” placing the texts in proximity so as to position the latter as the 
culminating portion of the former (see note 4, above).  
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of text and externalized memory. The combination resonates in the movement from cinema to 
newer media of the digital age, particularly those digital texts that embed or en-script user 
experience/memory, often multiple iterations, the most notable example being video games. 
Memory in such a medium, applicable to Suspiria, operates as a system with interconnections 
between natural processes and media technologies or the human and non-human domains media 
theorist Jussi Parikka emphasizes in the leakage of various media into human communications, 
particularly in A Geology of Media.32 Digital texts share characteristics of De Quincey memory 
system, they contain their own past iterations. Participatory digital texts, might offer a useful 
comparison of the two matrixes of memory (human and medium) in Suspiria: several genres of 
video games archive save files of user-game play, particularly narrative-based ones such as role-
playing games (or RPGs). Suddenly the human experience and game medium create a matrix of 
dialectic exchange between each’s systems of memory storage. The player and game read the 
game content (rendered and interpreted) by both systems, human and machine; gameplay 
requires both systems to store experiences (both temporarily and in long-term); the variability, 
the multiplicity of replay and re-iterations of play-through become co-authored texts at the space 
of interface between the two interacting, cooperative systems. 
 Suspiria de Profundis stands, with all its appendages, tangents, and eddies, as a model 
and a study that defines De Quincey’s contingently defined notions of mind and text. Through 
current developments in theory and technology, the sciences and the arts that branch out 
common concerns for philosophy and mathematics present in De Quincey, shared interests 
become apparent. De Quincey’s parallel ideas place him within several trajectories of thought. 
Yet, while current semiotics, media theory, and philosophy offer avenues to appreciate De 
                                                          
32. Jussi Parikka, A Geology of Media. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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Quincey’s commonality, they also distinguish his additions to each as contributions that can 
inform current thought. Reading Suspiria de Profundis with De Quincey’s involutes in mind 
transforms the act of reading to one that does not reduce a text to a single, homogenous meaning. 
Rather, reading for De Quincey, is a translation, is communication, is recollection, is process. 
Involute methodology is reading for the transformative act of involution, of entangling actuals 
around nodes of virtual, indeterminate signification and archiving each experience as a distinct 




 In the first part of this dissertation I examine De Quincey’s “Immaterial Media and 
Memory’s Metaphors.”  Chapter One, “Suspiria de Profundis and Memory Narrative,” outlines 
the background for involutes in De Quincey’s own models: the palimpsest and the caduceus. I 
argue that De Quincey utilizes the conceptual metaphor of the palimpsest for memory and the 
caduceus for narrative representation of memory in order to construct his concept of involutes. I 
examine the early portions of Suspiria de Profundis, including the “Introductory Notice” for the 
discussion of the caduceus for narrative law and form, though I begin with the “The Palimpsest”. 
The palimpsestic brain and the palimpsestuous memory are destabilizing structures that allow De 
Quincey to talk about text and reading in such a way that he can acknowledge his attempt to have 
his reader journey through his re-presented psyche’s depths, just as he travels through his 
dream’s reproductive powers, and through the experiences that repeat and blossom anew therein. 
The image of the palimpsest archive (or library) reinforces the unidentified archivist, not unlike 
the compositor De Quincey sees himself as, an unrecognized agent of organization. Even for De 
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Quincey, the palimpsest is a limited metaphor, one which he is quick to qualify, along with the 
caduceus. He invokes the horticultural wreathing to describe the narrative tendrils around the 
central shaft (the narrative topic), similar to dreams developing past experiences (“growths and 
fruitifications from seeds at that time sown”), and thereby grants layers on the palimpsest a 
presence as with any material artifact that exists in time and space (134). Rather than expose the 
limitations of linearity, De Quincey underscores the fluid layers of the memory as a narrative-
text. New Media’s expanding sense of textuality and interest in the externalization of memory 
directs attention to the material stages and layers of interface, mediation, or interpretation found 
with newer media, notably digital texts. Recognizing the distinct yet compound aspects of 
textuality speaks to De Quincey’s excavations of the layers of his memory-text. De Quincey's 
archaeology of self recognizes a simultaneity through the medium: brain and manuscript. This 
discussion arrives at digital archeology and archive theory as vital for understanding De 
Quincey’s involutes.  
 Chapter Two, “De Quincey’s Involutes and Experiences in Memory,” explores involutes 
through their related denotations and delineates De Quincey’s original concept. I examine the 
coining passage, the significance of the experience recollected, and surrounding imagery related 
to his other models. With involutes of experience, the decentered subject is not the source or 
center for explaining events. The mind receives experience. The mind records experience. But, 
De Quincey explains the lack of transparency of these procedures. An involute combines a 
particular progression and spatial property for apprehending a distinct relationship between 
surfaces and vectors in mathematics. I pursue the mathematic (and technological) roles for 
involutes for appreciating the quantitative phenomenon or specific property of experience as 
matter. In the mechanical age, geometric involutes are vital for interlocking; involute forms are 
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forms of reciprocity, of interweaving, of entangling. These aspects illuminate such phenomena in 
De Quincey’s human system and his narrative system. This discussion develops into discussions 
of the philosophical sense of the virtual and the actual.  
 In the second part of this dissertation I examine De Quincey’s “Involute Media and 
Involute Methods.” Chapter Three, “Central Forces and Inextricably Entangled Systems of 
Involutes,” explores De Quincey’s memory system, corresponding to Suspiria’s narrative 
system, through his sense of translation in dream imagery. I examine De Quincey’s 
preoccupation with visual-linguistic patterns. The result of this semiotic approach in De Quincey 
is an appreciation of varied linguistic operations, functions, and procedures operating 
simultaneously and interrelatedly. De Quincey’s reversionary motions thwart any straight linear 
trajectory. He finds a stabilizing continuity in foresight and hindsight that reaffirms both rather 
than conflating them. In fact, what seems an opposition is apposition. The tensions of 
consciousness here, in conjunction with De Quincey’s involute, help to explain approaches to 
understanding differential implications beyond mathematics and space-time, beyond science. 
Language provides an organizational comparison while also functioning as a system within 
thought. De Quincey’s underlying philosophy of involutes extends to his understanding of 
language as a semantic model and a system within thought and by extension the stages of 
involute sensibility: experience, memory, recollection, narrative. 
 Chapter Four, “Involute Texts and Involute Analysis: “The Vortex of the Merely 
Human,” examines “The English Mail-Coach” in light of involutes. The result is an example of 
involute analysis for narrative that also assists in informing systems theory and virtuality in terms 
of memory. The conflation of time as well as the temporal ties of each image demonstrates the 
dual trajectory of the involution. Self-organization ties actual instances to entangled virtual 
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multiplicities or mental markers, yet, the reflexivity differentiates to self-generate dreams that 
actualize. That the imagery coincides so fittingly with the geometric topology of virtual 
philosophy demonstrates De Quincey’s involute’s shared roots in philosophy and mathematics. 
The conflation of time as well as the temporal ties of each image demonstrates the dual trajectory 
of the involution. Self-organization ties actual instances to entangled virtual multiplicities or 
mental markers, yet, the reflexivity differentiates to self-generate dreams that actualize. That the 
imagery coincides so fittingly with the geometric topology of virtual philosophy demonstrates 
shared roots in philosophy and mathematics. Moreover, applying a general sense of physics’ 
complementarity, the images De Quincey offers behave as both recollection and experience, both 
virtual and actual, depending on what the observer appeals to in explaining the phenomena. Yet 
















Part One – Immaterial Media and Memory’s Metaphors 
 
Some of the phenomena developed in my dream−scenery, undoubtedly, do but 
repeat the experiences of childhood; and others seem likely to have been growths 
and fructifications from seeds at that time sown.  
    Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 13433 
          
Suspiria de Profundis, resembling one-part dream memoir and one-part memory treatise, permits 
Thomas De Quincey’s narrative representation of the dreaming faculty while advancing his 
theory of memory. He studies dream-phenomena as one access point to memory and his 
formative experiences, connected by shared characteristics of temporality, life and death. 
“Dream-scenery” suggests a world landscape and a theater backdrop, with the latter implicating 
re-productive, re-presentational theatrical properties along with specialized stage scaffolding and 
mechanized apparatuses. De Quincey marries poetic and horticultural images with the seemingly 
disparate area of mechanized technology. Through the combination, he lays the groundwork for 
his mathematically influenced figures of involutes. De Quincey’s related use of the palimpsest 
(for the brain) and the caduceus (for narrative) illuminate the qualities he formulates for a 
working understanding of the textuality of the mind. Merging the communicative content of 
textuality in linguistics and literary theory with media concerns assists in appreciating that dream 
content is as important for De Quincey’s study as are dream contexts.  
                                                          
33. I’ll refer primarily to the version of Suspiria De Profundis among Articles from Blackwoods’s Edinburgh 
Magazine and Taits Edinburgh Magazine, 1844-1846; in Vol.15 of The Works of Thomas De Quincey, in 21 
Volumes, eds. Fredrick Burwick and Grevel Lindop. (London, England: Pickering & Chatto: 2000-2003), 126-204. 
Additionally I recommend the proximity of the material in Grevel Lindop’s edition of The Oxford World Classics 
Edition (New York, 2008) of Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writings. The text is based on 
Burwick and Lindop’s Works of Thomas De Quincey (Edited by Grevel Lindop, Manchester: Pickering & Chatto, 
2000-2003, 21 volumes). For more details, refer to my Introduction. In the 2008 [1998] edition of only the selected 
texts, rather than one of De Quincey’s entire written works in multiple volumes, contains only the pertinent major 
texts (though, “On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth” separates Confessions and Suspiria). And, most 
importantly, relevant for this dissertation, this edition pairs Confessions of an English Opium-Eater with its “sequel” 
Suspiria, which is furthermore immediately followed by “The English Mail-Coach”—as if reuniting it as “Part III” 
of Suspiria de Profundis. The editor, Lindop, does well to acknowledge the relationships between the texts.  
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 Suspiria de Profundis’s study of memory includes the “experiences of childhood” that 
“undoubtedly . . . repeat” in his “dream-scenery”—but, these are only “some” of the dreaming 
faculty’s phenomena. To complete his study, and address the “others [that] seem likely to have 
been growths and fructifications from seeds at that time sown,” De Quincey’s memory-narrative 
digresses into tangential experiences that may as validly, though perhaps not as transparently, 
have germinated the elements of his dream content. Experience includes grafting new 
successions to previous experiences. The “phenomena” in his dreams develop out of memory 
and experience: the distinction becomes evident and vital once each sub-system reveals their 
ongoing processes over the course of his essay.  
 While experience and memory operate in tandem, “the imagery of dreams,” claims De 
Quincey, “translated everything into their own language” (132. In order to appreciate the 
textuality of the mind, De Quincey prioritizes language as the model for the operations of 
inscription and encoding. He separates dreams as distinct texts, each operating on their own 
system(s) of discourse. As latent content, De Quincey’s narrative digressions demand the same 
unconscious inclusion as if manifesting as dreams themselves. In The Interpretation of Dreams, 
Sigmund Freud establishes that a dream’s manifest content is symbolic representation, which has 
collapsed or condensed the conscious and unconscious external conditions or experiences of 
life,34 requiring not only parsing but interpretation or translation. Ultimately, De Quincey finds 
ways of recognizing these multiple roles—reader, interpreter, translator—within himself (or 
selves). He recognizes that dreams are texts requiring interpretation just as remembering is a type 
of reading of memory’s text. Suspiria provides a matrix (which I explore in Part Two) for a 
                                                          
34. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams. ed. James Strachey, Joseph Breuer, and Angela Richards. The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. (London: Vintage, 2001). This work 
from 1900 builds off the ideas from Studies in Hysteria (1895), also contained in the collection, addressing the 
process of dream analysis. 
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methodology directed toward such expansive understandings of text and intertextuality. 
Intertextuality between dreams, memory, and experience operate so fluidly in his essay because 
they do so in the mind. 
 De Quincey’s narrative not only renders the dreaming faculty but attempts to re-/de-
construct it as part of his study of memory. Digressive paragraphs and a tendency for lengthy 
paratactic sentences assist in juxtaposing tangential associations in compositional content. The 
structural correlation of experience with memory episodes and narrative with the dreaming 
faculty merge, intersect, or involve. Tandem operations of memory and experience mirror in 
narrative. Experiences of remembering dreams re-inscribe memory substrates; narrative retraces 
the act of remembering. The materiality, externalized inscription and metaphoric internalization, 
respective to the textuality of the essay’s systems (memory and dreams), operates in tandem and 
welcomes a new approach: an analytical approach beyond a strictly psychoanalytical reading of 
De Quincey’s re-collection of his dreams. 
 Part One, encompassing chapters One and Two, examines De Quincey’s initial 
envisioning of memory, dreams, and narrative as particular structures laying the theoretical 
groundwork for involutes. The type of physicality De Quincey attributes to the inscription of 
memory suggests a dialectic discourse between textual layers: this discourse is manifold, 
intertextual or hypertextual, and interdisciplinary. I examine De Quincey’s appeal to metaphor in 
light of Douwe Draaisma’s considerations in Metaphors of Memory, particularly focused on 
linguistics and abstractions of material objects.35 De Quincey dedicates a full section to his 
conceit of the human brain as a “palimpsest”; however, this only makes his parenthetical coining 
                                                          
35. Douwe Draaisma, Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About the Mind. trans. Paul Vincent. (Cambridge: 




of involutes—“(if I may coin that word”)—all the more intriguing (142). My focus is De 
Quincey’s coining and substantive application of involutes (see Chapter Two). The two primary 
conceptual images De Quincey uses to shape his theory are the palimpsest and caduceus (which I 
address in Chapter One). He reworks the palimpsest, after invoking its basic qualities and 
problematizing them in terms of memory, redrafting its structural functions to accommodate his 
theory of memory processes. De Quincey further embellishes the caduceus structure that he 
adopts to describe his past compositional aims (the content and imagery of which influences his 
manner of embellishing). Both metaphors evoke particular senses of multiplicity and cyclicality 
that combine and directly impact his sense of involutes.  
 In his narrative attempts at rendering memory processes, De Quincey further develops his 
appreciation for the complex that is memory. De Quincey’s psychological archaeology manifests 
in narrative as différance, both to differ and to defer, in Jacques Derrida’s sense of the term.36 By 
deciphering the stratified levels of experience, De Quincey’s study reveals that the memory 
complex generates a system of repetition and difference in line with Deleuze’s appreciation of 
actualization. In terms of discourse, the shift toward multiplicity in meaning and iteration of 
signs and signification appreciates the convulsions of destabilized movement and proliferation in 
De Quincey’s images of memory and narrative, the parallels between recollection processes or 
excavating the archive.  
 De Quincey’s technics of memory remain central concerns for externalized memory aids 
in our current age, a mnemotechnological milleu, recognized by Bernard Stiegler and other 
                                                          
36. Derrida, building on Ferdinand de Saussure, explores in his sense of différance the temporal processing delay in 
navigating the web of language. For more on his terminology, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. transl. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. (1976; repr., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).; and Jacques Derrida, 
"Speech and Phenomena” and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: 




media theorists who acknowledge the integral role of memory tools or mnemotechnics in human 
existence.37 De Quincey’s study of dreams constructs a conceptualization of memory reliant 
upon material forms and external objects. The result of De Quincey’s personal case study is a 
prescient philosophy that speaks to contemporary textuality as well as literary and cultural 
studies.  
 Digital archeology and archive theory assist understanding De Quincey’s involutes by 
illustrating the complex of iterations, fragmented data and subroutines built upon the core 
involute(s), whether concrete experiences or “the vortex of the merely human” (130). A channel 
for applying these post-modern theories is De Quincey’s preliminary model of the palimpsest, 
already participating in discussions of the destabilization of texts and reading prevailing in 
current literary theory. Informed by Gérard Genette and Sarah Dillon’s distinctions, the former 
establishing the textual qualities and the latter expanding the sense of the reading process,38 
palimpsestic qualities for De Quincey foreground his larger concerns. I argue De Quincey 
utilizes the conceptual metaphor of the palimpsest for memory and the caduceus for narrative 
representation of memory in order to construct his concept of involutes. New Media’s expanding 
sense of textuality and interest in the externalization of memory resonate with De Quincey’s 
project. De Quincey explores, through narrative, his material and textual concept of memory and 
dreams.  
 The interconnected systems of writing, inscription, reading, interpretation, and 
reproduction blur into simultaneity in Suspiria de Profundis, directing De Quincey to the 
                                                          
37. For his extensive coverage of the topic, Bernard Stiegler has three volumes (1998, 2009, 2011) to his series of 
books: Technics and Time, 1-3 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press). 
 
38. See: Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree. (1982; repr. Lincoln, Neb: University of 





fundamental elements of experience within each text—memory, dream, remembrance, narrative. 
De Quincey’s involute forms the basic unit, the “compound experience” (142). The compounded 
indivisibility of the involute initiates all the composite properties of the larger texts comprised of 
them. De Quincey views memory as a multilevel text requiring analytical reading—or at least 
awareness—of its separate structural layers. In the new media study Mechanisms, scholar 
Matthew Kirschenbaum distinguishes three key structural components found with newer media, 
notably digital texts: the material stages or layers of interface, mediation, or interpretation.39 The 
atypical materiality and textuality of the digital text provides a useful lens for understanding the 
remote and largely abstract texts De Quincey studies.  
 Rather than simply exposing the limitations of linearity or causality, De Quincey 
underscores the fluid layers of the memory as a narrative-text. I suggest De Quincey provides in 
his theory and narrative rendering of memory a working methodology for reading. Narratives 
exhibit their internal organization and processes as involute; involute analysis exposes these 
properties. In Part II, I pursue involute analysis for appreciating such involute phenomena as De 
Quincey outlines within the mind-text and also argue for its application with other newer texts, 
ones that exponentially complicate their stored and experienced iterations, most notably apparent 
in the medium and mode of digital texts with saved iterations of content as well as reader (or 
player, in the case of video games) progress, interaction or experience: complexes consisting of 
dynamic systems.  
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  Chapter One  Suspiria de Profundis and Memory Narrative 
 
 Thomas De Quincey opens the “Introductory Notice” to Suspiria de Profundis by 
invoking the “colossal pace of advance” and “continual development” of his era’s technological 
landscape and its impact on his recollections (130). De Quincey’s concerns over “this fierce 
condition of eternal hurry” announce the ubiquitous presence of motion, time and technology in 
his essay on memory-generated dreams, or, rather, dream-reproduced memories (130). Time, 
always implicated to some extend in a work on memory, is more than simply a movement 
through personal episodes for De Quincey. Temporality is a subject within the important 
memories he recalls. The crucial memories are so impactful on him for their exposure of time’s 
qualities—regardless of whether he was aware at the time or only upon reflection. It is the latter 
that demonstrates the techne, or art and craft, involved in De Quincey’s narrative; the former 
displays his construction of technical properties of memory. Suspiria de Profunids exhibits both 
working in conjunction. He recalls experiences of irregular time (expanding and contracting) that 
permit exposing memory’s processes during the fluctuation. Also, his narrative attempts to 
prolong pacing when commenting on repeated recollection, in effect layering time’s passage 
over those experiences.  
 The new technologies on the periphery of De Quincey’s focus formulate his appreciation 
of machinery and apparatuses in mental processes as well as the technology of the text: the 
technology and techne in writing and in recollecting. De Quincey examines his own memory arts 
in terms of textuality, attending to aspects of writing, inscription, reading, interpretation, and 
reproduction. The inscriptive impression appears frequently in Suspiria de Profundis, for written 
records and psychical reactions (emotive, cognitive, conscious or unconscious). Certainly, direct 
34 
 
reference and literary allusions factor into De Quincey’s memorable experiences and narration of 
them, as scholarship notes.40 Yet the textuality of the mind is so integral to De Quincey’s 
conception, he never directly states that the mind is a text—instead, he clarifies which type of 
text it is. The mind, or specifically the physiological structure of the brain, is a palimpsest as De 
Quincey famously posits in the portion of Suspiria entitled, “The Palimpsest.” The technical and 
textual properties as outlined by De Quincey are the focus of this present chapter.  
 The “accelerations of the press” included on his list of technology’s “gathering agitation” 
does more than underscore a rapidity indirect to his occupation—whether the innovations of 
cylinder printing presses and cylinder mould machines or Fourdrinier’s continuous paper making 
machine41 (133).  Textual reproduction suddenly approaches the speed of experience, ever 
shortening the gap between sequence and simultaneity: the instantaneousness of external 
representation and experiential inscription. Automatization and perpetual motion seem to 
threaten De Quincey on the horizon. The image conjures Herman Melville’s continued awe at 
pulp processing and its “procession along the wheeling cylinders” of a Paper-Mill.42  De Quincey 
captures, in his palimpsest-brain, a desire for the immediate record, further referencing the 
                                                          
40. See Robert Morrison and Daniel S. Roberts, eds. Thomas De Quincey: New Theoretical and Critical Directions. 
(New York: Routledge, 2008).  
 
41. After the first decade of the 19th century there was widespread adoption of cylindrical systems, coursing around 
a series of heated drums to dry the paper pulp, spread despite the patent granted the Fourdrinier brothers, Henry and 
Sealy, in 1806 for their machine that rapidly generated continuous paper rolls after. For a compilation of the 
historical timeline, see Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose, A Companion to The History of the Book. (Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 2009). And, for the complete survey of the technology of writing, see: David Finkelstein and 
Allistair McCleery, The Book History Reader. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).; and, David Finkelstein and Alistair 
McCleery. An introduction to Book History. (London: Routledge, 2013). 
 
42. Herman Melville, “The Tartarus of Maids” (1855), Melville's short fiction, 1853-1856. ed. William B. 
Dillingham (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977), 183-207, 205. The work is typically paired as, “The 
Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids.” In the relevant portion, Melville explores a sublimity in 
generating the blankness of the pristine paper: “not wholly unlike that which one might experience at the fulfillment 




photographic process of the daguerreotype,43 but also expresses a necessity for the infinite 
repository. De Quincey’s sense of textuality, a concept of the text as explored since modern 
literary theory, applies to the inscriptive properties of memory but also to external records, 
written or otherwise. The material quality De Quincey attributes to both representations, internal 
and external, draw attention to the challenges of storage (retrieval and capacity) that persist in 
our digital age. 
 The material and re-productive roles of writing and inscription provide De Quincey a 
schema for the complexities of memory. De Quincey’s memory shares common aspects with 
William Wordsworth’s spots of time, moments “of distinct preeminence” that potently influence 
the mind thereafter: such experiences as marks or spots of time “retain a fructifying virtue” to 
nourish and repair, “invisibly,” the mind, “especially the imaginative power” against the “trivial 
[…] and […] ordinary.” 44 Significant experiences are certainly generative for De Quincey, who 
also suggests that despite their obvious notability they also harbor concealed influences on 
mental faculties. Like Wordsworth, De Quincey engages the relationship of space and time for 
pinpointing or attempting to grasp preeminent moments, though his concept of experiences 
stresses points in time rather than spots of time. De Quincey distinguishes his poetics and theory 
of memory as founded in physics and mechanistically concretized. One intersection between the 
mechanized advances, including steam-locomotives, to which De Quincey also alludes, is the 
mathematics behind involved gears—and involutes are a concept vital to Suspiria de Profundis 
                                                          
43. For an insightful discussion of literary interest in photography, see: Andrew Miller, Poetry, Photography, 
Ekphrasis: Lyrical Representations of Photographs from the 19th Century to the Present. (Liverpool University 
Press, 2015). 
 
44. Inclusive passage concerning the famous “spots of time” is found in lines 208-23 of Book XII of The Prelude, 
(1850) but also in the earlier 1799 poem of the same title. An integral resource for the comparison of the three 
preludes is: William Wordsworth, J. W. Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill, The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 
1850: Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, Recent Critical Essays. (New York: Norton, 1980). 
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(and this dissertation). De Quincey perceives memory and recollection processes as in motion—
in development, growing and ripening—actual yet undergoing processing (perhaps something 
other than being in process or becoming). Rather than othering aspects of the self, De Quincey 
reconciles the material with the abstract, the external with the internal.  
 Suspiria’s compositional challenges in representing mental processes may indeed 
influence De Quincey’s understanding of the systems he attempts the essay to render. De 
Quincey forces a meta-awareness of literary representations as much as of perception and of 
experience. Modern studies of media aid to inform De Quincey’s textual and external re-
presentations. De Quincey’s free indirect discourse of narrative’s remembrance as moving parts 
and moving images suggests some prefiguring of Deleuzian cinematicity—Gilles Deleuze’s 
paradigmatically claims cinema, an autonomous machine of replication and repetitions, is a lens 
that sees seeing.45 De Quincey’s dream-scenery possesses a similar meta-discourse of 
representation. Deleuze’s postmodern merger of literary theory and philosophy approaches 
similar metaphysical and structural interests as De Quincey. But without the medium of cinema, 
comprised of new technology though an arguably literary form, De Quincey appeals to other 
technology which share traits for manipulating time and perception that are crucial to his 
outlook. For De Quincey memory experiences experiencing. De Quincey acknowledges that 
properties transfer between experience and the mental storage apparatus. Primarily these traces 
attribute written inscription to experience (text) and memory (medium).  
 In Suspiria de Profundis De Quincey offers several analogous and heuristic images for 
apprehending his subjects. Initially, the palimpsest and palimpsest-archive are models of 
memory’s structure, the caduceus for its organization (in narrative), the caduceus-narrative for 
                                                          
45. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image. trans. Barbara Jabberjam and Hugh Tomlinson. (1986; repr., 
New York: Continuum, 2008). 
37 
 
the processes of memory and dreams (remembering consciously and the unconsciously), all of 
which attempt to record, reproduce, or render the “concrete objects” of experience, or involutes 
(142). De Quincey’s involutes provide, once he redefines each related concept within the 
properties of his memory network, the quintessential concept for operations and order within his 
system(s). 
 
Section 1: Structuring Palimpsests in the Mind 
 
Everlasting layers of ideas, images, feelings, have fallen upon your brain softly as 
light. Each succession has seemed to bury all that went before. And yet, in reality, 
not one has been extinguished.  
   De Quincey, Suspria de Profundis, 175 
 
De Quincey’s palimpsest-brain garners attention from scholars for its role in nineteenth-century 
thought and for its potency as a metaphor for the mind.46 De Quincey equates the brain with a 
palimpsest, establishing memory as functioning as a text, though a rather particular type that 
demands a specialized type of reading. Linear yet cyclical, layered yet successive, solitary yet re-
inscribed, De Quincey outlines the palimpsest’s particular, conflicting properties in his 
definition: “A palimpsest, then, is a membrane or roll cleansed of its manuscript by reiterated 
successions” (172). As intricate a figure as the palimpsest appears in his definition, his brain-as-
                                                          
46. For historical accounts and traditions of fascination, see: Georges Declercq, Early Medieval Palimpsests. 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).; Tatjana Silec, Raeleen Chai-Elsholz, and Leo M. Carruthers, eds. Palimpsests and the 
Literary Imagination of Medieval England: Collected Essays. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).; Darby 
Lewes, Double Vision: Literary Palimpsests of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2008). For recent theoretical engagements and applications, including Genette and Dillon, who I engage 
directly, see: Matthew Battles, Palimpsest. A History of the Written Word. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 
2015).; George Bornstein and Ralph G. Williams, Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities. (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1996).; Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree. (1982; 
repr. Lincoln, Neb: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).; and, Sarah Dillon, The Palimpsest: Literature, Criticism, 




palimpsest is still more complicated. He decisively attributes the brain as such a “natural and 
mighty palimpsest” that only seems “cleansed” (175). Successive imprints only seemingly 
overwrite past layers: the brain remains an immemorial monument to all. “Each succession has 
seemed to bury all that went before,” might describe the usurpation of new generations, 
possessors of the palimpsest, but with a Romantic nostalgia for the relic, the ruin, that houses the 
unsnuffed, immortal sparks of life—sparks which, if ever seemingly destroyed, De Quincey 
assures us that, “in reality, not one has been extinguished” (175). The implied metaphors of the 
grave and flame (certainly the empty tomb and the living flame), resonate with the death/life 
imagery woven into Suspiria de Profundis and demonstrate the figurative and semantic network 
underlying it.47 Among the “tumult of images, illustrative and allusive,” which De Quincey 
offers, is the “fable of the Phoenix” as a similar cyclicality, “through eternal relays of funeral 
mists, is but a type of what we have done with Palimpsests”: “We have backed upon each 
phoenix in the long regressus, and forced him to expose his ancestral phoenix, sleeping in the 
ashes below his own ashes” (174). De Quincey’s project is one of regression and recursion, in 
which the “modern magic” of “Chemistry [ . . .] has extorted [. . .] from the dust and ashes of 
forgotten centuries, the secrets of a life extinct for the general eye, but still glowing in the 
embers” (174). “The image, the memorial, the record, which,” he claims, “is derived from a 
palimpsest”—just one of the “illustrative or allusive” images in “the coruscation of a restless 
understanding”— is characterized by, “the traces of each successive handwriting, regularly 
effaced [. . .] in the reverse order, been regularly called back” (174). The palimpsest-brain as an 
                                                          
47. Burwick (ed.) comments on De Quincey’s title in its publication history: “Without giving up the meaning, 'Sighs 
from the Depths', De Quincey replaced the word 'Abysso' with 'Profundis', echoing the Vulgate text of Psalm 130:1 
– De pro-fundis elamavi ad te, Domine ('Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord'). On 5 January 1845, he 
says of his progresss on 'Susperia' that 'I never succeeded so entirely to my own satisfaction', declaring that 'I am a 
new birth for composition' (Houghton Library, Harvard. bMS Am 1631–107). It was perhaps the idea of 'new birth' 
that prompted him later to refer to the work as 'Aurora'” (Works, 126). 
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immemorial text-artifact implicates the changing qualities and dynamic capabilities of its 
reception and readership. 
 Certainly, De Quincey’s conception of memory as writing is as old as the technology 
itself. Rather, his choice of metaphor—the brain as a palimpsest, instead of a wax tablet, codex, 
or even a mystic writing-pad—merits attention for an appeal to the archaic vellum scroll. Writing 
is “the oldest memory aid,” Douwe Draaisma notes in her comprehensive study, Metaphors of 
Memory.48 As the oldest memory technology, writing provides the oldest metaphor for memory. 
Certainly when De Quincey notes that memory records data that “have fallen upon your brain 
softly as light,” he acknowledges, perhaps, the bourgeoning photographic technologies, memory 
aids neither written nor printed, such as the 1830 daguerreotype and the talbotype.49 The light 
might also carry other associations, particularly concerning one of his central remembrances: the 
light when viewing his sister’s body.50 De Quincey, however, favors the reclaimed Medieval 
artifact. He prefers to align memory with an aspect of the arcane. The past-made-present, the 
uncanny presence-in-absence or absence-in-presence, locates De Quincey’s concept of memory 
in the post-Romantic, indeed, post-modern sensibility of texts, reading, and discourse. “In De 
Quincey’s autobiographical writing, the fantasy of the palimpsest of the mind does not secure a 
Romantic unity of mind,” argues Sarah Dillion in “Reinscribing De Quincey’s Palimpsest: The 
Significance of the Palimpsest in Contemporary Literary and Cultural Studies;” rather, his 
palimpsest “is instead implicated in a distinctly post-Romantic spectralization of the self, and of 
temporality, that is intimately related to Derrida’s theorization of spectrality in Specters of Marx: 
                                                          
48. Draaisma, 2000, Metaphors, 2. 
 
49. For more, see: Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography, from 1839 to the Present Day. (New York, 
N.Y.: The Museum of Modern Art, 1981). 
 
50. I discuss this core memory later in this chapter and in Chapter Two, building upon his sense of narratology with 
his concept of involutes and the context of his nomenclature.  
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The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (1994).”51 Indeed, the 
palimpsest destabilizes a Romantic sense of unity or order and displaces the role of the observer, 
the human subject. Yet, in so doing, De Quincey showcases his unique sensibility to a sublimity 
in phenomena, the unexpected collisions of memory and meaning in illustrative and allusive 
metaphor. His involute will build on the palimpsests’ characteristic displaced centrality.  
 For all the materiality of his choice of text, the palimpsest, De Quincey is not concerned 
with direct physiology or biology, or the science of the brain as an organ; metaphor is deliberate 
for its approximation and instability, its ability to evoke unpredictable interpretation. Through 
the palimpsest De Quincey can redefine the brain with the qualities he deems appropriate. 
Metaphor, the concept alone, is nuanced and varied by discipline, though Draaisma offers a 
concise breakdown which suffices for this first section. Traced back to Aristotle, metaphor offers 
parallel relations and comparison that “current literary studies generally reserve for parallel,” or 
an equal, “analogous relationship between objects, events, or relationships.”52 Yet, Aristotle also 
suggests an element of “transfer of meaning,” for which, as Draaisma clarifies, “the concept of 
‘transfer’ indicates that the connotations of the word in its usual context are transferred to the 
new, ‘strange’ context.”53 The palimpsest, in his initial presentation, offers De Quincey a distinct 
type of text with particular associated material inscription that he compares to the human brain. 
The extent of the relationship between the brain and the palimpsest is something De Quincey 
spends time delineating, as if aware of the ambiguity a reader might find in such a likeness. 
There is a “lack of consensus,” Draaisma further notes on metaphor, on “precisely what the 
                                                          
51. Sarah Dillon, The Palimpsest: Literature, Criticism, Theory. (London: Continuum, 2007), 247. And see, as 
referenced: Jacques Derrida, Stephen Cullenberg, Peggy Kamuf, and Bernd Magnus, Specters of Marx: The State of 
the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
 
52. Draaisma, 2000, Metaphor, 9. 
 
53. Draaisma, 2000, Metaphor, 9. 
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relationship is between two contexts,” and by extension, “how metaphors are related to reality,” 
or “even whether literal descriptions exist at all.”54  Indeed, De Quincey may occasionally rely 
on fluctuating interplay in order to tease out meaning he may be unable to fully articulate or is 
still in the process of formulating. These are some of the very qualities De Quincey values in the 
palimpsest, “interwoven” layers of “language” and “revelations”: “the same roll has served as a 
conservatory for three separate generations of flowers and fruits, all perfectly different, and yet 
all specially adapted to the wants of the successive possessors” (173). The conservatory shares 
qualities of the archive, here, as a botanical archive (the same generative imagery he provides  
the caduceus I’ll address later). Derrida’s analysis of the Mystic Writing-Pad, in Archive Fever, 
is apt for De Quincey’s palimpsest: “the technical model of the machine tool, intended, in 
Freud’s eyes, to represent on the outside memory as internal archivization” (13).55 The same 
external movement draws out the brain as a palimpsest, then conservatory within memory’s 
archival operations. The correlating archive and conservatory underscore the horticultural 
imagery De Quincey links to literature (important for his caduceus-narrative, explored fully in 
Section 3) while nesting the layers of text and con-text.  
 The palimpsest-cum-conservatory archives “separate” and “perfectly different” texts, 
“yet,” each is a text “specially adapted to the wants of the successive possessors” (173). In this 
comparison, not only is the self manifold, an unspecified and potentially infinite number, the 
idealized three-layered palimpsest greatly simplifies the quantity of impressions fallen upon any 
human brain, especially De Quincey’s anticipated reader. The texts within the palimpsest possess 
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a textuality that mutably and infinitely speaks to all readers/possessors. De Quincey’s palimpsest 
becomes an archive of infinitely generative textuality despite a finite number of texts. The 
possessors of such a text are unquantifiable. Extending these developments back to the brain, 
memory becomes the archiver(s) of the brain palimpsest’s infinity of texts. 
 Thomas De Quincey begins with one figural image and arrives at, or develops, another. 
Analogy and metaphor assist with his germinating and fructifying terms and concepts. I. A. 
Richard’s explanation in Philosophy of Rhetoric of metaphor’s properties open its possibilities to 
substitution, comparison, interaction, even heuristics.56 The functions and properties of metaphor 
preoccupy various and overlapping disciplines, including linguistics, psychoanalysis, cognitive 
studies. Equivocal metaphoric interplay becomes more pronounced for the metaphors De 
Quincey spends less time clarifying, but are nonetheless apparent even in the linguistic slippage 
of the “parchment” or “membrana” (172). For now, Jacques Lacan’s sense of metaphor as an 
effect 57 helps explain De Quincey not using the term metaphor at all. Rather, the metaphoric 
effect does more than explain the brain’s structure and functions of memory. The palimpsest 
grants human internal framework an external property and plurality. 
 
Delineating the “Conservatory” Palimpsest: Brain and Memory 
 
 De Quincey may pronounce the brain a faithful chronicle of “everlasting layers” that “in 
reality” are neither “extinguished” nor obscured, for himself and all—“Such a palimpsest is my 
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57. A view related to the mathematical inquiry addressed in this dissertation’s concern for language is the cogent 
analysis of Lacan and Aristotle; see: David Metzger, The Lost Cause of Rhetoric: The Relation of Rhetoric and 
Geometry in Aristotle and Lacan. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1995). 
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brain; such a palimpsest, oh reader! is yours” (175).  But by no means is memory an eidetic 
author, recorder, chronicler. For his purposes, De Quincey revises one of the very distinguishing 
features of the palimpsest. Typically, Draaisma notes, “unlimited capacity and enduring traces 
exclude each other among the aids that we use to replace memory.”58 Indeed, De Quincey’s 
brain-palimpsest avoids effaced traces and limited capacity. De Quincey’s revised palimpsest 
bares the same idealization as Freud’s Mystic Writing-Pad. The ideal Wunderblock or Mystic 
Writing-Pad,59 consists of three layers with depth corresponding to lasting impressions: an 
indelible base wax, a transient sheet of wax paper, and a transparent celluloid sheet. “If one looks 
under the wax paper, one sees that at a deeper level an enduring trace has been preserved, the 
wax is now engraved with what was previously only visible on the wax paper,” in Freud’s 
model, thus permitting simultaneous reuse and recording: “The outer sheets are again blank, as 
though they had never been written on, while on the inner one everything has been preserved.”60 
Such a clear hierarchy of preservation and effacement is absent in De Quincey’s palimpsest. Yet, 
his terminology seems deliberate enough. De Quincey tenuously circumvents the contentious 
dichotomy of body/mind by distinguishing the palimpsest-brain from memory (perhaps a 
deliberate choice, rather than the mind), which has certain limitations: “Rarely do things perish 
from my memory that are worth remembering. Rubbish dies instantly” (153).61 De Quincey 
                                                          
58. Draaisma, 2000, Metaphor, 8. 
 
59. “Mystic Writing-Pad is sometimes called a metaphor and sometimes an analogy or model, reflects the 
conceptual conflicts in this part of the linguistic world” (Draaisma, 2000, Metaphor, 10). 
 
60. Draaisma, 2000, Metaphor, 8. 
 
61. This description of his mind and the brain suggests the distinction in his mental categorizing systems: compare 
to the palimpsest: “The vellum, from having been the setting of the jewel, has risen at length to be the jewel itself; 
and the burden of thought, from having given the chief value to the vellum, has now become the chief obstacle to its 
value; nay, has totally extinguished its value, unless it can be dissociated from the connexion. Yet, if this unlinking 
can be effected, then – fast as the inscription upon the membrane is sinking into rubbish – the membrane itself is 
reviving in its separate importance; and, from bearing a ministerial value, the vellum has come at last to absorb the 
whole value” (De Quincey, 172). Memory is a compound structure of both mind and brain. 
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captures the effect as much as memory’s affect. Whereas Freud’s model underscores the role of 
the writer, (memory aides offer an enduring “remembrance” safe from “possible distortions to 
which it might have been subjected in my actual memory”62), De Quincey’s palimpsest 
highlights the role of the reader. Memory consists of a discerning agency apart from the 
automatic impressions of the palimpsest. Rubbish unworthy of remembering is cleansed, 
seemingly, “instantly,” expurgated from memory, hence removed from the access of 
remembering. In these respects, memory adheres more closely to the metaphor of the palimpsest, 
“cleansed of its manuscript by reiterated successions” (171). Here is, moreover, one of the few 
distinctions De Quincey will offer between memory and remembrance: memory houses and 
sustains whereas remembering conducts a type of reading that can be imperfect, impaired, or 
privileging. 
 To convey, fittingly, one example of past experiences among the “immortal impresses” 
brought to the surface of memory, De Quincey explains one common occurrence: literary 
“passages [. . .] which I never could have read but once (and that thirty years ago), often begin to 
blossom anew when I am lying awake, unable to sleep” (153). The written record implicates the 
roles of reading. Later in Suspiria De Quincey personifies a process within himself, the Dark 
Interpreter, that reinforces the reflective and more psychically complex literary procedure of 
interpretation as much as the initial physical or immediate cognitive sensory processing.63 
Presumably “worth remembering,” these passages demonstrate the automatic, mechanic record 
of the palimpsest, but also its germinating effect: these memories have not “perished,” nor 
revive, but rather “blossom anew” (153). As in the conservatory image, these plants speak 
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63. See Part II of this dissertation for full discussion of interpretation and the interpreter. 
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novelly to successive possessors, even the selves De Quincey may be tomorrow. He invokes the 
horticultural image, similar to dreams developing past experiences (“growths and fruitifications 
from seeds at that time sown”), and thereby grants layers on the palimpsest a presence as with 
any material artifact that exists in time and space.  
 The slippage between layers, the percolation up of a substrate or past inscription, 
destabilizes De Quincey’s position as remember-er or his role as a reader of the palimpsest-brain. 
The distinct images of palimpsests De Quincey offers, between the objective brain and subjective 
memory, maintain, nevertheless, key characteristics of the palimpsest as a manifold entity and 
intertextual fragment. Both palimpsests present in De Quincey’s metaphysics destabilize reading 
and texts in ways that resonate with literary theory since the New Critics.64 At its most basic, a 
text produces ambiguity in the disparate elements forming an organic whole. In this sense, the 
definition Sarah Dillon, building off Gérard Genette, offers of “palimpsestic,” as “the layering of 
a palimpsest,”65 might apply to any text. Indeed, palimpsestic shares traits with the polyvocality 
of discourse theory and semiotics (discussed in Chapter Two). Combining palimpsest studies and 
literary theory opens useful implications for the palimpsest image on De Quincey’s narrative 
rendering of memory. 
 Memory multiplies exponentially, if each layer on the palimpsest is a distinct text and 
every text is palimpsestic in its conglomeration. Each layer-text of the palimpsest recognizes its 
own intertextuality within and apart from the whole. Memory, as a type of reading for De 
Quincey, initiates the manifold relationships Genette explores in his sense of hypertextual 
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reading: “the hypertext invites us to engage in a relational reading.”66 With a hypertext, similar 
to following embedded hyperlinks, the reader may oscillate between juxtaposed layers during the 
reading experience. This relational reading Dillon distinguishes as “palimpsestuous” or “the 
subsequent reappearance of the underlying text.”67 Genette provides a useful nexus between the 
literary approaches to structure and the theory surrounding the palimpsest itself. A Structuralist, 
Genette inherits the shared interests in language of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-
Strauss, or semiotics and social anthropology, respectively, among other fields.68  Structuralism 
is mainly a linguistic method concerned with signs and discourse, particularly narrative, though 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s term “intellectual bricolage” 69 is an apt description as structuralism 
depends on the study of cultural systems by spanning a range of disciplines. This scope is vital 
for De Quincey and acknowledging ways of appreciating both his images and metaphors of 
memory. Interdisciplinary cross-sections appreciate De Quincey’s intellectual bricolage and 
breadth of knowledge spanning mathematics, philosophy, and language. 
 The palimpsest is key as both a sign/signifier and a type of discourse. More than 
symbolic, De Quincey stresses the unstated associations and relationships in metaphor. 
Moreover, De Quincey underscores his own linguistic preoccupation in notable instances, 
including his examples of pre-sleep or pre-conscious remembrance. “Words revive,” De Quincey 
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68. Gérard Genette, “Structuralism and Literary Criticism,” in Modern Criticism and Theory. ed. Nigel Wood and 
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69. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (1962; repr., London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson; Chicago: The 
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relations in experiences is influenced by Bergson, as he references, “the decision that everything must be taken 
account of facilitates the creation of a ‘memory bank’”: noted from “’fonction fabulatrice’ (trans. note)” (16). [He 
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(New York, 1956).] 
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explains, “and they arrange themselves gradually into sentences,” to such a point as he humbly 
claims his ability to tolerably recreate a page or a verse (153).70 Though in this general example 
De Quincey does not recognize any trigger for bringing these sentences to mind, the episodes of 
memories and dreams in Suspiria de Profundis suggest a “system of latent relations,” as if in line 
with pursuing Genette’s “structural synthesis” for which “thematic analysis” of networks locates 
relations between systems of forms and meanings or similarities—or homologies.71 Homologies, 
a term originating in chemistry and biology concurrent to De Quincey, identifies similar relative 
structures or relative positions. Cognates are homologies; philology studies homologies among 
languages. De Quincey is alert to the concept (if not the term). Homologies, in evolutionary 
terms, refer to branching species with common ancestry, a structural approach Genette utilizes; 
Genette suggests language and literature (as well as literary genres) as a homology, with shared 
structural relationships, particularly in the manner that they partition meaning. The shared 
principles of this homology include language and literature behaving with culturally defined 
perceptions of reality, of segmenting experience, of the relations between form and meaning that 
possess a systematic relationship underlying culture.72 Meaning and signs, when analyzed 
structurally for synthesis as well as homology, demonstrate interconnecting networks but also 
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overlapping trajectories of linguistic phenomena. De Quincey uses the idea of analogy when he 
explains the associations that make his memory so remarkably (though approximately) accurate. 
Interestingly, De Quincey expresses this palimpsestuous reading, or relational reading between 
layers by adopting a secondary role for readership: “I become a distinguished compositor in the 
darkness” (153). In remembering, or compositing, De Quincey suspends himself between layers, 
texts, and roles, “a suspended relation to meaning and reference,” that Jacques Derrida locates in 
all literature.73  Dillon emphasizes the interdisciplinarity of palimpsests, among their arbitrary 
layers that “bear no necessary relation to each other,” yet which showcase “the involvement, 
entanglement, interruption and inhabitation of disciples in and on each other.”74 Poststructuralist 
or Deconstructive readings further appreciate the gap De Quincey establishes between successive 
layers in texts and even, perhaps, the two distinct palimpsests operating in the mind. The 
undecideability, or “madness” Derrida reads in Søren Kierkegaard as “the moment of 
decision,”75 opens the rift inherent in the palimpsest as a text and destabilizes the act of reading 
as multiple. Compositing, as with either re-collecting or re-membering, suggests the same sense 
of rupture and suture, of fragment and collage.   
 For De Quincey, the subjective memory-archivist takes on the role of compositor. The 
palimpsest suggests “correlative spaces” rather than “unbroken linearity,” concepts Michel 
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Foucault demonstrates in The Archaeology of Knowledge.76 Postulating a type of archaeological 
or archival excavation of discursive knowledge, or “enveloping theory,” Foucault speaks almost 
for De Quincey when he articulates his project: "If philosophy is a memory or a return of the 
origin, what I am doing cannot, in any way, be regarded as philosophy; and if the history of 
thought consists in giving life to half-effaced figures, what I am doing is not history either.”77  
De Quincey's archaeology of self recognizes a simultaneity through the medium: brain and 
manuscript. De Quincey selects the image of the palimpsest in order to talk about text in such a 
way. The palimpsestic brain and the palimpsestuous memory discernable in light of these 
destabilizing influences appears consistent. Palimpsests, for De Quincey, offer actual (literal) 
material traces for conveying the multiple and the fragmentary nature of texts, memory, and 
experience. The “palimpsestuous” or composite quality of the memory/text and of 
remembering/reading becomes more clear. Memories remembered, similar to the texts layering a 
palimpsest, become multiple, along with their contents. 
 
Palimpsest Archives and Libraries 
 
 Any anachronism in reading such post-modern senses of destabilized texts vanishes when 
De Quincey scales his metaphor to include, finally, the all-encompassing storage system of 
palimpsests, “lying amongst the other diplomata of human archives and libraries” (175). The 
image of the archive (or library) reinforces the unidentified archivist, not unlike the compositor 
De Quincey sees himself as, an unrecognized agent of organization. Even for De Quincey, the 
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palimpsest is a limited metaphor, one which he is quick to qualify. “In the vellum palimpsest,” 
there is arbitrariness to the successive inscriptions, “which by pure accident have consecutively 
occupied the roll” (175).  In “our own heaven-created palimpsest, the deep memorial palimpsest 
of the brain,” De Quincey explains, “there are and cannot be such incoherencies” (175). De 
Quincey finds himself reorienting his position from reader-compositor to the cataloguing 
librarian.  
 De Quincey develops the archive-library for juxtaposed order, for categorical 
organization. Two layers may be relationally read without the “grotesque collisions of those 
successive themes, having no natural connection,” as otherwise found on an actual palimpsest 
(175). “The fleeting accidents of a man’s life, and its external shows, may indeed be irrelate and 
incongruous,” admits De Quincey; “but,” he acknowledges the existence of “organizing 
principles which fuse into harmony, and gather about fixed predetermined centres” (175). The 
organizing principles of the archive form their own discourse, which, as Foucault would suggest, 
seeks, "to deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to absolute axes of reference; it is trying 
to deploy a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system of differences, a scattering 
that is not related to absolute axes of reference; it is trying to operate a decentring that leaves no 
privilege to any centre."78 These fixed nodes of palimpsests within “predetermined centres" of 
the archive, require navigation. With no privileging, absolutes, relations or reductions to 
reference, the archive/library resembles the decentered palimpsest, requiring directive principles 
that anticipate the reader.  
 The role of the archivist suddenly shares the role of inscriber—and by extension the 
reader or remember-er are each different points on the same line, each conducting similar tasks. 
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Each remains non-centralized or, in Foucault’s sense, decentered. To employ the vellum scroll 
further, the line is not straight. Rather the line is a curve, involved and cyclical. Textually, in 
narrative or memory, if experiences are mathematic or, more precisely, geometric points, rather 
than spots of time or space, the location is one without set parameters or coordinates. While 
represented by a dot, a geometric point in a topological space is a structure-preserving place-
holder, map, or a morphism between objects or infinite expanses.79 De Quincey’s vellum scroll 
demonstrates displaced interpretive positions of the self or selves (his Dark Interpreter persona 
provides a distinct yet reciprocal procedure-set) positioned on the circle rather than in the center, 
among a fluid cycle of points involuting a potential abyss.  
  De Quincey deploys his sense of “consciousness” to function in a similar capacity as the 
decentered archivist: “Said but once, said but softly, not marked at all, words revive before me in 
darkness and solitude and they arrange themselves gradually into sentences, but through an effort 
some times of a distressing kind, to which I am in a manner forced to become a party” (153). 
Such moments of remembrance (or recollection) occur “when unable to sleep,” requiring, even 
forcing, in “an effort some times of a distressing kind,” active participation by the conscious 
mind to form fragments into a cohesive sequence, though perhaps only a larger fragment (153). 
De Quincey can reproduce “sometimes [. . .] half a page of verses, that would be found tolerably 
correct if collated with the volume that I never had in my hand but once” (153). The indelibility 
of his memory may require conscious management after storage, as if undergoing perpetual 
processing or reorganization. De Quincey’s consciousness is, “forced to become a party” in 
recomposing or recollecting utterances “not marked at all” by the conscious mind upon initial 
hearing: “Still it is a fact that this pertinacious life of memory for things that simply touch the 
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ear, without touching the consciousness, does in fact, beset me” (153). The immediacy and 
passivity apparent here figures into his concept of involutes (explored fully in Chapter Two, 
informed by his own supporting models); it is important to recognize he grants a “life” and 
existence—pertinacious and seemingly incongruous—to memory. Also, he grants that he can 
recognize (rather than recall) these “things” registered by the senses but not necessarily his 
attentive thoughts. Memory processes are living and ever on-going, occasionally rupturing into 
thought or forcing active participation. In computing storage, the phenomenon of disk 
fragmentation offers a viable comparison here. Fragmentation of files and data comprises 
shuffling file pieces and storing them fluidly rather than in a solid state. The result can reduce the 
efficient performance of more main routines or the capacity for the system to retrieve with 
optimal alacrity entire files. In relating this to De Quincey’s memory model, unconsciously 
stored data requires conscious processing and re-collecting of fragments; his conscious mind is 
forced to defragment files, restring or concatenate a series of data for more organized or 
accessible archiving.  
 Much as the archive juxtaposes storage of palimpsests by some cataloging system, 
“whatever heterogeneous elements life may have accumulated from without, will not permit the 
grandeur of human unity greatly to be violated,” De Quincey argues (175).  He suggests a new 
type of palimpsestic text that is categorical or thematic, associated by similarities or Genette’s 
homologies. Archive theory provides a key sense of archivization as reading and compositing, 
which De Quincey finds “accumulated” within a “human unity,” distinct from the 
“heterogeneous elements of life.” The exteriorization of memory is a part of, yet apart from, 
human unity. The models of external memory that De Quincey utilizes, namely the palimpsest 
and archive, adhere to certain rules of human unity: to order the “irrelate and incongruous” and 
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will not permit “its ultimate repose to be troubled, in the retrospect from dying moments, or from 
other great convulsions” (175). The nearest explanation De Quincey can offer for his seeming 
exceptional memory, far from photographic, is “the higher faculty of an electric aptitude for 
seizing analogies, and by means of those aerial pontoons passing over like lightning from one 
topic to another” (153). Analogy, a type of juxtaposition that pairs relationally by content or 
meaning, functions similarly to metaphor, and shows just how important such associations 
appear to him and to ordering his cognitive functioning. The mind archives complex imprints, 
ordering and storing memory's manifoldness though the unity of analogy and relational 
associations. 
 Thus far the metaphor of the palimpsest and the archive address conscious remembrance. 
The role of the dreaming apparatus complicates the palimpsest-archive, speaking to Derridean 
archive theory,80 a joint structure of both the psychic apparatus and the exterior-technics of 
material mnemonic traces. When Jacques Derrida explores a psychoanalytical 'impression' of 
archives (in Archive Fever),81 his discussions of inscriptions and imprints of the exergue echo De 
Quincey. In “the possibility of the archiving trace,” Derrida expresses the complexity of 
“separating the impression from the imprint.”82 This "immanent divisibility, the possibility of its 
fission, haunted it from the origin," notes Derrida of the imprint, cautioning that, "the faithful 
memory of such a singularity can only be given over to the specter.”83 The construction of the 
specter is yet another role for an aspect of De Quincey. In order to explore this further, De 
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Quincey’s palimpsestic brain and palimpsestuous memory must first impact his narrative. 
Narrative renders a type of remembering that exposes a distance between the original memory 
and the act of re-inscription/membering.    
 Certainly archive recognizes proliferating layers of re-inscription (of Derrida) as well as a 
‘system of discursivity’ (of Foucault); yet, De Quincey privileges the human palimpsest with a 
certain homogenous order, though the fusing and gathering that occurs via a decentered, spectral 
agency. The qualification De Quincey offers to these “everlasting layers” that “in reality” are 
neither “extinguished” nor obscured, is the limitation of whatever agent perceives these 
memories. To borrow the sense of an archivist-reader of the manuscript, in Wolfgang Iser’s 
sense of reading, the text is actualized or concretized and shaped with meaning in the act of 
reading: “reading can be characterized as a sort of kaleidoscope of perspectives, preintentions, 
recollections,”84 in which the process of reading becomes one of interaction between textual 
elements of the text and very act of reading itself.85 The agent of perception implicates both his 
own consciousness and his audience’s. De Quincey aligns his sense of consciousness with and 
the dreaming apparatus86 (or the subconscious mind) as the selective, subjective reader or 
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suffers from the decay of solitude, which is becoming a visionary idea in England, on the other hand, it is certain 
that some merely physical agencies can and do assist the faculty of dreaming almost preternaturally Amongst these 
is intense exercise; to some extent at least, and for some persons: but beyond all others is opium, which indeed 
seems to possess a specific power in that direction; not merely for exalting the colours of dream-scenery, but for 
deepening its shadows; and, above all, for strengthening the sense of its fearful realities.” 
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archivist operating within the mechanic, automatic record or database of the memory-palimpsest 
(the brain and its sensory system).87 The palimpsest models of memory influence De Quincey’s 
metaphor for the structure of a narrative rendering memory. The composite materiality of the 
palimpsest as a conceptual model influences the greater philosophy of De Quincey and the 
schema of Suspiria de Profundis, or sighs from the depths.  
 
Section 2: Inter-Medial and Re-produced as Re-“Collected” Works 
 
Here now was the case, that had once seemed so impressive to me in a mere 
fiction from a far distant age and land, literally reproduced in myself [. . .] should 
repeat within my own inner experience.     
   De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 168 
 
 If dreams “blossom anew” our past experiences, a figment of a fiction is “literally 
reproduced” in a reader, and internalized fictional exploits can “repeat within” one’s “own inner 
experience,” De Quincey moves beyond the slippage and manifoldness of even a palimpsestuous 
reading of memory and experience. De Quincey’s “inner experience” reproducing his memory 
(again, his unique recollection of Aladdin’s magician)88 resembles the “reproductive faculty of 
dreaming.” Moreover, De Quincey’s distinction of inner experience, as opposed to some external 
stimuli, reinforces the repetitious, palimpsestic layering generated by purely interior activity, a 
type of enveloping and branching that occurs by remembering, or re-inscribing the membrane. 
Re-reproduction, problematic since Plato argued the illusory—and elusory—execution of 
                                                          
87. Each successive chapter advances these concerns; Part II addresses system, temporality, and virtuality. 
 
88. See discussion in my Introduction. 
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mimesis in representing the world, finds added complications with rendering in text the 
experience of memory, which is itself conceived of as a text. 
 In his Introductory Notice to Suspiria de Profundis, De Quincey initiates a 
metadiscussion of narrative that introduces the “law” and “form” of his “former Confessions” as 
an evident compositional guide for Suspiria de Profundis (131). De Quincey’s Confessions of an 
English Opium-Eater (1821) achieves a scientific yet confessional report on his own case study 
of the experiences that expose and exemplify dreaming properties and the functions of the 
dreaming apparatus (the events also contribute to factors culminating in his opium addiction). 
The related subjects of both his ‘confessional’ essays, as he explains them, aim to examine 
dreams and the dreaming faculty. Suspiria, however, re-presents and embodies the experiences 
of the dreaming faculty, particularly its organization of related entries, grafting and hybridizing 
the phenomena of his dream-scenery.  
 Autobiographical in content that echoes other portions of De Quincey’s oeuvre, 
Suspiria’s further confessions certainly invite appreciation informed by biographical events 
outside its parameters. Yet, to do so risks dissolving its elements into tangential anecdotes or 
footnotes for other works among De Quincey’s collection—something perhaps of which De 
Quincey himself is guilty. In “dismembering Suspiria,” for revision and expansion of its various 
section, Lindop notes, “by pillaging the text for its autobiographical material,” De Quincey 
“rendered [ . . .] impossible” his “continued promise that he would append a satisfactory version 
of Suspiria to the revised Confessions.” 89 For Lindop, this suggests Suspiria as “an undefined 
repository for all [of De Quincey’s] more fantastical prose.”90 To adopt Derrida’s adage, “there is 
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nothing outside the text” or “there is no outside-text” for appreciating the moments Suspiria (if 
not De Quincey) links together.91 Though Lindop finds De Quincey’s claims “some years later 
that not only ‘The Daughter of Lebanon’ but also ‘The English Mail-Coach’ had been intended 
for Suspiria de Profundis strain credulity,” he includes the latter in his edition92 separate but 
successive to Suspiria, as if accepting some relationship between the pieces, though original 
publication in Blackwood’s was separated by several years. Nevertheless, just as subsequent 
revisions appealed to the idea of “Dream Echoes” of his experiences,93 the decipherment of these 
dreams and echoes, requires recognizing reverberations. 
 If De Quincey’s palimpsest-archive describes a text, and moreover memory as such a 
text, the only access is through the language of its layers: narration, remembrance, and 
inscription. The “human unity” compassing the fragmented texts on the manuscript and the 
indistinguishability of palimpsest layers assists in establishing an exteriority to the organizing 
principles of memory (and possibly consciousness) and narrative to represent, reproduce, and 
render its fluid fragments (175). Fragment does not necessarily denote incompleteness. 
Alexander Regier in Fracture and Fragmentation in British Romanticism informs a difference in 
the “unfolding” process of fragmentation, which “by definition, resist totalization.”94 Rather, 
Regier directs the sense of “a break that is located on a structural level,” onto fracture.95 Though 
                                                          
91. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Of Grammatology. (1976; repr., 
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94. Alexander Regier, Fracture and Fragmentation in British Romanticism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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fracture and fragment can overlap, “fracture can be likened to a condition, part of a structure; 
fragmentation more to a process, an unfolding.”96 The unfolding, in De Quincey’s case, seems 
appropriate to his image of the palimpsest. Regier’s sense might couple with that of computing 
memory, both storage and access, as well as Derrida’s decision and division in différance. Due to 
the key role of narrative and language in relating dreams and memory, and perhaps primarily in 
appreciation of De Quincey’s sense of linguistic and literary properties, the challenge becomes 
one of temporarily cordoning off the essay to puzzle out its cohesive components, and perhaps, 
the spaces or points between them, by engaging in the dialectic process of unfolding and 
producing the synergy of the whole work.  
 
Palimpsestic Fragments and Palimpsestuous Collections 
 
 Recent attention to Thomas De Quincey positions him firmly within scholarship’s recent 
cultural/critical turn toward celebrating the uncertain, the fragment, the scattered. Commenting 
on the most recent collection of De Quincey’s works, which includes hitherto unpublished or not 
since first serialized material,97 Joel Faflak lauds the efforts at inclusion, “his thought scatters 
itself and is scattered across the cultural landscape of the entire first half of the nineteenth 
century”98—a far cry from Darbishire’s attempts a century earlier, in De Quincey’s Literary 
Criticism, to gather the “scattered” matter through blatant efforts of expurgating digressions or 
“the abridgement of a tedious and technical argument,” selecting passages to be “disentangled 
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from their contexts.”99 Those who judged that “the subject fares no better than the style,”100 
disregard the synergistic discourse. De Quincey offers “a kind of serialized, interdisciplinary 
pandemonium of thought,”101 that resonates today—a culture formed by the scattering of 
broadcast media at our fingertips. No longer a “disappointing” critical identity with a 
“heterogeneous mass of prose, in which passages of profound reflection alternate with pages of 
rambling, incoherent argument or trivial reminiscence,” De Quincey can be read apart from the 
axiology that found little relevance in juxtaposition, wherein, “pieces of serious and subtle 
criticism lie bedded in matter whose interest is long since dead, or whose values belongs to a 
lower plane.”102 The critique inadvertently speaks directly to De Quincey’s palimpsest, which 
defends De Quincey against such selective appreciation. De Quincey finds appreciation in 
having rendered in his works a “profoundly indeterminate nature.”103 The title most indicative of 
Thomas De Quincey’s corpus, Suspiria de Profundis, manifests the key features and offers a 
microcosm of his works and a crystallization of his philosophies.  
 Perhaps because scholarship accepts Suspiria de Profundis as both a singular and plural 
entity, an essay or series, makes the work the most suitable medium for the matter. Suspiria is, 
according to Thomas de Quincey, a sequel to his earlier Confessions of an English Opium-Eater. 
Published serially in 1821 and as a single volume in 1822, his first Confessions model a similar 
pattern, of content rather than form, for the sequel. First appearing in 1845, and subtitled, “Being 
                                                          
99. Helen Darbishire, “Introduction,” in Thomas De Quincey, De Quincey's Literary Criticism. (London: H. 
Frowde: 1909), 9. 
 
100. Darbishire, 1909, “Introduction,” DQ's LC, 8. 
 
101. Darbishire, 1909, “Introduction,” DQ's LC,8. 
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103. Faflak, 2005, Re-Collecting. 
60 
 
a Sequel to the Confessions of an English Opium-Eater,” the fragmentary sequel was serialized 
in the Spring and Summer editions of Blackwood’s Magazine. De Quincey later added and 
altered the content for his collected works (a feature not singular to Suspiria), while still more 
material awaited inclusion until posthumous publications. More still were intended, either 
unwritten or lost.104 The pair of confessions have seen a long history of being published together, 
though the contexts of Suspiria often vary. The fluidity of its contents offers interconnected 
portions similar to the approach Margaret Russett proffers in De Quincey’s Romanticism: 
Canonical Minority and the Forms of Transmission: Russett’s “intertextual fragments” in her 
selected “dispersion of focus” on De Quincey is an approach that “substitutes involuted analysis 
for extensive view.”105 For now, the cursory sense of involute suffices106: something curled up, 
complicated, abstruse. Once again the palimpsest seems an appropriate image. Russett’s seminal 
approach, that “constitutes both more and less than a synechdoche of De Quincey’s 
achievement,”107 underscores the recent critical recognition and appreciation of his fragmentary 
and intertextual style. Suspiria de Profundis exemplifies this type of compositional plasticity and 
literary modernity.      
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 The greatest and most frequent portion or “little paper” (in De Quincey’s terms) 
separated (rather than “implausibly”108 omitted) is Suspiria’s Part II, or, “The English Mail-
Coach,” which De Quincey admits, “according to [his] original intention, formed part of the 
‘Suspiria de Profundis.’”109 “For a momentary purpose” (and likely monetary) De Quincey “did 
not scruple to detach” and “to publish it apart.”110 For that reason alone, it finds inclusion in the 
later portions of this project. De Quincey, in his collected works, includes an explanatory notice, 
making the case for his “original design,” leaving it to “the reader to judge how far this design, is 
kept in sight through the actual execution.”111 De Quincey’s appreciation of the distance between 
authorial intention and the text is quite in line with post-modern critical sentiments. His nearly 
Foucauldian claim is that the author is not a final authority but an historical function in the 
conversation between the text and readers. Having been surprised by his contemporary critics, 
who “deliberately in print, professed their inability to apprehend the meaning of the whole, or to 
follow the links of the connection between its several parts,” De Quincey redirects his readers to 
a type of reading for design and pattern recognition among links that can detach, allowing pieces 
to stand a-part yet all the while retain a place in a whole.112 The role of reception and readership 
(even critique) is one of vital participation in De Quincey’s palimpsest as well as his appreciation 
of memory and texts. 
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 Presumably, Suspiria is whole even with a part missing, making the more accurate 
translation of the basic gestalt principle quite apt: the whole is other than the sum of its parts.113 
Russett’s synecdochal reading or the relational palimpsestuous reading is not only permissible 
but necessary for the types of textuality that are palimpsestic or synecdochal. De Quincey 
invokes the types of meaning-making found within in the links or connections of the larger 
woven pattern, in the spaces of the literary puzzle, a gestalt or corpus consisting of several parts. 
De Quincey’s sense of archive is rather Derridean and extends to his body of works. Derrida, in 
analyzing the etymology of archive (“arkhē, we recall, names at once commencement and the 
commandment”) in Archive Fever, arrives at the sheltering relationship of the archon, a merger 
and separation between the shelter and the person sheltering, only to arrive at a blurring of the 
objects, person, and place.114 The “indeterminate” sense or “notion” of the archive to which 
Derrida alerts us returns back to the object.115 Relatedly conflated, the palimpsest-archive that De 
Quincey presents redirects appreciating the archive of his works with understanding the archive 
of the mind.  
 The fluidity of parts or fragments that are encoded to be recalled as a certain serial plastic 
whole resembles, remarkably, the fragmentation of files within the random access memory of 
computers. Yet, that modern process suggest an arbitrariness that the archive, both Derrida’s and 
De Quincey’s, will not permit: “In an archive, there should not be any absolute dissociation, any 
heterogeneity or secret which could separate (secernere), or partition, in an absolute manner,” 
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notes Derrida,116 echoing De Quincey. De Quincey prefigures ways of thinking and organization 
that, while typical of the digital age, adhere to “the archontic principle of the archive [. . .] a 
principle of consignation, that is, of gathering together.”117 Though he perceived “The English 
Mail-Coach” (and perhaps each part of Suspiria), “as sufficiently intelligible even when 
dislocated from its place in a larger whole,” he recognizes that he “may not be an indifferent and 
neutral judge in such a case,” being, himself, “little able to understand where the difficulty lies, 
or to detect any lurking obscurity, as those critics found themselves to unravel [his] logic.”118 De 
Quincey’s empowering role of readership, of shifting meaning-making, as well as his post-
modern embrace of “dislocation” and fragmentary cohesion, are just some possible explanations 
for his recent critical popularity. The challenge he sets forth pervades all his works: “to unravel 
[his] logic.” Certainly, intentionality is pointless, or as Lindop suggests aptly, for De Quincey, 
“attempts to discover [De Quincey’s] intentions are probably misguided.”119 Lindop elaborates 
that, “Although De Quincey sketched out two plans for Suspiria [ . . .] neither of these outlines 
need be taken very seriously, for De Quincey never wrote to a predetermined plan preferring to 
make decisions about both form and content as he went along.”120 As with Reiger’s unfolding, 
De Quincey’s sense in unravelling the logic, (perhaps the compositional form following the law 
of the work), suggests dislocation of parts to (re-)locate the relational links. His logic is indeed 
analogic. One sense of the logic De Quincey’s palimpsest offers is through analogy—his 
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memory excels due to “the higher faculty of an electric aptitude for seizing analogies [. . .] like 
lightning from one topic to another” (153). Analogy’s organizational relationships network 
memories, for the inscriber, archivist, and reader: operations in tandem with and tethered to that 
of experiencer, recollector, and narrator. Analogic, palimpsestic archives offer a useful figure for 
De Quincey’s compositional cohesion. 
 
Organization by Analogy 
 
 Analogy, especially in the manner with which De Quincey invokes the concept, 
establishes relational meaning as a fundamental principle for the interconnectedness of memory, 
experience, and narrative. Synechdoche and metaphor are the most relevant figures of speech for 
capturing the nuances of relational meaning-making beyond analogy. The micro-macro 
associations or part-for-whole relationship of synecdoche resembles relativistic co-existence on a 
vertical axis—not unlike the caduceus, the figure De Quincey invokes for connecting the 
composition and content of his narrative (ultimately interwoven with memory). Jerome McGann 
delineates similar characteristics concerning exchange along corresponding trajectories when 
discussing metaphor in Towards a Literature of Knowledge; the use of metaphor in the 
communicative matrix of text and reader is dialectic, aiming for a resolution that merges and 
synthesizes. 121 His distinct sense of metaphor has completely different application among other 
theorists, particularly in Lacanian psychoanalysis.122 In McGann’s sense of metaphor, De 
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Quincey offers textuality that coexists whether dislocated as separate parts or located as part of 
larger work. A text, for De Quincey, engages in dialectic exchange between its constituent parts. 
 Yet, De Quincey credits analogies with his mnemonic acuity. The relationship between 
analogy and metaphor, as figures of speech, is worth considering. Metaphor collapses or effaces 
the comparative relationship obvious in analogy. Metaphor’s meaning is similar to the 
palimpsestic archive’s nodes of organizational centers and relies on interpreting the invisible 
links or silences in a network of meaning-making. So while De Quincey may first compare the 
palimpsest to the human brain, he crafts a qualified immemorial palimpsest archive as the 
metaphor, with revised and perfected characteristics. It is this metaphor, his fantasy of the perfect 
palimpsest archive that offers a clear conceptual metaphor for memory and textuality.  
 For cognitive science, a conceptual metaphor presents an idea, typically one perceptually 
based, in relation to another. This image, for De Quincey it’s a palimpsest, or conceptual 
domain,123 provides a coherent organization constituent elements of the source and the target to 
which it is applied, both grounded in De Quincey’s personal experience, including space, time, 
motion, and other sensory or embodied events. Conceptual domains offer the imagery for 
metaphoric expression, hence all the associated meanings for palimpsests—which De Quincey 
rewrites and idealizes in relation to one another. Analogical reasoning and inferences rely on 
conceptual domains and the networks of conceptual metaphors underlying metaphoric 
expressions that render linguistic schemas.124 The unstated collation of meaning in the metaphors 
De Quincey invokes, including the palimpsest, requires deciphering or retracing the underlying 
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relationships. De Quincey appeals to analogy to explain the efficacy of his memory, implicates 
analogy in the associative organization of memory, and, ultimately, underscores the importance 
of analogy, and metaphor, in his own writing.  
 The guiding principle or “logic” De Quincey locates in his work resembles the new ways 
of thinking, perceiving, and feeling Deleuze underscores as philosophy, distinguishing it from 
science or art (and literature).125 In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari develop a 
philosophical triumvirate: concepts, percepts, and affects—newness for all of which are requisite 
for the infinite of creative movement of the philosophical concept: “As whole it is absolute, but 
insofar as it is fragmentary it is relative.”126 Suspiria de Profundis provides new philosophical 
concepts possessing such creative movement. De Quincey explores new concepts while 
simultaneously demonstrating their influence on his perception; the palimpsest-archive of the 
mind demands his particular senses of textuality and materiality for experience(s). His rendered 
narrative produces or affects those very concepts. Suspiria exemplifies what Deleuze and 
Guattari explain of the relationship between concept and event: “The concept speaks the event, 
not the essence or the thing—pure Event, a hecceity, an entity.”127 De Quincey’s personal or 
confessional narratives within both Suspiria and his Confessions build a type of empirical 
evidence for what otherwise forms a treatise on memory amid his memoirs of opium-enhanced 
dreaming. His philosophy includes his theory of memory’s structural behavior and the role of 
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what he calls the “dreaming faculty” in accessing the deep or obscured, “the shadowy” (188).128 
De Quincey’s philosophy, whether he explicitly recognizes it as such or not, guides Suspiria de 
Profundis (including The English Mail-Coach). Undercurrents of philosophical and metaphysical 
influences certainly pervade his thought. The “logic” in the strictest sense is De Quincey’s 
attempts, not directly at science or philosophy, but rather at general inquiry based on abductive 
reasoning—to utilize Charles Sanders Peirce’s sense. Abduction, according to Peirce, is “the 
process of forming explanatory hypothesis,” locating “the only logical operation which 
introduces any new idea,” or basically, “all the operations by which theories and conceptions are 
engendered.”129 De Quincey examines his own ‘case study’ of memory and dreams—a study 
equally dependent on examining his compositional and narratological elements. 
 De Quincey addresses compositional logic in terms of the “law” of the narrative. When 
he discusses his prior or “original Opium Confessions” in the Introductory Notice to Suspiria de 
Profundis, he offers a rather modern sense of the link between message and medium, which 
underscores more than genre conventions: “the law of the work” is “the principle which 
determined its form” (131). Besides recognizing Genette’s sense of structural synthesis, De 
Quincey seems to be conducting a thematic analysis of his earlier work. The object or “purpose” 
of his Confessions is vital to the law of the essay. De Quincey claims, his “Opium Confessions 
were written with some slight secondary purpose of exposing this specific power of opium upon 
the faculty of dreaming, but much more with the purpose of displaying the faculty itself; and the 
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outline of the work travelled in this course” (131). Foremost is “displaying the faculty itself,” 
rather than isolated dreams. Display of the faculty includes its functioning. Moreover, he refers 
to this as, “the reproductive faculty of dreaming” or “the faculty of dreaming splendidly” (131, 
130). The dreaming faculty develops past experiences, memories. Suspiria de Profundis 
examines the “early events in [his] life [that] had left a weakness in one organ which required (or 
seemed to require) that stimulant” (131). De Quincey generates his understanding of the 
dreaming faculty by studying his own experience with opium-intensified dreams, opium having 
enhanced the faculty’s general functions. In turn, opium’s effects expose for him key factors of 
dreams and a means to study the faculty’s functioning.  
 As the brain and memory are palimpsest-archive-esque entities, dreams repeat childhood 
episodes but also include “growths and fructifications from seeds at that time sown” (134). In 
this sense the core memories resemble the “predetermined centres” of the archival organizational 
principles of human “harmony” (175). Later developments “gather about” associations, cores, 
centers, or scrolled vellum. De Quincey’s primary purpose to display this faculty, not solely the 
dream content “developed,” but the dreaming process and its function is a synthesis of its 
structure and organization (134). How he displays the faculty and of what the faculty consists 
concern him as he undertakes his sequel—shared concerns of this present analysis. From the 
narrative experiment itself a model of cognition emerges. 
 Dreaming and memory, reflected in his composition, are always and already engaged in 
interpretation and aesthetics, or reproduction. Offshoots, generated and generational growth and 
fructifications direct both forward and back, to the shared point of the readerly imprint. Keenly, 
De Quincey suggests that “the outline of the work,” narrative’s representation or “displaying” of 
its subject (the dreaming faculty), followed the purpose and “travelled in this course”—however, 
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“precisely in the inverse or regressive order” (131). His re-production or re-presentation of the 
mind seems informed by his awareness of narrative and writing as a construction: “The work 
itself opened with the narration of my early adventures. These, in the natural order of succession, 
led to the opium as a resource for healing their consequences; and the opium as naturally led to 
the dreams” (131). Much as the palimpsest invokes particular senses of organization and 
structure, De Quincey alerts his reader, his critic, and even his own selves (archivers, 
interpreters, readers) to the relationship between structure and purpose, particularly a cyclicality 
and recursion similar to the vellum scroll. Yet, here, De Quincey recognizes a purposeful agent 
propelling his work: a remember-er, narrator, compositor. 
 The faculty, complementing his composition on it, is one of retrograde motion. Similar to 
the arcane palimpsest there is co-operative dialogue between past and present, between layered 
events, texts. While clarifying the cause-effect relationship, he suggests a transparency to his 
compositional aims: “but in the synthetic order of presenting the facts, what stood last in the 
succession of development stood first in the order of my purposes” (131). Composition 
synthetically negotiates purpose and means, “object” and subjects, requiring a retrospection and 
revelation of “facts” into a “natural order of succession.” He realizes his objectives run counter 
to the chronology of events, yet correspond to the “synthetic order” of re-collecting or re-
membering.  
 Dreams repeat the past with similar retrospection and cycling backward. In Derrida’s 
archive, he explains the archive as hypomnesic: “if there is no archive without consignation to an 
external place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of 
reimpression,” Derrida posits, “then we must also remember that repetition itself, the logic of 
repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, remains, according to Freud, indissociable from the 
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death drive. And thus from destruction.”130 In this sense the archive pervades each level of text in 
De Quincey, even dreams.  
 In the act of writing, De Quincey discovers the role of form in meaning-making. As 
McGann notes, “the act of writing has thoroughly materialized and socialized the field of the 
imagination’s activity […] a dynamic interchange between various parties each of whom plays 
some part in the total transaction.”131 The material palimpsest, its textuality influencing De 
Quincey’s understanding of the palimpsestic brain and palimpsestuous memory, either has 
impacted or been generated from his philosophical outlook on structures and organization, 
particularly that of the literary and textual. Besides the structure and organization of memory 
(and the brain), the experience is vital to De Quincey’s representation.  
 
Section 3: Caduceus in Narrative 
 
The faculty of shaping images in the distance out of slight elements, and grouping 
them after the yearnings of the heart, aided by a slight defect in my eyes, grew 
upon me at this time. And I recall at the present moment one instance of that sort, 
which may show how merely shadows, or a gleam of brightness, or nothing at all, 
could furnish a sufficient basis for this creative faculty. 
   De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 148  
 
 The viewer-De Quincey, a type of Derridean specter-archivist, locates a useful generative 
aspect or organizing principle in perception, even with a “slight defect”—or perhaps due to it. 
The “grouping” together or “faculty of shaping images [ . . .] out of slight elements” seems a 
perfect explanation of the gestalt system of reification, in which gaps or spaces in information 
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are generated to constitute the missing information in a visual stimulus. The resulting composite 
image, De Quincey points out, derives from such fleeting stimuli as “shadows,” “a gleam,” “or 
nothing at all.” Certainly this seems akin to the delireium of reading that Derrida puns by 
merging to read (the French lire) with delirium, an argument for delirious or hallucinatory 
reading experiences which later scholarship on reading practices advance toward the dynamics of 
reading.132 De Quincey recognizes the cognitive processes at work in meaning-making within the 
gaps or negative space between signifiers, images, memories. The conflated space of the 
palimpsest permits intertextual discourse and relational reading as do the spaces of communion 
between reader and text. Here, a mental faculty has active agency in “grouping” images to take 
shape in the void of the middle, rather than examining post hoc the pieces that “gather about” the 
“predetermined centres” organizing the memory archive. The faculty of shaping images out 
slight elements, of creatively completing a meaningful image out of partial visual stimuli is not 
only a useful one for compensating for perception, it reinforces the symbiosis between structure 
and organization. Moreover, it traces the importance of visual images in De Quincey’s 
philosophy and also the role of observer to perceive negative spaces as meaningful connections 
for the larger picture or network of meaning, particularly in language.  
 
 
                                                          
132. Andrew Bennett, in his Introduction to Readers and Reading, crystalizes the moment in which different literary 
approaches merge on the dynamic processes of reading: “Reading may be understood in terms of what we might call 
the ‘trance of reading’ – ‘trance’ as in transition or transit, transference, transposition, translation, transformation, 
transgression and, finally, entrancement. In the trance of reading, the identity of the reading subject is itself unstable, 
yet to be determined or constituted in the ‘experience’ of reading. In its most extreme form, the trance of reading 
would involve forgetting one’s surroundings, being ‘lost in a book’ – in what [Maurice] Blanchot calls ‘fascination’ 
of reading and what Derrida [(1979, 94) quoting Blanchot] refers to, in a portmanteau neologism, as delireium” (12); 
for complete context see: Andrew Bennett, Readers and Reading. (1995; repr., New York: Routledge, 2013). Rather 
than complete loss of self or total consciousness, De Quincey implies subprocesses continue imprinting 
experiences—both conscious and unconscious; this would extend to inscribing the memory-text and also re-
inscribing the literary text as one reads it. 
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The Whole Narrative Course: How Merely Shadows 
 
 As with the brain/memory, De Quincey co-opts another visual figure as his own heuristic 
tool, now, for narrative. The similarities between visual figures—palimpsest and caduceus—also 
reflect the similarities his narrative is meant to have with the subjects depicted. De Quincey 
redefines memory, from the manifold and discursive text to its library-archive wherein 
associatve organizing proliferates juxtaposed meaning further. De Quincey’s narratives engage 
memory but also the proliferation memory finds in distinct but interrelated systems of textuality: 
dreams. The caduceus is related to the palimpsest, and even perhaps a composite of the qualities 
De Quincey’s conception retains. A figure consisting of interrelated parts, De Quincey’s 
caduceus is a symbol contingent on linguistic and literary properties, the relationship between 
structure and organization, the semantics of narrative and cognition.  
 Suspiria functions with a recursion similar to Confessions, a related yet separate 
rendering of dreaming and memory. No longer concerned with the opium experiences, De 
Quincey focuses on the formative events that surface in his opium dreams. “Whereas 
Confessions is narrative and diachronic, Suspiria is a hybrid between narrative and various 
symbolic episodes that offer synchronic versions of the self,” according to the psychoanalytic 
reading Joel Faflak offers in Romantic Psychoanalysis: The Burden of the Mystery.133 Faflak’s 
survey134 of the “latter sections” of Suspiria argues they, “stand outside the experimental to 
imagine a radically contingent and literary apparatus within which to anatomize a subject self-
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134. Faflak includes a survey of each section included in the posthumous versions of Suspiria as well as the changes 
in titles. I remain committed to the original publications—simply for the sake of the parameters of this project—




analyzed by the doubles, shadows, and phantoms of his own psychic interiority.”135 The added 
complication, which the caduceus’s form—co-opted from the palimpsest—seems insightful of, is 
that interiority is also externalized and the self is manifold.  
 Though De Quincey applies the caduceus to his Confessions of An English Opium-Eater, 
its relevance to Suspiria de Profundis is perhaps even more striking. The ancient symbol of a 
curious double helix design certainly demonstrates narrative trajectory in a way that orders his 
episodic material, but only through the ordered chaos of its ornamental digressions—perhaps 
even then an over-simplification of “displaying” or re-presenting the systems of memory (131). 
The description and extended imagery of the caduceus focus his study on the sequence 
surrounding his sister Elizabeth’s death: “an intolerable grief” that De Quincey recognizes as “a 
‘passage’ in childhood” (133, 134). His use of quotations signals his awareness of it as a “trial” 
into adulthood but the condensation of meaning in “passage” is a verbal pun on the euphemism 
of death, doubling his ordeal with his sister’s passing. De Quincey both “prefix[es]” this account 
and “rehears[es] in extenso the particulars of that case in childhood” (134). He also 
acknowledges the reflection of himself as the adult as part and yet apart from those of himself as 
the child: “An adult sympathizes with himself in childhood because he is the same, and because 
(being the same) yet he is not the same. He acknowledges the deep, mysterious identity between 
himself, as adult and as infant [. . .] and yet, […] he feels the differences between his two selves” 
(133). The parallel selves, tethered and mirrored, must work together to represent the instances 
he aims to relate: “these facts move through a wilderness of natural thoughts or feelings; some in 
the child who suffers; some in the man who reports” (134). This representation, however, 
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adheres to the law and form relationship, a structural synthesis of content and its narratological 
rendering, De Quincey already established. 
 Externalized memory technics define De Quincey’s sense of brain’s storage capacity and 
enduring imprints which he must excavate. For Faflak’s psychoanalytical reading, “Suspriria’s 
lyric condensation and allegorical obscurity sublate interminability through a bricolage if 
heterogeneous psychic episodes—some autobiographical, some theoretical, some apocalyptic—
which the visionary sweep of the subject across the genealogy of his disparate parts.”136  Yet, 
these disparate parts are layered within the texts of memory and dreams, to which De Quincey 
must play the role of reader/recollector and speaker/narrator. De Quincey’s project in Suspiria de 
Profundis is to render the properties of the dreaming faculty through language and narrative—yet 
this process occurs through De Quincey engaging in studying his own experience within the 
methodology he outlines. 
 Palimpsestic form and palimpsestuous intertextuality are certainly at work in De 
Quincey’s narrative and the caduceus reflects this. The destabilized linearity, conflated dialectic 
layers of the palimpsest, are exposed to a hierarchy that elevates the conscious mind, the 
immediately visible layers, with the hidden depths of deep memory and dreams. He stabilized his 
schema with the brain as an externalized storage entity, a library-archive of palimpsests, 
adhering to human unity’s predetermined organization: “And the dreaming organ, in connection 
with the heart, the eye and the ear, compose the magnificent apparatus which forces the infinite 
into the chambers of a human brain, and throws dark reflections from eternities below all life 
upon the mirrors of the sleeping mind” (130). Memory, the archivist, the remember, navigates 
with a discernment in active remembering (aligned with conscious state) that dreams do not 
                                                          




require, dredging deep (unconscious) layers that seemed buried. The memories haunting De 
Quincey’s dreams involve the death and burial of his sister.  
 De Quincey’s opium use becomes a magnifier of an injured psyche, the “consequences” 
of his “early adventures” (131).137  The sequel must answer the question, “Was it opium, or was 
it opium in combination with something else, that raised these storms?” (134). The storms of 
opium-enhanced dreaming dredge the unconscious of its long-buried memories, “repeated, and 
ten thousand times repeated, by opium, for those who are its martyrs” (134). The repeating 
experiences of childhood become the subject and the content of his sequel, particularly the most 
grievous trauma: “It resulted that the terrific grief which I passed through drove a shaft for me 
into the worlds of death and darkness which never again closed, and through which it might be 
said that I ascended and descended at will, according to the temper of my spirits” (134). The 
shaft grief creates resembles not only an excavation site but echoes the core shape of the 
caduceus and its significant likening to the dreaming faculty: “The machinery for dreaming 
planted in the human brain was not planted for nothing. That faculty, in alliance with the mystery 
of darkness, is the one great tube through which man communicates with the shadowy” (130). 
And such a trajectory, into the depths of memory, De Quincey conceives in his medium as well 
as mode: “Here, at the point where I have called a halt, the reader has reached the lowest depths 
in my nursery afflictions” (169). In drawing attention to the section and publication break, De 
Quincey further acknowledges his attempt to have his reader journey through his re-presented 
psyche’s depths, through his dream’s reproductive powers, and through the experiences that 
repeat and blossom anew. 
                                                          
137. De Quincey claims to view opium differently, no longer as a salve, adding: “The work itself opened with the 
narration of my early adventures. These, in the natural order of succession, led to the opium as a resource for healing 
their consequences; and the opium as naturally led to the dreams. But in the synthetic order of presenting the facts, 
what stood last in the succession of development stood first in the order of my purposes” (131). 
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 The law and form of Suspiria further complicate the confluence of streams of chronology 
to assist in “displaying” or re-presenting the profound—all senses of the term apply—in 
memory. Beyond associating the concurrence of courses or the fathomless ocean with 
representing the mind, De Quincey posits, with thematic and semantic implications, the more 
provocative form of his narrative as a caduceus. It becomes clear that the arid stock of his subject 
does more than support the generative layers of ornament, his digressive representation of 
memories—after all, the form relates to the subject. De Quincey acknowledges that writing 
“must exhibit the law of the work; that is, the principle which determined its form.” Narrative is 
an act, consisting of both affect and effect. 
 
A Caduceus: Or A Gleam of Brightness 
 
From that point, according to the principles of art which govern the movement of 
these Confessions, I had meant to launch him upwards through the whole arch of 
ascending visions which seemed requisite to balance the sweep downwards, so 
recently described in this course. But accidents of the press have made it 
impossible to accomplish this purpose in the present month's journal. 
    De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 169 
 
 The ease with which Thomas De Quincey recognizes the “purpose” and “art” of his new 
confessions, and more broadly of narrative, while maintaining the imagery he establishes for 
dream, his childhood afflictions, and the descent or rising, situates the conflation he also sees 
between himself and his readers. Certainly, “Suspiria resituates the dream, the unconscious, 
repetition, trauma and the primal scene within an aesthetic metapsychology, an interpretation of 
dreams,” which Falfak recognizes as, “literary and aesthetic rather than scientific.”138 Certainly 
                                                          




as Faflak recognizes, “De Quincey’s decomposing body of dreams signifies a free-associating 
imagination that endlessly reproduces itself through the ‘myriad’ […] associations of his 
unconscious.”139 Faflak further suggests this is “the pathology of a free-associating imagination 
[that] dehumanizes the Anthropos.”140 But as with any interpretation, analysis must recognize the 
reader. Far from an examination of free associations, De Quincey invests in excavating deep-
rooted associations. Memory technics, even external ones are deeply humanizing—especially 
when they involve language and semantic exchange. 
 Whereas De Quincey, the rememberer, performed the role of reader, as narrator he has 
the added role of speaker. Separating the role of speaker from author, and bracketing 
momentarily the intentional fallacy, Foucault suggests: “If language expresses, it does so in so 
far as it is an imitation and duplication of things, but in so far as it manifests [ . . .] the 
fundamental will of those who speak it.” (316)141 De Quincey selects the caduceus, coopts it, and 
merges meaning. The caduceus narrative, like the dreaming apparatus, grants access to the 
depths of memory, allowing the immortal sighs to grow in narrative tendrils. In De Oratore, 
Cicero explains metaphoric speech as a tethered trajectory that orbits the words evoking the 
things themselves.142 De Quincey applies the same movements of thought and mental exercise in 
the operations of memory. In addition to publication breaks and titled sections, the fragments 
also indulge in frequent digressions, as he refers to them, which further produces the effect of 
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140. Faflak, 2008, Psychoanalysis, 176. 
 
141. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. (2002 [1966]; repr., New York: Routledge, 2012). 
  
142. Markus Tullius Cicero, M. T. Cicero De Oratore: or, His Three Dialogues upon the Character and 
Qualifications of the Orator. trans. William Guthrie. (Boston: R. P. & C. Williams, 1822). Of countless translations 
of De Oratore, this, the First American Edition, shares a poetic turn of phrase suiting this discussion of De Quincey. 
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memory’s system and the reproductive faculty of dreams. Suspiria de Profundis (and De 
Quincey) invite readers to apprehend the same quasi-sensory vividness of intensified dreaming. 
 The caduceus implicates De Quincey in a relationship with his reader. The shape of the 
caduceus does not simply represent De Quincey present and past, with all the relational 
memories associated with the ones he aims to narrate. Participation in reading, De Quincey 
imagines, is participatory: it means joining him in excavating his memories and dreams. With De 
Quincey’s sense of his own digressive style, Cicero’s sense of metaphoric functioning works 
well: “the hearer is drawn into a train of reflection, which carries him further than he should 
otherwise go, and yet not out of his way.”143 “If an object has not a word appropriated to itself 
[…] then we are obliged to use metaphors to express them;” Cicero further establishes in the 
classically foregrounding of the device that potent or “best chosen” metaphors “are applied to the 
senses, especially the seeing, which of all senses is the more exquisite […] they place in the eye 
of the imagination objects which otherwise it is impossible for us to see or comprehend.”144 
Metaphor, Cicero explains, is “the great ornament of language;” not only does De Quincey apply 
ornamentation to his revision of the caduceus, he invests in the interwoven properties of 
language Cicero expresses when cautioning that, “it is from the metaphorical that the 
enigmatical way of speaking arises; which last does not consist in words, but in periods; that is, a 
certain fabric of words.”145 And aside from traditional associations, the caduceus has the 
potential to invite similar generative shaping from the creative faculty. And, just as certain 
palimpsestic qualities require revision or substitution—the library/archive of perpetual 
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145. Cicero, De Oratore, III. Xxxix.273; III.xlil.276.   
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palimpsests—the narrative caduceus seems already impacted by metaphoric effect or a dynamic 
interchange between meanings, particularly in the alteration of its physical components. 
Language, furthermore, plays such a role with the tropes of metaphor and metonymy. The 
juncture of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, of semiotics and sociology, 
demonstrates the fundamental tool, or mechanism, analogical associations offer. 
 Lacan introduces the distinction between metonymy and metaphor into the linguistic 
concepts of both Saussure and Jakobson. Metonymy functions as combination or, adapting 
Freud, displacement whereas metaphor functions as substitution or condensation. Condensation 
is clearly at work in the caduceus. By invoking ideas in forms different from their original 
content, such as the caduceus, the psyche’s interplay crystalizes images to be both recognizable 
and certain objects unrecognizable to consciousness. The caduceus-narrative, therefore, presents 
content in a unknowable form, familiar material in an unfamiliar shape, to the point of 
potentially self-alienating the narrative from itself, in effect doubling it.  
 Through the experience of writing Confessions, De Quincey arrives at a conceptual 
metaphor for its form as well as one suitable to its subject:  
I tell my critic that the whole course of this narrative resembles, and was meant to 
resemble, a caduceus wreathed about with meandering ornaments, or the shaft of a tree's 
stem hung round and surmounted with some vagrant parasitical plant. (135) 
 
Appealing to the caduceus, De Quincey talks about several things at once. The caduceus invokes 
immediately Mercury’s staff and his key aspects. The caduceus is a short staff, sometimes 
winged,146 entwined by two snakes. De Quincey appeals to the caduceus not solely for its shape 
                                                          
146. While wings do not feature here for De Quincey’s image, the sense of flight would be relevant for the 
circumstances of the remembrance initiating his coining of involutes (in detail later in Chapter Two), naming his 
mind’s flight heavenward during a trance induced during his secret viewing of Elizabeth’s body. This returns to 
Derrida’s sense of delireium (making her body a conceptual image/domain or text instigating De Quincey’s re-
reading of it, experience, and memory).   
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and structure. The two-snake design has ancient and consistent associations with trade, 
eloquence, trickery, and negotiation, which De Quincey in effect rewrites by shifting the imagery 
of these snaking ornaments. More complex than two snakes, the wreathed and meandering vines 
overgrow their host plant, having “surmounted” the tree’s shaft to the point of obscuring the 
supporting core. The resemblance between the structure/organization of the caduceus and the 
dream apparatus cannot be overstated. 
 The implied or anticipated reader of Suspiria is an embodiment of De Quincey’s reading 
(and interpretation) of his own dreams. De Quincey indulges in some defense of his work that 
betrays key repetition in diction, and not solely through horticultural imagery. The horticultural 
description De Quincey provides in his invocation of the caduceus is just as important as his 
sense of the subject matter and its relationship to narrative. By replacing or surmounting the 
snakes, De Quincey avoids any confusion with Esculapius’s healing aspects—the narrative’s 
“reproductive” object is not about restoration. Hastening and excursion, perhaps even exchange, 
resonate more with the cyclical growth of the wreathing tendrils. It is through moments later in 
life that De Quincey glances the childhood experiences at the root of his memoir. Not just two 
but multiple returns to the “growths and fruitifications” of childhood experiences shape his 
narrative. His efforts never produce full restoration of a memory, but rather re-productions of 
remembrance (s), re-experiences. Each recollection must navigate and view through entangling 
layers of previous recollection.  
 Elaborating on the caduceus as a metaphor, he claims “the true object” of Confessions of 
an English Opium-Eater “is not the naked physiological theme” of addiction—“the murderous 
spear, the halbert”—but “those wandering musical variations upon the theme, those parasitical 
thoughts, feelings, digression, which climb up with bells and blossoms round about the arid 
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stock” (135). De Quincey suggests entering a system of discourse with a “surmounted” subject; 
the narrative is just as much the trappings as it is the anchoring topic (135). The whole course 
consists of both the subject-shaft and its “wreathed . . . meandering ornaments” or “wandering 
musical variations upon the theme.” Memory must wander the wreathed structure’s ever-
meandering différance. Mercury147 evokes commerce and communications, which are apt for De 
Quincey’s vocation. The staff, an extension or tool of the trade, would correlate well to his 
writing. Other, less common patronages of Mercury offer unexpectedly apt effects for his 
metaphor of these two works in particular. The caduceus is distinct from the symbol adopted by 
medical professions, identified as the rod of Asclepius, with which it is often confused, that 
consists of the single snake wrapped around a pole. The caduceus of classical antiquity was said 
to wake the sleeping and send the awake to sleep. If applied to the dying, their death was gentle; 
if applied to the dead, they returned to life. The form of a caduceus seems even more appropriate 
for his sequel. The imagery carries directly onto the central childhood experiences surrounding 
the death of his sister, Elizabeth, and his realization of mortality. 
 Having already asserted the reflection of form into the law of writing, De Quincey’s 
caducean narrative invites analysis of symbolic (cultural) associations as much as the shape and 
his unique descriptions of its form. The unpredictable effect likens the form of his digressive 
style as well as the dreaming faculty to the structure of meandering ornaments of the staff, 
invoking both ancient revelatory art and liminal movement between the living and the world of 
the dead. This reinforces the associations the caduceus has with death.  
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 The core memory, which he describes as the “suspension” of his mind, occurs when he 
surreptitiously views the body of his deceased sister Elizabeth in her bedchamber: “The 
particular case to which I refer in my own childhood was one of intolerable grief; a trial, in fact, 
more severe than many people at any age are called upon to stand” (133-4). Traditionally 
messages and communication included divination and Mercury’s role as a guide to the 
underworld also implies his position as a liminal figure, crossing the boundary between life and 
death. Associated with Hermes and later Mercury, the staff borne by heralds gains new meaning 
with the Roman guide of the dead. So this staff of the messenger-guide seems appropriate for his 
study of dreams and the imprints of his sister’s passing. The atmospheric imagery and 
terminology pervades his thoughts: “Those vast clouds of gloomy grandeur which overhung my 
dreams at all stages of opium, but which grew into the darkest of miseries in the last, and that 
haunting of the human face, which latterly towered into a curse—were they not partly derived 
from this childish experience?” (134). The sequence includes a network of signification: hearing 
her pained moans of illness and the nurse’s announcement of Elizabeth’s impending death, 
ascending a staircase to reach his sister’s bedchamber wherein her body has been lain; the first 
time he successfully enters and describes the light through the window cast on her face; his 
return trip thwarted by the locked door, and the final image of her coffin lowered into the 
ground.  
 Even this brief section of narrative sequence is interrupted several times with digressions 
including an imagined memory of a similar but nightmarish staircase in an unidentified novel.148 
                                                          
148. As not solely an example of memory’s failure, perhaps rather memory’s re-production or invention, the 
moment also recalls the structural quality as architecturally surreal, as in the work of Giovanni Battista Piraesi; see: 
Curtis Perry, "Piranesi's Prison: Thomas De Quincey and the Failure of Autobiography." Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900. 33.4 (1993): 809-824. Additionally, for the gothic influence, see: Cannon Schmitt, “De 
Quincey’s Gothic Autobiography and the Opium Wars,” in Alien Nation: Nineteenth-Century Gothic Fictions and 
English Nationality. (Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 46-75. 
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The image set informs his approach to the memory through associated digressive memories—
real or imagined—or episodes of experiences with similar visual echoes or afterimages, or, in 
Derrida’s “Freudian” archival sense, inscriptions. 
 
Digressions: Or Nothing At All 
 
Thoughts, feelings, digressions which [.  . .] ramble away from it at times with perhaps 
too rank a luxuriance; but at the same time, by the eternal interest attached to the 
subjects of these digressions, no matter what were the execution, spread a glory over 
incidents that for themselves would be less than nothing. 
   De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 135 
 
 
 De Quincey arrives at a philosophy of memory while analyzing the synthetic construction 
metanarrative of reconstituting memory. Narrative further replicates, “with perhaps too rank a 
luxuriance,” in its very attempt to render the reproductive dreaming faculty and the revelations of 
dreaming. As with the palimpsest-archive, there is an organizing principle, though, it is textually-
based, “by the eternal interest attached to the subjects of these digressions.” The dimensions he 
adds with “digressions” assist to explain rendering narrative through lateral trajectories. As with 
all metaphor, the distinct and seemingly disparate subject matters mingle. “Incidents that for 
themselves would be less than nothing”—a peculiar mathematic feat—have meaning generated 
in their gathering about central subjects. As with dreams manifesting content that is relevant, 
though perhaps not marked by consciousness, analogy in memory brings relational memories 
and readings into conversation. The relationship between structure and organization becomes 
more relevant. “Archivable meaning is also and in advance codetermined by the structure that 
archives,” Derrida insists reinforces, linking the predetermined centers of narrative with the 
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memory-archive that gathers them.149 For Derrida the process begins with the printed impression 
on the exergue, though successive impressions are part of the archive or palimpsestic encrusting 
of memory. De Quincey’s appeal to the palimpsest in conjunction with the caduceus relays the 
same concern for content and medium.  
 Co-determination adds the vital doubling of the law/form and organization/form 
paralleled in De Quincey’s memory and narrative—but also the complex images he selects 
consciously or unconsciously. But, as Derrida warns of impressions, “we have only an 
impression, an insistent impression through the unstable feeling of a shifting figure, of a schema, 
or of an in-finite or indefinite process.”150 Similar to condensation in dreams, the caduceus 
represents childhood memories of life and death, waking and dreaming, remembering and 
narrating. Note the agency he privileges in the vagrant parasitical plant and the contrast of the 
subject or the caduceus’s center and the surmounting ornaments: “The mere medical subject of 
the opium answers to the dry, withered pole, which shoots all the rings of the flowering plants, 
and seems to do so by some dexterity of its own; whereas, in fact, the plant and its tendrils have 
curled round the sullen cylinder by mere luxuriance of theirs” (135). Continuing to speak 
horticulturally, the structural poetics in De Quincey’s appeal to the caduceus maintain key 
aspects of the palimpsest. Death links the caduceus with his subject matter in Suspiria; however, 
here he underscores the generative “luxuriance” of “the plant and its tendrils” that has curled 
round the “sullen cylinder” of their own deliberate dexterity. Significantly, the caduceus is also 
used as a symbol representing printing, again by extension of the attributes of Mercury (in this 
case associated with writing and eloquence). He further blurs the metaphoric distinction of the 
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narrative discourse. The “murderous spear, the halbert” is itself a “dry, withered pole,” “sullen 
cylinder,” suggests a stagnancy that is not present in the plant growing up around it. The 
ornaments are parasitic yet attractive, thriving bells and blossoms, while the theme is now “arid 
stock.” The effects of this trauma on his mental faculty remain ongoing in the mind and in 
rendering both the trauma and memory processes in narrative. 
 A phenomenology of reading underlies the analysis thus far of the poetics of memory for 
De Quincey. Umberto Eco, in The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts, 
builds off Ingarden’s literary application of Husserl’s theory, suggesting that texts are produced 
in the act of reading.151 Similarly, Wolfgang Iser proclaims that, “a text can only come to life 
when it is read, and if it is to be examined, it must therefore be studied through the eyes of the 
reader.”152 De Quincey adopts the role of such a reader, reading his memory-text and the 
experiences of his dream-texts. Without engaging phenomenology extensively, (there is further 
discussion in Chapter Two, in relation to involutes), Roman Ingarden’s distinguishing between 
autonomous and heteronomous objects seems vital.153 Literary texts are classified as 
heteronomous objects requiring a subject-object relationship, rather than autonomous objects 
with immanent properties that do not require consciousness for completion. Heteronomous 
objects possess a combination of immanent properties and properties attributed to them by 
                                                          
151. Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1979). Additionally, Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler and Christine Brooke-Rose each offer a 
distinctive perspective on this contentious topic, each with numerous titles addressing the implications. Though, for 
Eco’s additions to the conversation, see: Umberto Eco Umberto, Interpretation and Overinterpretation. trans. Stefan 
Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
152. Wolfgang Iser “Indeterminacy and the Reader’s Response to Prose Fiction’, in Aspects of Narrative. ed. J.H. 
Milller. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 1-45, 2-3.  
 
153. Roman Ingarden, Time and Modes of Being. trans. Helen Michejda. (Springfield: Charle C. Thomas Publisher, 
1964). [This English translation is of portions of the first volume of the Polish edition, Der Streit um die Existenz 




consciousness and therefore do not have full existence without the participation of 
consciousness. A text requires concretization or realization by a reader.154 Considering dreams 
as such heteronomous objects seems akin to articulating a dream as a vital step in 
psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the literary concept of an implied or encoded reader, an anticipated 
audience, prefigured within the text, seems particularly relevant to De Quincey as he bridges the 
role of reader-archivist and speaker-rememberer. 
 To advance the spaces of communal meaning-making it is key to locate the central image 
of the caduceus: the staff, the shaft, the tube, the pall, the void through which the archaeologist-
archivist navigates. The reading and impulse Derrida notes in Freud pertains dually to De 
Quincey. Derrida views Freud—and the archive drive or, what De Quincey calls the ‘wants of 
the possessors’—as wanting, desiring “to be an archivist who is more of an archaeologist than 
the archaeologist [. . .] He wants to exhume a more archaic impression, he wasn’t to exhibit a 
more archaic imprint than the one the other archaeologists.”155 But this is an impulse that is both 
futile and false. Either, as examined earlier, the impression merges and discursively 
interconnects with the successive layers, or (perhaps and), requires the reading archivist-
archaeologist to concretize the text through the reading process. Aware of this, the effort is false 
as well, for the archaeological-archivist realizes that to retrace the imprint is to lay another layer 
on the exergue: “an imprint that is singular each time, an impression that is almost no longer an 
                                                          
154. Iser’s developments to Ingarden’s terms and distinctions produce concretization as arising through productive 
reading activity, while realization occurs in the mind of the reader by connecting gaps, or Leerstellen, to remove 
indeterminacy in the readerly horizon of expectation. For more of Ingarden’s work, see: Roman Ingarden, The 
Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature. trans. 
George G. Grabowicz. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).; and, Roman Ingarden, The Cognition of 
the Literary Work of Art. trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1973). 
 




archive but almost confuses itself with the pressure of the footstep that leaves its still-living mark 
on a substrate, a surface, a place of origin.”156 The elusory impulse is one of unity, “an archive 
without archive, where, suddenly indiscernible from the impression is its imprint.”157 Ultimately, 
Derridan archive assists to understand the philosophy De Quincey locates in the relationship 
between memory and narrative rendering of it. Rather than something along the lines of current 
psychoanalytic readings, Derrida’s ‘Freudian archive’ recognizes proliferation of experiences in 
the layers of the archive and inscription. 
 De Quincey’s caduceus narrative enables readers (and himself) to re-experience the 
experiences memory, particularly through the phenomena of dreams. Derrida recognizes unity in 
the act of re-inscription, a suspension of the moment: “In the instant when the printed archive is 
yet to be detached from the primary impression in its singular, irreproducible, and archaic origin. 
In the instant when the imprint is yet to be left, abandoned by the pressure of the impression” 
(97). This, for Derrida, is, “the instant of pure auto-affection, in the indistinction of the active 
and the passive, of a touching and the touched,”158 that resembles the rambling luxuriance of De 
Quincey’s ornamental digressions, surmounting the caduceus. The instance collapses the sense 
of material interaction with the archive, textual levels of writing, inscription, interpretation, 
reading, and reproduction. 
 Unlike Confessions of An English Opium-Eater, Suspiria de Profundis embodies the form 
of a caduceus. The sighs from the depths link interconnected dreams and episodes, presents its 
subject of—and with—ascending revelations, in relief, sighs that surface through the meandering 
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ornaments, vaster layers, depths of dreams and experiences of adulthood. The digressions and 
growths, the caduceus’s ornaments, offer connections between intersections that resonate on 
various levels. “And this is the condition of singularity, the idiom, the secret, the testimony,” 
Derrida finds that, “the trace no longer distinguishes itself from its substrate. No longer 
distinguishes between themselves . . .must be rediscovered—but this presupposes both memory 
and the archive, the one and the other as the same, right on the same subjectile in the field of 
excavation.”159 With external and material textuality and inscription as the foundational 
properties of his conceptual metaphors, De Quincey stresses the plasticity of repetition, the 
unwritten links of analogy based in language and signs. Narrative follows mental functions, 
operating in distinctly different systems of memory. Before examining the relationship between 
language and system, at its most basic, joining semiotics with information and systems theory 
(Part II), the most fundamental text of De Quincey’s philosophy provides a template for a 
methodology: the involute.  
 In many ways the most current technological memory aid to exhibit the layered 
archivable text that Suspiria resembles, is the multiple save files of video games. Each a text, a 
narrative remembrance, yet distinct in execution and iteration (or reading and speaking), the co-
existence of related yet separate save files catalogues experiences. Grounded in repetition and 
difference, the video game itself models the phenomenology of reading and textuality present in 
De Quincey’s philosophy. Even such a digital text possesses layers for examination: from 
interface or inscription, mediation or medium, and interpretation or reading. At the center of De 
Quincey’s philosophy is the most crucial image, the base inscription for each remembrance, of 
memory and experience: the involute, a concrete object of experience. The involute is also 
                                                          




virtual; virtual in the sense of a digital text, in the associative gaps in analogy and metaphor, in 
the juxtaposed meaning on digressions in his narrative on memory. Most significantly, the 
involute recognizes the participatory work of consciousness in heteronomous objects while 
adding a rather Deleuzian sense to its virtuality—the virtual is not abstract or ideal but concrete, 
however, always ever-yet-to-be-actualized.160 And the nomenclature of De Quincey’s term 
demonstrates his further interest in using the language of technology for analogies of experience 
as well as his philosophical and mathematical interests in the life of moments as artifacts existing 





























                                                          
160. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Deleuze features 
more prominently in later chapters. 
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Chapter Two: De Quincey’s Involutes and Experiences in Memory 
 
Let me pause for one instant in approaching a remembrance so affecting and 
revolutionary for my own mind, and one which (if any earthly remembrance) will 
survive for me in the hour of death [. . .] And, recollecting it, often I have been 
struck with the important truth, that far more of our deepest thoughts and feelings 
pass to us through perplexed combinations of concrete objects, pass to us as 
involutes (if I may coin that word) in compound experiences incapable of being 
disentangled, than ever reach us directly, and in their own abstract shapes. 
    Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria De Profundis, 142 
 
Cited in the Oxford English Dictionary, Thomas De Quincey’s usage of involutes is 
considered “rare.”161 De Quincey’s definition is indeed the only source for the denotation, 
“something involved or entangled,” including solely his two citations, the latter from Sketches 
from Childhood: “one of those many important cases which elsewhere I have called involutes of 
human sensibility.162 “Elsewhere” directs toward his coinage in Suspiria de Profundis but also 
indicates the pervasiveness of the idea, even to himself, in three significant domains: over the 
corpus of his writing, through the span of his exploring human sensibility, in the depths of his 
psychical world—or his cognitive semantics, the way he apprehends, through language, the 
world around him. A term ripe for his co-option, involutes for De Quincey provide a term he can 
both elaborate and simultaneously entangle with its other senses, as with caducean 
embellishments entwining around a core subject-shaft. Furthermore, elsewhere reinforces the 
parenthetical deferral, his subtle aside, to “coin that word,” involutes, when his own original 
sense relies heavily on pre-existing denotations. De Quincey’s co-option is a process of layered 
and discursive meaning, as if arising from palimpsestic structure and palimpsestuous 
interrelations. His nomenclature for experiential units, influenced by previous inscriptions and 
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162. OED, s. v. “involute, adj. and n.”. denotation: B.n.1. For my continuing discussion of the OED’s definitions 
and citations for “involute,” I refer to the specific alpha-numeric designation such as, in this case, B.n.1. 
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impacting future ones, may seem unexpected without knowledge of the disciplinary span of 
involutes’ other denotations. De Quincey’s coinage seemingly models linguistically the 
properties he establishes in his concept of involute experience. 
The definition provided by the OED, “something involved or entangled,” avoids De 
Quincey’s specifics of “thoughts and feelings” and “concrete objects,” opting instead for the 
unspecified and inexact something. Rather than anything, something suggests a narrower albeit 
unknown entity. The choice betrays some difficulty in parsing De Quincey’s coining-passage. 
The simplified something (something of a swift solution), similarly as indirect as De Quincey’s 
elsewhere, implies objects, perhaps more so than the figurative or adjectival senses of involute. 
Listed as the first noun form (the adjective and its four denotations precede), De Quincey’s usage 
shares company with only one other noun form, from geometry: “A curve such as would be 
traced out by the end of a flexible inextensible string if unwrapped (being still kept stretched) 
from a given curve in the plane of that curve; the locus of a point in a straight line which rolls 
without sliding on a given curve.”163 Restated, the typical rendering or example for drawing the 
involute of a circle is with a pencil tethered to a spool of thread, and in unwinding it, moving 
every element of arc along this rotating locus. Practical application of involutes includes gear 
mechanics, for notably locomotive164  valve gears, and also gears with interlacing teeth, aptly 
called involute gears, such as those found in time-pieces.165 The mathematic involute’s 
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164. The full-scale railway system in England arrived in the early years of the turn of the 1800s. For more history of 
the technology and the culture, see: Ian Carter, Railways and Culture in Britain: the Epitome of Modernity. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).; and, Michael Freeman, Railways and the Victorian Imagination. 
(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1999). 
 
165. Earlier texts on this subject exist, however; for one useful text offering the applied geometry, see: George B. 
Grant, A Handbook on the Teeth of Gears, Their Curves, Properties, and Practical Construction: With 
Odontographs, for Both Epicycloidal and Involute Teeth, Rules for the Strength of Teeth, a Table of Pitch 
Diameters, and Much Other General Information on the Subject. (Boston: Grant, 1885). 
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calculative procedures are perhaps only a different class of abstraction from De Quincey’s noun. 
The mathematics adds to De Quincey’s conceptual understanding of his objects as ones 
determined through a frame of reference relational to other figures, shapes, and topographies.  
De Quincey’s co-option of the involute follows from its pre-existing geometric bases. 
Evolving and involving describe the motion required either to roll a string round a circle or 
conversely unfurl a circle for measurement. 166 “Correlative to evolute n. and adj.,” the geometric 
noun167 first appears in Charles Hutton’s Mathematic & Philosophical Dictionary from 1796, 
addressing that, “the involute of a cycloid, is also a cycloid to the former”—a sense related to the 
adjectival form of the earliest use, in 1661, by Robert Lovell, describing conchological or cockle 
patterning as, “turbinate, which are either involute, as the Nautilus . . . or oricular, as the 
Welke.”168 The measurable involute develops from more general descriptions into a significant 
mathematical abstraction. Similarly, De Quincey extracts from real world objects concepts 
somewhat removed from them. De Quincey’s other key models and images (the vellum 
palimpsest and caduceus) lean toward cyclicality over linearity, tangential bifurcation over 
convergence, and expansive differentiation over simplification. 
                                                          
166. Variations on this definition and explanation appear in general books; for more on the period and historical 
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167. OED, s. v. “involute,” B. 2. (n.) 
 
168. OED, s. v. “involute,” A. 2. (adj.). As a reference, the OED cites, usually abbreviated, A Compleat History of 
Animals and Minerals [sic], R. Lovell, Panzooruktologia : Sive, Panzoologicomineralogia. Or a compleat history of 
animals and minerals, containing the summe of all authors, both ancient and modern, galenicall and chymicall, 
touching animals, viz, beasts, birds ... and man, as to their place, meat, name, temperature, vertues, use in meat and 
medicine, description, kinds ... With the anatomy of man, his diseases, and their definitions, causes, signes, cares, 
remedies ... As also a history of minerals, viz, earths, mettals, semi-mettals, their naturall and artificiall excrements, 
salts, sulphurs, and stones, with their place, matter, names, kinds, temperature, vertues, use, choice, dose, danger, 




 Involutes of human sensibility, De Quincey’s experiential units of feelings and thoughts 
imprinted into memory, rely on the geometric involute’s dimensional relations and structural 
properties. The mathematic rolling inwards extends to the sense of “nearly or wholly concealing” 
the axis of the spiral; when specifically concerning edges, the term appears in botanical 
descriptions,169 then extends toward anything “involved; entangled” or “hidden, obscure,” in the 
first adjectival listing dating back to 1669.170 The adjectival form, involuted, appears in thse 
physical descriptions, as well as literary and artistic contexts. Yet De Quincey’s involutes remain 
tethered to real world objects even when separated from their original connections. He applies 
the abstracted senses of indirectness and entangling (“far more […] through […] compound 
experiences incapable of being disentangled, than ever reach us directly”) toward items he feels 
are equivalent phenomena: thoughts and feelings. Not abstractions nor “abstract shapes” for De 
Quincey, these intangibles are “compound,” “perplexed combinations,” and “concrete objects,” 
which merge the mathematic figural relations with the wider descriptive range, from the 
narrowly literal to the broadly figurative.    
De Quincey’s appeal to the abstract geometrical involute complicates the abductive or 
abstractive procedure, returning thoughts and feelings into the state of concrete objects. Direct 
application of involute calculations for proper and efficient cog-wheel functioning returns to the 
prevalence of technology on De Quincey’s thoughts and in the opening of Suspiria de Profundis. 
Mechanized, interconnecting cogs are not involutes themselves; involutes determine the shape 
and spaces for cog-gear interlacing. The “involute figure or curve,” applicable “of a tooth in a 
cog-wheel,” predates the noun use that arrives amid differential equations with constant 
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coefficients (Leonard Euler 1734-9), Lagrange’s divergence theorem (1762), and Juriji Vega’s 
Thesaurus Logarithmorum Completus (1794).171 These principles relate to involute spirals—in 
many ways a two-dimensional representation resembling the three-dimensional caduceus.  
The mathematics concerning such spirals branch into disciplinary areas vital to 
understandings of matter and space in addition to time, the progression marked by instruments 
with such mechanized clockworks as involute cogs. Involute spirals share a visual similarity but 
mathematic distinction from logarithm spirals. John Napier’s use of logarithms to simple 
calculations (17th century) brought about Leonhard Euler’s linking to the exponential function 
(18th century), and the computations for modern computer science. While not a perfect 
comparison, similarities exist between memory (storage and retrieval) in computer systems 
(software and hardware) and the human brain. A logarithm is the inverse operation to 
exponentiation—and notably, logarithms, like constant coefficients, are functions of calculus, 
invented by Isaac Newton and Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz. Though involute spirals and 
logarithmic spirals are different, they share common interests in quantifying motion, 
progression—related features of both narrative and memory central to De Quincey. Calculus is 
the mathematical study of continuous change, infinite sequences and series (differentials, rates of 
changes and slopes of curves) and integrals of functions (accumulation of quantities and areas 
under/between curves). These calculus principles apply toward geometric calculus and 
differential geometry. While his work avoids formulae, De Quincey remains concerned with the 
general principles. Geometry questions shape, form, size, relative positions of figures, and 
properties of space, established by Euclid, then influenced by Descartes and de Fermat. 
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Differential geometry is key in studying motion and aspects of general relativity: Einstein’s 
replacement of Newtonian gravitation (1678), an explanation of fixed locations in space, 
accounted for matter and energy (rather than gravity between masses) having the ability to curve 
space (and light) from otherwise straight paths or trajectories. From there relativity and special 
relativity, addressing the relationship between space and time (and the space-time continuum, 
also of interest to Henri Bergson), examines motion from different frames of reference, rather 
similar to the corresponding processes of recollection and narration in Suspiria.  
De Quincey’s selects the involute—not vague spirals—for its distinct pattern, shared 
more so by the vellum scroll and the caduceus than from conchology.   
 
      Involute Figure172 
                                                          




                    
A logarithmic spiral, unlike the Archimedean or arithmetic spiral, forms a geometric progression. 
An involute spiral, however, distinguishes itself as having turns with constant separation 
distance, a spiral measured along rays from the origin which crosses the curve at right angles. 
The appearance is one of maintaining a steady, even pacing around the central point. Geometry’s 
primary contribution to an analysis of De Quincey’s involutes is the contingency of form and 
behavior. A secondary aid, though perhaps even more important, the properties of advanced 
structural relationships, for physics as well as for De Quincey, strictly define relative positions of 
figures and their properties in and within space. 
Notably, the 1843 usage by Edgar Allan Poe, an avid reader of De Quincey’s, in Murders 
in the Rue Morgue suggests, akin to De Quincey’s, that the mathematics of the period pervade 
their denotations: “The possible moves [in chess] being not only manifold but involute, the 
chances of such oversights are multiplied.”173 Poe’s more directly mathematical usage helps 
underscore a vital profoundness of De Quincey’s coinage. Involute, here, seemingly exceeds or 
further complicates manifoldness. Poe’s sense, similar to the Nautilus, reinforces the pattern of 
growth in nature celebrated by the mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci, whose pattern of 
numbers, each as the sum of the two previous, became recognized even in architecture, as “the 
golden spiral” (based off the ancient Golden Rectangle), a special type of logarithmic spiral at 
the juncture of science and art. Multiplication’s cognate multiplicity will become, decades after 
both Poe and De Quincey, a correlative term for manifoldness branching into philosophy and 
physics. The manifold sense of space and surfaces that Poe figuratively supposes as possibilities, 
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perhaps even group theory, which are “not only manifold but involute,” or entangled, suggests 
the advent of non-Euclidean geometry’s acceptance in the nineteenth century.  
The involute is both structure and behavior, organizational properties creating a matrix 
for modern theory and ways of thinking in both time and space. Specialized areas of geometry,174 
eventually complicate Euclidean geometry or parabolic geometry of surfaces and spaces: 
superseding Euclid’s parallel postulate is one of non-intersection with infinitely many lines, due 
to various curvatures in spatial properties. Bernard Riemann’s differential geometry enables 
modern physics and metaphysics, including Einstein’s general theory of relativity by permitting 
gravitational distortions, and, in turn, Henri Bergson’s theory of time and consciousness, 
duration or durée. Manifold space implicates manifold time. De Quincey is not developing a full 
philosophy of mathematics, as does Kant, with whom he takes a great interest; however, De 
Quincey’s involute suggests a vital interface between modern science and philosophy. Kant 
influences De Quincey, particularly in his preoccupation with synthesis, representation of 
phenomena, and the concept of a schema. Kant’s sense of the manifold in time and intuition 
establishes a unique approach to unities, especially those concerning consciousness, namely 
subjective, objective, and apperceptive unities. Something akin to embedding new data into 
preexisting contexts, or apperception, De Quincey’s involute offers a schema of the 
(mental/caducean/palimpsest) axial vortex surrounded by layers of systems and interplaying 
forces. De Quincey’s cyclical interface demonstrates the self as a radial zone of gyrating 
attraction and repulsion, of undercurrents surfacing and submerging. 
                                                          
174. Relevant areas include spherical geometry, elliptic geometry (curve toward), and hyperbolic geometry (curve 
away, also referred to as Lobachevsky-Bolyai-Gauss geometry); for additional material on the geometric forms, see: 
J. Stillwell, Sources of Hyperbolic Geometry. (Providence, RI: Amer. Math. Soc., 1996).; and, J. W. Anderson, 
Hyperbolic Geometry. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1999). 
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De Quincey’s coining of involutes is contingent upon involutes. The operation of 
language itself directs his preoccupation with the nomenclature of involutes. A Bahktinian 
appreciation of language points to its multivoicedness or polyvocality in re-appropriation of 
words, language, discourse. When Jacques Derrida explains Edmund Husserl, in Introduction to 
the Origin of Geometry, he anchors both their interests in the phenomenology of language, or, 
rather, the problem of language: there are degrees and levels in language that link back to the 
intentional act, “the sense of the constituting act can only be deciphered in the web of the 
constituted object” (64). Form and behavior are contingent; involutes entangle, obscure, involve. 
Parallels emerge between the linguistic and mathematic issues at stake for De Quincey’s term 
and concept. A geometric involute is not the inverse of exponentiation. A geometric involute 
appears similar but is not identical to an arithmetic spiral. Nor, as with hyperbolic spirals or the 
golden spiral, does an involute spiral grow outward like a shell. An involute combines a 
particular progression and spatial property for apprehending a distinct relationship between 
surfaces and vectors. In the mechanical age, geometric involutes are vital for interlocking, used 
twice on each tooth of almost every modern gear. Conic, helical, or spiraling, two-dimensional or 
more, involute forms are forms of reciprocity, of interweaving, of entangling. 
Involutes are relational and corresponding, in motion, separate-yet-connected. De 
Quincey’s sense is far more complex than the Oxford English Dictionary entry. The application 
in relation to experience, thoughts and feelings, and the entangling of such abstract notions 
within a highly representational topography of memory is provocative and compelling as much 
for the subjects concerned as for its potential contributions to the disciplines that study them. De 
Quincey’s nomenclature offers insights into a moment and way of thinking precipitating 
multiplicity and manifolds, the behavior of light, energy, particles and matter, and a sense of 
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space and time beyond ordinary human experience. De Quincey’s conceptions and 
representations pattern the world and human minds into systematic processors of particulate, 
entangling objects. 
 
Section 1: Coefficients, Coexistence, Combination and Concentrics; or, Formulating 
Involutes 
 
Thomas De Quincey’s coins the term “involutes,” quite conscious of a singular usage—
or process—he asserts on “involutes (if I may coin that word)” (104). De Quincey’s theory of 
memory resides at interstices of language, philosophy, mathematics, and technology. This 
conspicuous parenthetical aside in Suspiria de Profundis’s Part I is a vital component in 
explaining the organizations of memory and the process of experience—this is the philosophical 
discourse which I argue underlies and dictates the narrative of his essay.  
The preexisting denotations and connotations of involutes and involution certainly 
influence De Quincey’s choice of the term. The resonance of involution for De Quincey’s 
collective works influences Margaret Russett’s seminal approach to studying De Quincey: she 
considers the approach as a “dispersion of focus [that] may qualify it as literary history, albeit a 
history that substitutes involuted analysis for extensive view . . . these [Russett’s selected] 
intertextual fragments constitute both more and less than a synecdoche of De Quincey’s 
achievement.”175 Though Russett does not use the term involuted to the full extent by which De 
Quincey’s invokes the idea, her investigation seems attuned to De Quincey’s philosophy. 
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Appealing to linguistic patterns solely is only one facet of involutes. Synecdochal 
relationships and intertextuality are, indeed, vital components of relational meaning. In addition, 
Russett asserts that, “the minor Romantic’s career represents a primal scene of criticism,” a site 
facilitated by the “porousness and internal fractures of the literary ‘institution.”176 Such 
porousness is symptomatic of most of the period’s intellectual institutions; it applies beyond 
literature more broadly to the spirit of the age, to which De Quincey seems aware, if only 
marginally rather than epistemologically. Yet, as Russett notes, “to study minority, then, is to 
study generation.”177 Porousness or internal fractures seem useful descriptions for the typography 
of the palimpsest—and more importantly for the concept of De Quincey’s involute. De 
Quincey’s largely scrutinized term and concept allow for tracing common elements emerging 
indirectly from him, among varied fractioning fields, interdisciplinarily, elsewhere.   
Generation, with all its senses of contemporaneity, production, and succession, feature in 
the generative and reproductive faculties for which De Quincey derives the concept of involutes 
in Suspiria de Profundis—wherein the term involutes appears in only once. The housing of the 
concept focuses a somewhat kaleidoscopic lens178 onto the essay. Russett’s sampling analysis, 
explained through a relation of figurative interplay and porous rupturing, selects one surface of 
involute; Frederick Burwick examines a more metaphysical sense of sublime experience as an 
evocative power in “De Quincey’s Shakespearean Involutes.”179 Involutes, Burwick notes, shares 
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178. De Quincey uses the term kaleidoscope, which I discuss later, in Suspiria: “to new evolutions as incalculable as 
the caprices of a kaleidoscope; and the glory of their motions” (162). 
 
179. Frederick Burwick, Thomas De Quincey: Knowledge and Power. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 




a kinship with Wordsworth’s spots of time, “undying impressions which connected themselves 
with the circumstances.”180 De Quincey’s discussions of literary associations, primarily 
concerning Shakespeare, offer Burwick a specific category of compound experiences or 
involutes. The power in the “psychology of the reader’s response,” Burwick explains, “enables 
the reader ‘to feel vividly, and with a vital consciousness,’ the ‘modes of feeling,’ which 
otherwise lie dormant ‘in every human mind for want of a poet to organize them.’”181 Literature 
or poetic power can access the obscured or hidden within involutes—even the powerful 
revelatory moments, or involutes, within literature.  
Involutes are perplexed combinations, whereas literariness—its organization and order—
offers a sense of transparency or readability. Burwick highlights De Quincey’s description: “he 
goes on to explain, ‘when these inert and sleeping forms are organized, when these possibilities 
are actualized’ as the ‘conscious and living possession” of the mind,’” De Quincey compares the 
unconscious state of mind with hibernating involutes of experience, “once these revelatory 
moments of power are aroused and awakened with the consciousness, they become a part of 
personal experience and wield themselves as kindred experiences.”182 Linguistics and literariness 
provide different understandings of relational organization and patterning procedures. “Through 
these evocations of sublime power,” Burwick explains, “one involute may call forth another, and 
another.”183 The chain of associations is an integral quality of De Quincey’s involutes. Involute 
entanglement is not only for unconscious associations, in which literature dredges up into 
                                                          
180. Burwick, 2001, Knowledge and Power, 89; referencing, De Quincey, M 1:57-8. Burwick cites here as “M” 
Thomas De Quincey, The Collected Writings, 14 vols., ed. David Masson. (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 
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181. Burwick, 2001, Knowledge and Power,100; referencing, De Quincey, M 10:48.  
 
182. Burwick, 2001, Knowledge and Power, 100. 
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readable organization its own dense moments. Involute entanglement also connects these 
moments with associated personal experience obscured within one unconscious mind. 
Experience and memory find comparison with literature, yet, more complicatedly, a revelatory 
literary moment also becomes a personal experience in the process of reading, recollection, and 
revelation. The compounding of involutes here invokes the infinite in De Quincey’s formulation 
of the concept. 
De Quincey’s involutes define the recondite basis of experience and memory informed by 
and through linguistic principles, including the term’s network of meanings. Rather than abstract 
and isolated ideals, experience is fundamentally compound; human sensibility is a mixture of 
thoughts, feelings, and sensory intake. The process includes more than straightforward 
apperception. In the palimpsestic memory, new impressions compound with previous psychical 
involutes. De Quincey’s coining passage is the exemplar: the revelatory truth comes to him 
through the involute memory of the death of his sister Elizabeth. He simultaneously analyzes his 
experiences with language prior to and hence influencing the involute memory and the ways the 
remembrance, in turn, influence his later experiences.  
The involute remembrance or axial shaft of Suspiria de Profundis includes the sequence 
surrounding Elizabeth’s death. De Quincey’s opium dreams dredge up these childhood 
experiences the most. The relationship between this recollection and opium’s influence in 
enhancing it establishes an associated link, one which manifests in his figurative description. His 
return to opium use and its impact on his dreaming faculty shares funerary imagery: “those 
towering gates of ingress which hitherto had always seemed to stand open, now at last barred 
against my retreat, and hung with funeral crape” (132). The slippage and blurring that might 
cursorily seem thematic demonstrates the involute properties of memory: palimpsestuous 
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discourse between entwined caducean tendrils. The imagery also replicates the “recess of the 
entrance [and] the funeral banner of the holy office,” seen by the fictional abbess on her nun’s 
door; identified as “in a modern novel,” that De Quincey “since remembered” the novel remains 
elusive to scholarship (132).184 Imagined or re-produced in recollection, the literary possibility 
reinforces effaced traces while psychically protecting direct exposure to the profundity of the 
involute memory.  
The experience of realizing his inescapable dependency as a death (or a presence in 
absence) offers rich imagery that combines with previous, in fact, rendering figural network of 
involutes: “applicable to this tremendous situation (the situation of one escaping by some 
refluent current from the maelstrom roaring for him in the distance, who finds suddenly that this 
current is but an eddy, wheeling round upon the same maelstrom)” (132). De Quincey’s image 
set links to apprehending and coining involutes. The impasse collapses the sequence of 
Elizabeth’s death (and withholding during illness and after death) into memory that requires 
circuitous yet peripheral access of the center void, the axial vortex. These memories become the 
cyclical point that initiates the coinage or coining point. 
Suspiria de Profundis traces the “affliction, seemingly hushing itself to sleep, suddenly 
soars upwards, again upon combining with another mode of sorrow, namely, anxiety without 
definite limits,” aware of the compounding influences on already impactful experiences (162). 
De Quincey discovers the axial movement, here of his affliction, when sequential involutes 
become a maelstrom of palimpsestuous discourse: “Dream formed itself mysteriously within 
dream; within these Oxford dreams remoulded itself continually [. . .] And now in Oxford all 
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was bound up into unity; the first state and the last were melted into each other as in some sunny 
glorifying haze” (170). Involutes issue from the central point, the involute moment becomes the 
center of maelstrom, and new experiences issue out from and eddy back toward it. The 
significance of De Quincey calling attention to his own “coining” of involutes suggests his new 
denotation unites existing ones, compounding them, in order to become new, something other 
than the combination of the main senses. 
De Quincey invests in a juncture of several inquiries into language, including 
philosophical and metaphysical. Anchored in language, involutes parallel the role of the sign in 
signification, (theoretical work of Saussure and Derrida among others, and largely adopted by 
most post-modern literary theory). Housing both the sign and the signified, involutes as 
perplexed combinations are even a “dialectic” in sense of internal time-consciousness (and the 
phenomenological implications that invokes). The coining passage itself renders the influences 
of the various existing senses on his effort to establish a new denotation. A synecdochal reading, 
much as with De Quincey’s own analogies, serves to observe, in tandem, the palimpsestuous 
discourse between involute senses: such a philosophical-technical delineation of the term offers a 
richer appreciation of De Quincey’s coining and his essay. In direct relation to his coinage, De 
Quincey addresses a physicality for his abstractly concrete objects. He appeals to the figurative 
uses of involutes as introspective convolutions. The mathematical concept, requisite for 
commanding circular correlation, provides the recursive connections between related portions of 
text. Consequently, involutes inform his system of memory, structuring his sense of the human 
brain as an involute inscribed palimpsest, and therefore its own technical exteriorization of 
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memory, or hypomnemata, in narrative.185 The perplexed combinations defy any straight-
forward stratification. Foucault’s, as with Derrida’s, appreciation of the materialized or external 
representation of memory, based on Plato’s theory of anamnesis, includes the inscription of the 
note, the record, for further reflection.186 In the case of De Quincey’s archival mind, involutes 
make recollection an archaeological process within an entangled organization.  
 
Coexistence and Combination 
 
The passage in which Thomas De Quincey coins involutes outlines several important 
features of his concept with respect to his larger theory of experience and memory. Foremost, 
involutes continue his perception of the imagery and physicality of the archive mind. Moreover, 
the concrete (rather than the abstract) aspects of the preexisting term in conjunction with De 
Quincey’s new denotation delineates a deeply rooted relationship of meaning in his 
nomenclature of involutes—one which exemplifies the interconnectivity and significance of 
visual stimuli, specifically his childhood visual-linguistic experiences in shaping his semantic 
network (which Chapter Three studies in detail). Additionally, the entangling and manifold 
properties reinforce the archival aspects (discussed in Chapter One) while advancing the 
mathematical and philosophical underpinnings of his project, influenced by the applications of 
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involutes in the former field that relate to contingent concepts in the latter. Ultimately, the 
genesis of his notion, that merits the status of theory, derives from the process his narrative 
recreates and represents, of remembering a revolutionary experience that affects the germination 
of the concept and structure-process of involutes themselves.  
De Quincey underscores the earthly or empirical condition of his childhood case study 
(the remembrance or involute memory within the coining-passage or recollection coinage), rather 
than the spiritual or internal sources for other experiences or remembrances. Through this 
abduction, he explains all experience as (typically) compound, perplexed combinations that are 
incapable of disentangling into their abstract or isolated shapes. Involutes are indirectly received, 
read or accessed, whether consciously or unconsciously, more so than ever directly reaching 
“us.” The distinction between conscious and unconscious processes (discussed previously in 
Chapter One) establishes a self-functioning of involutes that proceeds autonomously. Involutes 
objectively entwining even without the human subject, who only participates in further adding 
associations, even when following one course.  
The final point is perhaps the most illuminating for appreciating De Quincey’s 
conceptualization of experience as movement on a trajectory, as passing, as passage, as process. 
“Thoughts and feelings”—the basic elements of experience—“pass to us” (he repeats the phrase) 
through oblique mediums that he names involutes. Involutes consist of “concrete objects”; 
concrete reinforces the sense of actual stimuli while stressing objects or actuals rather than 
abstractions. Involutes offer the added complication of being compound: “perplexed 
combinations” of concrete objects. Perplexed—uncertainty, involved, complex—derives from 
plexus—a network, intertwined, or a system of mathematical relations—to further reinforce the 
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idea that these entities are inextricably bound.187 These characteristics obscure the immediacy of 
thoughts and feelings that could reach “us” directly: “far more [. . .] pass to us [. . .] than ever 
reach us directly.” With numbers, concreteness applies to actual objects whereas abstract 
numbers are not connected to counting objects; similarly the thoughts and feelings we receive are 
concrete and attached to stimuli or combined with sensory objects, or the involutes of 
experience, as the sentence parses: “far more […] pass to us through perplexed combinations of 
concrete objects, pass to us as involutes [. . .] than [. . .] in their own abstract shapes.” In 
considering thoughts and feelings as elemental or particulate  forms (as in individual particles), 
which when isolated might possess the role of the abstract, De Quincey instead posits that they 
entangle in and with experience—they are incapable, moreover, of being disentangled 
(entanglement as if on the quantum level). De Quincey sets his view apart from other views of 
sensation (Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the latter pointedly viewing sensation as “perfectly 
distinct” and “simple and unmixed”188) through the sheer basis of involutes, reinforcing the 
impact of his concept. Experience is a complex medium—a conglomerate. 
De Quincey’s concept of involutes may be part of a reciprocal cycle between bodily 
experience and language. Parsing the syntax of De Quincey’s coining sentence reinforces these 
points in interesting ways. The human receptacle—whatever the pronoun “us” may include, 
whether the self, the mind, memory, consciousness, the unconscious, or any or all—is, 
grammatically, the direct object that receives the action, the passing. Involutes, thoughts and 
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188. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), in The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, 
(London: Rivington, 1824 12th ed.). Vol.1, 2.2.1. For an insightful discussion of empirical philosophy, see: 
Margaret Atherton, The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. (Lanham, Md: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999). 
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feelings, are the agents of the action; both his concept and the term he selects define the structure 
and the processes/behavior of experience.  
In De Quincey’s syntax, the agent of the action—to pass—is the subject: our thoughts 
and feelings (or, rather, “far more of” them) possess the agency to actively “pass”—the active 
voice with the verb, to pass, demonstrates the near paradoxical concepts De Quincey merges. 
The body clearly is, if nothing else, what anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss calls, “a conceptual 
tool with multiple possibilities for detotalizing or retotalizing any domain” (149).189 The human 
subject for De Quincey seems in line with Michel Foucault’s observations about the post-modern 
subject: “The researches of psychoanalysis, of linguistics, of ethnology have decentered the 
subject in relation to the laws of his desire, or forms of his language, the rules of his actions, or 
the games of his mythical or fabulous discourse, when it became clear that man himself, 
questioned as to what he was, could not account for […] his unconscious, the systematic forms 
of his language, or the regularities of his fictions.”190 In De Quincey’s sense the result is an 
involute realization. Foucault offers the sense of development with a similar recursive process: 
“the theme of a continuity of history has been reactivated once again; a history that would be not 
division, but development (devenir); not an interplay of relations, but an internal dynamic; not a 
system, but the hard work of freedom; not form, but the unceasing effort of a consciousness 
turned upon itself, trying to grasp itself in its deepest condition.”191 The decentered subject is not 
the source or center for explaining events; psychoanalysis points to the series of external systems 
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acting upon the subject, which the subject neither controls nor perhaps even understands. The 
mind receives experience. The mind records experience. But, De Quincey explains the lack of 
transparency of these procedures: these activities occur in the arena that he calls “the 
shadowy.”192 Passing here repeats the passage of his thoughts in the descent via the dreaming 
apparatus to deep memory, (significantly, memory of the passing of his sister and his passage 
from idyllic childhood). The verb echoes a similar passivity or inevitability as the passing of his 
sister, the central subject and catalyst of his passage into knowledge of death, causing the injury 
to his psyche that drives a shaft into dreams’ dark depths.  
As combined and concrete conduits of thoughts and feelings, De Quincey’s conceptual 
view of experience finds reality outside and entering the body. The “synthetical unity of the 
manifold in general,” a cognitive connection between concepts and intuitions, assists Immanuel 
Kant’s exploration of time, its internal experience, as well as signification— all are key 
components underlying De Quincey’s concerns for memory and narrative. When Kant addresses 
the relationship concepts and objects, in the Critique of Pure Reason, establishing the 
transcendental schema, he locates a medial representation of the mind that helps explain the 
process De Quincey’s involute undergoes: “the conception must contain that which is 
represented in the object to be subsumed under it.”193 The concept of the involute captures the 
representational qualities of the particles of experience. For Kant, the schema, circumventing an 
ontological gap between abstract universals and concrete particulars, provides the mediating 
representation in which understanding oscillates between the heterogenous general qualities 
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linking concepts and those that “represent the object in concreto.”194 De Quincey aims to explain 
the manner in which memories correlating to his remembrance of Elizabeth’s death behave as 
sediment, encrusting it, while the underlying spirits or seeds also resurface and germinating into 
tendrils. To convey that both successive strata and substrates process the ability to impact future 
experiences, he appeals to and co-opts the varied, yet related, properties of involutes.  
De Quincey’s resulting schema of involutes exceeds the initial involutes of human 
sensibility he offers. Involutes become a way for De Quincey to order his understanding of 
thought, language, and, ultimately, reality. De Quincey first appeals to a known concept, such as 
the palimpsest for the brain, and then allows bodily experience to redefine the concept; the 
palimpsest brain becomes the palimpsestuous archive of palimpsestic memories. His palimpsest 
discussion elaborates on the functions of memories, expanding his study of the fundamental unit, 
involutes. The body offers a material structure that De Quincey can overlay with the involute 
schema. In these ways De Quincey invests in the anthropomorphic metaphor without any strict 
adherence to innatism or realism—at least at first. There is an innatist impulse to define reality 
through the body. Bodily metaphors pervade history, often as a key instrument in what Lévi-
Strauss calls “the science of the concrete,” in The Savage Mind (La pensée sauvage).195 In his 
study, Lévi-Strauss compares the child and primitive linguistic attention to the body, one of the 
most pervasive metaphors in human history. More so, the innatist finds the body as the mind’s 
most basic image for shaping reality, as Marc Johnson argues, in Body in the Mind: The Bodily 
Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason.196 The body is understood as the basis for other 
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forms of cognition, often pre-conceptual or non-propositional; Johnson’s objectivist approach 
suggests abstract mental images (or “image schema”) assist the mind make meaning from signs 
and language (29).197 De Quincey’s images, including the archive, caduceus, and maelstrom, 
shape his understanding of order and organization. He also applies images onto the body 
(palimpsest, apparatus, mechanism) in order to reinforce the direction of experience, as passing 
into the body/mind. Language offers the traceable cyclicality of De Quincey’s cognition, 
intaking from external reality experiences that determine meaning and signification for future 
encounters.  
De Quincey places the body as a domain for understanding the world, but he does so with 
a sense that demonstrates the impact he suffered at a crucial stage of his childhood psychical 
development. Some concepts of modern child psychology support De Quincey’s self-assessment. 
Recent scholarship on De Quincey, focusing on Suspiria de Profundis, locates his project within 
studies of trauma, particularly through psychoanalytical approaches, as does Rei Terada.198 
“Depths of awareness,” is Terada’s phrase for “the obverse of trauma as the not fully known,” 
which he examines through a primarily Freudian reading of Suspiria de Profundis.199 De 
Quincey’s repeated recollections point to his need to continually process understanding of deep 
memory. Terada, in noting an analysist’s limitations (similar issues of mediation, much like 
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observer-shaped reality), cites D. W. Winnicott’s comments on his field.200 Winnicott found 
trauma occurring as early as the infant stage, causing developmental unity to fragment, becoming 
potentially “one of fragmentation of the line of continuity of being,” offering another expression 
of the foliation of involute memory in repeated recollection.201 De Quincey locates his childhood 
trauma, the sequence of Elizabeth’s death within a broader set of his nursery afflictions and 
remembrances, underlying substrates and traces. Her death is Suspiria’s subject for its memory 
study. Though certainly an exemplary involute memory,202 it remains, in De Quincey’s opinion 
(even for his exceptional memory), an applicable case study for a general memory dream study. 
In effect De Quincey suggests that the noteworthiness of remembrances is in their intensity 
rather than quality or class. De Quincey redirects focus to surrounding experiences for relational 
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signification, uncovring a network of his pre-established visio-linguistic semantics and cognitive 
processing. Related memories entwine and redefine association. Focusing on the way a child 
creates a mental model of the world through experience and language, or what he terms genetic 
epistemology, Jean Piaget foregrounded the work of cognitive theory within clinical psychology. 
Piaget recognizes, in The Child’s Conception of the World, between stage 1 (typically the age of 
six) to stage 2 (the age of eight), children shift in awareness of their independence from the 
outside world.203 The death of Elizabeth occurs when De Quincey is six, precisely between those 
stages.  
Piaget’s assessment would confirm De Quincey’s own claims of the profound impact of 
Elizabeth’s death and the successive force of the surrounding imagery on other events. By 
focusing on the origins of a child’s basic categories of thinking, Piaget developed an appreciation 
for periodic and drastic reassessments or systematic reorganization of knowledge. Piaget notes 
that for a child, reciprocally, words are “bound up with things and to speak would mean to act 
directly on these things.”204 Furthermore, “external things would be less material,” notes Piaget, 
“and would be endowed with intentions and will.”205 In the earlier state, children are less aware 
of their thinking self, making even dreams appear “as a disturbance breaking in from without.”206 
The description sounds strikingly similar to the passing of external abstract entities into De 
Quincey’s human self. To complicate these issues, the adult De Quincey reflects on the 
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formative traumas he suffers, resultantly blurring external with internal and material with 
immaterial.207 Instead, De Qunicey’s co-option of an interlocking concept, that operates both 
tangentially and concentrically, redirects him to explore the relational spaces of intersection of 
his selves rather than attempt to disentangle the relationship(s).  
De Quincey demonstrates what Piaget would call assimilation and accommodation of 
schemata. Kant’s schema—a procedure linking a non-empirical concept with a sense 
impression—becomes a shared term, from its classical roots in rhetoric, among disciplines 
studying cognitive and behavioral patterning: schemata, their mechanisms, their networks of 
relations, demonstrate  conceptual patterns based on conventional human scenes or conceptual 
pairings with abstract sets applicable to specifics or further abstract meanings.208 Piaget employs 
the schema as the basic unit of knowledge, defining it as, “a cohesive, repeatable action sequence 
possessing component actions that are tightly interconnected and governed by a core 
meaning.”209 The key processes of the schema resemble De Quincey’s involutes (whether the 
basic unit or a memory sequence): a repeatable memory experience comprised of entangled 
components with a core meaning. New circumstances require the mind to access pre-existing 
schemata for apprehending the new. The result is either accommodation, wherein the existing 
knowledge-base or schema does not apply or, assimilation, wherein an existing schema does 
apply to the new circumstance. De Quincey models this assessment-processing system through 
his adoption and adaptation or co-option of involutes. He assesses new data against previous 
denotation, then processes relationality, associating (categorically cataloguing) and archiving 
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among other experiences (files, diplomata); yet, while connected they remain fairly distinct. 
Accommodation aids De Quincey’s reassessment of the palimpsest-brain into an palimpsestic 
archive-mind. De Quincey’s appeal to mathematic involutes suggests assimilation to apprehend 
internal/external experience, just as the caduceus assists his understanding of a narrative order 
that can represent memory experiences. Moreover, De Quincey’s understanding of the archive-
mind and caduceus-narrative influence his involute. Distinct from the schema, De Quincey’s 
involute as a basic unit creates relational, tangential and cyclical/spherical, chains within or along 
itself as a manifold space. Rather than sequential chains between other involutes, layers, and 
tendrils, involutes embed, encrust themselves. The involute is the point and the space of 
intersection.  
The involute is the interface of representational exchange. Involute experience is 
relational, tangential and concentric; it contains knowledge even along its correlative spaces and 
vectors, making it akin to (yet more structurally complex than) paired schemata. De Quincey’s 
involute experiences also consist of memory and the processes within assimilation and 
accommodation, of comparison and application from existing or underlying substrates to the new 
data or strata. The similarity of De Quincey’s involutes, themselves, to Piaget’s schemata is 
intriguing. One involute entangles others, implicates others in relational meaning. The cohesive 
and replicable sequences that offer meaning, however, are not abstractly or directly received: 
involutes remain perplexed combinations. Cognitive psychology since Piaget attempts to address 
environmental factors (social and cultural) in equilibration, or the process of mastering new 
information and circumstances. In some ways, De Quincey attempts to draw upon environmental 
factors, particularly language and contextual circumstances. 
116 
 
The contexts of involutes are as multiple as the units’ contents. The point or site of 
recollection re-inscribes the memory point. De Quincey envisions the reader-archivist role as a 
dark or obscured chronicling interpreter. At some level an active or conscious re-collector, the 
mind operates amid an archived collection of palimpsestuous memory texts. De Quincey 
discovers each memory itself—each experience, each layered inscription of experience—is also 
palimpsestic. The recollection is a type of reading of the recorded experience, yet, a 
palimpsestuous reading with coexisting textual discourse and manuscript contexts. Recollection 
is, itself, an involute experience. And that experience is an entangled combination, one entwined 
or enwreathing to an extent in which separation or disentangling is futile. Involutes consist as a 
system of all these sub-processes. De Quincey is “struck” by the truth of involutes through the 
repeated return to the central remembrance, the experience at the core of Suspiria de Profundis 
and the Afflictions of Childhood, by “recollecting it, often.” Experience, as with his rendering of 
it, is as much the abstract elements as the medium through which they travel.  
Involutes, as De Quincey’s conceptual domain for experience within human sensibility, 
establishes organizational principles that in turn shape the properties of the mind and reality. The 
interrelationship of De Quincey’s written medium and the subjects of Suspiria de Profundis 
revolve around his involutes and exceed any limiting view of his work as simply, or 
dismissively, involuted (one cognate). There is a vast scope and depth that he requires of the 
term, “involute.” Involute derives from the Latin involūtus, involūtum, the past participle of 
involvĕre: “to roll in or up, into or upon, to wrap up, envelop, surround, entangle, make 
obscure.” 210 Immediately this appeals to his palimpsestic vellum parchment, his caducean 
narrative, and the entangling relationship of experience and memory he discovers through a 
                                                          




revolutionary remembrance (another cognate). De Quincey, however, does not use the verb or 
the cognate noun, involution, which invokes retrograde motion either in medical sciences, to 
suggest organ/tissue retrograde or bodily decline,211 or in astronomy, concerning the orbiting 
heavenly bodies. De Quincey’s involutes move recursively while also progressing and re-
producing. The Oxford English Dictionary catalogues the related descriptive usages, typically of 
structural patterning: any intricate spiraling or whorls, but typically those wound closely round 
the axis, nearly or wholly concealing it. The image evokes De Quincey’s revised and reproduced 
caduceus, the description of his narrative structure. The term involute applies to anything from 
circling shapes in botany to convoluted obscurity in language or literature: as likely for a plant’s 
leaf as the progression of a play’s plot. 212 De Quincey’s has more complexity and compounds in 
mind for involutes than otherwise commonplace, descriptive usages. After all, he has in mind the 
involved parchment scroll for the palimpsestic brain: as he parses involutes, De Quincey is 
interested in both concrete objects and abstract shapes. 
De Quincey’s nomenclature of involutes implicates the abstract qualities of conceptual 
structures and actual spatial relationships found in differential geometry or practical application 
in architecture and engineering. Both architecture and engineering present themselves as 
important fields for De Quincey, practically and comparatively. In order to explain his narrative 
caduceus, De Quincey appeals to an “analogy” in the concrete objects his readers might 
recognize and be able to visualize: “Just as in Cheapside, if you look right and left, the streets so 
                                                          
211. Such retrogressive evolution is also called, catagenesis. A link between volution and genesis seems intriguing, 
considering particularly “synthesis” and building “basic elements into complex ones” (3.a.) and “the process of 
obtaining a given power of a number” (3.b. Math.); see related denoted entries: “genesis, n.” in OED Online.  
 
212. These uses are frequent in periodicals of the time, including newspaper reviews of performances. Also 
important is the etymology of involution, Latin involūtiōn-em, is the noun of action from involvĕre to involve v.. 
("involution, n." OED Online). For “involution” as “management of plot,” see one example in Theatre Royal, Drury 




narrow, that lead off at right angles, seem quarried and blasted out of some Babylonian 
brick−kiln; bored, not raised artificially by the builder's hand” (135). He anchors his sublime 
image of Cheapside’s streets through a geometrical, engineering eye that is equally interested (as 
with the palimpsest and caduceus) in fostering a nostalgia for arcane craftsmanship. 
Imagining the streets excavated out of or carved into the buildings, De Quincey 
nevertheless locates these effects in some natural process rather than done “artificially by the 
builder’s hand” (135). He purses the implausible further with a supposition, a complication: 
“But, if you inquire of the worthy men who live in that neighborhood, you will find it 
unanimously deposed that not the streets were quarried out of the bricks, but, on the contrary 
(most ridiculous as it seems), that the bricks have supervened upon the streets” (135). At first the 
“ridiculous” premise seems ridiculous for the narrative voice’s dismissal of the seemingly 
apparent truth that the bricks indeed are superimposed onto the streets. Contrarily he imagines a 
process has occurred by which streets were drilled into the world, rather than buildings erected 
around the streets; he fancies the streets a paradox, both naturally cut as a river bed, while having 
erupted out of a pre-existing structure that is, too, both quarry and chamber, an ancient brick-
kiln. His ordering too seems obviously and amusingly anachronistic. And yet, he’s attempting to 
offer a keen point about the abstract concept and the concrete object. To do so he juxtaposes his 
observation with the “most ridiculous as it seems” insights of the supposed residents, who testify 
that, “The streets did not intrude amongst the bricks, but those cursed bricks came to imprison 
the streets” (135). Imprisonment in brick, in actual and concrete objects, the concept or abstract 
form of the “street” cements and takes shape.  
The concrete object that incarcerates the abstract concept is the process De Quincey 
equates with his caduceus narrative: “So, also, the ugly pole – hop pole, vine pole, espalier, no 
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matter what – is there only for support” (135). “Not the flowers are for the pole, but the pole is 
for the flowers,” De Quincey elaborates of his generative digressions, his narrative tendrils: 
“Upon the same analogy, view me as one (in the words of a true and most impassioned poet) 
“viridantem floribus hastas” making verdant, and gay with the life of flowers, murderous spears 
and halberts things that express death in their origin (being made from dead substances that once 
had lived in forests), things that express ruin in their use” (135). He again reinforces the contrast 
between the supports and the subjects circling it, of death and life, of murderous cores that have 
generative embellishments. Beyond the obvious, his comparative analogy offers a connection 
between what he suggests as abstract forms and figurative images. He narrative’s subjects stem 
from death yet become a celebration of verdant life. In this connection the streets of the brick-
kiln suggest structure that is imposed upon the layer beneath as much as it is predetermined by 
the construct below. Much like the inscription of the palimpsest, the past has presence in the 
present: the present is shaped by the past just as the past is viewed through the present. 
Cheapside becomes a dimensional layer of the inscriptions on the palimpsest. Just as vividly, the 
pair of images extends to neural pathways, to archive in the mind. 
The reciprocity of the images he invokes informs the images and narrative that follows—
and even the concept of involutes. Involutes move outward but also circle backward, curling in 
both directions and rely upon interconnecting curves, angles, tangents, or entangling associated 
memories. 
 
Coefficients and Concentrics 
 
As sometimes, upon the English lakes, water−fowl that have careered in the air 
until the eye is wearied with the eternal wheelings of their inimitable flight, 
Grecian simplicities of motion, amidst a labyrinthine infinity of curves that would 
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baffle the geometry of Apollonius seek the water at last, as if with some settled 
purpose (you imagine) of reposing. 
  Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 162213 
 
De Quincey calls further attention to his mathematic interests, combined with motion or 
velocity in space and time, when describing his childhood affliction: his infant trauma over his 
sister’s death. The “labyrinthine infinity of curves” evoke both the palimpsest archive and the 
foundational unit: the involute. “The geometry of Apollonius” returns to involutes, employed in 
his theories on conic sections (again, the mathematics of a curve or the spiraling rotation of a 
point). But coining involutes extends beyond simply the use of jargon as fresh metaphors for 
perception and memory. The description De Quincey offers of the water-fowl on the English 
lakes demonstrates his interest in the mathematics of space, motion, and time. He raises the 
comparison to explain the impact on “the infant”—himself—in respect to geometry, infinities, 
and physics. 
De Quincey couples the natural form of the “inimitable flight” with “eternal 
wheelings”—evoking his caducean multiplicity of narrative but also the calculation required in 
the wheeling of gear mechanics (vital in time pieces, but also the flourishing technologies of the 
19th Century: locomotives, paper manufacture and printing, and even involute motion for writing 
logograms in phonography.214) These involutes interconnect and reinforce the mechanized 
                                                          
213. Comparison with Wordsworth’s “Home at Grasmere” (The Recluse, Part First), particularly the phenomenon of 
revivified memories and remembrances seems most apt in lines 754-860, which encapsulate: “musing in solitude, I 
oft perceive / Fair trains of imagery before me rise, / Accompanied by feelings of delight / Pure, or with no 
unpleasing sadness mixed; / And I am conscious of affecting thoughts / And dear remembrances, whose presence 
soothes / Or elevates the Mind” (755-761); “For I must tread on shadowy ground, must sink / Deep--and, aloft 
ascending, breathe in worlds. To which the heaven of heavens is but a veil” (780-783); and, “How exquisitely the 
individual Mind / (And the progressive powers perhaps no less / Of the whole species) to the external World / Is 
fitted:--and how exquisitely, too-- / Theme this but little heard of among men-- / The external World is fitted to the 
Mind; / And the creation (by no lower name / Can it be called) which they with blended might / Accomplish:--this is 
our high argument” (816-824). 
   
214. Time preoccupies De Quincey as do locomotives. “The English Mail-Coach” engage both in highly significant 
ways which merit in depth analysis in Part II, in terms of the narrative of on its own and as a section of Suspiria de 
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apparatus of memory. For the modern era, technology impacts interdisciplinary philosopher and 
theorist historians including Lewis Mumford, Thomas Kuhn, and Pierre Duhem, who each 
emphasize in one form or another the role of the mechanistic as a basic metaphor.215 In fact, in 
the development of modernity, Mumford stresses that “men had become mechanical before they 
perfected complicated machines”; “’machine’ is an expression of the ‘mechanical mind’ […] for 
the organic has become visible again even within the mechanical complex.”216 While, the body 
metaphor serves to map knowledge, to bring disparate pieces together in ways that would 
otherwise be unthinkable, De Quincey joins the geometric and engineering senses to implicate a 
purposeful system (or systems) operating even where there appears to be “eternal wheelings,” 
“inimitiable flight,” “labyrinthine infinity of curves,” or compositional sublime disarray. 
 De Quincey’s mechanized dreaming apparatus shares with involutes his investment in his 
cultural moment. The role of language in shaping reality has a basis in several fields, including 
cognitive science. Cultural and social sciences as well as psychology recognize the importance of 
naming objects. In Embodied Mind, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, base 
their interdisciplinary approach primarily on cognitive science’s exploration of semantics.217 
They suggest an idea of an embodied cognition that attributes cognition shaping to other bodily 
aspects, including orientation and spatial understandings. As with De Quincey’s concept, the 
                                                          
Profundis. For a current interdisciplinary discussion, see: Jon May and Nigel Thrift. Timespace: Geographies of 
Temporality. (London: Routledge, 2007).  
 
215. Among several titles, those with key relevance from these theorists include: Lewis Mumford, The Future of 
Technics & Civilization. (London: Freedom Press, 1986); Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
(University of Chicago Press, 1962); and, Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1954). 
 
216. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (London: Lowe and Routledge, 1934), 3-6. Also see: Lewis 
Mumford, The Myth of the Machine. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967).  
 
217. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 




nomenclature may influence the relational structure of self to internalized concrete abstractions, 
such as thoughts and feelings. Embodied cognition’s combination of cognitive science and 
continental philosophy also reflects the interests in body metaphors intersecting the anthropology 
and philosophy of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Undoubtedly De Quincey invokes even the specialized 
denotations of his day and yet he realizes—as immediately as he proposes it—his involute is 
something else entirely, surpassing the interconnectivity of all these meanings. 
The term involute is appropriate for describing the important truth issuing from “so 
affecting and revolutionary” a remembrance; the recollection of it initiates a digressive involute 
narrative, multiple with lines of movement, pro/re-gression, action and reaction (142). The 
application of concentric spiraling in gearing reinforces the juncture of contact along a common 
tangent, an external tangent to the base circles, or in engineering terms: the Line of Action.218 
Trajectories, or the lines of action, expose the uniqueness of De Quincey’s involute. Contact and 
commonality underlie the relational components of involutes. The typical visualization requires 
an imagined process of placing a string to a point on a curve and envisioning a string attached to 
one point, revolving or unwinding upon itself. The mathematic sense links well with Michel 
Foucault’s sense of the post-modern subject, decentered. Specifically, an involute is a curve, 
formulated from a point on another given curve. The decentered human subject is formed by 
influencing forces, which in De Quincey’s case might be explained as external forces combined 
with thoughts and feelings, jumbled and transmitted into involutes as much as combinations 
reciprocally issuing out from them. Involutes are a kind of roulette or revolving curve on a fixed 
plane, something akin to the approximate path of a tethered object or maypole ribbon to a pole. 
                                                          
218. For one standard selection from the field, see: R. C. Juvinall, Fundamentals of Machine Component Design 
(1983; repr., New York: Wiley, 2006). 
123 
 
The human subject is no longer the center or agent of actions, rather a participant in complex 
processes that organizes events or the meaning in narrative. 
The systems and forces act upon the produced subject, which in the case of De Quincey’s 
involutes are entangled combinations that in turn form intersecting memories. The decentering 
that underlies involutes is clear in De Quincey’s description surrounding the revolutionary 
remembrance. Elizabeth’s death cements his abstract understanding of the concept of death. The 
sighs from the depths, simplified to the theme of death, is the pole of the caduceus, anchoring the 
subject(s) of his narrative. The variations upon the theme, the narrative digressions, each circle 
back and wind round the central point, operating much the same as the mathemathical involute. 
The place and role of language—even in defining involutes—becomes a foundation for 
the metaphysical and phenomenological aspects of De Quincey’s involutes. The relationship 
between the experiencing self and the experience becomes a matrix, a marriage, the type of 
contingency Maurice Merleau-Ponty identifies between the flesh and the chiasm, a reversibility 
in “the intertwining” (The Visible and the Invisible).219 The chiasm shares elements of the 
rupture and fracture of post-modern literary theory, but also the discourse between spaces of 
inscription for the palimpsest and spaces of interlacing objects for the involute-gear. Merleau-
Ponty’s chiasm focuses on the body and body metaphors—relevant to the shaft De Quincey feels 
did strike through his memory faculty during the nurse’s pronouncement of Elizabeth’s 
immanent passing. The body emerges from experience, and perhaps, experience emerges from 
language. 
The affecting moment of visiting his deceased sister is the moment he finds most 
revolutionary, which for the purposes of this discussion shall be the core involute (vastly more 
                                                          
219. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes. ed. Claude Lefort, transl. 
Alphonso Lingis. (1968; repr., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000). 
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complicated than schemata). The “eternal wheelings” of cognitive and mnemonic processes 
exceed “Grecian simplicities of motion,” creating a structure resembling “a labyrinthine infinity 
of curves.” As with the center of the maelstrom or the shaft of the caduceus, the core involute is 
his central-memory issuing lines of remembrance, eddies that return to the core. Recollection of 
the central memory point, De Quincey’s often recursion to the remembrance, establishes the 
coining remembrance-point: with its distinct lines of repeated reflection, the coining point adds 
depth or manifold foliation to the central memory point. “Often I have been struck with the 
important truth,” claims De Quincey, of involutes: often struck when “recollecting it,” the 
remembrance now made multiple at the point of intersection from which derives the interlaced 
variations of all successive recollections.  
“The eye is wearied” by the water-fowl’s motions; the sublime mathematic description 
underscores images and vision as crucial for De Quincey. De Quincey constructs the involute to 
provide a co-opted visual structure for his abstractions. The visual image is what distinguishes 
the announcement of Elizabeth’s impending death with his visitation of her body—the full 
sequence yields infinite possible image-sets for later experiences (such as funerary imagery with 
opium use). The flight of the water-fowls even echoes the “flight” he experiences while viewing 
her body. Unlike the similar yet distal relationship between flight and ascending and descending 
at will through the scarring shaft into the depths of “death and darkness,” De Quincey recalls the 
“wandering or suspension of [his] perfect mind” as a trance, involving his “flight and pursuit” 
through an opening in the heavenly vault, revealing “a shaft which ran up forever” (134). The 
core involute—the juncture of the central memory-remembrance and the coining-
remembrance—shares its linguistic and conceptual framework with his description of the key 
event (recollection of the remembrance) and his reflections on their lasting psychical effects 
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(recollection of the coining truth). The core involute defines De Quincey’s reality as much as it is 
defined by it. Elizabeth’s death causes “convulsions,” “agitations” and a “tumult” (133, 130). He 
recalls prior encounters with the concept of death, including the earlier death of his other sister, 
which he did not yet fully apprehend. De Quincey is old enough, at Elizabeth’s death, to 
comprehend and be affected by death’s finality. “Utter, utter misery,” De Quincey proclaims of 
the “revelation” that his idolized sister is about to die, “itself, as a remarkable thing, is swallowed 
up in its own chaos” (141). The revelation concerning her impending death, thwarts his 
expectation of her recovery from a minor illness and is the pure trauma: “O! moment of darkness 
and delirium, when a nurse awakened me from that delusion, and launched God’s thunderbolt at 
my heart in the assurance that my sister must die” (141). The thunderbolt is certainly echoed in 
the piercing nature of involute truth, De Quincey having “been struck” with both. Conversely, 
the sublimity of seeing her body—the core memory—is one of generation: remembrances, an 
important truth, a philosophy, and his caducean narrative’s flowering tendrils.  
The most crucial moment before seeing her body is the announcement and “assurance” of 
her impending death. The impactful experience shapes the foundations of what he experiences 
when he sees her body. De Quincey, hearing his sick sister’s agony through the walls, can 
imagine her existing in both states alive and dead, (a sort of Schrodinger’s cat). Unlike the core 
memory he often revisits for involute revelation, he admits to his readers that this preceding 
“revelation” he would wish to avoid: “I wish not to recall the circumstances of that time, when 
my agony was at its height, and hers in another sense was approaching” (141). The vertical 
reference recalls the caduceus: “Enough to say, that all was soon over; and the morning of that 
day had at last arrived which looked down upon her innocent face, sleeping the sleep from which 
there was no awaking, and upon me sorrowing the sorrow for which there is no consolation” 
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(141-2). Caducean imagery converges central aspects of Suspiria de Profundis: death, memory 
and dreams. While tangential digressions entwine around and encircle the subject of his 
childhood affliction, Mercury’s axial rod aligns with the revelatory dreams and memories of 
Elizabeth’s death as a means and instrument for traversing the boundary of conscious 
recollection and life into the depths of death and unconscious memory. The network of meaning 
surrounding his knowledge of the caduceus seems to underlie his description of the experience of 
her death and his sense of dreams accessing the shadowy depths of memory or unconscious 
mind, much as the street is imprisoned under the bricks. The caducean image appeals as an 
image of composition. Composition both provides and is an analogy for remembering. 
If the portions of text preceding De Quincey’s coining and the narrative’s approaching 
the corresponding memory reflects the period of anticipation over his sister’s impending death, 
the succeeding sections, subjects, and the form of Suspiria as a serial essay reflects well the re-
membrances of his memory over the course of years and dreams. The object or the law of the 
work—to display the coefficient of the opium on dreams—dictates the form, the reproductive 
faculty of dreams and narrative become indistinguishable: 
 
The nursery experience had been the ally and the natural coefficient of the opium. 
For that reason it was that the nursery experience has been narrated. Logically it 
bears the very same relation to the convulsions of the dreaming faculty as the 
opium. The idealizing tendency existed in the dream −theatre of my childhood; 
but the preternatural strength of its action and coloring was first developed after 
the confluence of the two causes.  (169) 
 
 
Much as confluence reinforces combination, coefficients suggest a specific relation or 
combination of the two factors. Coefficients, another mathematic term, is a constant (in his case, 
the nursery experience) by a which a variable (the opium) is multiplied. When applied in 
engineering and physics, a coefficient expresses a quantitative phenomenon or specific property 
127 
 
of matter—in this case, De Quincey appeals to the ideal of a formulaic expression of convulsions 
upon his dreaming faculty. His nursery afflictions are the first memories his opium-dreams 
dredge from the depths of memory. Through suspended and resumed use of opium, “[d]uring this 
third prostration before the dark idol, and after some years,” De Quincey finds that “new and 
monstrous phenomena began slowly to arise” (132). With a sense of increase similar to an 
algebraic expression of exponential coefficients, De Quincey explains his dilemma: “when I 
could no longer conceal from myself that these dreadful symptoms were moving forward 
forever, by a pace steadily, solemnly, and equably increasing, I endeavored, with some feeling of 
panic, for a third time to retrace my steps” (132). His retrograde efforts fail: “But I had not 
reversed my motions for many weeks, before I became profoundly aware that this was 
impossible” (132).220 The revelation is that “[a]ll is lost”: his is utter grief over his dependency 
on opium and discovering its continuing effects on his dreams (132). The comparison to his 
nursery grief is clear: “The sentiment which attends the sudden revelation that all is lost silently 
is gathered up into the heart; it is too deep for gestures or for words; and no part of it passes to 
the outside” (132). “Passes,” here, “as for a death already passed,” expresses a type of 
communication or manifestation, a similar concretization as in confronting his apprehension of 
death:  
I, at least, upon seeing those awful gates closed and hung with 
draperies of woe, as for a death already past, spoke not, nor started, 
nor groaned. One profound sigh ascended from my heart, and I 
was silent for days. (133) 
 
The imagery he employs, of the “gates closed and hung with draperies of woe,” along with the 
antagonism of hearing but not seeing, anticipate (in narrative) a sequence of imagery surrounding 
                                                          
220. De Quincey expresses his anxiety as temporal motion quite in line with the subject matter of “The English 
Mail-Coach” I discuss in Chapter Four. 
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viewing her body, a body not living. De Quincey outlines his adult addiction in the preface 
before even “approaching” the effecting remembrance. As he renders in narrative the involute 
phenomenon, the narrative echoes generate the concentric rings of the sighs emanating from the 
depths of his afflictions. The funerary imagery invokes the core memory as the schema he 
applies to new situations as dire to injuring the core of his psyche: “The voice perishes; the 
gestures are frozen; and the spirit of man flies back upon its own centre” (133). As an archival 
trace, the core involute discursively shapes and engages his later experiences and its imagery 
pervades his narrative. More poignantly, he expresses the experience as his own death, a death of 
innocence and peace. His grief, furthermore, invokes involute imagery in his expression of his 
own decentered subject. The profound sigh ascending from his heart is the concentric involution 
of his memory, the involute generating his Suspiria de Profundis.  
De Quincey’s language establishes the key images that recur in his narrative’s 
recollection of the revolutionary experience—as if the visitation of these memories on his 
dreaming and waking mind were influenced by the trauma of knowing, of discovery, of 
revelation. “Mere anarchy and confusion fell upon me,” De Quincey says, further delineating the 
convulsions and agitations as sensory: “Deaf and blind I was, as I reeled under the revelation” 
(141). De Quincey claims he wishes not to recall the moment, but also admits—somewhat 
contradictory to this immemorial archive memory—that, “Rightly it is said of utter, utter misery, 
that it ‘cannot be remembered.’”221 Utter misery is confusion and a chaotic chasm, a void, an 
abyss. Corresponding involutes, schemata, or relational imagery during the event of seeing her 
                                                          
221. Qtd. in De Quincey’s reference note: ”'I stood in unimaginable trance / And agony, which cannot be 
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murdered husband; Coleridge, Remorse (1813), IViii.76. De Quincey may also have known the original version of 




body fills the void. Viewing her body offers some equilibrium, a new schema or knowledge base 
to apply or re-write the true trauma, the trace and substrate, of facing her loss. 
De Quincey wishes not to recall the circumstances of assurance over Elizabeth’s death, 
while expressing the possibility that they cannot be remembered. Yet, he conveys a strong sense 
of the moments, through repeated memories which supplant them. Seeing her body is the first 
memory to fill the traumatic void. Suspiria de Profundis’s scheme renders the involute 
fragmentation of memory and narrative. His title, key subjects, memory episodes, and literary 
allusions suggest his preoccupation with semantic and cognitive associations within both 
memory and narrative. The sections ‘echo’ a network of signification surrounding viewing 
Elizabeth body after death and before burial: briefly this includes the moments of approaching 
and entering her room, ascent of the staircase, the doorway, the bed, her face in the noon sunlight 
with a morning breeze upon his—and experiencing a long interval of time contracting into a 
minute. During this sequence, vital sets of visual echoes emerge: first the sunlight through the 
window, then the locked door to Elizabeth’s chamber (when he attempts a second viewing, 
triggering his first remembrance of the initial moment), and finally the coffin descending into the 
grave.  
De Quincey’s narrative strives to manifest the dreaming faculty. He directly echoes the 
monumental trauma of Elizabeth’s death in his conception of the dreaming structure—in many 
ways shaping it. The “shaft” of the caduceus-narrative and the “pall” of Elizabeth’s coffin merge 
when he employs both “shaft” and “pall” for the structure of the mental faculty. The dreaming 
“apparatus” or, “the machinery for dreaming in the human brain,” accesses memory’s depths (a 
sort of ur-unconscious): a “great tube through which man communicates with the shadowy” 
(131). As memories constitute most of his dream, even opium-enhanced ones, dreaming is a 
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primary component of memory for De Quincey. Opium dreams exaggerate memories, dreams 
revivify memories, the narrative embodies relived memories, like variations upon a theme—but 
what the palimpsest-archive, caduceus-narrative, and his involutes suggest is that experience 
inherently entangles the future into associations already set in the mind.  
De Quincey’s memory, his stress on recollection of a remembrance, in many ways 
prefigures the post-modern subject; this decentering carries to the reminiscing, recollecting, and 
remembering subject the sense of the post-modern body that Barbara Stafford, an art scholar, 
notes of the body metaphor and its history of perception in Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen 
in Enlightenment Art and Medicine, Stafford argues that the body, as it appears in twentieth-
century art, represents chaos and fragmentation rather than wholeness and coherence.222  The 
involute of his coining is a complex, yet fragmented, dimensional entity. He reflects on his 
earlier confessions as a caduceus, offers the palimpsest and archive as a vessel for his subjects, 
but arrives at involutes as the defining concept for the philosophy he explores in Suspiria. All his 
other images reinforce the vital aspects and characteristics for which he employs involutes. 
Involutes become the conceptual domain for his philosophy. 
 
Section 2: Geometric Co-option and Coining Involutes  
 
Suddenly starts off the infant, suddenly ascend the birds, to new evolutions as 
incalculable as the caprices of a kaleidoscope; and the glory of their motions, 
from the mixed immortalities of beauty and inexhaustible variety, becomes at 
least pathetic to survey. So also, and with such life of variation, do the primary 
convulsions of nature such, perhaps, as only primary formations in the human 
system can experience come round again and again by reverberating shocks. 
   Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 162-163 
    
 
                                                          
222. Stafford offers a fine exploration of the junction between sciences and art: Barbara Maria Stafford, Body 
Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine. (1993; repr., Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1997). 
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In Thomas De Quincey’s lengthy comparison of psychical trauma on “the infant”—for 
which his childhood serves as case study—to the movement of waterfowls, he pursues a 
mathematical lexicon. He cites the “Grecian simplicities of motion,” to suggest his sense of 
contemporary advances “amidst a labyrinthine infinity of curves that would baffle the geometry 
of Apollonius” (162). Notably Apollonius, in addition to writing on conic sections, offered the 
hypothesis of eccentric orbits, also involving involutes.223 Orbital eccentricity examines the 
deviations of one orbiting object from the path of perfect circles around another, a factor 
preceding gravitational impacts on matter. The “new evolutions as incalculable as the caprices of 
a kaleidoscope” provide a sublimity and ineffability that transcends the calculable, the 
quantifiable characteristics of the very field to which his use of jargon appeals. The eye-
wearying “glory of their motions,” initiate a near divine and unknowability to both subjects: “the 
mixed immortalities of beauty and inexhaustible variety, becomes at least pathetic to survey.” He 
might as easily be describing a caducean composition, a palimpsestic memory, or a lifetime of 
recollecting the coining remembrance-point. He is, however, directly addressing the similarities 
between “primary convulsions of nature” and “primary formations in the human system.” The 
cyclicality of nature provides the visual model for “experience” operating in human memory, 
wherein it can “come round again and again by reverberating shocks.” “Grief” is the central 
memory, “utter misery” in grief issues endless recollection, and grief reverberates through the 
human system: when the water-fowl “seek the water at last, as if with some settled purpose (you 
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imagine) of reposing,” they again take flight, “suddenly ascend the birds,” “suddenly starts off 
the infant,” endlessly arise sighs from the depths.224 
Thomas De Quincey’s analogy for destabilized, reverberating memories is the flight of 
water-fowls, a pattern and motion beyond the grasp of fundamental mathematics. De Quincey 
scrutinizes his memories as they expose these otherwise concealed processes. His description of 
the human memory system offers a sketch of involutes in action.  
Involutes, influenced by the caduceus, the palimpsest, the archive, have comparative 
qualities yet becomes their own distinct conceptual domain or metaphor. It is important to note, 
for further exploration of involutes, the mathematic usage of “abstract” and “concrete” 
concerning numbers: an abstract number designates its singular entity without application to 
things, whereas a concrete number is associated to things and their quantities counted. To explain 
the experiences of repeated shocks that issue from childhood trauma, he anchors abstractions 
(“incalculable,” “immortalities,” “inexhaustible”) in concrete images (“fowls”, “kaleidoscope”), 
which render as poetic figures (usually metaphors) or mediums of representation. Much of his 
discussion touches on philosophical terms or concepts, directly or indirectly. Several vital 
discussions within scholarship engage De Quincey’s philosophical interests in Immanuel Kant, 
the most prominent figure De Quincey addresses throughout his writings. De Quincey’s 
endeavor with involutes, while not explicitly stating a philosophy, positions itself within a rich 
philosophical vista. The aim of Suspiria is to concretize one involute moment’s infinitely 
                                                          
224. Wordsworth lines, again from “Home at Grasmere,” seem appropriate (277-320): “Ah no, the stream / Is 
flowing, and will never cease to flow, / And I shall float upon that stream again. / By such forgetfulness the soul 
becomes, /  Words cannot say how beautiful” (293-296); “Shout after should—reiterated whoop, / In manner of a 
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-And if with this / I mix more lowly matter; with the thing / Contemplated, describe the Mind and Man / 
Contemplating; and who, and what he was-- / The transitory Being that beheld / This Vision;--when and where, and 
how he lived; / Be not this labour useless” (841-851). 
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abstract proliferation into concrete instances of embodiment. The two systems, mind and 
narrative, inform the processes of each other demonstrating concretization in a remembrance, 
through recollections, and for memory’s involute system. 
 
Involutes as a Conceptual Domain  
 
A metaphoric sense of involutes develops into a concretized combined and new or other 
denotation. The progression suggests De Quincey’s frame of reference as a recollecting adult 
studying his own metaphoric language of as child. The core memory or involute remembrance 
informs his experiences later in life. The nursery experiences, particularly “the lowest depths in 
[his] nursery afflictions,” become the first memories De Quincey’s opium use vivifies in his 
dreams: a “phase of revolving affection” in which “the affliction, seemingly hushing itself to 
sleep, suddenly soars upwards, again upon combining with another mode of sorrow, namely, 
anxiety without definite limits, and the trouble of a reproaching conscience” (162). The soaring-
flight or surfacing of painful memories seems oddly paired with the “glory” of the water-fowl 
without recognizing the awe De Quincey finds in involutes. De Quincey transmutes the 
mechanical involute into a means of recognizing sub-routines in the mind but in an organic or 
non-ordered system—at least one consisting of never fully traceable gradations caused by 
unpredictable modulations. The involute system becomes a merger of mechanical general 
patterns with variability in particulars.  
The involute as a conceptual domain influences the operations of the body and the world. 
As Lévi-Strauss recognized, the body serves as a “three-dimensional matrix, a genuine system by 
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means of a creature” that “constitutes the object of thought and furnishes the conceptual tool.”225 
Through the body, which for De Quincey is an involute-archive mind, all kinds of not-yet-
structured phenomena find organization and order projected out of the sense of bodily principles 
and behavior. He credits a “strength of lunacy” to human dreams, “the fearful caprice of lunacy, 
and the malice of lunacy, whilst the victim of those dreams nay be all the more certainly removed 
from lunacy” (169). His own faculty suffers “convulsions” due to the “confluence” and 
“coefficient” of opium with his grave psychical injury: “the idealizing tendency existed in the 
dream-theatre of my childhood; but the preternatural strength of its action and coloring was first 
developed after the confluence of the two causes” (169). Yet, he finds fruitful contemplation in 
the glory of involute moments opening into new experiences, of discovering the complexity of 
the indirectly communicated abstract forms within the concrete object.  
De Quincey’s development of involutes shapes his other descriptions as much as it 
shapes his reality. Lévi-Strauss, concerned too with language in a social domain, compares 
primitive man’s linguistic operations with a child’s cognition in a similar fashion to other 
philosophers interested in metaphoric language and cognition in our perceptions of the world.226 
Comparing metaphor to a miniature fable or “fable in brief,” Giambattista Vico in New Science 
(Prinicipi di Scienza Nuova), first published in 1725, suggests literal language followed the 
original language of metaphor.227 As a conceptual domain, the involute as a basic formulation 
shapes De Quincey’s philosophical inquiry. Involutes place him at the crossroads of several 
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fields which pursue overlapping inquiries into language’s powers of shaping reality or our 
thoughts about reality, whether in the form of schema, metaphors, domains, or models. “In 
scientific language, a model is essentially a heuristic procedure,” Paul Ricoeur explains in 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning, “that serves to overthrow an 
inadequate interpretation and to open the way to a new and more adequate one.”228 Such a 
heuristic revision, or perhaps paradigm shift, seems appropriate to what Deleuze qualifies as new 
ways of thinking, the philosophical precursor to science and art.229 Ricoeur’s sense of such 
theoretical models as De Quincey’s involutes demonstrates “an epistemological point of view” 
becoming, “the real models and which consist of construing an imaginary object more accessible 
to description as a more complex domain of reality whose properties correspond to the properties 
of the object.”230 De Quincey’s involute model coopts the properties of involutes and applies 
them to his conception of the particles of reality, experience, and thought.  
De Quincey and his child-self may both wish not to recall and possibly cannot recall the 
in-the-moment impact of certain moments on his mind; however, the repeated reflection as an 
adult and in the exaggeration of opium’s coefficient combination with his faculty of dreaming, 
De Quincey finds these closed moments opening and unfolding, unfurling and evolving as 
involutes. The human system is one in which “experience[s] come round again and again by 
reverberating shocks” (163). De Quincey inherits Kant’s united interests in cognition, language 
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and mathematic-philosophical attentions to space and time. In his discussion of the schema and 
images, in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the role of cognition and imagination.231 De 
Quincey’s descriptions of the infant and waterfowl seem to conform with Kant’s reasoning. A 
stress on the materiality of experiences, of thoughts and feelings as objects redirects De Quincey 
to understand the material existence of experience (rather than isolated phenomena) as units and 
entangling conglomerates, independent and distinct when signified, represented, and 
conceptualized. De Quincey builds upon Kant’s distinguishing of the internal sense of time and 
cognition’s conception as a signified representation of objects. The schema, “always a mere 
product of the imagination,” functions with “transcendental synthesis,” much as does the 
cognitive processes of metaphor, as Kant outlines it: “in truth, it is not images of objects, but 
schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions.”232 The schema, “this 
thought,” Kant argues, “is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image […] 
this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a conception, 
I call the schema of this conception.”233 The process is one of deducing categories and 
generalities of phenomena that can then be applied back, “extended to objects as things in 
themselves.”234 Beyond simply a schema, involutes formulate a guiding principle for De 
Quincey’s way of viewing the world and experience.  
De Quincey’s act of coining, much as involutes themselves, relies upon a combination of 
concrete objects rather than direct denotation of the abstract form. “As Max Black puts it,” 
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Ricoeur comments, “to describe a domain of reality in terms of an imaginary theoretical model is 
a way of seeing things differently by changing our language about the subject of our 
investigation.”235 De Quincey redefines a conception of reality the moment he coins involutes of 
experience. “This change of language,” Ricoeur explains, and which is applicable to describing 
De Quincey’s involutes, “proceeds from the construction of heuristic fiction and through the 
transposition of the characteristics of this heuristic fiction to reality itself.”236 As both metaphoric 
and his own literal involutes, the relational meaning works in tandem as a unit.   
In order to define involutes De Quincey offers a series of analogies, metaphors, and 
comparisons. Max Black’s contributions to the study of Models and Metaphors, suggest that 
metaphor may generate new meaning. Black’s study “contend[s] that some metaphors enable us 
to see aspects of reality that the metaphor’s production helps to constitute.”237  To define 
involutes is to demonstrate them through comparison, metaphor, analogy. I. A. Richards, with 
Charles Ogden, in Meaning of Meaning : A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought 
and of the Science of Symbolism (1923), explains metaphor as “the whole double unit” of “the 
original idea” and “the borrowed one” or the “tenor” and the “vehicle,” respectively.238 Ogden 
and Richards’ terms themselves are intriguing for their own figurative—even metaphoric—
properties, which incidentally coincide with the language De Quincey employs in his discussion 
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of palimpsests. Partially an explanation of their origin, arising through use-value, De Quincey 
utilizes terms strikingly similar to Richards’ for the medium and the message of the palimpsest: 
“relation between the vehicle and its freight has gradually been undermined” (172). The 
“vehicle” is the vellum and the freight is human thought: “Once it had been the impress of a 
human mind which stamped its value upon the vellum; the vellum, though costly, had 
contributed but a secondary element of value to the total result” (172). Translated into different 
theoretical terms, the medium transfers a secondary value or quality to the prized message, or, 
the sign-signifier dually impacts the signified. Presumably addressing the vellum palimpsest, he 
indirectly addresses his memory theory (impress of a human mind) within his metaphor: 
language entangles memory. He roots his own metaphor of the palimpsest brain in a tradition of 
the human mind’s external memory aids, hypomnemata, or record of memory. Yet, the tenable 
relationship is not something De Quincey points out. Either the connection evades his conscious 
statement in narrative, or, perhaps the linguistic-conceptual associations are so deeply rooted as 
to connect themselves logically. 
De Quincey, much like the pervading trend in these metaphor theories, seems to 
recognize, “between the symbol and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the 
indirect one,” which is the observation Richards suggests of context and relational meaning, 
aligning the metaphor’s meaning to the subject that uses it.239 To advance this even further, De 
Quincey’s discussion of interrelationship of the concrete “vehicle” and the abstract “freight”—
they both employ vehicle, yet Richards offers the alternate term, tenor rather than De Quincey’s 
consistently material freight —of the vellum offers a provocative story of the life of a metaphor. 
The dynamic shifts when, “the vellum, from having been the setting of the jewel, has risen at 
                                                          
239. Ogden and Richards, 2013, MM, 11-12. 
139 
 
length to be the jewel itself;” De Quincey complicates the life cycle with a transfer of value: “the 
burden of thought, from having given the chief value to the vellum, has now become the chief 
obstacle to its value; nay, has totally extinguished its value, unless it can be dissociated from the 
connection” (172). His metaphor is transcendent; he selects a metaphor for memory’s medium of 
the brain that, as media studies attests, is part of the history of memory. Moreover, in the process 
De Quincey's metaphor also describes the history of the metaphoric medium as if explaining 
metaphoric operation itself.  
Even as the diction and terminology connect together, De Quincey underscores the 
limitation of language. Language is contextual and temporal; its limits require reception and 
interpretation. The tandem operation of vehicle and freight, or tenor and freight, is cogently 
redirected by Max Black as a “system of relationships” between the primary and secondary 
subjects.240 Black’s terminology helps to direct the metaphor as a interlaced coupling, much as 
involutes themselves. Black outlines the metaphoric phenomena in language as a frame or the 
context of metaphorical term and its focus—bringing the sense of metaphor in line with the 
delineation of characteristics between the general and specific (similar to categorical generalities 
in Kant’s schema, or the replicable pattern of Piaget’s). For Black, the metaphoric subject 
becomes an “implicative complex.”241 De Quincey’s involute moves from the literal meaning of 
the metaphoric sense into a matrix he must define through other explorations of relative imagery, 
language, analogy, and figuration. Metaphor may be the most basic level of language—language 
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as a sign system is inherently metaphoric, in the sense that language (and metaphor) remained 
ever-yet-to-be-actualized. 
De Quincey’s involutes acquire his additional meaning through the surplus of the 
metaphor, and also the additional figural work he offers to underscore the characteristics of the 
schema or newly established cognitive model. De Quincey offers discursive arbitrariness in the 
vellum palimpsest as a keen example of relational meaning through context: “Yet, if this 
unlinking can be effected, then, fast as the inscription upon the membrane is sinking into rubbish, 
the membrane itself is reviving in its separate importance; and, from bearing a ministerial value, 
the vellum has come at last to absorb the whole value” (172). Media principles apply to 
metaphor theory here. The brain as the vehicle for the freight of memory, the palimpsestic 
quality (endless re-inscription) transfers to the memory, and further reinforces the shared 
characteristics of involutes in memory. 
Any dissociation of inscription from the vellum is an illusion, however, as the 
characteristics of the palimpsest demand. Memory, too, is an illusion of dissociation: memory is 
structured by and consisting of involutes. As much as De Quincey pursues one idea, the language 
of another related concept pervades his discussion. “Hence the importance for our ancestors that 
the separation should be effected,” De Quincey’s history of the palimpsest continues, arriving at 
the palimpsest itself: “Hence it arose in the middle ages, as a considerable object for chemistry, 
to discharge the writing from the roll, and thus to make it available for a new succession of 
thoughts” (173, 172).  De Quincey’s diction and choice of imagery suggests the relational ties 
between his subjects. De Quincey appeals to a figurative comparison of the palimpsest, one akin 
to his imagery of the caduceus: “The soil, if cleansed from what once had been hot−house plants, 
but now were held to be weeds, would be ready to receive a fresh and more appropriate crop” 
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(172). The allusive network De Quincey presents around his involutes suggests the need for 
interplay between figurative and literal meaning. He juxtaposes imaginary examples, analogous 
figures, or poetic descriptions to combine and expand the possible meanings of both. Yet, 
echoing images and the context of circumstances within his narrative suggest order or system 
beyond arbitrary interplay—interconnections to which he does not draw attention, but which 
draw attention to themselves.  
De Quincey renders, in narrative, the exteriorization of his philosophical view of 
memory, of involutes. The aim or concrete object of involutes could be explained as a 
reversionary purpose.: “In that object,” here meaning purpose or aim in the genesis of the 
palimpsest: 
the monkish chemist succeeded; but after a fashion which seems almost 
incredible, incredible not as regards the extent of their success, but as regards the 
delicacy of restraints under which it moved, so equally adjusted was their success 
to the immediate interests of that period, and to the reversionary interests of our 
own.     (172-3)  
 
Reversion seems to encompass revision and revivification, reproduction and reverberations. All 
resonate in the palimpsest: “They expelled the writing sufficiently to leave a field for the new 
manuscript, and yet not sufficiently to make the traces of the elder manuscript irrecoverable for 
us” (173). De Quincey then asks, “Could magic, could Hermes Trismegistus, have done more?” 
with a direct allusion to the wielder of the caduceus with all its powers concerning death and life 
(173). Through the connection he makes over the powers of resuscitation and passage into the 
afterlife, he establishes memory as reversion.  
Reversion reinforces the material or physical motion of the vellum scroll. The 
exteriorization of the memory medium is recollection as much as it is reversion/involution of the 
scroll: “They did the thing; but not so radically as to prevent us, their posterity, from undoing it” 
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(173). But also, further linking the revelatory nursery experiences, the stakes are about life and 
death or the simultaneity of both states: “But really it is a problem not harder apparently than to 
bid a generation kill, but so that a subsequent generation may call back into life; bury, but so that 
posterity may command to rise again” (173). In this regard the past-De Quincey, the child 
afflicted, is much like the “monkish chemist.” The child’s trauma, having furled around itself, 
flying upon its center, suggests involute movement. “The rude chemistry of past ages” and “the 
more refined chemistry of our own” have different goals: “They did the thing proposed to them: 
they did it effectually, for they founded upon it all that was wanted: and yet ineffectually, since 
we unravelled their work; effacing all above which they had superscribed; restoring all below 
which they had effaced” (173). With the palimpsest, De Quincey remarks that the will of present 
circumstances alone determine its meaning: the present must destroy the supplanted layers in 
order to undo the past effacement. “Had they been better chemists, had we been worse,” De 
Quincey explains, “the mixed result” with pivotal imagery, “namely, that, dying for them, the 
flower should revive for us, could not have been effected” (173). Involute memory finds its 
process in successive supplanting and restoration. De Quincey’s involutes find their process in 
immortal impresses, one bringing forth the next, infinitely. All inscriptions are present, even 
when seemingly absent, while only some are visible or readable at any one time. While the 
present seeks to efface the previous, both remain; the past revives to supplant. Visibility equates 
to vivification, revolving or reverting to his coining memory. The metaphoric exchange 
(abstract/concrete) of language for cognition provides the vital underpinnings for analyzing De 
Quincey’s visual imagery in the philosophical domain, with all the implications of De Quincey’s 
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He who has really read the preceding parts of these present Confessions will be 
aware that a stricter scrutiny of the past, such as was natural after the whole 
economy of the dreaming faculty had been convulsed beyond all precedents on 
record, led me to the conviction that not one agency, but two agencies, had 
cooperated to the tremendous result.      
    Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 169 
 
The two agencies, his impacted dreaming faculty and excessive opium use, are just one 
example of the prevalence for interrelationship or cooperation in De Quincey’s philosophy. He 
establishes the inter-dependence of the past effecting the significances of the present, but also of 
present experience on the future. Literature and circumstances intertwine in experience, as do 
thoughts and feelings. The remembrance and its recollection also merge or blur in discourse. And 
the guiding concept for all of these behaviors, of involutes, builds its denotation from its own 
metaphoric sense as well as others, the palimpsest and the caduceus. Much as with the shaft and 
the streets—both void and object, structure and process—at the core meaning is both literal and 
figurative.  
Through his epistemology of the palimpsest, De Quincey describes the situation through 
the material-medium and its communication through generations. Perception and memory 
resonate as dual aspects. The metaphysical tension between representation and matter not only 
recur in De Quincey’s metaphors and analogic relations, but suggest his prefiguring of Henri 
Bergson’s metaphysics. In Matter and Memory, Bergson dispels realism and materialism by 
affirming that matter is only images. Additionally, however—and all the more akin to De 
Quincey—Bergson also refutes idealism by refusing to reduce matter to our representations for 
it. 242 “Necessary poverty” is Bergson’s sense of the loss that occurs through perception: the 
                                                          




image of the material thing become a representation, a reductive “selection” in the process of 
“discernment in the etymological sense of the word.”243 While Bergson connects consciousness’s 
interest in preserving only bodily relevant data, the similarity to De Quincey’s relevant 
palimpsest layers is useful. Moreover, De Quincey extends the analogy to a hypothetic book of 
the reader’s, not unlike his own: 
What would you think, fair reader, of a problem such as this, to write a book 
which should be sense for your own generation, nonsense for the next, should 
revive into sense for the next after that, but again become nonsense for the fourth; 
and so on by alternate successions, sinking into night or blazing into day, like the 
Sicilian river Arethusa, and the English river Mole; or like the undulating motions 
of a flattened stone which children cause to skim the breast of a river, now diving 
below the water, now grazing its surface, sinking heavily into darkness, rising 
buoyantly into light, through a long vista of alternations? (173) 
 
This passage recalls imagery of the dreaming apparatus as well as contrasts that are central to his 
memory of realizing the concept he coins as involutes.244 The oscillations and motions of the 
flattened stone illustrate De Quincey’s connection between his psychical turmoil (convulsions, 
agitations, tumults) and perceivable images. De Quincey’s kaleidoscopic sense of motion aligns 
his interests, much as does Bergson’s, with spatial properties in consciousness’s relationship with 
reality’s time-space. For Bergson, consciousness connects “enormous periods in the internal 
history of things, quasi-instantaneous views [. . .] views this time pictorial, of which the most 
vivid colors condense an infinity of repetitions and elementary changes.”245 Without 
consciousness, “matter resolves itself into numberless vibrations,” explains Bergson, matter’s 
infinite vibrations are “all linked together in uninterrupted continuity, all bound up with each 
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other, and traveling in every direction like shivers.”246 The description resembles De Quincey’s 
involute as well as his description of his mental state when traumatic revelations strike his 
consciousness, the “suspension” of De Quincey’s “perfect mind” (145).  
The similarities between De Quincey and Bergson are worth comparison as a way to 
reconcile De Quincey’s conceptual domain of involutes and the operations of his memory. 
Memory for Bergson consists of two cooperating types: habit-memory and pure-memory. Habit 
or automatic, repetitious behavior aligns with bodily perception whereas personal memories 
persist in a pure state or reference file. Together, behavioral and referential memory apply the 
past toward future experiences, much as it does for De Quincey. Memory, according to Bergson, 
is motion and movement. The conservation of the past occurs while a continuity of progress 
accommodates the difference of each new moment adding itself to all previous moments. 
Similarly, De Quincey’s encrusting layers or chaining involutes result from the processing of 
archived memory and perceptional repetition through invested imagery. Where De Quincey 
explains involutes entangling, Bergson offers moments stacking: their heterogeneity in memory 
remains a progressing unity. The conservation of the past is the movement of memory-matter into 
single images. Bergson relies on the image as a concept that underscores matter in order to 
circumvent the material valuing of the original over representations. Just as materially invested, 
De Quincey’s mind and narrative (as well as his memory and dreams) possess no hierarchy, 
rather the same value, only differing by degree (relevant further in Bergson’s sense of the virtual, 
of focus later).  
De Quincey, however, imbues, the molecules of memory and experience with a textual 
materiality (based on the palimpsest and caduceus influences on his involute). De Quincey’s 
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involute provides for structural layers aware of the linguistical systems of medium, inscription, 
and interface. The impact of one concept, such as involutes, on De Quincey’s larger 
metaphysical view parallels Bergson’s concept of images, which influence Bergson’s 
understanding of the structure and processes available to memory. The unconscious precedes 
images, according to Bergson, which he explains with the example of a telescope and the 
operation of its lenses (suitable to his concept of the image). Rotation is the focusing in on 
singular images or instances of memory; contraction is the condensing of images into general 
knowledge. In other words, experience in pure memory (or the unconscious) offers preceding 
models for images and also singular instances transmute into generalities.247 The simultaneous 
actions and directions for memory, as well as the terms Bergson uses, underscore similar sense 
of motion, in mind and moment, for De Quincey.  
The telescoping lenses of Bergson’s cone, oscillating as when the eye focuses, uncannily 
parallel De Quincey’s network for explaining involutes. Bergson’s two types of memory, moving 
from unity to multiplicity or interpenetration to fragmentation, clarify the successions and 
repetitions separated in perception with consciousness but also explains a complexity in De 
Quincey that schemata lack. Bergson’s concepts can apply to language (though he does not do so 
directly in Matter and Memory). In De Quincey’s reliance on or appeal to linguistic elements in 
his ordering of experience and the world, his memory and narrative to render it, functions in a 
similar way. Specific instances emerge from associated terms and descriptions (characteristics 
conveyed through figural images) and the specifics of particular moments transfer to others 
(general qualities and figural images transfer onto others). This oscillation of the telescope lenses 
is akin to Black’s frame and focus or manipulation of the involution of the cone. Uniting these 
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models offers a sense of understanding memory as a negotiation between matter and 
consciousness but also as a negotiation between the linguistic images forming a matrix around 
the matter, both in—to adapt the terms—habit and pure linguistics, or, lexical relations and 
experiential associations.  
The mental leaps of both metaphor and analogy, in De Quincey, offer a sense of 
synecdochal or relational reasoning between, perhaps, two systems of memory. Behind the 
accidental and casual appearance of metaphor, there is always a system, as current research in 
literature and linguistics demonstrates. Metaphors permit “mental leaps” to use Paul Thagard’s 
phrase, studying analogy in human thinking through perspectives from cognitive science, or 
more recently,248 Keith J. Holyoak’s “Analogy and Relational Reasoning.”249 To fully appreciate 
the role of system, however, requires delineating the concept in Niklas Luhmann's sense.250 
Luhmann, similar to De Quincey and Bergson, considers both interrelations and multiplicity. The 
similarities between these ideas suggest the type of self-proliferation in De Quincey’s involutes. 
The central function for any system is the necessity for communication. Luhmann develops 
systems theory concerning social system(s); yet, a linguistic society is apparent in De Quincey’s 
cognitive network. Communication for Luhmann constitutes the unity of “utterance, information 
and understanding” and its ongoing self-reproducing or autopoiesis (Greek “self-creation” or 
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“self-making”).251 Self-reproducing or maintaining of self suggests an almost biological status 
quo of homeostasis, or, the type of signal integrity important to communication or informational 
systems. Luhmann suggests that systems seek to maintain self; yet, self-maintenance is not 
necessarily static stagnation. The involute engineers spiraling reproduction. For De Quincey’s 
involute system, involutes maintain themselves through repeated utterance, entangling new 
information with the substrata beneath while influencing understanding through variating 
reverberation.  
De Quincey’s idiosyncratic study exhibits his childhood experiences, and in so doing 
offers within the remembrances subtle undercurrents that trace his semantic patterning. De 
Quincey’s narration of his nursery afflictions privilege key images that surround his portrait of 
grief, dreaming and memory, and, ultimately, involutes: life and death, light yet limited vision, 
obscuring objects, limits, and depths. “On the day after [his] sister’s death,” De Quincey “formed 
[his] own scheme for seeing her once more: 
 
There were two staircases; and by one of these I knew that about noon, when all 
would be quiet, I could steal up into her chamber. I imagine that it was exactly 
high noon when I reached the chamber door; it was locked, but the key was not 
taken away. Entering, I closed the door so softly, that, although it opened upon a 
hall which ascended through all the stories, no echo ran along the silent walls. 
Then turning round, I sought my sister's face. But the bed had been moved, and 
the back was now turned. Nothing met my eyes but one large window wide open, 
through which the sun of midsummer at noonday was showering down torrents of 
splendor. The weather was dry, the sky was cloudless, the blue depths seemed the 
express types of infinity; and it was not possible for eye to behold or for heart to 
conceive any symbols more pathetic of life and the glory of life. (142) 
 
 
When he turns to view her face, and after remarking briefly on her features, a “mournful” 
wind—“it is in this world the one solid audible symbol of eternity”—from the window forces the 
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juxtaposition of “the open window and a dead body on a summer day” (144). Any replication of 
the “torrents of splendor” from “the sun of midsummer at noonday” through the “large window 
wide open,” whether in part or whole, offers a resonant message, if not meaning, when it occurs 
in descriptions of other matter, particularly such “types of infinity” as he recognizes in “the blue 
depths” of the sky. This schema, in a Luhmann system, requires structural coupling and 
differentiation. Luhmann’s structural coupling, much like the relational structure of metaphor, 
implicates tandem and interlacing trajectories. The coupling of discourse, of system, of meaning-
making, is clear in light of metaphoric relations, of frames and focus.  The meaning of these 
“symbols,” none “more pathetic of life and the glory of life” in memory, are both habitual 
symbolism and personal symbolism. The perception to the singular moment and matter, in a 
Bergsonian sense, is then applicable to abductive reasoning or generalizing. Differentiation 
permits a system to fulfill complex structured unity, particularly with respect to autopoiesis, 
which requires a message from and to, a sender and receiver, the inter-systemic relationship (as 
opposed to communications outside the “closed” system). The images that De Quincey offers in 
this moment do not simply echo in the course of his narrative; rather, they differentiate into 
separate utterances or information.  
 De Quincey’s reverberation of experience manifests in narrative variation. The two 
staircases, the closed door, no echo, the back of the bed, the window, and the sky all resonate 
with prominent imagery throughout Suspiria. Bergson, in Creative Evolution, explains 
complexification, “ forms ever more and more complex,” “the infinitely complex machine” with 
operations of “growing complexity.” 252 Existence’s operations become a series of bifurcations 
                                                          





and differentiations, which for De Quincey generates in the involute system. De Quincey’s 
experiences and perceptions influence his mental conceptions and representations both in 
memory and language. Recollection and narrative, in turn, restructure De Quincey’s perceptions. 
Without a divisible nature, the compound expression of the literal and the metaphor are more 
than discursive. The impulse of these attitudes of perception and metaphor coincide with De 
Quincey’s aims, related to Bergon’s countering of realism and materialism. 
 Language, for De Quincey, holds a material quality. His attention aligns him with media 
studies but also the historical questions of language. In Contagious Metaphor, Petra Mitchell 
places Friedrich Nietzsche’s work on metaphor in a position that influences modern literary 
approaches, 253 such as Deconstruction. “Nietzsche argued that all language is, at base, 
metaphorical,” Mitchell notes of “Über Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”: “written in 1873 
but unpublished during his lifetime, Nietzsche provides one of history’s most incisive critiques 
of literal language [. . .] “an unproblemantic relationship between words and things does not and 
cannot exist.”254 By stressing that he coins involutes, De Quincey reinforces language as 
fundamentally metaphoric in the way that discourse in language could be called palimpsestuous. 
Nietzsche’s argument also points to the act of naming—an illusion of genesis or epistemology—
as the root for the problematic relationship. “The process of naming is itself metaphorical, there 
can be no language prior to metaphor,” as Mitchell explains Nietzsche’s argument: “As a result, 
Nietzsche writes, ‘we possess nothing by metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in 
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no way to the original entities.’”255 Perhaps it is accurate to suggest that De Quincey’s study of 
involutes of human sensibility suggests that all language is indeed involute. 
By coining, De Quincey also stresses the imprint on an object as other than cosmetic and 
arbitrary. Perception is key. Its importance, with Bergsonian ties to consciousness, implicate 
specific roles for language and cognitive processes. Perception and language demonstrate a 
power to re-produce reality, just as De Quincey claims of dreams. De Quincey orders his 
perceptions and re-collections upon the characteristics of involutes. In the coining-recollection, 
De Quincey describes the scenario of the core involute as both a viewing of Elizabeth and an 
ethereal dream-vision: “a trance” (144). Whether a marriage or matrix, the metaphoric exchange 
or structural coupling of the two visions link De Quincey’s conscious and unconscious. He 
claims to hear a distinct mournful wind from outside that causes him to glance between the 
window and Elizabeth: “Instantly, when my ear caught this vast Eolian intonation, when my eye 
filled with the golden fullness of life, the pomps and glory of the heavens outside, and turning 
when it settled upon the frost which overspread my sister's face, instantly a trance fell upon me” 
(144). The glance he must make to the window and back creates a sharp contrast of matter, 
perception, image, and representation. An after-image of the heavens settles upon her face, 
juxtaposing the contrast; while a “mode of antagonism” (De Quincey’s concept, addressed 
further in Chapter Three) seems apparent here, the figurative descriptions resonate the void and 
central point related to the geometric involute (143). While in this “trance,” De Quincey 
recollects the sleep-like experience as a near out of body daydream with imagery central to 
Suspiria and involutes:  
A vault seemed to open in the zenith of the far blue sky, a shaft which ran up 
forever. I, in spirit, rose as if on billows that also ran up the shaft forever; and the 
billows seemed to pursue the throne of God; but that also ran before us and fled 
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away continually. The flight and the pursuit seemed to go on for ever and ever. 
Frost, gathering frost, some Sarsar wind of death, seemed to repel me; I slept − for 
how long I cannot say: slowly I recovered my self-possession, and found myself 
standing, as before, close to my sister's bed.     (144) 
 
The structural images alongside the motions and spaces evoking mathematics merge, for De 
Quincey, with theological relevance. The dreaming apparatus and wound in his faculty follow 
the trajectory outlined in the trance. The futile pursuit ends in revolving back to the starting point 
of frost, now “to repel” him from the suspended state. His crisis and trauma find an unsteady 
repose:  
O flight of the solitary child to the solitary God, flight from the ruined corpse to 
the throne that could not be ruined! how rich wert thou in truth for after years! 
Rupture of grief that, being too mighty for a child to sustain, foundest a happy 
oblivion in a heavenborn dream, and within that sleep didst conceal a dream, 
whose meaning, in after years, when slowly I deciphered, suddenly there flashed 
upon me new light; and even by the grief of a child, as I will show you, reader, 
hereafter, were confounded the falsehoods of philosophers.   (144) 
 
Once again, De Quincey’s repeated recollection provides him revelation of “meaning” that the 
experience possessed, which he “slowly [. . .] deciphers” later, “in after years” (144). He copes 
with the “rupture of grief” he cannot sustain while a child through its “oblivion in a heavenborn 
dream.” His trance and Elizabeth’s death, two different figures of sleep, combine: “within that 
sleep didst conceal a dream.” The slippage of meaning holds its own insights. Relational 
meaning, a coupling structure, entangles through language as much as within language. The role 
of vision, the visions, is pivotal for the scene, and also for ideas on language. Historically the 
questions of language include discussion of pre-linguistic and abstract thought deriving from 
visual stimuli including gestures. Rousseau’s contributions to the discussion correlate metaphor 
to physical gestures, translating visual mimetic units to representations in speech, ultimately 
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coupling the visual and audio-oral channels of the brain.256 Certain vestiges of the dialogue 
between these systems—the visual system and audio-oral system—are apparent in De Quincey’s 
description.  
 De Quincey draws attention to his subsequent process of re-viewing, re-presenting, or 
reading the past. The primacy of visual representations express that which is unknowable and 
ineffable at the time. The inter-systemic relationship Luhmann might locate in the perception-
mimesis or representation’s structural coupling underlies both sensory systems. De Quincey is 
not simply caught in a circular progression that repeats the coining remembrance into later 
narrative. Nor, does his study only operate regressively, deriving meaning in later image 
patterning from only one more basic unit, in an infinite regress. De Quincey demonstrates a 
complex system, the by-product of his inquiry, examination, and coining. The system is part of 
his nascent theory that provides a progression vital to philosophy. Philosophy relies upon 
exploring and redefining the conceptual space of inquiry. The relational properties of De 
Quincey’s involute, appear quite apart from the diminishing finitude of such concepts as 
Leibniz’s monads, an indivisible unit; instead, De Quincey’s core remembrance operates with 
similar force or action while establishing a new understanding of unit(s). The involute unit is 
generative progression. Adult reflection, and furthermore, adult narration, provides the keys for 
decrypting the dream, the experience, the involute(s) of memory. By applying Luhmann’s 
system theory to metaphor/language theory, De Quincey’s (and the Suspiria’s) internal audio-
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oral and visual systems then constitute sub-systems within the system of perception integral to 
cognition and language. 
 De Quincey’s Suspiria aims to render the process of apprehension as a complex of 
systems and sub-processes—with an alertness to systems principles. De Quincey explains his 
aims to his readers by invoking the same key imagery of the coining remembrance:   
Here, at the point where I have called a halt, the reader has reached the lowest 
depths in my nursery afflictions. From that point, according to the principles of 
art which govern the movement of these Confessions, I had meant to launch him 
upwards through the whole arch of ascending visions which seemed requisite to 
balance the sweep downwards, so recently described in his course.     (169) 
 
The complex apparent in De Quincey’s system of imagery presents the multiplicity also at work 
within involutes. For Luhmann, systems comprise a multiplicity of events in communication; in 
the central remembrance point or the core involute of his essay, De Quincey renders the 
multiplicity of communicative events taking place. De Quincey means to re-represent in his “art” 
the movements he feels and felt, which in turn should render the same experiences in his reader. 
De Quincey refers to these movements “already sketched” as the “phases of revolving affection” 
for which the core involute of Suspiria is one “where the afffliction, seemingly hushing itself to 
sleep, suddenly soars upwards, again upon combining with another mode of sorrow, namely, 
anxiety without definite limits, and the trouble of a reproaching conscience” (162). The 
childhood trauma, in another sleep-state, surfaces in his adulthood with opium’s influence. His 
narrative exhibits a motion of tendril digressions; his memory must read palimpsestuously 
through layers of recollection; his remembrances travel from eddy to eddy, in approaching the 
center of the maelstrom. Each suffers a necessary poverty, to apply Bergson’s term.257 Yet, the 
multiplicity extends even further for De Quincey’s philosophy. De Quincey creates a juncture for 
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memory and language, which Bergson offers in his metaphysics of memory and matter. Each 
instance, being a multiplicity—an involute—can never be fully re-presented:  
It is impossible, with respect to any memorable grief, that it can be adequately 
exhibited so as to indicate the enormity of the convulsion which really it caused, 
without viewing it under a variety of aspects,− a thing which is here almost 
necessary for the effect of proportion to what follows: 1st, for instance, in its 
immediate pressure, so stunning and confounding; 2dly, in its oscillations, as in 
its earlier agitations, frantic with tumults, that borrow the wings of the winds; or 
in its diseased impulses of sick languishing desire, through which sorrow 
transforms itself to a sunny angel, that beckons us to a sweet repose.      (162) 
 
It is only by “viewing it under a variety of aspects,” De Quincey suggests, that “memorable grief 
[. . .] can be adequately exhibited.” The concrete object of each moment consists of perplexed 
combination that require exploration, multiple and varied views for each recollection’s further 
interlocking and entwining. He lists the three modes “almost necessary for the effect of 
proportion” and “to indicate the enormity of the convulsion [. . .] caused.”  “Immediate pressure” 
rightly corresponds, in the sense of printing and contraction, of the reception in memory. All 
successive associations compound the “oscillations, as in its earlier agitations”—which returns to 
imagery of the waterfowl movements. The transformation of “languishing desire” into “a sunny 
angel,” besides invoking the descriptions for Elizabeth, reiterates the central remembrance point 
issuing from the void of trauma. The hushed affliction “suddenly soars upwards,” De Quincey 
notes the third mode of exhibiting an involute: earlier agitation “combining with another,” with 
the latter impacting the former. Much as an involute can evolve outward, it can revolve inward. 
 The seemingly opposed motion of centrifugal and centripetal forces aids the multiplicity 
of an involute: involutes are manifold in structure and operation. Bergson’s sense of multiplicity 
creates a juncture leading to phenomenology and Bergsonism, primarily developed by Gilles 
Deleuze. While phenomenology assists in understanding De Quincey’s narratology, Deleuze’s 
attention to the physics and metaphysics of Bergson offer explanation for involutes, with the 
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sense of proportion and intensity at work in De Quincey: “I find my resource in a sort of 'jury' 
peroration, not sufficient in the way of a balance by its proportions, but sufficient to indicate the 
quality of the balance which I had contemplated” (169). These points seem particularly key due 
to the nature of the revolutionary remembrance: a singular moment in which he experiences time 
“contracted” during the “suspension” of his “perfect mind” (145). The geometric involute offers 
De Quincey a matrix for qualitative multiplicity in the concreteness of ‘thoughts and feelings’—
con/sub-sequently recollection or reminiscence. De Quincey's involute, as the aspects of 
philosophical anamnesis that Bernard Stiegler would call the embodied act of remembering, 
becomes its own experiential continuum, what Henri Bergson later calls duration: categorically 
differentiated from the quantitative dimension of time. Furthermore, the mathematics that 
involutes invokes, primarily differential geometry, links related philosophical inquiry into the 
qualities and quantities of time and space, and even perception. 
Suspiria de Profundis exhibits his inherited philosophical exploration of memory 
phenomena as well as the re-production of remembrance as memoir. From that moment 
experiences infinitely entwine in memory, the interconnectivity of experience impacts the 
semantic network he renders in his narrative’s discursive system. Successive moments have their 
foundations in previous experience; however, accessing the preceding layers is only possible 
through the newer growths and fructifications. The same is true of new denotations, particularly 
for his involute. 
 
Section 3: The Virtual Philosophy in Involute Experience and Re-experiencing Involutes 
 
 
The mathematic interest pervading Suspiria extends De Quincey’s co-option from the 
spatial structure of involutes in geometry to the physics of time and motion in the behavior of 
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involutes. Involutes operate or consist in all stages or ontological modes from experience, 
memory, to recollection—and further, to De Quincey’s representations in narrative. Involutes are 
also virtual—in a particular sense of the word. Virtual appears widely as synonymous with 
various simulative or representative acts, but also, more recently, digital objects. The comparison 
is useful for its unusual sense of materiality; however, a metaphysical distinction must be made 
concerning De Quincey’s involutes.  
Involute experience is multiple in components, manifold in medium, and to attempt 
approximating a representation of experience requires repeated, varied, and differentiated views. 
The virtual is in each involute layer, but also in the relationships between the layers. From a 
media studies standpoint, De Quincey’s concept of experience follows a tripartite model.258 De 
Quincey demonstrates the tripartite model in his mental and narrative representations, or his 
internal and narratological systems. On the physical level involutes form the fundamental signs 
of inscription (“on a medium”).259 On the logical level, involutes dictate the discursive 
procedures by which inscribed data is read (or “recognized and interpreted”).260 And, on the 
conceptual level, involutes determine the experiential, tangible, or consumable: “the object [. . .] 
deal[t] with in the real world.”261 A reader of Suspiria de Profundis encounters three levels of 
involutes, as does De Quincey in the act of recollection. The reader might be said to have a 
virtual or simulated experience of excavating De Quincey’s recollection, memory, even, his 
experience. Involute is manifold in structure and processes. Experiencing Susprira de Profundis 
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re-presents, re-creates even, the same interconnection of memory. Conscious experience of the 
text follows temporal sequence while maintaining, simultaneously, a unity with previous content. 
The discursive continuity requires networking content, including poetic images, with a sense of 
contextual associations as well as the linguistic sign-signifier-signified. The virtuality of 
involutes includes their behavior for each level of experience: the inscriber, reader-archivist, re-
collector. 
A sense of virtual experience in the discourse between literature and consciousness is a 
sense of the term that aligns with phenomenological appreciations of literature. This more typical 
sense of the virtual assists in understanding De Quincey’s involute as a marriage between the 
two branches of thought from Bergson, phenomenology and Bergsonism. Contributing to the 
former, Gaston Bachelard in The Poetics of Space, specifies that “a phenomenological inquiry on 
poetry,” specifically, “aspires to go deep, because of methodological obligations.”262 The sense 
of accessing depths, as well as what Bachelard refers to as the “doublet of resonances and 
repercussions,” speak to De Quincey’s poetic images of the psychical apparatus (including the 
dreaming organ) as well as the physics of motion in the mind. The sphere and its roundness is an 
image Bachelard accepts for being, as others do, 263 related and yet distinct from the particular 
roundness of De Quincey’s involute. Bachelard’s phenomenological position avoids the 
separation of image and being. Images for De Quincey seem more than poetic, yet somewhat 
more aligned with Bergson’s sense of representation, with a necessary poverty requiring 
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differentiation and repetition. When Bachelard pursues his inquiry into literature, he argues, “it 
must go beyond the sentimental resonances with which we receive (more or less richly—whether 
this richness be within ourselves or within the poem) a work of art.”264 There are, in effect, two 
intersecting spheres: that of the reader and of the text.  
Phenomenological leanings are clear in De Quincey, though perhaps involutes offer a 
recursion that connects resonances and repercussions. The discursive reading experience, which 
blurs richness between text and reader, Bachelard recognizes as “phenomenological doublet of 
resonances and repercussions must be sensitized.”265 “The resonances are dispersed on different 
planes of our life in the world,” Bachelard elaborates, “while the repercussions invite us to give 
greater depth to our own existence.”266 De Quincey’s narrative seeks to recreate in his reader the 
tumults and elevations of his own experience. Rendering in narrative the inner workings of the 
mind is no small feat; rather, De Quincey elevates the literary endeavor, as Robert Ready 
explains in in his essay, “De Quincey’s Magnificent Apparatus.”267 Offering connections 
between the mechanic aspects of the dreaming faculty as a reproductive apparatus, Ready 
addresses De Quincey’s rhetorical mechanisms: “Reproduction is the most exigent force in life 
after sustenance.”268 Ready examines De Quincey’s outline of the mental apparatus and its 
functions, appealing to Freudian psychology to explain the transfer of narrative properties 
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(composition, inscription, textuality) onto the mind: “we need to remember Freud’s 
characterization of preconscious activity, especially that of dreaming: psychic economy binds 
stimulus by repeating it, mastering it in a kind of necessary dramatization of it, a 
reproduction.”269 The generative potential from preconscious to consciousness, as with the 
experience of a literary text, makes actual the virtual. And in this vein, the Bergsonism sense of 
virtuality becomes evident. 
The planes of life, for Bachleard, invoke, as with De Quincey, time rather than space. 
Appealing to the transience of sound, Bachelard explains the relationship between text and 
reader: “in the resonance we hear the poem, in the reverberations we speak it, it is our own.”270 
In other words, virtuality in literature operates through the co-option of utterance, the Bakhtinian 
polyvocality of language.271 Variations on a theme, the basis of the caduceus's tendrils, expresses 
this manifoldness for De Quincey, as does the palimpsest and as will the chorus during his 
dream-fugue (in “The English Mail-Coach”). Bachelard’s attention to vibrations, moreover, 
advances the interest of nineteenth century physics into a sense of multiplicity: “the multiplicity 
of resonances then issues from the reverberations’ unity of being.”272 To rephrase, reverberations 
have a unity of being that issues a multiplicity of resonances: a reverberation can resonate at 
different moments on the plane of our temporal existence (and possibly on planes of 
consciousness). De Quincey’s involute captures the same sense of this unity of being, 
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differentiated into a multiplicity of resonances, which disperse onto various temporal planes of 
consciousness.  
De Quincey establishes vibrations as a communicative frequency, in the sense appealed 
to in the context of the information branch of systems theory. The vibrations communicate, 
exchange, discourse, translate. For Luhmann’s idea of system, systems are closed: they operate 
without exchange from the environment. In terms of the way De Quincy employs Suspiria de 
Profundis for a model of memory, his internal and narratological systems might be viewed as 
one system: the psychical and narratological components operate as the structural couplings 
requisite for communication in systems. De Quincey’s narrative, external memory, and his 
internal memory are structurally coupled, paired as reciprocal transmitter-receivers. In 
recognizing this structure, the communicative processes internal to each can become more 
apparent, replicating the same models of exchange and discourse. Involutes depend upon 
virtuality. The doublet in Bachelard, the two structural couplings of De Quincey, are not the only 
discursive elements present: there is also time and space. 
 
Virtual Time: In Valuing the Immeasurable 
 
De Quincey presents a philosophical expression of experience in the mind that coincides 
with the innovations in physics of his day, while, in some ways initiating a line of thought closer 
to that of Henri Bergson, whose metaphysics, based on some qualification of Albert Einstein’s 
physics, requires first Bernard Riemann’s additions to understanding types of non-Euclidean 
space. These ontological distinctions for understanding the world and reality are vital for De 
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Quincey. The mathematics of involutes lays the foundation for De Quincey’s revelations about 
his perception and apprehension, his philosophy.  
Suspiria de Profundis explores De Quincey’s philosophy—in the sense of a new 
conceptual position for inquiry—in the very act of rendering it. De Quincey is not concerned 
with epistemology, though indebted to its history, rather, he utilizes the general and particular of 
his own case to expose relational meaning central to linguistic discussions into areas experience 
that share the characteristics of reading. Lakoff and Johnson point out that metaphors divide “our 
world up into clusters, so we can deal with clusters instead of elements.”273 Indeed, the “ready-
made” schemas Lakoff and Johnson discuss, sound structurally similar to an involute: an 
advanced mode from more “basic” metaphors, epiphoric objects” represent a paradigm, or 
coherent system of reasoning, in a condensed form.274 With the revelation of involutes, the 
dilating dreams of a contracted moment, De Quincey’s way of viewing the world, apprehending 
experience, and of thinking about thinking redefines itself.   
Comparison, again, with his previous confession offers insight into his project and 
process. “As a text, the Confessions is a calculated literary product,” observes Robert Ready, 
explaining that it, “meant to set going the reader’s divisive experience of vision and of analysis.” 
275 Ready further explains the relationship De Quincey sees his narrative take on: “the book 
illustrates what De Quincey characterized in 1828 as the action of true rhetoric, ‘an exhibition 
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which presupposes a state of tense exertion on the part both of auditor and performer.’”276 A text, 
narrative, must anticipate a space of communication. Suspiria de Profundis is arguably as 
calculated as De Quincey’s Confessions, though affecting an experience of recursive, digressive 
reproduction within the mind-text. De Quincey captures both the Romantic imagination and the 
poetic imagination’s resonance and reverberation that Bachelard locates in literature: “Needless 
to say, the reverberation, in spite of its derivative name, has a simple phenomenological nature in 
the domain of poetic imagination.”277 Bachelard continues, in effect advancing Bergson’s image 
into the realm of linguistics: “The image offered us by reading . . . becomes a new being in our 
language, expressing us by making us what it expresses; in other words, it is at once a becoming 
of expression, and a becoming of our being.”278 Bachelard’s becomes and becoming suggests 
translation or transmission of the image into the reader’s being to the point of near transmutation. 
De Quincey’s focus for memory, however, is on internal readings conducted during recollection, 
by selves along an involute continuity. Bachelard assists to merge metaphysics with the 
postulates of linguistics and communication sciences operating within De Quincey’s rhetorical 
site, the exhibition: the text that presupposes an interface of expression and reception can extend 
from narrative’s reproduction into the reproduction of the mental faculty. The continuity Bergson 
offers (expanded in Deleuze's additions, his Bergson-ism) offers a distinct view of unity more 
useful for De Quincey than being and becoming. The virtual lends the required unified plurality 
to the various reading selves within memory: actualization renders the multiplicity of the virtual. 
Virtual, in fact, is one term De Quincey employs in Suspiria de Profundis, to describe time with 
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still more remarkable similarities to Bergson.279 The involute(s) of each level of the narrative and 
the experience are virtual and exhibit this multiplicity.  
De Quincey’s childhood trance holds additional, though nevertheless related, 
epistemological value for his philosophy of involutes. The singularity of his trauma and then his 
trance creates the singular conditions for an “inverse phenomenon” in his experience of time: 
In the Opium Confessions I touched a little upon the extraordinary power 
connected with opium (after long use) of amplifying the dimensions of time. 
Space, also, it amplifies by degrees that are sometimes terrific. But time it is upon 
which the exalting and multiplying power of opium chiefly spends its operation. 
Time becomes infinitely elastic, stretching out to such immeasurable and 
vanishing termini, that it seems ridiculous to compute the sense of it, on waking, 
by expressions commensurate to human life. As in starry fields one computes by 
diameters of the earth's orbit, or of Jupiter's, so, in valuing the virtual time lived 
during some dreams, the measurement by generations is ridiculous by millenia is 
ridiculous; by eons, I should say, if eons were more determinate, would be also, 
ridiculous. On this single occasion, however, in my life, the very inverse 
phenomenon occurred. But why speak of it in connection with opium? Could a 
child of six years old have been under that influence? No. but simply because it so 
exactly reversed the operation of opium. Instead of a short interval expanding into 
a vast one, upon this occasion a long one had contracted into a minute.   (144-145) 
 
While discussing his previous Confessions in Suspiria, De Quincey contrasts his subjects. In 
Confessions he explored the relative nature of time experienced under opium’s influence 
“amplifying the dimensions of time. Space, also, it amplifies by degrees that are sometimes 
terrific”—now, in Suspiria he recognizes a nascent sense of duration in subjectivity and 
experience. At his sister’s bedside he experiences a moment in which, “instead of a short interval 
expanding into a vast one, upon this occasion a long one had contracted into a minute.” De 
Quincey’s “deepest thoughts and feelings” in this contracted moment are more profoundly dense 
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and inextricable than ordinarily: “I have reason to believe that a very long one [interval] had 
elapsed during this wandering or suspension of my perfect mind” (145). Contraction in time 
alters in varying ways, much as with frequencies in sound (relevant to signals in 
communications), including pitch or intensity. Over the course of Suspiria, a memoir of 
recollection, De Quincey showcases the depth of the trance: the bedside scene structurally 
coupled with the heaven-born vision. The unity of this contracted moment in consciousness and 
the indeterminately long interval of the event exemplify the reverberations that cause resonances 
throughout his life, but also involute experience and memory as entangling multiplicity: 
Bergsonism’s virtuality depends upon duration or virtual time. 
De Quincey’s expression of “virtual time” is strikingly similar to Bergson’s duration. 
Duration or durée is the term Henri Bergson uses to respond to Einstein’s relativity of space-
time. Bergson in Time and Free Will proposes the need to separate time and space, the latter 
depending or predicated upon quantitative data, while the former is qualitative and linked to the 
“freedom” of the immediate data of consciousness.280 Bergson’s differentiation between spatial 
and temporal events or experience, allows distinction that helps him define multiplicity, which in 
turn establishes the sense of virtuality already captured by De Quincey. De Quincey might 
indeed be worth crediting with another coining: “in valuing the virtual time lived during some 
dreams.” Predating the physics of relativity, instead De Quincey attends to the influencing 
mathematics of motion and time. Valuing, rather than quantifying, is De Quincey’s 
approximation for experiences incommensurate to human life, intense temporal effects 
immeasurable by human computations.  
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De Quincey appeals often to motion or velocity for a sense of the relation between time 
and space. De Quincey is part of what Richard Sha argues is a Romantic investment in 
metaphysics. In “The Motion Behind Romantic Emotion,” Sha outlines several examples among 
De Quincey’s contemporaries.281 Sha points to Shelley’s “Speculations on Metaphysics,” in 
which, Shelley “essentializes differences between ‘thoughts, or ideas, or notions’ in terms of 
‘Force,’ and thus the term bridges mind and body, thoughts and emotion.”282 Sha argues that 
force “provides to the emotions the aura of effectivity and materiality, because emotions are 
rendered into dispositions for automatic action without clear actors,” suggesting force as a 
“moving conceptual place-holder” for emotion studies.283 Shelley’s force coincides with several 
of De Quincey’s images for experience, though De Quincey often stresses immeasurability, such 
as intensity or quality. Force is also a concept in physics, in Newton’s classical mechanics, and 
further applies to work involving both power and energy, two terms related to the work-energy 
principle of physics. Again, this returns to the application of involutes in mechanics. De Quincey 
is not alone utilizing mechanic applications for his philosophical interests. As Sha notes, both 
“’motion’ and ‘action’ are the basis of Darwin’s ideas about the nervous system,” but more 
extensively, the metaphors of mechanics permitted analogies of man and machine or electricity 
with the spirit.284 “Both physics and chemistry, of course, had a huge impact on Romantic 
physiology,” explains Sha, “largely through John Brown’s theories of excitability, which listed 
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the emotions and passions as internal exiting powers.”285 Brown’s contribution includes 
Brownian motion, 286 which, like Dalton’s atomic theory,287 already cemented, suggests a 
material compounding of particles in undetectable relationships—the foundations of current 
entanglement theories.288 Two aspects of Brownian motion, diffusion and resonances, address 
issues of integrability, even entropy (to be discussed in Part II, mainly in Chapter Four), that 
mark De Quincey’s involutes on the progression to later issues of chaos and dynamic systems. 
Brown’s random trajectories offer a sense of De Quincey’s own seemingly unpredictable 
digressions and recursions. De Quincey’s perplexed combinations, incapable of being 
disentangled, derive from shared interests between the mechanical-organic self-maintaining 
system. 
De Quincey’s personal case study has already yielded the coefficient forces at work in his 
system—it is in the effects his sense of physics resides. Michael Faraday, as Sha points out, 
“built upon a British tradition of force atoms, which the atomic center as being surrounded by 
spheres of attraction.”289 (35). De Quincey’s childhood affliction’s agitations, the cycling of the 
maelstrom, the wheeling of the waterfowls’ flight, the undulation of the skipping stone, among 
his other images of emotional motion, seem invested similarly. Sha offers Faraday’s 1818 lecture 
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on “Observations on the Inertial of the Mind” as an example of the Romantic connections 
between physics and emotions; Faraday has “implicit faith in the unity of disparate forces.”290 
Sha excerpts Faraday’s elaboration: ‘The centripetal force, the centrifugal force, the force 
resulting from chemical action and that which originates in muscular exertion are at all times 
active in changing and varying the states induced by inertia [. . .] These are represented among 
intellectual beings by the sensations, perceptions, passions, and other mental influences which 
interfere . . . in the dictates of our reason.’”291 “This unity,” Sha suggests, “founders upon both 
the ability to impute causality and the problem of representation.”292 De Quincey’s involute, 
however, posits a conceptual framework that is more than simple co-option. De Quincey’s 
involute, when informed by his sense of virtual time, divests interest, as does Bergson, in 
mechanistic causality or the juxtaposition of events in space. As with Bergson’s sense of 
duration, the motions De Quincey investigates or analogizes are temporal motions, motions 
between conscious states. 
 While in his trance, time and space separate for De Quincey. The separation is not 
unusual, whereas the effect on experienced or internal time is. De Quincey acknowledges that 
space “also” can be amplified along with time—he credits opium with amplifying the 
dimensions of both, though, apparently, the effects are separate as are the two. Unlike opium’s 
effect that expands time, during his trance, “on this single occasion [. . .] the very inverse 
phenomenon occurred.” De Quincey claims that the vision of the “heavenborn dream”—the sky-
vault, the forever-shaft—contracts into a minute for his consciousness: “I have reason to believe 
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that a very long [interval of time] had elapsed during this wandering or suspension of my perfect 
mind” (145). De Quincey reconstructs the discrepancy between his lived consciousness as a 
minute and the time of the event far longer. He employs “perfect mind” for consciousness, 
though it seems useful for implicating the structural coupling of the conscious/unconscious in 
both the mind and narrative. His trance, a “wandering or suspension,” elides directly 
philosophical or Kantian issues of freedom and consciousness. Instead, perhaps not as directly as 
Bergson, De Quincey offers an alternative focus, an inquiry into the relationships of 
consciousness in time and space. 
 The freed conscious self of De Quincey in his trance exhibits what Bergson would call 
duration. Duration expresses time’s ability to contract, dilate and expand—without respect to 
space. Spatial multiplicity is homogeneous space, quantitative and enumerable; unlike temporal 
heterogeneity. De Quincey’s attempt to explain his conscious wandering in the vision of the sky 
and shaft is through describing both images not spatially but through temporality, the 
immeasurable temporality of “forever”: “a shaft which ran up forever.” De Quincey states: “I, in 
spirit, rose as if on billows that also ran up the shaft forever” (144). “The billows seemed to 
pursue the throne of God”—an infinite image—that “fled away continually,” De Quincey adds, 
offering another temporal description before reiterating that “the flight and the pursuit seemed to 
go on for ever and ever” (144). De Quincey grapples with showcasing the sense of time as 
difficult to understand as Bergson’s heterogeneous multiplicity of time. Conversely, the 
homogeneous and spatial, the quantitative multiplicities are easily numerically discerned or 
represented, enumerated. Therefore, Bergson describes time-consciousness as, “several 
conscious states,” a conglomerate, “organized into a whole,” and without spatiality, time allows 
these conscious states to “permeate one another”; the end result of this permeation of 
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consciousness within duration, is the whole “gradually gain[s] a richer content.”293 De Quincey’s 
dual sense of time, somehow alert to a long interval of (real) time passing though he perceives it 
“contracted into a minute,” offers two obvious states of consciousness—within the trance are 
continual states, innumerable states that permeate one another. 
 Involutes offer De Quincey the possibility for apprehending the permeation of conscious 
states. Involutes are the basis for encoding and accessing memory (the three stages: inscription, 
reading, and experiencing) and are involved, palimpsestuous, interlocking. In explaining the 
impact of the wind’s juxtaposing of the window and Elizabeth’s body, De Quincey demonstrates 
the characteristic linking between memories:  
Many times since, upon a summer day, when the sun is about the hottest, I have 
remarked the same wind arising and uttering the same hollow, solemn, 
Memnonian, but saintly swell: it is in this world the one sole audible symbol of 
eternity. And three times in my life I have happened to hear the same sound in the 
same circumstances, namely, when standing between an open window and a dead 
body on a summer day. (144) 
 
Successive instances of similar images can recall to mind past ones. The temporal collapse 
memory allows offers a related example of several conscious states organizing into a whole 
composing something other and richer in content than when isolated. Memnonia, the name used 
during the time of the Ramesseum’s excavations (roughly 1750-1850), the Egyptian ruins of 
Ramesses II’s monument was one of several archeological sites that helped inspire 
antiquarianism among Romantics.294 Memnonia offers De Quincey a historical “symbol of 
eternity” in the utterance of the wind. The sustaining of two presents, a present and a past 
present, demonstrates not only the functions of memory, but that memory operates in relation to 
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time or duration. Couching eternity in a physical allusion draws upon the multitude of states 
existing almost in defiance of space. Ancient history can co-exist with the present. Joining the 
past, the ruin, with the successive circumstances, palimpsestic involute layers, recalling the 
trance’s freedom of the conscious state.    
 De Quincey’s explanation of time dilation in his opium dreams, a more typical expansion 
of time, impact the role of involutes of memory further; however, the virtual of time 
consciousness requires further clarification as it applies for Bergsonism. Gilles Deleuze, the 
major contributor to Bergsonism, suggests: “Everything happens as if the universe were a 
tremendous Memory.”295 Deleuze elaborates on duration to include multiple durations, different 
durations, within itself: personal duration, matter’s duration, all durations within one time. In 
fact, duration must be so in order for memory to operate as it does. “There is, on one hand, a 
multiplicity of successive states of consciousness and, on the other hand, a unity which binds 
them together,” Deleuze suggests, and, “duration will be the synthesis of this unity and 
multiplicity.”296 Duration that is multiple and in effect a multiplicity is ultimately virtual. Virtual, 
in Bergsonism, offers a counter-premise from the real/ideal:  
While the real is in the image and likeness of the possible that it realizes, the 
actual, on the other hand does not resemble the virtuality that it embodies. It is the 
difference that is primary in the process of actualization — the difference between 
the virtual from which we begin and the actuals at which we arrive, and also the 
difference between the complementary lines according to which actualization 
takes place. In short, the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it 
is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create 
its lines of differentiation in order to be actualized. 297 
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De Quincey employs the terms “contracted” and “dilated” for the virtual time of lived, 
conscious, or involute experience. One of Bergson’s famous images is of time as an elastic band, 
stretching and contracting, 298 much the same way De Quincey describes it: “time becomes 
infinitely elastic, stretching out to such immeasurable and vanishing termini, that it seems 
ridiculous to compute the sense of it, on waking, by expressions commensurate to human life” 
(144). The virtual must be actualized; all actuals derived in the process of actualization are in the 
virtual. The actuals, the complementary lines, are different, differentiated from each other, 
issuing from the virtual. De Quincey’s involute provides a useful image for this: the involute 
spirals, parallel yet distinct, emanating from a central point. Different, successive recollections, 
actualize the virtual remembrance. In this way, memory is the process of actualization of a 
virtual experience. The elasticity of time and consciousness in De Quincey is distinctly 
Bergsonism in its details. 
 Involute experience in memory, for De Quincey, operates through actualized recollection; 
dreams function through similar (yet distinct) processes.  Memory enacts a form of repetition, a 
repetition that includes active synthesis of these two presents, different in actualizing the virtual. 
Memory, for Deleuze, utilizing the metaphysics of Bergson, is both recollection and perception, 
recalling a now past present into the present and perceiving both simultaneously.299 De Quincey, 
when addressing the narrative rendering of the whole of these experiences, explains the role of 
dreaming as an extension of memory:  
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The reader must suppose me at Oxford; twelve years and a half are gone by; I am 
in the glory of youthful happiness: but I have now first tampered with opium; and 
now first the agitations of my childhood reopened in strength, now first they 
swept in upon the brain with power, and the grandeur of recovered life, under the 
separate and the concurring inspirations of opium. (169) 
 
In dreams he can experience an actualization of the virtual agitations of childhood, “reopened in 
strength, now first they swept in upon the brain with power.” The movement aligns with the 
collapse in time, as the two consciousness—the present and the past-present—merge. The 
sustaining of both is only possible through a recollection of the past, a re-presentation of the 
experience in memory.  
 
The Virtual as Language, Dreams, and Involute Philosophy 
 
I became profoundly aware [. . .] in the imagery of my dreams, which translated 
everything into their own language.     
   Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 132 
 
 
 De Quincey’s dreams actualize, repeatedly, the multiplicity of each virtual experience or 
remembrance. Profound reverberations resonate incalculably. De Quincey explains the 
phenomenon as “dream formed itself mysteriously within dream” (170). He further utilizes the 
imagery of the scene recalled for the re-experience of it: “within these Oxford dreams remoulded 
itself continually [. . .] And now in Oxford all was bound up into unity; the first state and the last 
were melted into each other as in some sunny glorifying haze” (170). Ready comments on 
reproduction as interpretation: “In the Confessions, dreams reproduce ceaselessly interpretable 
phenomena of mental life like Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’ and dramatize the uninterpretable 
power of individual being.”300 Ready recognizes the expansive proliferation De Quincey 
                                                          
300. Ready, 1978, “Magnificent Apparatus,” 49. 
174 
 
expresses of the faculty: “De Quincey’s magnificent apparatus, his reproductive organ, serves the 
dreamer’s life by engendering continual knowledge of just how far his experience extends his 
sympathy with the infinite.”301 The continual remolding, echoes the pursuit of his consciousness, 
“for ever and ever”: “Once again, after twelve years' interval, the nursery of my childhood 
expanded before me” (169). But the scene and figures, while appearing “once again,” “now 
dilated to colossal proportions”: “my sister was moaning in bed; I was beginning to be restless 
with fears not intelligible to myself” (169). In his Oxford dreams, his first opium dreams, the 
scene most impactful, the singularly contracted involute in the shaft of his psyche, expands to 
amplified dimensions.  
Dreams actualize virtual experience, (or perhaps remembrances—or, perhaps both 
simultaneously), as do recollections. De Quincey experiences “once again,” creating a 
simultaneity with his past self.  “The Bergsonian theory of simultaneity,” explains Deleuze, 
“tends to confirm the conception of duration as the virtual coexistence of all the degrees of a 
single and identical time.” 302 Note the similarity in a passage from Suspiria: “In a moment, in 
the twinkling of an eye, every act, every design of [. . .] past life, lived again, arraying 
themselves not as a succession, but as parts of a coexistence [. . .] the simultaneity of 
arrangement under which the past events of life, though in fact successive, had formed their 
dread line of revelation” (176). The uncanny parallels demonstrate clearly De Quincey’s 
divergent interests as offering something new. De Quincey explains the successive sequence 
thought of as time as plastic depending on perspective. Time is virtual with all points on the line 
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as coexisting. Simultaneity simply exposes the correspondence of different experiences. “In 
reality, duration divides up and does so constantly,” explains Deleuze, adding: “That is why it is 
a multiplicity [. . .] In other words, the subjective, or duration, is the virtual [. . .] actualization 
comes about through differentiation.”303 Luhmann’s sense of communicative difference for 
maintaining a system’s processes approaches the concepts of difference in a similarly positive 
sense as Deleuze’s repetitious replication. To merge the ideas, the system and its operations 
might indeed be virtual, actualized in each replication, differentiated for unity. The underlying 
discourse of the involutes of experience is multiplicity and the virtual, in a highly Deleuzian 
sense of these terms, particularly in his sense of difference and repetition.304 The involute, for De 
Quincey, encapsulates the metaphoric clustering of meaning that establishes both the virtual and 
manifold nature of experience. 
Here Deleuze’s discussion of grounding seems evocative of De Quincey’s reproductive 
faculty as poetic imagination in his narrative: “To ground [. . .] is to represent the present — in 
other words, to make the present arrive and pass within representation (finite or infinite).”305 “In 
fact to ground is always to bend, to curve and recurve — to organize the order of the seasons, the 
days and years,” Deleuze continues.306 When compared to De Quincey’s involute, “the object of 
the claim (the quality, difference),” that Deleuze grounds, “finds itself placed in a circle; the arcs 
of the circle are distinguished to the extent that the ground establishes moments of stasis within 
qualitative becomings, stoppages in between the two extremes of more and less.”307 De 
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Quincey’s involutes spiral and operate between Bergson’s virtuality and Deleuzian memory, the 
ideas of multiplicity, as well as repetition and difference, and the virtual—all invoked directly or 
indirectly by De Quincey. De Quincey places his sense of consciousness as always within a 
temporal motion. Following the phenomenological vein, Sha points to other Romantic senses of 
motion: “Because physics then increasingly emphasized the dynamism of matter, physicists thus 
are hardly necessarily engaged in the process of freezing being, as Merleau-Ponty charged.”308 
Consciousness is a matrix of experience and recollection, of recalling past presents into the 
present for correlation. Consciousness is palimpsestuous as well as involuted. His ideas place 
him not only in relation to Deleuze building off Bergson, but among other post-modernist 
metaphysics, including Derrida’s conceptions of Husserl’s dialectic of internal time-
consciousness. The dialectic is one of protention and retention within the living present—as 
Derrida explains, “what seems the utmost importance to Husserl is as much an operation 
(reactivation itself as the ability to open a hidden historical field) as the nature of the field itself 
(as the possibility of something like reactivation).”309 De Quincey’s use of narrative to represent 
the reproductive processes of recollection manipulates narratological time in order to permit 
simultaneity rather than strict succession. The hidden historical field, or the virtual event, draws 
attempts to actualize it, dually excavate it. Derrida, whose concerns advance a more language-
based exploration, speaks to De Quincey’s dual systems of his memory and his narrative.  
Even the perplexed combinations of thoughts and feelings present in involutes are located 
in language. As Bachelard states the interdisciplinary idea of language’s primacy: “As a general 
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thesis I believe that everything specifically human in man is logos.”310 Bachelard echoes 
Bergson’s sense of creation, but also of sublimation: “One would not be able to mediate in a 
zone that preceded language.”311 Ready points to a similar effect in De Quincey, when “the 
reproductive faculty shows itself again as power—personal, definitively indefinite.”312 Ready 
locates the primary process in De Quincey’s image-language, “which consciousness of one’s 
own life reads without discursive understanding.”313 Discursive understanding, a dialectic 
between different stages or selves, provides the same trajectory, as Bergson, positioning memory 
before image. For De Quincey’s memory-text of the mind, language, the word, is foremost; the 
mind’s re-production of experience must actualize the virtuality in language. This preconscious 
state, whether pre-logos or pre-apprehension, underscores the contingency of involutes—
thoughts and feelings—upon language. In other words, or rather Bachelard’s, the “poetic image, 
which stems from the logos,”314 directs the involute, back to a linguistically—rhetorically and 
discursively—predetermined structure and behavior, or involute networks of associations. 
The sense of communication, like experience, as an experience or event, to use 
Luhmann’s systems terminology, parallels the relationship of the virtual and the actual in De 
Quincey’s involutes. “Without the ultimate objectification that writing permits,” Derrida explains 
of discourse and dialogue, “all language would as yet remain captive of the de facto and actual 
intentionality of the speaking subject or community of speaking subjects.”315 Derrida aims to 
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translate “Husserl’s exacting effort to catch the ideality of thematic sense and of words [mots] in 
their relations with the linguisitic event.”316 “By absolutely virtualizing dialogue,” Derrida 
continues, “writing creates a kind of autonomous transcendental field from which every present 
subject can be absent.”317 The reading experience of writing, then, actualizes the virtual. “This 
‘being of the book,’ this ‘instance of printed thought’ whose ‘language is not natural,’ Gaston 
Bachelard calls a ‘bibliomenon.’” (Derrida, 91).318 The reproducibility and representation depend 
upon both difference and differánce.  
 Actualization is différance—to both differ and defer. Involutes in the concrete layered 
palimpsest embody the cyclicality of narrative signification actualized from the virtual 
compound/concrete memory. To add to the work on palimpsests and De Quincey’s palimpsestic 
brain, Derrida’s différance permeates the palimpsestic layers of psychological imprints of 
repeated memory, a proliferation of meaning and iterations or inscriptions of recollection. 
Derrida’s inscribed exergue resembles De Quincey’s palimpsest in several ways. The two-fold 
relevance of archive theory (proliferating layers of re-inscription (of Derrida) as well as a 
‘system of discursivity’ (Foucault’s archive) resonates with both the structure of the palimpsest 
and the behavior of inscription as well as the convulsion of wheeling destabilized movement and 
meaning. When Jacques Derrida explores a psychoanalytical 'impression' of archives (in Archive 
Fever), his discussions of inscriptions and imprints echo De Quincey. In following Hanold's 
interest in Pompeii and “the possibility of the archiving trace,” Derrida expresses the complexity 
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of “[s]eparating the impression from the imprint.”319 The palimpsest suggests “correlative 
spaces” rather than “unbroken linearity,” concepts Michel Foucault demonstrates in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge.320 The sections of De Quincey’s essay demonstrate the differences 
between recollections of one moment, and additionally, his associations manifest as narrative 
digressions which defer his ever fully excavating the entire memory in all its ‘perplexed’ 
complexity, combinations, or entangled concrete impressions.  
 Differentiation offers additional implications in the Derridian sense of differance. “In 
Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary 
impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which 
concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary from of repetition which is fully 
positive and affirmative: “differentiation is [. . .] a creation, and that difference is [. . .] 
essentially positive and creative.”321  “Ultimately, then, De Quincey is against interpretation,” 
argues Ready: “Rhetoric is a discursive mode, but the possibility yet inheres in it of signaling the 
intuition of infinity, power, dreams; but even that possibility of rhetorical movement towards 
intuition is overcome.”322 Ready argues that, “in another sense, the division in the Opium-Eater 
is between what De Quincey’s essay ‘Rhetoric’ calls ‘the discursive and the intuitive acts of the 
mind. ’”323 In a way that recalls Russett’s idea of synecdochal readings of De Quincey, Ready 
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elaborates on De Quincey’s description of the subject as applicable to the essay itself: “In that 
work discourse is carried on ‘discurrendo,’--by running about to the right and the left, laying the 
separate notices together, and thence mediately deriving some third apprehension.’”324 
Moreover, the collapse of sequence is clear when Ready elaborates on De Quincey’s sense of 
temporality, “to be distinguished from the immediacy of intuition, such as that of God, for whom 
all truth reaches, ‘simultaneously, first and last, without successive time or partition of acts.’”325  
The caducean shape De Quincey develops in Suspiria, while doubling for the sequel, points 
toward the applicability of involutes and his underlying philosophy.    
De Quincey’s concept is aligned with Deleuze’s Bergsonism: “an immemorial Memory 
or pure past, a past which itself was never present but which causes the present to pass, and in 
relation to which all the presents coexist in a circle.”326 Similar to simultaneity, Deleuze states 
“compossibility itself is a circle of convergence on which are distributed all the points of view, 
all the presents of which the world is composed.”327  Deleuze’s “mobile circle” sounds very 
much akin to De Quincey’s involute. De Quincey already thwarted linearity in Confessions, 
which, according to Ready, of “the final two dreams,” if “the use-quester attempts to see them as 
emblems sufficiently prepared for by the previous linear narrative,” the dreams, in fact, “finish 
nothing.”328 “Their mystery,” Ready argues, “is that of the redeeming non-sequitur, confusing 
each attempt to view them solely from their determinants.”329 The mathematical involute even 
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bares relation to Gilles Deleuze’s ‘tangent’ curve, ‘curvilinear’ movement, and his idea of 
Leibniz’s infinity ‘fold,’ senses building toward the continual state of subjects as ever-becoming, 
to which De Quincey’s involutes seem even more akin.330 Relevant to Deleuze's assemblage, 
consisting of palimpsest sedimentation and consciousness cyclicality that produces both 
centrifugal and centripetal tensions. De Quincey's involutes of experience underscores "the 
image, the memorial, the record” (143-4) —invokes archival aspects of memory,331 with concern 
for time and durée, in tandem with Deleuze’s sense of a “mobile circle” of “becomings” wherein 
“all the presents coexist in a circle.”332 De Quincey understands memory as the intersection and 
coexistence of experience, of the mind, and of the act of remembering. 
 Narrative repetitions, similar to recollection processes, in effect embody a virtual 
memory, actualize the virtual through differentiation. An involute experience—compound and 
concrete—is virtual; each recollection actualizes fragments of a complete memory record. 
Analysis of the structure of De Quincey’s essay yields insights not only from his awareness of 
external theories (such as Piranesi’s architectonics explored by Curtis Perry333) but De Quincey’s 
own attention to his narrative principles connected to his theory of involutes. De Quincey’s 
narrative may very well attempt to trace or recollect the involutes concentric to this one foci, of 
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his surreptitiously visiting his deceased sister’s body laid out in her bedchamber, with each 
section of his fragmented essay entangling and circling back upon it. His endeavor vastly 
exceeds the aims by offering the involute schema and model of experience as a type of reading, 
involute reading, a process necessary to recognize a narrative modeling involute experience. 
 De Quincey’s ability to think in involutes becomes a philosophy of involutes. By tracing 
common threads in Riemann’s multiplicity of points and surfaces, Deleuze’s Bergsonism, as well 
as interdisciplinary contributions by Foucault and Derrida, ideas of multiplicity toward narrative 
and discourse become more readily available to literary studies. The narratology of De Quincey’s 
essay demonstrates its discourse: the ‘sighs from the depths’ in the remembrance of a moment 
encrusted—or perhaps crystalized—by the strata of a palimpsestic memory. Through the 
behavior and structure of the dreaming faculty, De Quincey’s involute reveals his prescient sense 
of human existence within “counter forces of corresponding magnitude [. . .] that shall radiate 
centrifugally against the storm of life so perilously centripetal toward the vortex of the merely 
human” (130). Thomas De Quincey’s theory of memory operations, of involutes, anticipates, or 
even marks, a new episteme: thinking in and producing texts operating in layers, in archives, in 
cycles, in palimpsests, in systems, in non-linearity, in rhizomes, and invoking De Quincey’s 









Part Two – Involute Media and Involute Methods 
 
 The second part of this dissertation moves toward a methodology for involute analysis. 
Part One establishes Thomas De Quincey's concept of involutes in relation to his own conceptual 
models and in the context of several fields. The resulting material and textual objects of 
experience, involutes, provide the structural operations of thought and narrative, of memory and 
remembrance, of consciousness and dreams. In Part Two, having explored De Quincey's 
recognition that dreams and memories are texts that require interpretation, I explore the 
process(es) he outlines involved in re-collecting, re-producing, or reading memory. 
 Involutes are more than tangential—they are interlocking, entangling. Having anchored 
the concept in contexts beyond the figurative, De Quincey's involute demonstrates a destabilizing 
effect on the concrete. With systems theory and virtual philosophy, De Quincey's involutes 
suggest a dialectical matrix perpetually communicating between lines of actualization and 
counter-actualization. De Quincey’s conceptualization of involutes provides a dialectic beyond 
the simply cyclical: the involute reconciles the relational structure with the interstices of 
meaning, it reconciles the decentered subject with their observational determinacy on uncertain 
objects and behaviors (without and within themselves). The involute simultaneously actualizes 
and counter-actualizes the virtual in archive and its traces. 
 Involute analysis is the formal method I propose for Thomas De Quincey’s involute 
reading practices. De Quincey reads his memory-text with the recursion of involutes. Applying 
this awareness toward the latter portions of Suspiria de Profundis (including "The English Mail-
Coach") illuminates the patterns the serial essay captures. Rather than static images or cinematic 
frames, involutes are dimensionally compound and perplexingly entangling objects for ordering 
existence. They pattern themselves, as do fractals, into larger formations. From De Quincey’s 
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reading of his memory-text, all texts become viable objects for the same analytical method. As a 
medium, involutes impact their procedures and formulaic analysis of their functioning. Involutes 
operate the systems without and within the text and the reader. 
 Yet, even as De Quincey recognized memory and narrative intersecting at points of 
meaning, the systems of interaction are not always apparent. Associations and meaning may 
interplay through juxtaposition by elusive agencies, entangle with oscillating undercurrents, and 
recur elsewhere with algorithmic functioning. The structural implications of involute systems 
form the basic methodological level of involute analysis. The untraceable tethered properties De 
Quincey locates in his own readerly associations demonstrate the layered and dueling trajectories 
within any node of meaning or signification. De Quincey revises the typical literary figuring of 
antagonism as relations, contradictions even, that are not oppositional but complementary. The 
involute system accommodates multiple trajectories from interacting systems and sub-systems. 













Chapter Three: Central Forces and Inextricably Entangled Systems of Involutes 
 
The Oxford visions, of which some have been given, were but anticipations 
necessary to illustrate the glimpse opened of childhood (as being its reaction). In 
this Second part, returning from that anticipation, I retrace an abstract of my 
boyish and youthful days, so far as they furnished or exposed the germs of later 
experiences in worlds more shadowy. 
 
Upon me, as upon others scattered thinly by tens and twenties over every 
thousand years, fell too powerfully and too early the vision of life. The horror of 
life mixed itself already in earliest youth with the heavenly sweetness of life; that 
grief, which one in a hundred has sensibility enough to gather from the sad 
retrospect of life in its closing stage, for me shed its dews as a prelibation upon' 
the fountains of life whilst yet sparkling to the morning sun. I saw from afar and 
from before what I was to see from behind.  
    Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 188 
 
         
 Thomas De Quincey begins “Part II” by reflecting on the necessities of narrative that 
parallel the operations of experience and memory. De Quincey anticipates his audience and the 
requisite groundwork for their understanding—but in order to do so he must look both forward 
and backward, must excavate the strata as he lays the foundations. Correspondingly, experiences 
become “anticipations” of future events. For him, “the vision of life” is the revelation of “the 
horror of life mixed [. . .] with the heavenly sweetness of life,” a combination that “shed its dews 
as a prelibation upon the foundations of life whilst yet sparkling to the morning sun.” The 
combination becomes one of sublime loss and trauma of “that grief,” which, “fell too powerfully 
and too early,” on him. As a result, his narrative digresses in approaching his coining memory, 
then employs the remaining narrative as a retracing of it. The procedure appears to be 
observation from points of future effects upon the past causal events: “the glimpse opened of 
childhood (as being its reaction).” Recollection and narrative move to collapse the span of space 
and time between these interlinear points; yet, these trajectories and perspectives collide. 
Newton’s third law, of equal and opposite reactions, assists the dual trajectory of colliding 
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objects and forces, or relatedly, of De Quincey’s own recollections. Having inherited a world 
aware of these and other physical properties, De Quincey can focus on relational interaction 
while also concerning himself with the interspaces when arraying such lines, such as Leibniz’s 
arrangements of linear equations later referred to as a matrix (the term coined by James Sylvester 
in 1850).334 Matrices and operators, both concepts that De Quincey’s near contemporary, the 
mathematician Joseph Fourier develops, provide the means of solving complex equations and 
functions through intermediate functions, ideas which span algebra and geometric modeling and 
structuring of time. De Quincey spans diverse fields when he engages the concepts of reactive 
relations and intermedial communications. 
 De Quincey’s narrative extends a mnemonic matrix, simultaneously reproducing and 
compensating for his past trauma. Distinguishing De Quincey’s coining point (or Cp)—Suspiria 
de Profundis’ case study for all experiences—along the curve’s line of remembrance from the 
line of experience isolates a point of intersection, recursion, and curvature permitting one point to 
become several, of a course to be layered as manifold. The remembrance involute (or Ri), assists 
to isolate various recollection points (Rp), returning to the coining point (Cp), which crosscuts 
other points, vectors, and involutes juxtaposed in archival palimpsestuousness. These systems are 
possible in the involutive structures of the mind and narrative, both involute texts, each with the 
involutive processes of the participatory, archival recorder and the observing-re-experiencer. 
Einsteinian physics, pivoting on the concept of relativity, recognizes the relative position of the 
observer and that which is observed—De Quincey struggles with the same positional roles in the 
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process of recollection and narration. De Quincey’s schematic of involute moments permits the 
gravitation of past and future experiences toward nodes of signification. In a similar fashion, 
involution plays a role in the differential equations crucial to Einstein’s spacetime-bending 
gravity. Modern physics grapples with the condensing of dimensions, data, and spaces into 
compact or reduced, yet, further complicated planes. De Quincey’s ontology, embedded rather 
than explicitly stated, invests in mathematic concepts and principles related to involutes that 
remain relevant for contemporary scientific and philosophical understandings of the world.  
 De Quincey’s involute memory is consonant with the involutive properties found in 
differential equations and topology, spacetime, and calculus on manifolds—advancements from 
the energy-matter relationship in physics which both applies the term involute to describe when 
mass reaches zero at the velocity of light and also when raising a number to any power, in other 
words, to approach an unreachable infinity.335 Involutes as De Quincey conceives them, permits 
those parallel contradictions including complete record and inaccessibility, of separation yet 
entanglement, and his involute system relies on language to explore these paradoxes. Language 
captures experience, facilitating the palimpsest of memory; yet, the involute system that utilizes 
language also operates within language. And due to that relationship, language provides a model 
for understanding involute properties. De Quincey’s interest in language certainly informs his 
nomenclature of involutes. In fact, the aspects De Quincey distinguishes in his involutes directly 
reflect his linguistic concerns, which are the primary influences for the operation and concepts of 
involutes beyond their mathematic cooption at the time of his coining. 
 De Quincey’s philological leanings and aptitude apply commensurate manifoldness from 
language and discourse to his understanding of the world. De Quincey’s involutes are part of his 
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latent lingual investigations, his efforts to parameterize language in order to describe memory, 
functions within memory, and correlate functions in the variables of the involute system. De 
Quincey positions his concept at a juncture of seemingly disparate areas, the sciences and 
humanities. His key terminology holds a liminal position from involution’s role in logic: 
nonclassical logic applies the term involute to a negation that satisfies the law of double 
negation, which Boolean algebra extends to the operation of complement (as found in Augustus 
De Morgan’s laws of modern formal logic, the applications of which include set theory, electoral 
and computer engineering, and even text searching).336 The ubiquitous use of language for 
systemic functions, and vice versa, demonstrates a disciplinary intersection De Quincey furthers 
with involutes. Involutory functions, from circles to cyphers to group theory, return to the 
starting point when the function is applied twice,337 demonstrating further relational properties 
De Quincey explores in language. De Quincey, in effect, merges or reunites these two distinct 
areas of inquiry—language and mathematics. De Quincey broadly applies mathematic 
conceptual modeling to language. When he applies linguistic phenomena to mathematics, his 
memory theory approaches metaphysical explanations of the memory and reality. De Quincey’s 
philosophical leanings align him with similarly cross-disciplinary philosophies, particularly those 
of Deleuze, Foucault, and Ricoeur, each of whom ground their work in language and science.  
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 De Quincey’s involute offers a view of memory and language that demonstrates both 
through contemporary sciences with aspects that resemble those in his metaphysics. As a 
byproduct, involutes provide a means of appreciating contemporary science as an extension of 
linguistic (and mnemonic) properties. De Quincey’s encodes the circumstances of Elizabeth’s 
death with deeper signification due to previous shared elements, a pattern to which it adds and 
further involutes. By appreciating the textual medium of the mind as manifold, De Quincey 
transfers the mathematic topological properties of foliation, the geometric tool for understanding 
manifold equivalence relation or one-to-one correspondence as continuous transformation (or 
homeomorphism) and maintained distances (or isometry), to language. De Quincey’s 
palimpsestuous memory-narrative permits local analytic solutions based upon relational context. 
Memory is predisposed by prior experiences. De Quincey does more than invoke involutes with 
a prescience of their place in modern physics, geometry, and related specialized mathematics. 
Eigenvectors, for instance, reply upon the same diminishing field as textual-discursive context 
offers meaning in communication systems, in language. More specific to De Quincey’s 
terminology, continuities of involution assist in correlating and distributing foliated vector 
spaces, making manifoldness more readily understood.338 Involutive distributions are the tangent 
spaces to foliations, the groupings that break manifolds into simply interacting, parallel 
submanifolds or tangent bundles.339  More significant tangent bundles issuing from De 
Quincey’s RI (remembrance involute) render in Suspiria’s narrative through recursive imagery. 
Of those discussed thus far, the example of the shaft (caduceus, burial, psychical injury) and 
passage (textual extract, death, transition) demonstrate a semiosis pairing of tangent bundles: the 
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shaft and passage share synonymity. Their layered meaning along the lines of remembrance and 
experience demonstrates distinct but related meaning from the context of the CP or coining 
memory and various Rp returning to it. De Quincey transmutes these properties in light of the 
operations of language in capturing, coding, and expressing relational meaning between layers or 
foliations of experience. For this chapter, the flight of the waterfowl points out another parallel 
submanifold, as do sight, sighs, and depths, each offering a narrow vector of meaning as a 
distinct bundle while also intersecting the broader encompassing foliations of the entire RI and 
essay.  
 Suspiria de Profundis’ analysis of the coefficients (opium on dreams and his childhood 
afflicted faculty of memory), necessitates De Quincey reviewing the cognitive framework that 
exacerbates the impact of Elizabeth’s death on him then and afterwards. The “worlds more 
shadowy” resemble the “fearful realities” of preternatural dreaming: “power [. . .] not merely for 
exalting the colors of dream-scenery, but for deepening its shadows; and, above all, for 
strengthening the sense of its fearful realities” (131). Deepened shadows in dreams serve to 
reinforce the impressions of impactful experience on the future. Plural realities, a sense of the 
multiplicity that one involute provides, recalls the simultaneity operating in the human system 
when even retrospect and foresight become a unity.  
 Yet, De Quincey’s reversionary motions thwart any straight linear trajectory: “I saw from 
afar and from before what I was to see from behind.” He finds a stabilizing continuity in 
foresight and hindsight that reaffirms both rather than conflating them. In fact, what seems an 
opposition is apposition: “the confluence of the mighty and terrific discords with the subtle 
concords” (188). De Quincey explains the relations, “not by contrast, or as reciprocal foils, do 
these elements act, which is the feeble conception of many, but by union” (188). He elaborates 
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that, “they are the sexual forces in music: ‘male and female created he them;’ and these mighty 
antagonists do not put forth their hostilities by repulsion, but by deepest attraction” (188). There 
is an interlocking, relational necessity between what might otherwise seem antagonistic binaries. 
His own case provides rare extremes of the human system. The first part of Suspiria lays the 
foundations of the second part: “returning from that anticipation, I retrace an abstract of my 
boyish and youthful days, so far as they furnished or exposed the germs of later experiences in 
worlds more shadowy.” Involutes pervade Thomas De Quincey’s nascent theoretical method for 
self-analysis of memory and dreams—and now narrative: 
As ‘in to−day already walks to−morrow,’ so in the past experience of a youthful 
life may be seen dimly the future. The collisions with alien interests or hostile 
views, of a child, boy, or very young man, so insulated as each of these is sure to 
be, those aspects of opposition which such a person can occupy, are limited by the 
exceedingly few and trivial lines of connection along which he is able to radiate 
any essential influence whatever upon the fortunes or happiness of others. 
Circumstances may magnify his importance for the moment; but, after all, any 
cable which he carries out upon other vessels is easily slipped upon a feud arising. 
Far otherwise is the state of relations connecting an adult or responsible man with 
the circles around him, as life advances. The network of these relations is a 
thousand times more intricate, the jarring of these intricate relations a thousand 
times more frequent, and the vibrations a thousand times harsher which these 
jarrings diffuse. This truth is felt beforehand misgivingly and in troubled vision, 
by a young man who stands upon the threshold of manhood.   (188-189) 
 
The human system operates within an environment: “the state of relations connecting an adult or 
responsible man with the circles around him.” Again the involute informs the concentric image 
De Quincey offers of self. As a result of an individual’s concentricity, “collisions with alien 
interests” on the child “so insulated” can create “aspects of opposition.” “The network of these 
relations […] a thousand times more intricate,” signals that the system operates and consists of 
involutes. The social relationship offers exchange with the system and its environment that “are 
limited by the exceedingly few and trivial lines of connection along which he is able to radiate 
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any essential influence.” The social-individual relationship is a primary application of system 
theory, though the sense of self as plural, as selves, operates in a similar part-whole sense of 
system. 
 De Quincey’s own difficulties during his years of education are the subtext in his 
otherwise general description of the maturing self (“upon the threshold of manhood” and the 
epiphanies of such an initiation) within a social network (188). This sense of the “intricate 
relations” and “vibrations” diffused by jarrings on any “cable which he carries out upon other 
vessels” connecting him to the world, offers an image that resonates with the digital age but 
exposes the roots of network (from the Anglo-Saxon, both parts being both noun and verb, 
suggesting the process and action, of ensnaring with mesh of cords or threads)340 and the 
vestigial characteristics and linguistic lineages ever at work—of which De Quincey makes note. 
 De Quincey’s attention turns to language: the language of dreams, based upon the 
language of the mind or how the mind creates or networks, associations that organize experience 
and understanding. Translation is the procedure De Quincey likens to dream reproduction of 
imagery. By moving away from a strictly psychoanalytical sense of condensation in dreams, and 
by redirecting analysis to De Quincey’s linguistic concerns, the stakes of semiotics underscore 
language as the system De Quincey models for memory. Memory and dreams are like languages, 
function as language does, and the system(s) within which these two languages coexist must 
translate in ways resembling communication models. The properties De Quincey accepts for 
active mental languages shares concerns but quite different approaches to language, particularly 
when in conversation between the layers of sedimented memory and dreams. What De Quincey 
might invoke as an ordered system of language can also behave as unpredictably as language 
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systems often do, and which he demonstrates in the behavior of his streams of consciousness in 
narrative digressions. Metaphor theory investigates language aspects that hold the unexpected 
generative properties of colliding meaning, of entangling involutes, in ways that appreciate the 
manifold—speaking to the calculus and geometry of manifolds—or structure of memory, 
thought, and narrative.   
 De Quincey draws upon preconceived notions of language. He also develops a working 
appreciation of language operations through his study of involutes of memory. The semiotic 
work of Umberto Eco and Paul Ricoeur, isolating issues of interpretation, guides Section I which 
addresses Thomas De Quincey’s interest in translation. Semiotics and translation theory provide 
a framework for De Quincey’s view of language as a model for memory systems, and, 
secondarily, returns the issues of De Quincey’s involute back to differential topography or issues 
of parameterizing sub-routines. A different approach, linking metaphor theory and systems 
principles, to questions of language assists to expose further involute operations in De Quincey. 
Section 2 approaches the unconscious juxtapositions, palimpsestuous or archival interactions 
through the relational operations of metaphor and its related theories. Section 3 shifts the focus 
further to De Quincey’s linguistic interests in narrative, including internal narrative, with some 
parallels to operator theory (specifically linked to matrices, including the work of Leibniz, 
Sylvester and Fourier) in mathematics. The tensions of consciousness here, in conjunction with 
De Quincey’s involute, help to explain approaches to understanding differential implications 
beyond mathematics and spacetime, beyond science. The result in De Quincey is an appreciation 





Section 1: Translation and Visual-Linguistic Networks 
 
The principle of interpretation says that “a sign is something by knowing we 
know something more” (Peirce). The Peircean idea of semiosis is the idea of an 
infinite process of interpretation. It seems that the symbolic mode is the 
paramount example of this possibility… The Peircean notion of semiosis … 
provides a theoretical tool for identifying, according to different semiosis 
processes, a continuum of intermediate positions …     
    Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus (1997), 3 
 
The approaches to language operations found in semiotics demonstrates some key 
features De Quincey presumes language to have in order to use it as a model for systematic 
functioning. In devising involutes as the principle units of his philosophy, the linguistic (and 
visual) signs and images De Quincey discusses, attending to language patterns, become 
analogous to each other: sensory-experiential data mingles with synonymous motifs (whether 
personal/idiosyncratic or literary/traditional). Moreover, his focus shifts visual-linguistic 
relations to the forefront, identifying the human system (experience, memory, recollection, 
narration) as comprised of relational subsystems operating at different levels within the network. 
De Quincey’s involute is still the basic unit within the visual-linguistic network, only now visual 
and linguistic involutes layer to manifest in narrative the subsystems of human experience.  
De Quincey philologically anchors his discussion throughout Suspiria de Profundis, most 
strikingly in his etymological analysis from the portion entitled, “Levana and Our Ladies of 
Sorrow.” The ancient Roman figure of Levana underscores a link between definitive associations 
he has categorized with his sister Elizabeth. In the image of Levana, the seemingly tangential 
elements for his recollection involute (issuing the coining memory, culminating in his trance 
while viewing Elizabeth’s dead body) De Quincey provides contextual associations with 
education and grief. A figure “oftentimes” in his Oxford dreams, known to him “by her Roman 
symbols,” “ennobling” of new-born infants “that grandeur which belongs to man everywhere,” 
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“as proxy for the goddess Levana […] raised it upright […] and presented its forehead to the 
world” (177). “This symbolic act,” De Quincey explains, much like the figure herself, “that 
mysterious lady, who never revealed her face (except to me in dreams), but always acted by 
delegation, had her name from the Latin verb (as still it is the Italian verb) levare, to raise aloft” 
(177). Not only does De Quincey recognize an element of his scholastic retelling that “might 
bear different interpretations,” he links the etymological and linguistic connotations: “hence it 
has arisen that some people have understood by Levana the tutelary power that controls the 
education of the nursery” (177).  In the introduction of the figure he evokes several key images, 
yet just as significantly, he demonstrates the operations of language in naming and building 
networks of cognates and broader connotations (cultural or individual): 
She therefore watches over human education. Now, the word educo, with the 
penultimate short, was derived (by a process often exemplified in the 
crystallization of languages) from the word educo, with the penultimate long. 
Whatsoever educes, or develops, educates. By the education of Levana, therefore, 
is meant, not the poor machinery that moves by spelling−books and grammars, 
but by that mighty system of central forces hidden in the deep bosom of human 
life, which by passion, by strife, by temptation, by the energies of resistance, 
works forever upon children, resting not day or night, any more than the mighty 
wheel of day and night themselves, whose moments, like restless spokes, are 
glimmering forever as they revolve.   (177-8) 
      
De Quincey adds a note, crediting the image of glimmering spokes to Wordsworth,341 clarifying 
that, “less would it become a philosopher to covet other people’s images” (178). As a 
philosopher, De Quincey may indeed suggest the evocative nature of images and language in his 
philosophical foundations. The concentric image of the wheel and the net of spokes issuing out 
                                                          
341.  See, for comparison, Wordsworth’s “A Night’s Piece” (Complete Poetical Works, 1888), lines 13-26: “The 
clear Moon, and the glory of the heavens. / There, in a black-blue vault she sails along, / Followed by multitudes of 
stars, that, small / And sharp, and bright, along the dark abyss / Drive as she drives: how fast they wheel away, Yet 
vanish not!--the wind is in the tree, / But they are silent;--still they roll along / Immeasurably distant; and the vault, / 
Built round by those white clouds, enormous clouds, / Still deepens its unfathomable depth. / At length the Vision 
closes; and the mind, / Not undisturbed by the delight it feels, / Which slowly settles into peaceful calm, / Is left to 
muse upon the solemn scene.” 
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“restless,” once again reinforces the involute as the principle in the “mighty system of central 
forces” (177). Involute structure dictates operations, which far exceed the “poor machinery” of 
dictionaries or grammars. The “mighty system of central forces” operates on involutes, “not the 
poor machinery that moves by spelling-books and grammars,” but the complexity of language. 
In fact, the system, “resting not,” consists of activity “day or night,” thereby implicating the 
languages of various states of mind, including dreams (177). “A process often exemplified in the 
crystallization of language,” is De Quincey’s articulation of living languages growing, in the 
sense of concretizing cognates, extending or actualizing virtual meaning contained in one word 
into new related forms (177).  De Quincey’s nascent semiotics in Suspiria de Profundis 
recognizes semantic systems and their interaction in his memory processes. De Quincey, when 
introducing Levana, includes this footnote:  
This it may be said, requires a corresponding duration of experience; but as an 
argument for this mysterious power lurking in our nature, I may remind the reader 
of one phenomenon open to the notice of every body, viz. the tendency of very 
aged persons to throw back and concentrate the light of their memory upon scenes 
from early childhood, as to which they recall many traces had faded even to 
themselves in middle life, whilst they often forget altogether the whole 
intermediate stages of their experience. This shows that naturally, and without 
violent agencies, the human brain is by tendency a palimpsest. (177) 
 
“Duration of experience,” can operate “without violent agencies,” as in his case, and “naturally” 
as “mysterious power lurking in our nature”: “by passion, by strife . . . by the energies of 
resistance,” the human system moves and operates, as do the traces on the palimpsest: 
“moments, like restless spokes are glimmering forever as they revolve.” Suspiria de Profundis 
patterns these. His adult apprehension, derived from the matrix of childhood afflictions and 
opium effects, includes an attention to language along similar frameworks to those offered by 
Umberto Eco and Paul Ricoeur for the philosophy of language. Their language inquiries, each 
building on semiotics, arrives at narrative, a subdivision of linguistic study. Narrative, however, 
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uses language for its signage within its own grammar, syntax, and generic routines. A study of a 
system run on (or structured by) language lends analysis crucial to the mental systems within De 
Quincey—obviously vital for his narrative, Suspiria, but also the ways he uses narrative to 
reciprocally investigate the concepts it renders. Connecting narrative and hermeneutics, as Eco 
and Ricoeur do in their distinct ways, De Quincey exposes his memory systems as operating on 
entangling lines of remembrance and lines of experience. Mental system(s) and narrative 
system(s) duly operate on language, now appreciated by De Quincey as involute. Involute 
language impacts all systems and media participating in its operations. Couching De Quincey’s 
concept in new media’s sense of the text (predominantly digital), to which it rightly belongs, the 
text or textual system consists of the layers or subsystems beneath the immediate interface.  
In Suspiria de Profundis, De Quincey pauses in approaching his coining memory to 
explain his visual-linguistic predispositions that impact the signification of the experience. Eco’s 
locus of semiotics, cognition, and metaphysics is the sign; De Quincey’s is the involute—
nonetheless, a distinct semiotic unit (or sign) for specific intricate interrelations. De Quincey’s 
linguistic interests, while not extensively semantics, or a study of signs and what they stand for, 
is invested in both the syntactics or syntax between signs, which for De Quincey are involutes in 
structure and behavior. Involutes may transfer between discourse, language, and thought, though 
involutes then operate uniquely in each area, or each textual system. Following his interests in 
media, he examines the medium of thought (the involute) in relation to the units of language and 
discourse. De Quincey already established the organizing principles of his narrative as 
contingent on the law or purpose of a work. Language provides an organizational comparison 
while also functioning as a system within thought. De Quincey’s underlying philosophy of 
involutes extends to his understanding of language as a semantic model and a system within 
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thought and by extension the stages of involute sensibility: experience, memory, recollection, 
narrative. 
The structural relations within involutes (perplexed combinations) and between involutes 
(compound, entangling) allow De Quincey access to a type of pragmatics of memory: De 
Quincey examines the relation of memories to interpreters or his various selves engaged in the 
processes of memory. Reading memory requires De Quincey’s reading of his own languages and 
systems of signs. Over the course of Eco’s work concerning the sign, he co-opts Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s contributions to logic (bridging his philosophy and mathematics): the Peircean semeiotic 
or general theory of signs, for the study of language and communication. Eco’s “Peircean notion 
of semiosis”342 adapts with greater focus on language Peirce’s more mathematic interests. This 
interdisciplinary refocusing suits De Quincey’s much earlier co-option of mathematic principles 
and similar interests in representations. Semiosis is the chain of sign relations issuing when the 
interpreter/-tant of a sign establishes a new starting point for additional sign relations. When Eco 
addresses the Peircean schema, recognizing that “schematism [is] right in the middle of the 
debate on cognitive processes,” Eco invokes the continuum of “intermediate moments” or 
positions for the reader in semiosis processes which develop out of Peirce’s arguing for the 
existences of infinite collections and infinitesimals (or multitudes foundational for differential 
and integral calculus), and even his manifoldness of points.343 Avoiding sophisticated 
                                                          
342. Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition. trans. Alastair McEwen. (1997; 
repr., New York: Harcourt. Brace, 2000), 66-68. 
 
343. Umberto Eco, 2000b, Kant and the Platypus, 7, 114: "The continuum is everything and nothing and therefore 
eludes all determination" (52). See Charles S. Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings. ed. Matthew E. 
Moore (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2010). Peirce’s Reasoning and Logic of Things, suggests still 
unsolved issues for logic and mathematics namely a unique topology of points (wherein an event at a point causes 
the point to become two points), as well as non-Archimediean fields or genuine continua—the application toward 
semiotics is apparent in the discussion: (Charles Sanders Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge 
Conferences Lectures of 1898. ed. Kenneth Laine Letner, intro. Kenneth Laine Ketner and Hilary Putnam. 
[Cambridge (MA): Harvard University: 1992]). For more of his writing, see: Charles S. Peirce, The New Elements of 
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mathematics, as does De Quincey, Eco’s interdisciplinary focus follows, too, what he views as 
“the task of a philosophical discourse … to take another look at Kant’s point of departure and to 
see what group of problems he had been wrestling with, because his experience teaches us 
something too.”344 De Quincey’s philosophical departure, his crystalline involute as the basis of 
thought and language (possibly everything), pivots upon his own experiences and his processes 
for apprehending them. The mathematic and mechanical involute provide De Quincey a model 
he adapts to accommodate complex (and perhaps unpredictable yet predictive) interconnections. 
De Quincey struggles with a distinct set of problems concerning experience, memory, dreams, 
and narrative: the implications and contingencies each has for the other aspect.  
Interconnections and interrelations are key for involutes. De Quincey’s narrative 
caduceus suggests the non-linear topography he develops within the involute. His archive 
palimpsest offers the involute discursive unpredictability through context as well as connotative 
and semantic associations. The inability to isolate or disentangle systems—memory, dreams, 
remembrance, narrative—for individual study underscores the constant relation between them. 
 The human system is not simple; rather, the complexity of the system and subsystems 
operates as a network. The principles of network most evident within De Quincey’s study 
operate in the exchange between visual and linguistic systems: the visual-linguistic 
environmental factors that establish a sign-based semantics and the visual-linguistic expressions 
or significations of his material experiences. If the opium dreams of the sequence of Elizabeth’s 
death (from illness through funeral) is the text, he attempts to trace the semantics of his 
experiences prior to it: these provide the signs of discourse before he can understand the 
                                                          
Mathematics, Volumes 1-3, ed. Carolyn Eisele (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976). See also, Richard 
Milton Martin, Peirce's Logic of Relations and other Studies. (Cinnaminson, NJ: Foris Publications, 1980).  
 
344. Eco, 2000b, Kant and the Platypus, 7. 
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translation between conscious and dream languages. Dream syntactic distortions focus his sense 
of memory grammar. Yet, in order to interpret the meaning of signs and un/conscious utterances 
in memory (specifically that memory sequence), De Quincey’s narrative includes the events after 
the dreams, impacted by the significations of the systems and his larger network of existence. 
Without invoking being or becoming, the phenomenological concerns his metaphysics 
skirts, De Quincey isolates the infinite in the involute—its structure, functioning, processes—
much as Paul Ricoeur argues that the meaning of Being is always mediated. For Ricoeur, human 
existence (Dasien) apprehends self though its own possibilities located outside and other than the 
self.345 Such a sentiment is applicable for De Quincey, who does not directly argue a philosophy, 
but, perhaps hermeneutics, in Ricoeur’s sense of an “art of deciphering indirect meaning.”346 De 
Quincey’s attention to signs and symbols as well as texts and narratives pinpoints a similar 
mediation to that which Ricoeur argues for in the access to self and human identity.  
Suspiria de Profundis allows for De Quincey performing as both author and reader of his 
various selves and memory texts. The same dual role of narrative identity is Ricoeur’s point of 
the plurality of self, other, and language, building off Heidegger’s linguistic aims. From his 
coining of involutes (which “pass to us”), to his study of the Oxford-opium dreams encrypting 
the significances of his coining memory, De Quincey elides the verb and even the self as 
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346. Qtd. in Richard Kearney’s “Introduction: Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Translation” (in 
Paul Ricoeur, On Translation. trans. Eileen Brennan [London: Routledge, 2006], x.). Furthermore, in On 
Translation, Ricoeur expands the idea with the merger of phenomenology and hermeneutics: “That consciousness is 
outside itself, that it is towards meaning before meaning is for it an, above all, before consciousness is for itself: is 
this not what the central discovery of phenomenology implies [. . .] For all consciousness of meaning involves a 
moment of distanciation, a distancing from ‘lived experience’ as purely and simply adhered to. Phenomenology 
begins when, not content to ‘live’ or ‘relive’, we interrupt lived experience in order to signify it. Thus the epoché 




subject—even when defining the human experience, thoughts and feelings pass to the human 
receptor through the involute medium. Heidegger, investigating language phenomenologically, 
remains intrigued by the reflection it holds of Being, “its meaning a vapor.”347 “The absence of 
the verb ‘to be,’ the absence of this single lexeme, is absence itself,” counters Derrida in “The 
Supplement of Copula,” which he then expands in his discussion of the presence/absence 
concerning the archival trance.348 Indeed, De Quincey diverts being and its lexical relative to be 
(Dasein) from his focus. The vaporous trace seems appropriate for De Quincey’s sighs from the 
depths and the interlacing spaces of involute gears. De Quincey locates presence in absence, as 
does Derrida, while recognizing the mediations of presence incapable of direct access.  
The idea of presence does not concern solely De Quincey’s profound trauma over his 
sister but his encrypted self. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger entitles one section, 
“The Grammar and Etymology of ‘Being,’” offering Being “three initial and vividly definite 
meanings: living, emerging, abiding,” whose “meaning have died out, that only an abstract 
meaning, ‘to be,’ has survived.”349 The concrete or “root meanings” that Heidegger identifies in 
the “inner history of precisely this word sein,” redirect the question of language’s arbitrariness, 
suggesting—in his argument—“in their addressing and naming and saying, do not [they] unveil 
arbitrary details in the sphere of the sayable?”350 Of the sayable, or narrating identity, Ricoeur 
                                                          
347. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (1962; repr., Malden: 
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348. Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of the Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics,” in The Georgia Review 30, 
no. 3 (1976): 527-564; 555. 
 
349. Martin Heidegger Introduction to Metaphysics trans. Gregory Fried (2000; repr. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014), 76. 
 
350. Heidegger, 2014, Metaphysics, 77. 
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isolates the very linguistic process that De Quincey does: the paradigm of translation (as 
interpretation and transference). For Ricoeur translation becomes (a) philosophy: “To think, to 
speak is always to translate, even when one speaks to oneself, when one discovers the traces (and 
one cannot subsist without them) of the Other in oneself.”351 In the entangling of involutes, the 
web of self, De Quincey suggests expanding, intricate lines within the networks of meaning that 
are incapable of being disentangled.  
Yet, De Quincey’s appeal to the inexhaustible multiplicity of what might be actualized 
from the virtual provides a distinct attitude toward the interwoven and ever-entwining actuality 
of self as well as language. Ricoeur provides an understanding of self-founding and self-knowing 
an outside or others that assists in appreciating De Quincey’s retrospection. De Quincey 
excavates underlying external languages and reversion to entangling internal languages. The 
involute (its processes and its analysis) demonstrates the multitude of selves at each stage of 
memory.  
In narratologically modeling the dreaming faculty, for a study of memory in dreams that 
recognizes memory as contingent upon the very experience of encoding into memory, De 
Quincey cannot escape, even as he recognizes, the interconnections and contingencies of each 
level of reproduction. Each level simultaneously coexists with the previous stage. This 
interlocking involute structure (the mechanical involute) blurs the parameters, entangles the sub-
systems. Furthermore, the mathematic involute reinforces the spiraling from each point, the new 
cycle of processes commencing with (re-)experiencing. De Quincey’s involute appeals to 
mathematic models and linguistic/narratological reproduction for the infinite actualization of the 
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virtual in all experience. Involutes of experience, the medium of human sensibility, combine to 
form the assemblage otherwise recognized as a text—an involute text. This occurs at each stage.  
In semiotic analysis a text is any message that constructs and is interpreted through conventions 
of a communicative medium. The involute, for De Quincey, is the basic unit. The interpretive 
continuum of actualization in involute (re-)experience does not alter the original, virtual object, 
or suggest the ever-presence of becoming, but differentiates the manifold and involves networks 
of multiplicities, actual and interpretive.  
The involute structure, functioning and processes bring De Quincey’s conception of the 
experience-memory-text in approximate range of the semiotic sign. Eco’s semiotics, in the 
theoretical genealogy of Saussure’s semiology, establishes the sign through the “co-operative [. . 
.] semiotic relevance” concerning code in “both linguistics and information theory;”352 the sign, 
influenced by the communication model, transmits information or communicates a message, 
saying or indicating a thing that the communicator knows and wants others to know as well. The 
inherent arbitrariness of sign-signifier-signified rests on agreed upon meaning or a common code 
between transmitter and the receiver. Eco appeals, in the wake of Jacobson and Luhmann, to 
communication models. An interdisciplinary scope similar to Eco’s is present in De Quincey, 
though his appeals to available terminology helps define his conceptual model.  
De Quincey’s mechanical and geometric involute offers preliminary concepts: 
interlocking gears’ cyclicality offer a perpetual (and leveling) state of transmission between 
transmitter and receiver, whereas, the geometric implicates the issues of signal integrity 
(feedback loops in informational aspects of communication models). De Quincey’s coinage, 
however, implicates the more philological and linguistic facets of involute, particularly concerns 
                                                          




about interpretive manifolds and infinities. Language’s system of signification, to borrow the 
term code, requires conventions and agreed meaning within a common code.353 Yet, the 
conventions of language underscore its limitations, its potential failure in communicating 
intelligible messages or indicating accurately through mediating codes, or, more basically, signs.  
Signs are representations of meaning—already this aligns with De Quincey’s sense of the 
reproductive aspect of the dreaming faculty. Language in its most basic sense is a system of 
communication that assigns agreed upon meaning to signs. In much the same way involution in 
the manifolds and foliations of circles and curves strive to identify groups of homeomorphisms, 
in other words, the accessible patterning for meaning-making in geometrical terms.354 For the 
various codes at work within it, language requires participation between the interlocking gears, 
which relies upon the reduction of space and vectoring through or limiting of available meaning. 
Involutes expose multiplicity but not at the expense of actual, stabilized readings—readings 
simply become infinite. 
 
Language as Involute: Translating Memory, Dream Imagery and Dream Language 
 
De Quincey employs language as the key model for the system of the mind, including 
subsystems (memory, dreams, thought) with separate but related languages, embedded codes, or 
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subroutines. Just as language crystalizes, the processing of involute units or virtual 
experience/memory actualizes. The involute as a basic unit of experience assists De Quincey’s 
theory of memory. Just as aptly as appealing to the caduceus or palimpsest as a metaphor for 
form, consequently also subject and purpose, De Quincey conceives his involute as the vehicle 
that combines thoughts and feelings.  
De Quincey offers an organizing principle to the faculty of dreaming: “in the imagery of 
my dreams, which translated everything into their own language” (132). When delineating the 
three ladies of Sorrow—including one of sighs—who accompany Levana, he applies the medial 
template to parallel dreams and memory: “For already, in my fervent youth, I saw (dimly 
relieved upon the dark back−ground of my dreams) the imperfect lineaments of the awful sisters” 
(178). The relief, much as does an impression, offers a projection of influences he figures; he 
draws attention to his personifications, or “impersonations” he explains as “abstractions 
presented […] as clothed with human attributes of life” (179). Materiality underscores the power 
of images for De Quincey. These ladies are further examples of his impulse to concretize 
“individual sorrow” into something else, “The Sorrows”: “I want a term expressing the mighty 
abstractions that incarnate themselves in all individual sufferings of man’s heart” (179). He is not 
aiming for generalities or universals; the sorrows still speak to his idiosyncratic specifics but 
through a virtual quintessence. Here De Quincey signals his interest in language, memory, and 
narrative move into metaphysical areas. His aim is to concretize, actualize or crystalize in 
language, the abstract, the virtual. Imagery, the collective set of images, in his dreams equates 
with a language with its own signification, though the laws may correlate or translate.  
The language of dreams shares a common grammar with the language of memory. As 
such, a “specific semiotics,” in Eco’s terms, of De Quincey could be possible, but only in light of 
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involutes. Eco suggests that “every specific semiotics (as every science) is concerned with 
general epistemological problems.”355 The involute is the unit for the medium, the principle for 
the laws governing behavior and signification in the system. “A specific semiotics is, or aims to 
being,” according to Eco, “the ‘grammar’ of a particular sign system, and proves to be successful 
insofar as it describes a given field of communicative phenomena as ruled by a system of 
signification.”356 The grammar in De Quincey is the infinite of actualization, frequency and 
repetition, in which differentiation expands out from the virtual. Suspiria de Profundis re-
produces in extensio the re-moulded dreams of his childhood experiences. Because experiences 
can never be disentangled from their combinations of thoughts and feelings, of sensory 
environment and previous experiences, or even of language, their constituent parts infinitely 
recombine. The virtual can never fully, finally or finitely be actualized. De Quincey’s endeavor 
in and through Suspiria de Profundis is documenting the degree of intensity, exemplified in the 
singularity of contracted time. The quality of the involute experience manifests itself. 
Actualization becomes infinite, recursive and expansive. Translation, as De Quincey invokes the 
idea, adheres to a dual trajectory for internal and external, (much as Ricoeur suggests) a unifying 
property within plurality. 
Imbuing dream imagery with the qualities of a language complicates rather than 
demystifies dreams and the subconscious of the dreaming state. The language of dreams dilates 
his core remembrance point of contracted time to the expanded proportions of his Oxford opium 
dreams. Dreams open up, interpret, and actualize the virtual memory. In Suspiria de Profundis 
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the narrative echoes the recursion/reversion or differentiation within dreams that De Quincey’s 
dreams actualize of virtual memory. In explaining dream language, De Quincey also provides his 
ideas on language, its system and properties. That dreams translate memories also requires 
examining De Quincey’s ideas on translation. Ultimately, the narrative project in his series of 
essays corresponds to the procedures he outlines within memory. The parallel systems of 
memory and narrative operate under similar principles of language or communication.  
De Quincey’s sense of translation and involute language also feature as tenets of 
communication theory. In the standard, yet simplified, model of communication, transmission 
follows the transferring of information or sending and receiving of a message via a channel-
medium-conduit; the source can be one-sided, making the model linear rather than interactive, 
these being two different conceptual models of communication processes.357 In information 
models, data must be encoded and decoded by the transmitter and receiver, respectively; and, 
issues of successful transmission involve technical effectiveness but also semantic conveyance of 
the code, or any symbolic system of agreed upon meaning.358 As the dreamer, even before he 
narrates and composes, De Quincey participates as both the role of receiver and transmitter; his 
dream language codes his memory through the dreaming channel or faculty. De Quincey, 
however, implicates himself in both languages, either pre-consciously or sub-consciously. He 
attempts to read and interpret both, by relying on partial ciphers, or correlative code in the 
conventions of shared grammar, namely repeated imagery and language associations. The 
language of the conscious mind and unconscious mind share a grammar and aspects of code 
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translated into proportional stature, velocity and duration, expanding and dilating the figures and 
scenes within the contracted time.  
De Quincey’s semiotic study of his visual-linguistic connections during contracted time 
translated into his dream language (commensurate to the impact on his psyche), demonstrates 
representation (in narrative) and reproduction (in memory/dreams) as a type of translation. 
Translation fascinates De Quincey as do languages. Translation is an art distinct from writing, a 
notion he well knows, to which his inclusion of untranslated phrases also attests.359 In Suspiria, 
De Quincey references learning both Greek and Latin, the latter of which includes a vital 
catalytic “incident” at “less than eleven years of age” (165). When asked by a bookseller (his 
debts to whom brought heightened anxiety) to translate from “Beza's Latin Testament [. . .]  the 
great chapter of St. Paul on the grave and resurrection,” De Quincey does not translate, in the 
strictest sense, but rather recites from memory the admired English passage that he “had read 
again and again with so passionate a sense of its grandeur” (165). Not exactly a charade of 
translation, (excepting perhaps in “fluency and effect”), his description of the process 
underscores the link between memory and writing, with remembrance as a type of reading:  
I was struck by perceiving that it was the great chapter of St. Paul on the grave 
and resurrection. I had never seen a Latin version; yet, from the simplicity of the 
scriptural style in any translation (though Beza's is far from good), I could not 
well have failed in construing. But, as it happened to be this particular chapter, 
which in English I had read again and again with so passionate a sense of its 
grandeur, I read it off with a fluency and effect like some great opera singer 
uttering a rapturous bravura . . . And it is remarkable, that from this moment, 
when the deep memory of the English words had forced me into seeing the 
precise correspondence of the two concurrent streams, (Latin and English,) never 
again did any difficulty arise to check the velocity of my progress in this 
particular language.  (165) 
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De Quincey’s own sense of translation delineates the cognitive relationships and semantic 
processes he recognizes as involved in the process. The similarity of imagery and terminology to 
his description of narrative is striking. This monumental act of “translation” utilizes the imagery 
of streams (as also in the “confluence” of opium and childhood afflictions, the causes for his 
dreaming “splendidly” or “almost preternaturally”) with the interaction or concurrency in his 
mind of his native language and his new study. De Quincey’s logocentrism is matched only by 
his visio-centrism, “seeing the precise correspondence” (rather than phonocentric, though he 
includes the auditory image for effect). The two languages or sign systems run or course 
simultaneously to assist him in apprehending the passage. The past-present and present texts 
coexist, visually, for correspondence. De Quincey identifies the process in stages: first, 
“perceiving” (or reading), then, “construing” (through the aid of stylistic cues, the “simplicity of 
the scriptural style”), and finally, accessing a “deep memory” that “forced [him] into seeing the 
precise correspondence.” His recognition process includes parallel equivalence—synonymous 
with “correspondence”—but also mental negotiation or cognitive communication, even 
discourse, between the two languages.  
 Translation, De Quincey aptly suggests, is not literal nor exact: translation is memory 
work. Work, here, like Freud’s “dream work,” requires mixed conceptualization, as noted in 
approaches to the mechanical procedures in linguistic processes (such as displacements, 
condensation or distortion of images either as metaphor or symbol). Rather than a lack of 
autonomy, that might be intra-lingual, De Quincey actively becomes the place of inter-lingual 
dialogue, the space of discourse. As De Quincey even suggests, “my path lies on the interspace 
between religion and philosophy, that connects them both,” suggesting the space between fields 
210 
 
as also a place of connection (162). The interspace of translation is the place of semantic 
discourse.   
 De Quincey points to the memory aid of linguistic conventions in his act of translation. 
The simple scriptural style, he remarks, makes it unmistakable. Analytical reasoning relies on 
commonalities—semantic competence—between two systems to derive a further existing 
similarity. Cognitive discourse analysis recognizes various procedural steps similar to the active 
reading and psychological mechanisms De Quincey describes in this act of translation. Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of translation offers two key trajectories that explain De Quincey’s similar focus: for 
Ricoeur translation suggest a linguistic paradigm that attends to how words relate to meanings in 
contexts (both within language or between languages), and the ontological paradigm for 
interpersonal translation that occurs between one human and another.360 Several instances of 
translation occur simultaneously for De Quincey. He construes the meaning of the Latin 
scriptural translation (linguistic) while concurrently communicating with his deep memory 
(ontological) of the English scriptural passage (further linguistic). The steps De Quincey outlines 
are required for the work of translation with any memory text, meaning they must also occur 
when he assumes the role of reader-remember-er among his various narrating identities.  
 More than just concurrent and corresponding semes or semantic properties are at work in 
the translation of the passage in two languages: past and present moments align in “precise 
correspondence” in order for the mind to correlate the passages—a unity of duration, a 
simultaneity of time. It is worth noting that correspondence holds varied mathematic senses, 
beyond straightforward binary mirroring. Much as De Quincey suggests the correspondence of 
two distinct versions of the passage, most notably, the algebraic geometry usage can extend to 
                                                          




asymmetrical correspondence, in which correspondence can be from two lines as well as 
between two lines.361 The two passages—representative of their languages—are distinct in his 
personal use and scale, but also in terms of location (time/place) and textuality. Deep memory is 
certainly one specter of Suspiria de Profundis. In this instance, deep memory results from 
repetition. Rereading the English scripture layers and deepens the memory of the words. The 
depth of the impression from repeated imprinting does not bury the memory so much as deepen 
the imprint. Deep implies intensity: the depth and repetition “forced [De Quincey] into seeing the 
precise correspondence.”  Deep memory also concerns the often recollected and accessed 
(perhaps, the neural pathway) and the noteworthy experiences that impact what De Quincey 
remembers from that point onward—the profound memories that either cultivate or prune, or in 
any way dictate the development and growth of the psyche/mind/brain. Deep memory has as 
much to do with the deep-seated and ingrained (by rote, here, typical for classical language 
drills) as with the obscured and buried: these are figurative for certain memory content, yet literal 
in the sense of memories containing the imagery so significant among his experiences. 
 
 “Deep Memory” and “Confluence”: Crystalizing “separate but concurring inspirations”   
 
 Beyond parsing, translation requires construing, analyzing the arrangement and 
connection, from the same Latin origin as constructing. 362 The close connection or 
correspondence becomes concurrent readings. De Quincey’s act of translation is decoding and 
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encoding, a suspending of “two concurrent streams”: De Quincey construes by aligning 
concurrent passages, one concrete and actual the other virtual in memory. Active and deep 
memory erect a joint space of discourse. In deconstructing meaning through syntax and 
recollecting from memory, De Quincey also infers. As Eco informs, “the sēmeîon was not 
considered as an equivalent but as an inference.”363 “The phenomenology of our experience with 
mirror images represents the experimentum crucis for testing the role played by two fundamental 
characteristics of any semiosic experience,” which, according to Eco, are: “a sign is an x standing 
for a y which is absent, and the process which leads the interpreter from x to y is of an inferential 
nature.”364 The process here, as for translating memory in De Quincey, occurs, as Eco identifies 
it, on “threshold between semiotic and presemiotic phenomenon.”365 De Quincey recognizes the 
pragmatics of his various memory texts that may be evident only in effect. 
 De Quincey applies translation to dreams, tracing the pragmatics of the process. Dreams 
interpret experiences to varied effect, though De Quincey’s Suspiria focuses on “the grandeur 
which belongs potentially to human dreams” (129). He reads the code within his dream-scenery, 
grasping the syntax of the dream-language: when “the agitations of [his] childhood reopened in 
strength [. . .] swept in upon the brain with power, and the grandeur of recovered life,” De 
Quincey notes figures (as well the duration of the events) are now “dilated to colossal 
proportions” in his dreams:  
The reader must suppose me at Oxford; twelve years and a half are gone by; I am 
in the glory of youthful happiness: but I have now first tampered with opium; and 
now first the agitations of my childhood reopened in strength, now first they 
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swept in upon the brain with power, and the grandeur of recovered life, under the 
separate and the concurring inspirations of opium. Once again, after twelve years' 
interval, the nursery of my childhood expanded before me: my sister was moaning 
in bed; I was beginning to be restless with fears not intelligible to myself. Once 
again the nurse, but now dilated to colossal proportions, stood as upon some 
Grecian stage with her uplifted hand, and, like the superb Medea standing alone 
with her children in the nursery at Corinth, smote me senseless to the ground. 
Again I was in the chamber with my sister's corpse, again the pomps of life rose 
up in silence, the glory of summer, the frost of death. Dream formed itself 
mysteriously within dream; within these Oxford dreams remoulded itself 
continually the trance in my sister's chamber, the blue heavens, the everlasting 
vault, the soaring billows, the throne steeped in the thought (but not the sight) of 
"Him that sate thereon;" the flight, the pursuit, the irrecoverable steps of my 
return to earth. Once more the funeral procession gathered; the priest in his white 
surplice stood waiting with a book in his hand by the side of an open grave, the 
sacristan with his shovel; the coffin sank; the dust to dust descended. Again I was 
in the church on a heavenly Sunday morning.     (169-170) 
 
In his condensed summation or abstract of the sequence of childhood affliction, De Quincey 
underscores the significant images and imagery that recurs in his narrative. The disputed reader 
that De Quincey criticizes might think that, “it would have been sufficient to state the fact, 
without rehearsing in extenso the particulars of that case in childhood” (134). This reaction 
would be to miss the object of his entire project, in extenso. Just as the “nursery of [his] 
childhood expanded,” so too do the significant images. Narrative must in turn reflect the pattern, 
the syntax, the experiences. “Dream formed itself mysteriously within dream,” De Quincey 
claims, creating a concentric image of discourse resembling the human-social self. He also, 
displaces the action and force onto the experiences and memories rather than the dreams or 
dreaming faculty: “Within these Oxford dreams remoulded itself continually the trance in my 
sister's chamber, the blue heavens, the everlasting vault, the soaring billows, the throne steeped 
in the thought (but not the sight).” The trance, heavenly vault, billows and throne, thought-but-
not-sight are De Quincey’s select abbreviations of the significant images from the sequence. It, 
rather than they or these, “remoulded itself continually” within dreams: it refers back to “dream” 
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(rather than imagery) in the previous clause (“dream formed itself mysteriously within dream”). 
The statement underscores the reproductive faculty, stressing the repetition, rehearsing, 
“continually,” on the agency of the dream. Remold differs from translate. Memory apprehends 
the intensity, dreams translate the scale of memory, and dreams remolds themselves.  Moreover, 
the dreams become vehicles for the quality of the experiences.  
 Dreams establish, rather involute-ly, a chain of signs and signification: De Quincey 
attempts to render this semiosis in narrative. A dream, as with the “process exemplified by the 
crystallization of language,” re-molds and actualizes. The choices of images recur elsewhere in 
Suspiria, as outward reverberations through concentric layers. “Rehearsing in extenso” 
recognizes dreams remoulding dreams as well as memories re-collected, translated between 
languages. Experience and re-experience germinate and mutate into growths and fruitifications 
for dream-scenery. De Quincey’s process of translation, of reading, explains his understanding of 
dreams “translating” memory into “images”: the signification of dream language. Translation is a 
rhetorical process of interpretation. The message, a text, requires interpretation, which is always 
multiple. “If texts can be produced and interpreted as I suggested in The Role of the Reader (Eco 
1979),” Eco explains, “it is because the universe of semiosis can be postulated in the format of a 
labyrinth.”366 Eco’s labyrinth develops much the way De Quincey constructs his involute. The 
labyrinth connects two points in a unicursal, non-branching path, the most approximate model 
Eco decides upon367 after rejecting first the tree of knowledge, then the dictionary, for their 
ordering of knowledge by hierarchy. In a similar fashion, De Quincey co-opted and revised the 
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caduceus to operate to redistribute importance from subject to digressions. Rather than the 
rigidity of the tree or dictionary, flawed models for Eco, he select the encyclopedia, with its 
interlinked or hypertextual relationships, as the organizational scheme present in the labyrinth. 
Eco’s impulses resemble De Quincey’s in translating the properties of the palimpsest into the 
archival mind. Both the encyclopedia and palimpsest share leveling and intertextual 
relationships. De Quincey’s palimpsest archive mind aspires to operate through organization 
permitted by its structure. The semiosic labyrinth suggests the singular path yet the unlimited of 
interpretation, even when restricting the competence or the conventions of meaning. The archive 
of palimpsestuous rolled vellum, however, is a dimensional complex of inter-discourse. 
 As more than a conceptual model for memory, the involute that merges the caduceus and 
palimpsest engenders polyvocality in terms of the virtual and actual; the semantics of language, 
of translating memories into dreams, of cognition through pre-thought to recollection. De 
Quincey’s involute requires the interworking of these various systems. De Quincey must 
partially reconstruct the involute to accommodate the complexity he requires of it. Eco’s model, 
a one-dimensional and linear construct, is worth following to appreciate the complexity with 
which De Quincey grapples. Eco’s encyclopedia, more so than a dictionary, “permits us to 
understand the mechanism of the synecdoche, but not that of the metaphor.”368 In synecdoche, 
transference “by similarity between two semes or semantic properties,” for instance, Eco traces 
the system of content offered by the interpretant.369 By structuring the semiosic universe “as a 
labyrinth,” Eco posits that the structure “governs the approach to other classical issues such as 
metaphor, symbol, and code.”370 De Quincey’s structure is the involute, a “labyrinthine infinity 
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of curves,” concrete, perplexed combinations, infinitely compounding and incapable of being 
disentangled. Similar, yet ever more complex and fully dimensional, the involute provides 
palimpsestuous-ness to the labyrinth that transforms the process of textual interpretation to one 
of actualization. De Quincey permits texts as consisting of multiplicities: the text is virtual. 
 Translation, for De Quincey is a combination of interpretation and transference. Ricoeur, 
addressing psychoanalysis’s paradigm for dreams as “substituted and disguised representation,” 
notes the “interplay of forces [that] can be read in the text of the dream account [are] understood 
as a kind of palimpsest, riddle, or hieroglyph,”371 analogies which are all applicable for De 
Quincey. Ultimately, psychoanalysis provides only a limited form of investigation concerning 
symbols in experience, all the more evident when it comes to De Quincey. Ricoeur includes the 
poetic and sacred as spheres of bound symbols that distinguish our sense of symbol from 
metaphor: “the latter is free of invention of discourse; the former is bound to the cosmos.”372 De 
Quincey recognizes that the dream-scenery is one of “dilated” language, with a convention of 
syntax like hyperbole in the “grandeur of recovered life” memories “dilated to colossal 
proportions,” including classical and scriptural allusions. “The relation between the literal 
meaning and the figurative meaning,” according to Ricoeur, can be found in the “metaphorical 
utterance”373 produced in De Quincey’s dream-scenery. The relation “provides an appropriate 
guideline,” Ricoeur outlines “to identify the properly semantic traits of a symbol,” requiring 
inter-signification between primary and secondary signification “in effect, as the meaning of 
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meaning.”374 The most vital images or semes in De Quincey’s dilated coining memory adopt the 
mode of the symbol in Suspiria de Profundis’s narratology, the model for involutes in cognition 
and involutes in discourse.  
 Semiotics’ exploration delineates De Quincey’s sense of translation as the process of 
communication between separate but related languages, systems of meaning, though operated on 
either different scales or concentrations. The figural undercurrents—in the texts of the mind and 
his essay—are more than thematic: the codes-signs-semes pattern as sub-routines that operate in 
the background of thought and, by extension, of narrative. The layered topography can bind 
seemingly surface or arbitrary lexical networks through imbedded, corresponding, as-of-yet un-
actualized meaning.  
 
Section 2: Difference and Digressive Mapping in Mind and Narrative 
 
Metaphorical functioning would be completely inadequate as a way of expressing 
the different temporality of symbols, what we might call their insistence, if 
metaphors did not save themselves from complete evanescence by means of a 
whole array of intersignifications. One metaphor, in effect, calls for another and 
each one stays alive by conserving its power to evoke the whole network.[ . .] The 
network engenders what we can call root metaphors, metaphors which, on the one 
hand, have the power to bring together the partial metaphors borrowed from the 
diverse fields of our experience and thereby to assure them of a kind of 
equilibrium. On the other hand, they have the ability to engender a conceptual 
diversity [. . .] an unlimited number of potential interpretations at a conceptual 
level. Root metaphors assemble and scatter. They assemble subordinate images 
together, and they scatter concepts at a higher level. They are dominant metaphors 
capable of both engendering and organizing a network that serves as a junction 
between the symbolic level with its slow evolution and the volatile metaphoric 
level.  
    Paul Ricoeur, “Metaphor and Symbol,” 64 
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Thomas De Quincey’s exploration of his involute provides a study conforming to the 
primary inquiry of metaphor theory. The conceptual model of the involute for De Quincey 
exemplifies the functioning of language Paul Ricoeur delineates in the meaning-making 
operations of metaphor and symbol. Symbolic importance crystalizes De Quincey’s memories 
surrounding Elizabeth’s death. In the summary of the nursery sequence, De Quincey select the 
most important aspects. His sister’s paradoxical state of presence/absence initiates with his 
separation from her during her illness, the prognostication from the nurse, then his visit with the 
body, and, finally the burial. The theological paradox of life-in-death operates within the subtext 
of the “passage”—invoking all senses of the word—as De Quincey positions the central involute 
of Suspiria de Profundis to generate his narrative, as it generated the images for his dreams, 
while, just as importantly, establishing his conception of memory. De Quincey also 
acknowledges the precedents that Ricoeur would call root metaphors. Not only does Ricoeur’s 
sense of chaining metaphors seems rather akin to De Quincey’s concept of involute behavior in 
memory’s structure, but De Quincey suggests the same pattern by which images or signs, visual-
linguisitic couplings, engender and organize a juncture between symbolic and metaphoric levels. 
De Quincey conducts a study, along the lines of a general semiotic analysis, in order to 
establish the visual-linguistic grammar of his cognition. “The notion of interpretation can explain 
both in which sense a given text displays two and no more possibilities of disambiguation,” 
argues Eco, “and why an instance of the symbolic mode requests an indefinite series of 
alternative or complementary interpretations.”375 De Quincey’s dream-scenery is dilated 
signification and, significantly, visual. Even the auditory image is supplanted with visual images: 
“in the chamber with my sister's corpse, again the pomps of life rose up in silence, the glory of 
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summer, the frost of death” (170). Perhaps as significant for De Quincey’s visual-linguistic 
patterning are images of the absence of sight: the throne steeped in the thought (but not the sight) 
of "Him that sate thereon." The “unlimited number of potential interpretations,” Ricoeur 
acknowledges occurring “at the conceptual level”376 of root metaphors are the involute 
combinations: the dew and germs “furnished and exposed” of “later experiences,” that De 
Quincey repeatedly acknowledges. 
Involutes function as root metaphors, caducean and palimpsestuous. Ricoeur explains 
that root metaphors, “assemble subordinante images together, and they scatter concepts at a 
higher level.” De Quincey illustrates this through the digressions he feels are necessary to 
understand gathering together in the coining sequence, then, after to demonstrate its extensive 
effects and scattering or diffusing through later experiences. “The notion of symbolic mode,” to 
which metaphor belongs, according to Eco, “accounts for all these cases of textual production 
that do not rely on a preestablished portion of encyclopedia but invent and propose for the first 
time a new interpretive connection.”377 This impulse for invention and new interpretive 
connections describes both the reproductive power of the dreaming faculty and the type of 
actualization De Quincey seeks in rehearsing the episode in extension, in infinite semiosis, in a 
continuum of virtual time. For Ricoeur, this new-ness takes the form of a “surplus of meaning,” 
generated as “the symbol assimilated rather than apprehend[ed] a resemblance.”378 “Moreover, in 
assimilating something to others it assimilates us to what is thereby signified,” Ricoeur argues : 
“All the boundaries are blurred—between things as well as between the things and ourselves.”379 
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Permeated parameters are characteristic of involutes. De Quincey as dreamer and reader/re-
collector assimilates meaning into the dream-scenery of his memory, perhaps, most poignantly in 
the figure of the nurse. In his concise expression of the remoulded Oxford opium-dreams, the 
dream-image translates her role as the figure that foretells the death of Elizabeth, interpreting her 
afterwards as the agent that prefigures her death. As “the superb Medea” in his dream-language 
(as much as in De Quincey’s narration), the secondary signification of the nurse offers the 
surplus of meaning in the murderous maternal figure, exaggerated in quality and proportions 
relative to the severity of the event. 
Translation requires interpretive processes—resembling the analogical problem solving 
of metaphor. “Metaphors can be read according to multiple interpretations,” Eco explains, “yet 
these interpretations can be more or less legitimate on the grounds of underlying encyclopedic 
competence.”380 Metaphor operates by non-similarity whereas perceptual similarities do explain 
the substitution in metonymy—and these semantics and pragmatics are interests that underlie the 
surfaces of Suspiria De Profundis. As De Quincey demonstrates, the correspondence need not be 
similar or symmetrical, but rather concurrent. In computer science programming, concurrency 
simply means partially ordered components or units to order events when two tasks overlap. In 
remolded or reproduced signification, De Quincey’s layout for a surplus of meaning appreciates 
a unique manifoldness of language. Language’s involutions, commensurate to geometry’s 
topological manifolds and differential structures, directly impacts the manifoldness of thought, 
memory and narrative. 
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Permeated Parameters: “Palm to palm” and “Again the pomps of life rose up” 
 
Perhaps just as remarkable as De Quincey’s pragmatics is the attention he draws to his 
own process of recollection, a shift between the role of reader and speaker, which he must 
construct a representation of himself, in a Derridian sense of self-representation: 
Let me pause for one instant in approaching a remembrance so 
affecting and revolutionary for my own mind, and one which (if 
any earthly remembrance) will survive for me in the hour of death, to remind 
some readers, and to inform others, that in the original Opium Confessions I 
endeavored to explain the reason why death, caeteris paribus, is more profoundly 
affecting in summer than in other parts of the year; so far, at least, as it is liable to 
any modification at all from accidents of scenery or season. The reason, as I there 
suggested, lies in the antagonism between the tropical redundancy of life in 
summer and the dark sterilities of the grave. The summer we see, the grave we 
haunt with our thoughts; the glory is around us, the darkness is within us. And the 
two coming into collision, each exalts the other into stronger relief. But in my 
case there was even a subtler reason why the summer had this intense power of 
vivifying the spectacle or the thoughts of death.   (142) 
  
The images that impact De Quincey possess personal significance as well as broader 
signification. “It appears as though certain fundamental human experiences make up an 
immediate symbolism that presides over the most primitive metaphoric order,” analyzes Ricoeur, 
noting further, “everything indicates that symbolic systems constitute a reservoir of meaning 
whose metaphoric potential is yet to be spoken.”381 De Quincey first contrasts his traumatic 
awareness of Elizabeth’s passing with the earlier death of his sister Jane, aligning seasonal 
associations with life cycles: “I was sad for Jane's absence. But still in my heart I trusted that she 
would come again. Summer and winter came again crocuses and roses; why not little Jane?” 
(139). But even deeper (in the full force of the term) is the cyclicality of life, death, and rebirth 
symbolized in the seasonal associations he derives from the illustrated bible of his nursery.  
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 De Quincey argues that instances of his own experience that add layers of signification to 
summer, death, and the combination or relational meaning of death in summer:  
“Summer, therefore, had connected itself with death, not merely as a mode of antagonism, but 
also through intricate relations to scriptural scenery and events” (143). Previously, in his first 
Confessions, De Quincey focuses on the mode of antagonism of death in summer; now, he traces 
the impact to the readings (and images) of scripture, arguing for a greater complex of 
associations that are less readily identifiable as antagonism:  
It had happened that amongst our nursery collection of books was the Bible 
illustrated with many pictures. And in long dark evenings, as my three sisters with 
myself sate by the firelight round the guard of our nursery, no book was so much 
in request amongst us. It ruled us and swayed us as mysteriously as music. One 
young nurse, whom we all loved, before any candle was lighted, would often 
strain her eye to read it for us; and, sometimes, according to her simple powers, 
would endeavor to explain what we found obscure.   (142-3) 
 
Certainly, opposing aspects are evident, including dark/light and obscure/explain. De Quincey 
draw the connections for the scene: “we, the children, were all constitutionally touched with 
pensiveness; the fitful gloom and sudden lambencies of the room by firelight suited our evening 
state of feelings; and they suited, also, the divine revelations of power and mysterious beauty 
which awed us” (143). More is at work, including the sense of prominence for the nurse as guard 
rather than a Medea, and the accompanying three sisters: the figures of Levana and the three 
Sorrows germinate from these deep memories. Even when figurative semes, (“exteroceptive”) 
which refer to sensible qualities, create a matrix with the abstract semes, (“interceptive”) which 
categorize the world,382 Eco notes that some mediation must occur. “That mediation that Kant 
entrusted to the schemata, intermediaries between the abstraction of the categorical apparatus 
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and the concreteness of the manifold of the intuition,” provide the discourse within the 
structure.383 Ricoeur’s study of metaphoric functioning384 assists to offer terminology to the 
process De Quincey follows. Ricoeur notes the connotations both metaphor and symbol have: 
Lacking any status in established language, a metaphor is in the strong sense of 
the word, an event of discourse. The result is that when a metaphor is taken up 
and accepted by a linguistic community it tends to become confused with an 
extension of the polysemy of words. It first becomes a trivial, then a dead 
metaphor. Symbols, in contrast, because they plunge their roots into the durable 
constellations of life, feeling, and the universe, and because they have such an 
incredible stability, lead us to think that a symbol never dies, it is only 
transformed.385    
 
The metaphoric, poetic figures of light and knowledge are unquestionable. Presumably the depth 
in memory, the impresses of the experience, root the scene and circumstances for future 
fruitification. As metaphor theory suggests, metaphoric operations underlie all language. “The 
relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning of a metaphorical utterance 
provides an appropriate guideline,” Ricoeur argues, “which will allow us to identify the properly 
semantic traits of a symbol.”386 Ricoeur distinguishes metaphor and symbol through their 
relational structures and conceptual synthesis. De Quincey’s pragmatics derive a similar sense of 
the metaphoric operations underlying his cognition. “The most insistent metaphors,” Ricoeur 
clarifies, “hold fast to the intertwining of the symbolic infrastructure and metaphoric 
superstructure.”387 Through his mental excavations, De Quincey traces the network of 
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intersignifications, assembled subordinate images and scattered concepts. Appropriate collisions 
of meaning and inter-signification replace over-simplified antagonism.  
 The children “constitutionally touched with pensiveness” are suited to the “fitful gloom 
and sudden lambencies of the room,” though it is De Quincey’s exchange of meaning that makes 
the metaphoric work clear: the collision of light and dark with clarity and obscurity “suited our 
evening state of feelings.” The “divine revelations of power and mysterious beauty” also 
collapses the circumstances of the nurse’s “simple powers” and the bible’s that “ruled” and 
“swayed [. . .] as mysteriously as music.” The conduits, both the bible and the educating nurse, 
merge in or, perhaps more accurately are subsumed by, the description surrounding the 
signification communicated through their united power. The symbolic intensity in the elements 
of the scene that de Quincey describes resembles Ricoeur’s explanation of the metaphoric 
superstructure and symbolic infrastructure, “beyond its constituting a network, a set of metaphors 
presents an original hierarchical constitution.”388 “The preverbal character of such an experience 
“ elaborates Ricoeur, “is attested to by the very modulations of space and time as sacred space 
and sacred time, which result and which are inscribed beneath language at the aesthetic level of 
experience, in the Kantian sense of this expression.”389 The circumstances of the nursery bible 
revelations offer a pattern evident in Suspiria. By describing the nurse(-ry)-evenings and 
illustrated bible readings as De Quincey does, he outlines what Johnson (concerning his work 
with Lakoff) addresses, in “Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor,” as “the location event-structure 
metaphor,” which “comprises a vast complex system of several submappings, each of which is 
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what Grady (1997) calls a ‘primary’ metaphor.390 (41). Johnson explains that “the semantics of 
our terms for events is given by the detailed structure of the mapping” and submappings.391 
Similar visual-linguistic relations magnify in intensity the circumstances of Elizabeth’s death in 
his memory and his dreams. But this only sets the stage, the dream-scenery, for the semiosic 
example De Quincey provides concerning Palm Sunday (the backdrop of her death) and his 
deferred apprehension of the associations and connotations surrounding it. When mapping 
manifolds, in differential geometry and topology, there are immersions and submersion—in fact, 
for Riemann models there is also mapping between surfaces. The embedded complex apparent in 
De Quincey appears primed for the interests in interspatial mapping both structurally in 
topography and procedurally in metaphor, appealing to commensurate analyses in both 
disciplines.  
 
Involute Communication and Mapping: Deferral and Digression 
  
 
 De Quincey employs a metalingual function, to use linguist Roman Jakobson’s sense392 
as structures for signification and processing communications. Yet, the referential and 
embeddedness of communication within contexts is due to language as the code of cognition: for 
De Quincey this relies on the interplay of the visual-linguistic network, the interconnection of 
language and visual images: “Out of this digression, which was almost necessary for the purpose 
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of showing how inextricably my feelings and images of death were entangled with those of 
summer, I return to the bed−chamber of my sister” (143). The narrative combines the 
deferring/differing of digression with the “prelibation” of visual-linguistic impressions “upon the 
fountains of life” that resonate the visual-semes of central remembrance point as “vibrations” 
later. Elizabeth’s death in summer as well as the contrast between the window view and her face 
is not enough, De Quincey notes, on its own to make the trite discord (or antagonism) of death in 
summer/life: “Yet still even this explanation does not suffice; it was not merely by the peace and 
by the summer, by the deep sound of rest below all rest, and of ascending glory, that I had been 
haunted” (143). De Quincey realizes the signification lies deeper, a sub-script of further 
involutes: “It was also because Jerusalem stood near to those deep images both in time and in 
place” (143). The “omphalos (navel) of the earth”—with the visual reinforcement of circles, 
involutes, and the shaft—is, De Quincey notes, a “pretention [that] had once been made for 
Jerusalem, and once for Delphi; and both pretensions had become ridiculous, as the figure of the 
planet became known” implicates knowledge processes as on-going and reassessing (143). He 
explains the concentric point or interspace, is, “if not of the earth, for earth's tenant, Jerusalem 
was the omphalos of mortality”: 
The nurse knew and explained to us the chief differences in oriental climates; and 
all these differences (as it happens) express themselves in the great varieties of 
summer. The cloudless sunlights of Syria those seemed to argue everlasting 
summer; the disciples plucking the ears of corn that must be summer; but, above 
all, the very name of Palm Sunday (a festival in the English church) troubled me 
like an anthem. "Sunday!" what was that ? That was the day of peace which 
masked another peace deeper than the heart of man can comprehend. "Palms!" 
what were they? That was an equivocal word; palms, in the sense of trophies, 
expressed the pomps of life; palms, as a product of nature, expressed the pomps of 
summer.      (143) 
 
“Equivocal,” De Quincey’s term, stresses interpreting meaning from the unity within the term. 
Rather than the polyvocality or multiplicity of language De Quincey addresses the difference of 
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interpretation in actualizing the virtual. In this passage, he offers a recreation of his 
apprehension—interpretation and translation—of terms, notably visual images, that resonate 
later. Similarly the deep memory of the passage of St. Paul “troubled [him] like an anthem” 
(143). The network of each of these primary metaphors of “everlasting” and “summer” offer root 
metaphors for De Quincey. In metaphoric exchange that arranges associations much like a 
chiasmus, De Quincey links palms and pomps as life and summer. The images of an open, clear 
sky in the “cloudless sunlights” reinforces the stress on the day, Sunday, as much as the “ears of 
corn” play one the physical and bodily pun of the palms. Conscious of the recursion or not, De 
Quincey focuses his description of Elizabeth’s body on her face and her hands, her palms. 
 Moreover, the links to mortality offer all the reasons for the digression of Jerusalem and 
Palm Sunday, for “out of this digression, which was almost necessary for the purpose of showing 
how inextricably my feelings and images of death were entangled with those of summer, I return 
to the bed-chamber of my sister.” The intrusion, digression, or deferral resumes with the 
following visual-linguistic parallels:  
From the gorgeous sunlight I turned round to the corpse. There lay the sweet 
childish figure; there the angel face; and, as people usually fancy, it was said in the 
house that no features had suffered any change. Had they not? The forehead, 
indeed, the serene and noble forehead, that might be the same; but the frozen 
eyelids, the darkness that seemed to steal from beneath them, the marble lips, the 
stiffening hands, laid palm to palm, as if repeating the supplications of closing 
anguish, could these be mistaken for life? Had it been so, wherefore did I not spring 
to those heavenly lips with tears and never−ending kisses? But so it was not. I 
stood checked for a moment; awe, not fear, fell upon me; and, whilst I stood, a 
solemn wind began to blow, the most mournful that ear ever heard.    (143-4) 
 
The bible discussion prior to, and in anticipation of, facing once again Elizabeth’s paradoxical 
corpse, prepares De Quincey and his readers for her features and “frozen eyelids, the darkness 
that seemed to steal from beneath them.” Jerusalem, “there, on the contrary, it was, as we infants 
understood,” De Quincey explains, “that mortality had been trampled under foot […] for that 
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very reason, there it was that mortality had opened its very gloomiest crater” (143). The 
description of Jerusalem, particularly set during Palm Sunday, reinforces the descriptions De 
Quincey provides for Elizabeth, his trace, as well as the dreaming faculty: “there it was, indeed, 
that the human had risen on wings from the grave; but, for that reason, there also it was that the 
divine had been swallowed up by the abyss; the lesser star could not rise, before the greater 
would submit to eclipse” (143).  De Quincey is quite aware of the threshold of his childhood 
development in circumstantial learning as well as in apprehending mortality. 
 The significance of the trace and contracted time embed with the underlying “intricate 
relations to scriptural scenery and events,” not merely the mode of antagonism (143). In fact, if 
conceptual is a structure for human understanding, the circumstances of the scriptural readings, 
the nursery evening are just as vital. From Lakoff and Johnson’s study of causal metaphors in 
Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), they demonstrate that conceptual metaphor has a central role in 
abstract conceptualization. Johnson elaborates that: 
If conceptual metaphor is essential for abstract thought, then the 
classic objectivist/literalist picture cannot be correct. Conceptual 
metaphor is a structure of human understanding, and the source 
domains of the metaphors come from our bodily, sensory-motor 
experience, which becomes the basis for abstract conceptualization 
and reasoning. From this perspective, truth is a matter of how our 
body-based understanding of a sentence fits or fails to fit, our 
body-based understanding of a situation… There is a form of 
‘correspondence.’393 (44) 
 
The “correspondence” suggests a process similar to the precise correspondence of the concurrent 
passages for De Quincey in translation. Translation, to continue with De Quincey’s terminology, 
might align the source domain of the body’s sensory-moto experience with abstract 
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conceptualization: the children, “all constitutionally touched with pensiveness,” to associate 
“fitful gloom and sudden lambencies” with “the divine revelations of power and mysterious 
beauty.” De Quincey’s referential competence of summertime (as a child he “possesses the 
instructions with which to identify”394 summer) and but only inferential competence of mortality 
(knows that death is not to be alive), he must appeal to the metaphor of life and light, death and 
darkness. By including this “almost necessary” digression, De Quincey showcases the 
“inextricable” connects of involutes, following metaphoric correspondence of the context (or 
referential). The digressions provide the underlying involutes that entangle the traumatic 
experience. They offer the requisite syntax organizing his conceptualizations or signal embedded 
code—occurring on the metalingual layer, to link semiotics and communication theory. The 
algorithmic or prescribed sequences of signification issue from involutes as if following linear 
systems—but only when tracing one teleology from one starting point.  
 De Quincey’s narrative is a commensurate model of the layering involutes of memory. 
Separately and together his narrative and his memory form matrices, which, when added and 
multiplied become something akin to abstract algebra, variational calculus and differential 
equations: the functions and formula require a distinct analysis offered by operator theory. 
Mathematics scholar Evans Harrell recently proposed that operationally “operators act like 
matrices,”395 both of which mediate abstractly to provide condition for solution, or meaning 
making. Without delving too deeply into the actual mathematics of linearity, spaces of infinite 
dimension, and so forth, the value of recognizing that two concepts behave or operate in a similar 
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fashion is the similar aim of comparing De Quincey’s linguistic investigations with counterparts 
in the field from which he coopts his most central term and concept. De Quincey’s involutes 
strive to understand germinating structures and entangling processes within contracted spaces. 
De Quincey, however, is less concerned with solutions—moving him away from mathematical 
aims—than he is with offering a method for analysis that is as open-ended as the infinite 
involute.  
 
Section 3: Feedback Loops, Repeated and Remoulded Continually in Sequence and 
Simultaneity 
 
The use of language or the employment of any code which implies a play of 
forms […] also presupposes […] a spacing and temporalizing, a play of traces. 
This play must be a sort of inscription prior to writing, a protowriting, without a 
present origin, without an archē. 
  Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 146396 
 
 
Suspiria de Profundis’s matrix of dream theory and memory semantics rest on the 
involute and involute cognition. Operating with elements of semantics, communication, 
discourse theory, De Quincey sense of the mental operations are structured by his visual-
linguistic experiences: “the past events of life . . . formed their dread line of revelation” (176). 
Woven within this philosophical outlook on splendid dreaming are two components related to 
vision: communication in darkness--or with the obliqueness of not fully apprehended 
knowledge—and solitude or separation. These are two aspects underlying the sequence of 
Elizabeth’s death: her separation yet audible sufferings paired with the proclamation of her fate, 
his surreptitious viewing of her body followed by barred entry on his second visit, and lastly, her 
funeral service and the coffin’s decent into the earth. The parallel images in his theory of dream-
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memory phenomenon demonstrate the metaphoric superstructure for De Quincey’s symbolic 
infrastructure: 
A pall, deep as oblivion, had been thrown by life over every trace 
of these experiences; and yet suddenly, at a silent command, at the 
signal of a blazing rocket sent up from the brain, the pall draws up, 
and the whole depths of the theatre are exposed. Here was the 
greater mystery: now this mystery is liable to no doubt; for it is 
repeated, and ten thousand times repeated, by opium, for those 
who are its martyrs. (176) 
 
The repetition “ten thousand times repeated” exceeds the finite parameters of his essay, yet De 
Quincey attempts in the latter sections to demonstrate it. A particular type of repetition and 
remolding occurs in “The Apparition of the Brocken,” which De Quincey argues is vital for 
Suspiria. Indeed, the “play of forms,” using Derrida’s phrase, offers a sense of the deep 
inscription underlying De Quincey’s fascination with the Brocken “dream-legend.”397 
“Savannah-La-Mar” provides a vision of “the whole depths of the theatre” of a sunken city 
“expose” in a fantasy inverting the paradoxes of sight and death. Part II as with “The English 
Mail-Coach” relate later life experiences, further influenced by memory and dreams (see Chapter 
Four). The study of discourse and language, despite varied inquiry and method, arrives at a 
similar acceptance of communication as unpredictable and unexpected—something quite distinct 
from the initial premises of communication theory but especially the mathematic solution.  
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 De Quincey’s involute with its play of forms, proliferating structure, and interlacing 
operations conceives of a uniquely functioning world. In the decades after De Quincey, the 
mathematician Ferdinand Georg Frobenius develops a method (related to the Laurent Series for 
spaces between concentric circles) for infinite series solutions.398 De Quincey’s approach to 
language operates beyond the physical theories of classical mechanics and more in tandem with 
general relativity and differential geometry or differential systems integrability.399 Following 
Leibniz’s contributions, but contemporary with Joseph Fourier, whose theorems include 
differentiation, convolution, and infinite systems, De Quincey’s branching involutions of 
language, mind and text share the interests of distinct fields. Fourier in his Théorie Analytique de 
la Chaleur (1807-1822), provides the first explicit differential operator, an operator being a 
function whose domain is a set of functions (rather than real or complex numbers); as such the 
operator is a necessary product and function of the equation. Certainly modern physics accepts 
these complexities of the world. De Quincey’s involute, however, suggests a sublimity in 
unpredictable effects of otherwise recognizable systems, structures, and processes of interlocking 
and entangling co-existence.  
 Though advanced areas of modern mathematics include aspects of the involute and De 
Quincey’s involutes, the intricacies remain beyond the parameters of this study of De Quincey. 
The shared concerns are evident, nevertheless, in the philosophy operating in tandem to the 
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physics: the manifold is a central concept to both. Integrability of a manifold, in an 
oversimplified explanation, is formulated through the geometric and algebraic structures of 
differential forms, isolating the submanifold for compatibility with exterior derivatives. In 
linguistic terms, the manifold structure of De Quincey involutes have substructures with 
compatible external coefficents, replicas, reproductions. Such foliation is relational, in discourse 
terminology, relying upon tangents and compatibility with integral or embedded manifolds (or 
further involutes). The sense of such shared terms as tangents and embedded manifolds are 
useful, even if the specialized mathematics are too vast for development here. Distribution in 
differential geometry concerns the parameters of differentiable manifolds, in which functions are 
continuously differentiable when derivative functions are themselves continuous—or, simply 
stated, the space of a function that has a derivative which is itself continuous or completely 
defined without discontinuities or gaps.400 De Quincey’s study occupies a linguistic equivalent. 
 The repetition of the dreams that expose “every trace” of his nursery experiences, 
shrouded in “a pall, deep as oblivion,” locate the correspondences between memories, 
recollections, and the past selves that communicate and demonstrate the “deeper” dream-memory 
“phenomenon”: “the resurrection itself, and the possibility of resurrection, for what had so long 
slept in the dust” (176). Beyond actualizing these virtual sleeping memories or subscripts on the 
palimpsest, the caduceus narrative operates to showcase is visual-linguistic semantic memory 
structures:  
The reader is likely to differ from me upon the question, moved by recurring to 
such experiences of childhood, whether much value attaches to the perceptions 
and intellectual glimpses of a child. Children, like men, range through a gamut 
that is infinite, of temperaments and characters, ascending from the very dust 
below our feet to highest heaven. (160) 
 
                                                          




The. complications arise concerning duration and the transmission or interpretation of involute 
networks between his past-present selves. “The gamut that is infinite” through which each 
experiencing-self ranges impacts the combinations of involutes, the context of encoding and 
reading, of recollecting/interpreting. “Ascending from the very dust below,” and mirroring the 
dreaming apparatus and traumatic shaft, replicates his trance’s travel “to the highest heaven.” 
The trajectory is the same he aims to offer the readers of Suspiria:  
Here pause, reader! Imagine yourself seated in some cloud−scaling swing, 
oscillating under the impulse of lunatic hands; for the strength of lunacy may 
belong to human dreams, the fearful caprice of lunacy, and the malice of lunacy, 
whilst the victim of those dreams may be all the more certainly removed from 
lunacy; even as a bridge gathers cohesion and strength from the increasing 
resistance into which it is forced by increasing pressure. Seated in such a swing, 
fast as you reach the lowest point of depression, may you rely on racing up to a 
starry altitude of corresponding ascent. Ups and downs you will see, heights and 
depths, in our fiery course together, such as will sometimes tempt you to look 
shyly and suspiciously at me, your guide, and the ruler of the oscillations. (169) 
 
By the ascent and decent of the swing, the oscillations narrative can convey of the human system 
thusly afflicted as De Quincey become “corresponding.” “Ups and downs you will see,” De 
Quincey tells his reader, “heights and depths, in our fiery course together.” In this manner, for 
narrative, De Quincey is the “ruler of the oscillations” rather than the “victim of those dream.” 
Even more importantly, De Quincey suggests the variation he offers, first as preceding 
digressions, then the alternate dream-vision sections, rehearsing in extensio, offers “cohesion.” 
“Even as a bridge gathers cohesion and strength,” the significant aspects of his memories 
reinforce in differentiation within the “might system of central forces,” or the “increasing 
resistance into which it is forced by increasing pressure.”  With each actualization, the relevant 
message becomes manifest. 
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 De Quincey advises his reader, through the mask of reassuring himself or fortifying his 
narrative against the cynical or critical, that, “the reader of more kindness (for a surly reader is 
always a bad critic) will also have more discernment”:  
He will perceive that it is not for the mere facts that the case is reported, but 
because these facts move through a wilderness of natural thoughts or feelings: 
some in the child who suffers; some in the man who reports; but all so far 
interesting as they relate to solemn objects.     (134)    
  
“Facts,” messages or data, move through a medium (or media) that requires navigation or 
interpretation. The “wilderness” of involutes (natural thoughts or feelings), whether the wreathed 
caducean ornaments of narrative or the palimpsetuous memory-archive, the chain of signs is an 
unwieldy, even infinite, interpretive journey. De Quincey distinguishes the dual roles and 
perspectives of the child experiencing and the adult reporting, albeit their positions in practice 
might blur. “Some” seems both vague and haphazard—betraying a sense that the two, though 
different, may occasionally be indistinguishable. Eric Kramer recently points toward the shift in 
thinking of humans as “empirical but rather projective,” that “human consciousness continually 
integrates memory with expectation and planning.”401 “Retention and pretension constantly 
integrate,” Kramer elaborates, implicating the role of vision and visionary quality to human’s 
projective consciousness.402 Experiences retain in memory due to expectations of significance as 
well as previous experiences—this much De Quincey traces himself.  
 De Quincey, however, offers only the preliminary cases in his potentially open model of 
involute systems of textual interpretation. “The classical models of the tree and the labyrinth,” 
Eco continues, rely, however, on recognizing that, “/Tree/ and /labyrinth/ are not metaphors,” 
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rather, “they are topological and logical models, and as such they were and are studied in their 
proper domain.”403 The labyrinth invokes the chain or continuum of interpretation, “as labels or 
emblems for the overall discussion,” Eco continues, “they can be taken as metaphors [yet] they 
stand for the nonmetaphoric Peircean notion of unlimited semiosis.”404 The branching tree, unlike 
the labyrinth, certainly invokes De Quincey’s caduceus, the aspects of which De Quincey 
transfers to his involute as well as translation. 
 De Quincey distinguishes the labyrinthine possibility in the palimpsest-archive of the 
mind; he further establishes the virtual-involute to the topological and logical model for the 
translation and interpretation occurring in actualization. Quincey acknowledges, that in his 
narratological efforts—“to clear away all doubts and scruples which can gather about the roots of 
such as malady,” as his (134). The “polydimensional network of properties” Eco sees in the 
infinite potentials of componential representation,405 resembles the contingency Mikhail Bakhtin 
makes concerning words and utterances.406 Both Eco and Bakhtin present a discursive model of 
relational meaning that suits De Quincey’s involute—both mechanically and geometrically co-
opted. Bakhtin terms the similar purpose in the signal-relay semantic competence as the 
“Addressivity” or a type of anticipation of the intended audience’s shared code, but also stresses 
the “Answerability” or the potential and anticipated response, the answer of a transmitted 
utterance. Permeating modern physics is operator theory, particularly the self-adjoint operator of 
quantum mechanics, unbounded and capable of functioning in infinite-dimensional space—the 
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effect makes them continuous and observable of vector spaces that share similar traits to De 
Quincey’s sense of the matrices of memory, language, and narrative. By following the 
communication model, however, De Quincey’s sense of the role of his Dark Interpreter as an 
operator makes finite and apparent the role of communication feedback between him various 
temporal selves.  
 
The Interpreter as Feedback 
 
The reader, who wishes at all to understand the course of these Confessions, 
ought not to pass over this dream-legend. There is no great wonder that a vision, 
which occupied my waking thoughts in those years, should re-appear in my 
dreams. It was in fact a legend recurring in sleep, most of which I had myself 
silently written or sculptured in my daylight reveries. 
   Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 182 
 
 
 De Quincey’s footnote explaining the section of “The Apparition of the Brocken,” 
provides an example of his awareness of recollection’s interplay of reproduction. Whether 
dreams or “daylight reveries,” his “waking thoughts” reappear, “recurring in sleep” those 
thoughts he had “silently written or sculptured.” The discourse between layers operating by his 
semantics have intermediate stages of retention and protention, of integrating memory with 
projective signification. The phenomenon at Brocken, an optical illusion created by the natural 
formation, offers visitors a reflection of themselves—and an appropriate analogy for De 
Quincey’s discursivity and recursively. As De Quincey explains the phenomenon, when the 
apparition appears, each action you perform it mirrors, such as veiling one’s head—yet his 
description spirals back to his own circumstances:  
Immediately you see that the apparition of the Brocken veils his head, after the 
model of Judaea weeping under her palm−tree, as if he also had a human heart, 
and that he also, in childhood, having suffered an affliction which was ineffable, 
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wished by these mute symbols to breathe a sigh towards heaven in memory of that 
affliction, and by way of record, though many a year after, that it was indeed 
unutterable by words. (184) 
 
The Broken apparition, to appear as his reflection, must be provided an interiority similar to De 
Quincey’s. The infrastructure and superstructure of the apparition correlates to the section’s 
function in Suspiria. The metaphoric figure offers a symbolic expression of the recollecting-self. 
The extra-semantic, emotive evocations woven together, are “unutterable by words,” expressive 
only as “a sigh” by a reflection. The palm-tree and weeping Judaea, which the apparition mimics 
is the interpretation only available when apprehending the vision as other rather than self; the 
return to the image of the palms reinforces the othering of the cognitive value during those 
nursery associations. Much as Ricoeur, “shifts the problem of the metaphor from the semantics 
of the word to the semantics of the sentence,”407 De Quincey’s dream-legend supplements as 
well as underscores significance. The silence of the symbolic reflection is relevant even as it 
“breathe[s] a sigh towards heaven in memory of that affliction.” The silence, similar yet distinct, 
in “Savannah-La-Mar” suggests the pristine virtual experience ever able to be revisited. The 
Brocken apparition serves to reinforce plurality of actualization but also the “equivocal” not just 
of a word, but now the series, sequence: the sentence, utterance, or memory.  
 To complicate the continuum or infinite is the sense of generating a new transmission, De 
Quincey suggests the Brocken figure has a dual parallel:  
This trial is decisive. You are now satisfied that the apparition is but a reflex of 
yourself; and, in uttering your secret feelings to him, you make this phantom the 
dark symbolic mirror for reflection to the daylight what else must be hidden 
forever. Such a relation does the Dark Interpreter, whom immediately the reader 
will learn to know as an intruder into my dreams, bear to my own mind. He is 
originally a mere reflex of my inner nature. But as the apparition of the Brocken 
sometimes is disturbed by storms or by driving showers, so as to dissemble his 
                                                          




real origin, in like manner the Interpreter sometimes swerves out of my orbit, and 
mixes a little with alien natures. (184-5) 
 
The Dark Interpreter, as “originally a mere reflex of [his] inner nature,” also “mixes a little with 
alien natures.” The interpreter may translate but also remold. The roles of memory’s two basic 
forms, offered by memory theorists such as James and Husserl, assume these personas for De 
Quincey: “the ‘primary’ or ‘retentional’ vs. ‘secondary’ or ‘reproductive’” types of memory are 
more complicated, as recently Edward Casey notes in Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, 
“there is an entire set of intermediate forms of remembering.”408 The “reproductive faculty of 
dreaming” is the early sense De Quincey offers in Suspiria de Profundis, to explain dreams 
translating and interpreting memory. Interconnected, interpenetrating, the forms or stages of 
memory are “intermediate between primary and secondary memory, as well as between mind 
and world,” Casey notes, also distinguishing recognition and reminiscing, as well as 
distinguishing what is remembered with what is imagined, “so polymorphic is remembering that 
no single set of intentional structures or eidetic features can capture the whole phenomenon.”409 
De Quincey’s projections of self communicate with his self-presence in memory. “I do not 
always know him in these cases as my own parhelion,” De Quincey clarifies of his Interpreter: 
“What he says, generally, is but that which I have said in daylight, and in meditation deep 
enough to sculpture itself on my heart” (185). “But sometimes,” De Quincey confesses, “as his 
face alters, his words alter; and they do not always seem such as I have used, or could use” (185). 
De Quincey’s preferred term of recollection or recollecting a remembrance seems to betray a 
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suspicion of his own monkish chemist, effacing as he re-writes—transfers, substitutes, 
translates—the key signs in memory.  
 The “phantom the dark symbolic mirror for reflection to the daylight what else must be 
hidden forever,” becomes a manifest self to assist correcting the transmitted utterance in 
memory, excavated by the dreaming apparatus (184). The modern communications model of 
signal to receiver, adds to informational diagram of Claude Shannon and the linguistic functions 
of Roman Jakobson, with a recursive loop that feeds back information to reduce corruption by 
disruptive noise. Feedback “has one main function,” explains media scholar John Fiske; “it helps 
the communicator adjust his or her message to the needs and responses of the receiver.”410 When 
De Quincey claims the phantom interpreter “swerves out of my orbit,” the alien natures implicate 
discursive concentric selves (memories, experiences) but also language (literature) requisite for 
De Quincey to apprehend his own signification (and his readers “to understand the course of 
these Confessions”). “The Greek chorus is perhaps not quite understood by critics, any more than 
the Dark Interpreter by myself,” suggests De Quincey, “but the leading function of both must be 
supposed this− not to tell you anything absolutely new,− that was done by the actors in the 
drama” (185). The Interpreter-feedback loop assists the message and meaning:  
To recall you to your own lurking thoughts, hidden for the moment 
or imperfectly developed, and to place before you, in immediate 
connection with groups vanishing too quickly for any effort of 
meditation on your own part, such commentaries, prophetic or 
looking back, pointing the moral or deciphering the mystery, 
justifying Providence, or mitigating the fierceness of anguish, as 
would or might have occurred to your own meditative heart, had 
only time been allowed for its motions. (185, note 48)  
 
The interdisciplinary communication-linguistic model assists in understanding De Quincey’s 
narratological efforts to render inter-/intra-memory discourse. Both addressivity and 
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answerability require interpretation of context as well as text. Bakhtinian polyglossia, the 
hybridized and intertextual nature of language, places “primacy of context over text,”411 by 
acknowledging the coexistence of uses or utterances in every sign or word, as if each term is a 
palimpsest of denotations and palimpsestuous connotations. Recognizing Eco’s 
polydimensionality, much as with Bakhtin’s relational or dialogic meaning, the contingent 
relation between words underscores their preexisting systems of meaning as well as the 
transference or transfer of properties between componential representation. In the Bakhtinian 
sense of discourse, a similar topical domain (work) can voice many utterances, each always a 
borrowed element from previous sources, traceable though scoured as in the palimpsest. 
The wreathing of multiple experiences stemming from one involute conflate into the 
layered palimpsestic/palimpsestuous text of the mind and the essay. “Though feedback inserts a 
return look from the destination to the source, it does not destroy the linearity of the model,” 
Fiske notes412 Though seeming to rupture the linearity of the narrative, rather, De Quincey’s 
conceptual models layer the sense of linearity with feedback built in; “it is there to make the 
process of transmitting messages more efficient.”413 Multiplicity and the addressivity of the 
receiver help to reconcile the efficiency of maintaining the message and the generative forces of 
dreams. The involute, virtual and manifold, in each actualization differentiates the palimpsestous 
interplay of traces between memories. “The Interpreter is anchored and stationary in my dreams; 
but great storms and driving mists cause him to fluctuate uncertainly, or even to retire altogether, 
like his gloomy counterpart, the shy phantom of the Brocken,” De Quincey explains, and his 
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behavior aligns with the memory faculty, “to assume new features or strange features, as in 
dreams always there is a power not contented with reproduction, but which absolutely creates or 
transforms” (185). The transformative and reproductive power is most evident in the vision of 
Savannah-La-Mar, the desire for recovering the past intact: 
God smote Savannah−la−mar, and in one night, by earthquake, removed her, with 
all her towers standing and population sleeping, from the steadfast foundations of 
the shore to the coral floors of ocean. And God said, Pompeii did I bury and 
conceal from men through seventeen centuries: this city I will bury, but not 
conceal. She shall be a monument to men of my mysterious anger, set in azure 
light through generations to come; for I will enshrine her in a crystal dome of my 
tropic seas. (185-6) 
 
The “enshrined” city exposes De Quincey’s deep anxiety over Elizabeth’s body, the metaphoric 
pattern reappearing in a city he describes as “one ample cemetery, and has been for many a 
year,” but “fascinates the eye with a Fata−Morgana revelation, as of human life still subsisting in 
submarine asylums sacred from the storms that torment our upper air” (186). The vision of 
Savannah-La-Mar, far from realistic, “sleeping in everlasting sanctity,” is one possible with the 
aid of not actual memory but generative properties and the Interpreter: “oftentimes in dreams did 
I and the Dark Interpreter cleave the watery veil that divided us from her streets” (186). Whereas 
De Quincey cannot again see Elizabeth after his surreptitious trance-induced viewing, the 
episode remolds into the idealized sleeping city within the “crystal dome.” 
Applying the communication model, as Eco does, to the signs of language, Eco is quick 
to point out, for the post-modern study, that “like every science, even a specific semiotics ought 
to take into account a sort of ‘uncertainty principle’ (as anthropologists must be aware of the fact 
that their presence as observers can disturb the normal course of the behavioral phenomena they 
observe).”414 De Quincey seems aware of his projections of self—the experiencing child, the 
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dreaming student, the reporting adult—but also the movement of each through time, duration, 
and involute semiosis. De Quincey’s cursory semiotic study, the hermeneutical workings of his 
philosophy, is in many ways also an eidetic analysis. The illustrated bible, the referent context of 
the nursery experiences, provides De Quincey—whether reconstructed with greater significance 
in hindsight as a child or adult—a vital study (and digression) of his cognitive syntax codifying 
the system of signs vital in his central remembrance point.  
The moments succeeding the childhood afflictions in De Quincey’s dreams and 
narratives exemplify syntactic operations as involute as the mental structures containing them. 
The medium of the mind, as with the medium of narrative, contains the tensions of manifold and 
serialized actualization, of durations suspended, dilated and contracted in memory. The course of 
his narrative, though digressive and fragmented is not fractured but concentric. The matrix of 
meaning, like the visual-linguistic network, interconnects the central forces in the mighty and 
dynamic human system, that, as De Quincey describes it, “gathers cohesion and strength from 
the increasing resistance into which it is forced by increasing pressure” (169). Centering his 
study through language, De Quincey can address mathematic principles while sparing any need 
for precise equations, formula or graphs. The point may be that involutes in his conception of 
them cannot be qualified or valued or even understood in that manner. Language provides a 
fluid, arbitrary and abstract structure with processes and operations suited to accommodate. 
Communication theory and systems theory assist to understand De Quincey’s endeavor through 
their interdisciplinary applications. Involutes may coopt a mathematic concept but De Quincey 
applies linguistic concerns onto the science and philosophy of understanding not only memory 




Chapter Four: Involute Texts and Involute Analysis: “The Vortex of the Merely Human”  
 
For I was now seriously afraid of pointing attention to myself as one that, by 
having purchased some numbers, and obtained others on credit, had silently 
contracted an engagement to take all the rest, though they should stretch to the 
crack of doom. Certainly I had never heard of a work that extended to 15,000 
volumes; but still there was no natural impossibility that it should; and, if in any 
case, in none so reasonably as one upon the inexhaustible sea. Besides, any slight 
mistake as to the letter of the number could not affect the horror of the final 
prospect. I saw by the imprint, and I heard, that this work emanated from London, 
a vast centre of mystery to me, and the more so, as a thing unseen at any time by 
my eyes, and nearly two hundred miles distant.  
     Thomas De Quincey, Suspiria de Profundis, 166 
 During the episode of translation at the bookseller’s, De Quincey presents a scene of 
uncertainty and limitlessness related to his understanding of spatial relations and textuality 
(specifically, serialized publication) that is in keeping with his sense of communicative 
connectivity and of underlying structures. De Quincey’s concerns for language, which bring him 
in company with post-modern theories, extend to the implications of text and medium. His 
thoughts—at least in narrative—move from an endless text (his fear of contract as consumer) 
that “should stretch to the crack of doom” or “as one upon the inexhaustible sea” to its 
publishing source, London, a “vast centre of mystery [. . .] as a thing unseen […] and […] 
distant.” Reversionary as these images appear to earlier ones, chronological and narratological, 
such as a sleeping submarine city and Elizabeth’s seemingly slumbering corpse, they invoke a 
larger set of connoted semes and figurations. Any of these unutterable and unuttered associations 
may be tangentially relevant from any stage of the processes approaching composition.  
 When images or words manifest, either reproduced or remoulded, in Suspiria de 
Profundis they are never simply lexical echoes that operate as literary imagery. Were that the 
case, here, the doomsday thunderclap or crack might solely evoke the revelatory shaft’s strike, 
the mysterious vast centre might be himself, and so forth. To track these processes through the 
245 
 
layers of cognition and recollection would require excavation of intangible, inaccessible 
substrates. Partially the impediment is due to the tandem systems producing long-term memory. 
The language of Suspiria indeed renders memory in the confluence of syntactic layers and 
systems. The main issue is that any system operating in and through involutes has dynamic 
system qualities; in mathematics dynamic systems have a function that describes the time 
dependence of a point in geometrical spaces, which for systems models means a system with an 
internal dynamics or memory of past states. Such systems, related sets of processes and 
reservoirs, are characterized by continual change from the flow of material or energy.  
 De Quincey’s main models—the palimpsest, caduceus, involute—each appeal to a 
recursive pattern similar to feedback. N. Katherine Hayles captures the prevalence of feedback as 
she employs “the recurrent image” of a feedback loop, as a broad post-modern metaphor, in fact, 
“to explain the complex interactions of theory, technology, and culture.”415 A comparable yet 
distinct notion might be a heterogenous assemblage. 416 Whereas the feedback cycle allows 
Hayles the discourse of “society itself” as “a complex system in a technical sense,” feedback 
between theory and culture “through the medium of technology,”417 demonstrates the focus on 
materiality in recent decades. Hayles’s approach anchors the textual (and narrative) focus that is 
crucial for De Quincey’s project. For De Quincey, memory and text are a set in the same 
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philosophical, and perhaps dynamic, system. Worth noting are some additions, or rather, 
“differenciation” or divergence, Manuel DeLanda offers to Deleuze in Intensive Science and 
Virtual Philosophy, a “line of argumentation [that] is, in fact, not Deleuze’s own, although it 
follows directly from his ontological analysis.”418 With “topological connectivity” DeLanda 
explains an assemblage possesses less rigid metric properties than would permit change through 
random collision as well as mutate and differentiate differences.419 De Quincey’s dynamic 
system includes topological connectivity between memory and text. The two structures are 
interconnected, as with involute gears, through an intermeshing dialectic matrix. Other elements 
of DeLanda’s mathematical philosophy address the continuum of virtual multiplicities by 
including Albert Lautman’s work on dis/symmetry and dialectical structure.420 DeLanda 
distinguishes extensive and intensive processes and qualities that coincide with communicative 
issues of memory for De Quincey and in his systems of memory. De Quincey’s involute—all 
levels within memory—is a concrete universal that can mesh with others into a continuum 
through relations and feedback loop, as DeLanda explains multiplicities: involutes consist of 
topological continuums or “non-metric space.”421 More recent neuroscience models, 
demonstrating concerns for psychological and physiological interaction, account for a type of 
feedback as in communication-informational models. This complicates the distinctions of 
declarative or explicit memory (intentionally recollected) and undeclarative or implicit memory 
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(unconsciously acquired and accessed). Memory’s virtual multiplicities reinforce that the issue is 
not a simple binary of conscious and unconscious traces. 
 De Quincey’s involute is both the hardware and the software, the structure and the 
processes of several systems. Mathematic philosophy of the virtual provides a general sense of 
the structures of both text and memory, whereas the disciplines focused on the brain/mind 
operate with sole focus on those junctures. Neuroscience’s continuing illuminations of the 
brain’s interworkings are useful for considering the fragmenting of data among sub-systems; 
however, the transitions in memory process are of primary comparison to the involute model’s 
virtual functions. Recognizing the complexity of multiple parallel memory systems within 
involute memory provides an important distinction from the paradigm of rigid or predictable 
mechanical operations. In the fields of psychology the prominent working memory model422 
undergoes continuing refinement, though its basic model consists of synthesis among fluid 
systems of temporary storage before converting information into more permanent storage among 
crystallised systems. Crystallization is De Quincey’s term when describing languages in their 
developed states for comparison with education, notably in an analogy that links language, 
textuality (and literature), mechanisms and the human system: rather than “the poor machinery 
that moves spelling-books,” a crystalized language resembles “that mighty system of central 
forces hidden in the deep bosom of human life” that “works forever upon children” (as concerns 
his discussion of the figure of Levana).  
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 De Quincey distinguishes a difference in layers of storage: “deep memory” occurs 
through repeated re-experience and recollection. Temporary memory remains fluid in the sense 
of requiring maintenance while being stored. The visuo-spatial sketch-pad suspends visual and 
spatial data, while the phonological loop must accommodate auditory transience and mnemonic 
decay through a secondary rehearsal aspect, the articulatory loop. This loop of repetition is 
similar to the feedback function in communication systems. Repetition is key for memory, as De 
Quincey notes, whether consciously repeated or not: childhood experience, “[rest] not day or 
night, any more than the mighty wheel of day and night themselves, whose moments, like 
restless spokes, are glimmering forever as they revolve.” De Quincey recognizes that some 
operations occur in the background, processes for which fluid short term memory also accounts. 
Together the two fluid systems (visual and auditory) co-operate with a third, a devised backup 
interface between working and long-term: the episodic buffer behaves as something akin to 
random-access memory (RAM) in computing. Instead of the main goal of efficiency, for 
computing this is housing readily accessible storage of files frequently needed, the episodic 
buffer may facilitate proper filing in long term memory.423 The complete sequence of Elizabeth’s 
death becomes all the more significant for potential short-term permeation in surrounding 
experiences. De Quincey’s environmental elements as well as past experiences (including 
literary readings) influence working memory’s fluidity. The repetition of short-term memory 
may explain the fluid entangling of moments in the involute sequence among themselves and 
with De Quincey’s past or long-term memories.  
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 Part of what De Quincey’s narrative imagery and digressions render is the complex that 
he retraces while narrating his recollection of the core involute of Suspiria de Profundis. The 
fluid systems sometimes compete in the process of embedding memory into long-term memory 
(LTM) storage. These crystallised systems consist of visual semantics that extracts general 
knowledge from experiences, language or individual lexicon (in the sense of Saussure’s parole, 
distinct from langue424), and episodic LTM (long-term memory) that imprints the unique 
individual experiences of events. The neuroscience of brain memory directs to the processes that 
construct memory as a heterogenous object not unlike the text De Quincey suggests, or a 
deconstructionist such as de Man might find irreducible, a network of moving parts, inseparable, 
in capable of being disentangled. De Man’s sense of undecidability within texts,425 sustains 
interconnected, and possibly incompatible, couplings occurring in systemic exchange. This 
complexity and interconnectivity, evident already in several models for De Quincey, agree with 
the involute as the structure and syntax for his memory. Connections certainly exist, though not 
as directly or determinately. 
 Selecting any one meaning or interpretation, therefore, even for literal or figurative 
usage, would be reductive. Even the typical mathematic function points to the equality of input 
and output. Multiplicity, however, arrives at considerations of the mathematic manifold or non-
Euclidean plane that—like De Quincey’s involute—requires no higher or additional space for 
metrization (topology that can be rendered in metric space), instead housing a variable number of 
dimensions (which, like algebraic geometric, is non-metrizable space). When language’s 
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proliferation is a factor, the result is just as infinite. Involute multiplicity in the involute system 
operates in individual memory just as in language’s memory. De Quincey’s project and his 
philosophy embrace dynamism’s plurality. The imprint is a symbol, to suggest the full weight of 
the term, elsewhere in Suspiria of the manifoldness of textual materiality, the infrastructure of 
which combines with the superstructure of the memory-text, ultimately offering a cognitive 
model of the languages or transcoding systems of the brain. Yet, to read only these immediate 
(or elsewhere apparent) connotations into the imprint, here the publisher’s mark, might miss 
unspoken substrates connecting or collapsing the connection between the other elements in the 
passage, including, for instance, the two other topographies: the spatial distance (200 hundred 
miles geography) and the extensive textual volumes (fifteen thousand as a hyperbolic figure). 
Derrida, advancing de Man’s sense of deconstruction, argues it is an act within texts: “texts 
deconstruct themselves by themselves.”426 De Quincey suggests that the connection is the 
infinite; “the inexhaustible sea” as perpetual motion and “stretch-ing” to judgement as being on 
the brink of infinity illumes De Quincey’s preoccupation with time’s motion and its material role 
over space. The fluidity or plasticity of memory and time found themselves upon his sense of the 
living and entangling involute, an organic mechanism. 
 Duration, for De Quincey, produces temporal discourse. Quincey’s mechanics of memory 
strike similar chords as Bergson’s, in which memory is “always bent upon action, seated in the 
present and looking only to the future […] In truth it no longer represents our pasts to us, it acts 
it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but 
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because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment.”427 Motion and habitual 
movements resonate similarly to the mechanical sense offered contemporaneously by Maine de 
Biran in 1804, distinguishing mechanical memory from sensitive memory and representative 
memory.428 Yet, the wheeling, eddying maelstrom-esque involute, and any systems or networks 
comprised of such elements, is a mechanism both unpredictable and in flux. In addition to 
grappling with incompleteness in the archeological record of memory, the recollector-archivist-
reader’s perspective must view the past, concurrent streams from the confluence. De Quincey 
pursues the “vast centre of mystery” of London as a shadowy, secret network:  
I felt the fatal truth, that here was a ghostly cobweb radiating into all the 
provinces from the mighty metropolis. I secretly had trodden upon the outer 
circumference had damaged or deranged the fine threads or links, concealment or 
reparation there could be none. Slowly perhaps, but surely, the vibration would 
travel back to London. The ancient spider that sat there at the centre would rush 
along the network through all longitudes and latitudes, until he found the 
responsible caitiff, author of so much mischief.     (165) 
 
The network De Quincey imagines is elusive and comprised of untraceable traces. The “ancient 
spider” provides the figure of forgotten code, a primeval firmware, permanent programming that 
is unalterable. In computing terms, it is read-only memory, not-rewritable, un-editable, and 
unceasing. The spider’s actions run automatically: a run-program, preset, prescribed, once 
activated by the proper prompt, a coded stimulus. In programming terms, actions and 
applications are encoded commands, executed when directed. In analysis terms, however, 
communication implies a level of reception and engagement. The observer views the meaning or 
trace it seeks; in modern physics the observer effect acknowledges that measurements of certain 
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systems cannot be made without affecting the systems. Ultimately the effect is uncertainty, that 
measurement requires participation of the observer as an object in the system. Indeterminate and 
complementary, extending the quantum mechanics sense (Bohr and Heisenberg’s Copenhagen 
Interpretation), pervades the object-subject dynamic when addressing any variables. The more 
precise or certain of one property, the less so of its complementary variable, its coefficient.  
 For De Quincey, the confluence of past and present, of experience and recollection, and 
other combined variables might be examined (such as position and momentum) but to focus on 
one is to lose sight of the other. Insights into quantum behavior, arising after the double-slit 
experiment, concerning duality of particle-wave and motion and mechanics, demands the 
sciences of the twenty-first century recognize the role of the no-longer objective observer. To 
assist considering De Quincey’s oscillating positions outside and within his memory, his own 
recourse to language and narrative brings him in conversation with Paul Ricoeur; the two also 
share metaphysical interests in time. In Ricoeur’s examination, “Time and Narrative,” he 
suggests the “Heideggerian analysis of within-time-ness [. . .] which makes the description of our 
temporality dependent on the description of the things of our concern,” thus making personal 
interests in events or circumstances a type of predication of them.429 In a similar manner, the 
access of long term memory to understand working memory, or even the process of applying a 
schema to new information, permits the observer to determine the past experiences with which to 
compare, inform, and define the present. In newer media terms, the echo chamber applies similar 
principles of information becoming amplified or reinforced by repetition within a closed system; 
in Ricoeur’s sense of, “what Heidegger calls this trait of concern ‘preoccupation’ or 
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‘circumspection,’” readerly concern has “other traits that are more deeply hidden, and because of 
these hidden, deep traits, it has fundamental temporal modes” from those “Heidegger calls […] 
das Vorhandene (‘subsisting things which our concern counts on’) and das Zuhandene (‘utensils 
offered to our manipulation’).”430 “It is therefore language,” Ricoeur argues, “with its storehouse 
of meanings, that keeps the description of concern, in the modality of preoccupation or 
circumspection, from slipping back into the description of the things of our concern and from 
remaining tied to the sphere of vorhanden [present-at-hand] and zuhanden [ready-at-hand].”431 In 
this ordinary language philosophy Ricoeur finds narrative activity operates on both a linear 
representation of time and episodic chains of events. De Quincey suggests his preoccupation 
with hidden systems, comparable to language(s) in the mind, as a communication network that 
spans and scans (in ways that would make post-modernist such as Borges or Pynchon envious).    
 The “author of so much mischief” infringes on the unseen network—and De Quincey’s 
choice of terms reveals, as always, a nexus of several ideas at once. Commensurate to the 
observer-shaped reality, the wave function invites duality to particle behavior, or in De 
Quincey’s case, the remember-er and experiencer. Crystalline long-term memory accrues layers 
of new experiences, fluidly in process. The moment, De Quincey’s involute, is also a point of 
differentiation. De Quincey invokes the maelstrom and the “eternal wheelings” of waterfowl, to 
arrive at a sense quite similar to the moment of change, a complicated threshold of force and 
motion identified as lines of flight by Gilles Deleuze and Féliz Guattari in A Thousand 
Plateaus.432 These lines of flight will be of use further on. Here, De Quincey utilizes the 
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extension of author to connote action as well as creation; moreover, the network compares to 
“any elaborate work”: 
Even with less ignorance than mine, there was something to appall a child's 
imagination in the vast systematic machinery by which any elaborate work could 
disperse itself, could levy money, could put questions and get answers, all in 
profound silence, nay, even in darkness, searching every nook of every town and 
of every hamlet in so populous a kingdom.   (166-167) 
 
De Quincey’s sense of the network that encompasses discourses of economy and 
communications, originates in the text, its serial volumes, a self-proliferating work. He in effect 
links the codex to the properties of the computer and the digital-telecommunications age. 
“Searching every nook of every town and of every hamlet,” the network is inexhaustible and 
extensive, reaching all corners of the increasingly globalized empire or “kingdom.” The spider’s 
web merges underlying structure and embedded programming. Its seemingly autonomous and  
automatic operations reflect the shadowy of the unconscious, “in darkness.” The insight De 
Quincey adds to the “ghostly cobweb” upon which he “secretly” infringes is that it already 
operates “in profound silence, nay, even darkness.” De Quincey’s perspective on relational scope 
and interconnected communications permeates his imagined sense of external social and 
commercial or even economic systems, not solely “a child’s imagination.” The mail system, in 
“The English Mail-Coach” stresses this image further (discussed later in this chapter).  
 De Quincey’s “vast systematic machinery,” imaginable in structure and constituent parts, 
somehow remains mysterious and “unknown” or “absolutely inconceivable”: 
I had some dim terrors, also, connected with the Stationers' Company. I had often 
observed them in popular works threatening unknown men with unknown 
chastisements, for offences equally unknown; nay, to myself, absolutely 
inconceivable. Could I be the mysterious criminal so long pointed out, as it were, 
in prophecy? I figured the stationers, doubtless all powerful men, pulling at one 




 The “searching” action of this network, as he imagines it, to seek him out, resembles De 
Quincey’s memory of the magician’s geomancy in the tales of Arabian Nights. The rope from 
which he imagines himself hanging extends the image of the threads of the network, ensnaring 
him for his entanglement in it. De Quincey imagines himself “hanging at the other end,” as the 
spider reinforces the parallel, distorting through power relations the scale of his infraction (“the 
mysterious criminal […] in prophecy”). The nightmarish element of these unknowable systems 
offers the preoccupation De Quincey has while reading his own situation. At the end of this 
passage, he returns to the episode in the tales that “had particularly interested” him and his sister, 
concerning the magician tracking a porter by the ropes he left behind (a variation from the 
magician’s geomancy for locating Aladdin).433 This provides the parallel between the fantastical 
delivery he imagines for himself as the purchaser of the fifteen thousand volumes:  
Looking out, I should perceive a procession of carts and wagons, all advancing in 
measured movements; each in turn would present its rear, deliver its cargo of volumes, 
by shooting them, like a load of coals, on the lawn, and wheel off to the rear, by way 
of clearing the road for its successors. Then the impossibility of even asking the 
servants to cover with sheets, or counterpanes, or table-cloths, such a mountainous, 
such a “star-y-pointing” record of my past offences, lying in so conspicuous a 
situation! Men would not know my guilt merely, they would see it.    (167) 
 
The “measured movements” of the procession is a key image-set, particularly as each having 
dispatched their cargo, “wheel off to the rear, by way of clearing the road for its successor.” The 
successive layers and generations of the palimpsest seem to merge here with the Babylonian 
quarry of brick streets. De Quincey’s retelling of the tale of a “young porter, having his ropes 
about his person [who] finds a beautiful lady imprisoned” by a magician, from whom the porter 
flees, places the focus here on the porter’s forgotten ropes. Yet the magician, his role aligning 
with the ancient spider, tracks down the porter, akin to De Quincey: “Upon this story I used to 
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amuse my sister by ventriloquizing to the magician, from the lips of the trembling young man, 
‘O, Mr. Magician, these ropes cannot be mine! They are far too good […] If you please, Mr. 
Magician, I never had money enough to buy so beautiful a set of ropes’” (167). “But argument is 
thrown away upon a magician, and off he sets on his travels with the young porter,” De Quincey 
explains, “not forgetting to take the ropes along with him” (167). Any underlying theme 
concerning valuable possessions or the like appears incidental to the links of imprisonment, 
ropes/threads, and tacitly tethering obligations. “The reason why this form of consequences,” De 
Quincey envisions for himself, “so much more than any other, struck by [his] imagination was, 
that it connected itself with one of the Arabian Nights” (167). The connection is not one he 
makes; rather the consequences he imagines “connected itself” to his previous associated 
network of meaning. De Quincey does not trace the particular association that connects the two 
imagined stories (his imaged fate and the porter’s). The further entangling of parallel images—
silence, the visible record, and tethering—reinforce the binding of the network, of the porter to 
magician, of thought to memory, of De Quincey to his memory texts.   
 Reappearance and recursion are a vital component to the metaphoric processes that occur 
during recollection, dreaming, or reveries. Each a new experience undergoes fluid systems 
processes prior to crystallization in long-term memory. De Quincey’s involute adheres to some 
extent to DeLanda’s (divergent) development of Deleuzian multiplicity, a further advancement 
of  Bergsonism. As Deleuze replaces essences with multiplicities (a modal preference for virtual 
and actual rather than possible and real), he pursues multiplicities as concrete universals. 
Concreteness, rather than abstraction, is Hegel’s sense of the dialectical relations between 
categories.434 For Deleuze, the set of instances possesses qualities of both the universal and the 
                                                          




particular and provide the alternative philosophical system to remove any anxiety in the 
particular actualizing the virtual universal. Multiplicities and concrete universals both assist in 
understanding De Quincey. De Quincey’s pragmatics recognizes the circumstantial associations, 
both exteroceptive and interceptive, such as Arabian Nights, the educating lambency of the 
nursery bible readings or the lively palms/pomps of summer/Sunday. The relationship could be 
considered one of singularities and multiplicities, as “processes,” in the way DeLanda 
distinguishes spaces and attractors.435 (19-24). Part of the fluid state of memory is metaphoric 
patterning to previous semantic layers, language visual-linguistic image-sets. These extensive 
properties permit processes that are intensive morphogenetic, with discrete and localized 
discursivity, as on the palimpsest. Yet, there is also the interaction, complexity or chaos of 
interconnected systems: the involute of language, De Quincey’s visual-linguistic cognition, 
memory and narrative. Memory is transcoding: converting messages between separate coded 
representations or languages, always differentiated in time. Translation in dreams expands in 
quantity those schemas of quality; narrative, according to Ricoeur, offers order between 
connections of external stimuli and internal abstract thought. In the trajectory of any reading, the 
observer-created reality actualizes and differentiates. With this awareness, involute reading 
paradigmatically links properties of chaos and order associated with the computer and the 
digital-telecommunications age back to the codex. In retracing media developments, involute 
reading and analysis comes to apply to any work or text.  
 
Section 1: “Incalculable motions” and “Counter forces”: Centrifugal and Centripetal 
tensions 
 
It is as though recollection inverted the so-called natural order of time. By reading 
the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end, we learn also to read time 
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itself backward, as the recapitulating of the initial conditions of a course of action 
in its terminal consequences. In this way, a plot establishes human action not only 
within time, as we said at the beginning of the section, but within memory. 
Memory, accordingly, repeats the course of events according to an order that is 
the counterpart of time as ‘stretching along’ between a beginning and an end. 
    Ricoeur, “Narrative and Time,” 180 
 
 For Suspriria de Profundis to be the study of dreams and memory that De Quincey 
desires, his narrative must follow the law or purpose of the work—yet, perhaps the relationship 
may be the inverse. Perhaps the law of the work is just as contingent on the form. Or, perhaps, 
they are mutually determined. Narrative and its key principle of time might provide a component 
view, if not a model, for involute memory. In the study “Narrative Time,” part of a larger 
philosophy of language developed into Time and Narrative, Ricoeur invokes the “well known 
metaphor of the arrow of time,” yet, complicates any straightforward sense of trajectory in 
narrative.436 With recollection, as Ricoeur notes, having inverted time, narrative plot “establishes 
human action not only within time” but also “within memory.” The two positions for De 
Quincey, within time and within memory, are evident tensions in the coursing of Suspiria: in its 
narrative progression and in his relating recollections within remembrances. Ricoeur explains 
this trajectory as dual: memory “repeats the course of events according to an order that is the 
counterpart of time ‘stretching along’ between a beginning and an end.”437 The image is one of 
opposite movement along the same line. Similar attention to linearity and stretching time 
pervades Suspiria de Profundis and De Quincey’s duration, fundamental to his coining and 
conceptualization of involutes. Suspiria, however, weaves courses, through confluence and 
convergence, through involutes that are not linear but spherical. De Quincey sits as the ancient 
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spider in the center of the mysterious network, privy to vibrations along all longitudes and 
latitudes of his involute memories: “Concealment or reparation there could be none,” for any 
“damaged or deranged” effects on “the fine threads or links.” De Quincey stresses co-existence 
with his past iterations or author-selves encompassing the circumference of self. The stretching 
of narrative time, for De Quincey, is centrifugal and centripetal. 
 Time, its measurement and relative nature, is often the subject of key moments in 
Suspiria de Profundis, permitting De Quincey the means for narratologically examining time. De 
Quincey suggests he includes, particularly in Part II of Suspiria, “illustrations from [his] own 
experience” to demonstrate time in memory and narrative. He offers, in essence, life as a 
memory palace, with self-invested prompts (evoking preoccupation or circumspection) 
“confining our gaze to those, and no others, for whom personally we shall be interested”: 
If life could throw open its long suites of chambers to our eyes from some station 
beforehand, if, from some secret stand, we could look by anticipation along its 
vast corridors, and aside into the recesses opening upon them from either hand, 
halls of tragedy or chambers of retribution, simply in that small wing and no more 
of the great caravanserai which we ourselves shall haunt, simply in that narrow 
tract of time, and no more, where we ourselves shall range, and confining our 
gaze to those, and no others, for whom personally we shall be interested, what a 
recoil we should suffer of horror in our estimate of life!   (198) 
 
Life, or rather time, has a conceptual space that resembles the archive of the mind. Mary 
Carruthers, in The Book of Memory, explains the importance of the memory palace in history, as 
a method of visualizations, of spatial loci of an individual’s environment assigned information as 
“living concordance” for efficient recall.438 Among the varied memory practices Carruthers 
catalogues, the rhetorical role of the memory palace is particularly apt for De Quincey. The 
mnemonic recall the palace facilitates allows for fluid recollection and organization to suit 
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debate and dialogue. The concordance resembles the correspondence De Quincey explained in 
the act of translation. The living aspects, of progressing, developing, reproducing, reinforces 
reviving the past into or alongside the present. In De Quincey’s visualized mindscape, as with 
duration, he becomes multiple: “ourselves shall haunt, simply in that narrow tract of time, and no 
more, where we ourselves shall range.” Time, in which existences “haunt,” resembles the 
narrative time, the availability of life to “throw open its long suits of chambers to our eyes from 
some station beforehand,” and of memory, “if, from some secret stand, we could look by 
anticipation along its vast corridors.” The chamber De Quincey envisions operates on involute 
structuring: “along its vast corridors, and aside into the recesses opening upon them from either 
hand, halls of tragedy or chambers of retribution.” “What a recoil we shall suffer of a horror in 
our estimate of life,” De Quincey cautions of the past “as a secret exhibition,” should “the past 
[be] viewed not as the past, but by a spectator who steps back ten years deeper into the rear, in 
order that he may regard it as a future” (199). De Quincey offers this commentary as part of his 
explanation for the criticisms his previous confessions suffered from his allusion to persons and 
places in London. However, the subject shifts to the experience of time in recollection: “the 
calamity of 1840 contemplated from the station of 1830, the doom that rang the knell of 
happiness viewed from a point of time when as yet it was neither feared nor would even have 
been intelligible [. . .] but which, if seen today, would draw forth an involuntary groan” (199). 
Whether “contemplated” or “viewed” from the previous “point of time” De Quincey suggests 
time (or life) is capable of displaying these perspectives of events without cognizance, lacking 
knowledge that would be, “neither feared nor would even have been intelligible.” Viewed 
through memory, hindsight offers no such luxury.  
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 With a trajectory of time and perspective to explore, De Quincey addresses his reader, 
drawing attention to the parallel relationship. De Quincey externalizes his internal imagined 
reader, his “fair companion in this exploring voyage of inquest into hidden science, or forgotten 
scenes of human life” (201). He adds the metaphor of “direct[ing] our glasses upon” characters, 
as if seated with a friend at the theater (though implying a microscope is an intriguing 
alternative) (201). “Hidden science, or forgotten scenes of human life” offer a keen equation. 
Much like the spider-web’s covert technics, the neglected experiences of life are nevertheless 
operating in the background, the darkness, the shadowy. He reinforces this, whether consciously 
or not, in his description; after the episode of failed courtship, he pauses over the intruding 
images of two sisters, scriptural passages, summer evenings, and sunrays. The images reference 
his nursery years, Suspiria’s involute memory. The sunrays, “dying lights of love,” he admits 
triggered—as they contributed to his trance—his alluded recollections: his memory “went back 
in thought to this image” (201). He employs a vignette of several intervals of years which have 
“passed over” the girl, “the young lady in the boudoir,” to finally “a third generation” concealed 
by “cloud” and “draperies” (202). The generational timespan recalls the preliminary palimpsest 
De Quincey explained to readers as a text able to speak directly and pertinently to its succession 
of readers. Involute memory is the palimpsestic vision but also an optical illusion allowing 
perception to fluctuate selectively between simultaneous images. To resolve this episode, he 
invokes, again, the magic of narrative through an allusion to Arabian Nights: “Once more, ‘open 
sesame!’” he beckons the scenic curtains (202). The memory theater analogy he offers shares an 
associated syntax and grammar for images as does the dream-scenery of his dreaming theater.  
 There are temporal places and spaces in De Quincey’s travel episodes that distinguish 
narrative-time for a reader and memory-time for a rememberer. Ricoeur’s discussion of time in 
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narrative assists with appreciating the subjective and objective positions in relation to time. 
Ricoeur joins those exploring Bergsionian time while addressing the narratological focus of 
Vladimir Propp and Algirdas Greimas.439 Influenced by the common grounds of narrative theory 
and semiotics, Ricoeur builds on analyzable groupings of textual material (usually thematically 
linked), discourse and discursive actions and utterances. Greimas particularly provides the 
parallel levels available for meaning-making in a seemingly single homogenous discourse, what 
he calls isotopy.440 Ricoeur adds the element of time to the discussion of meaning set and layers, 
crucial to the relationship De Quincey establishes in the interrelated systems of memory and text. 
In “Narrative Time,” Ricoeur locates key issues in the temporal dialectic he feels others “hastily” 
misidentify (looking only at the level of manifestation, Greimas’ term,441 or interface in media 
terms). Ricoeur argues that finding “[n]arrative time and chronological time at the level of the 
surface grammar,” alone, “neglected a fundamental feature of a narrative’s temporal 
dialectic.”442 The temporal dialectic operates upon sublevels and describes De Quincey’s role as 
narrator but also as recollector and archiver. “Being in time is already something quite different 
from measuring intervals between limiting instances,” Ricoeur notes: “it is first of all to reckon 
with time and so to calculate.”443 De Quincey demonstrates reckoning with time, even prior to 
narrative, expanding Ricoeur’s temporal dialectic of narrative into the systems of language, 
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thought and memory, all also evident in the language—if not the voices—of De Quincey when 
recollecting moments.  
 Reckoning with time adds an awareness of negotiating and measuring, of being aware of 
the process while participating in the process. The issue places De Quincey in an indeterminate 
position. The indeterminacy he feels transforms the ordered memory palace. The vision De 
Quincey offers when spanning the generations in his vignette becomes a scene of a verdant 
labyrinth:  
How perfect is the verdure; how rich the blossoming shrubberies 
that screen with verdurous walls from the possibility of intrusion, 
whilst by their own wandering line of distribution they shape, and 
umbrageously embay, what one might call lawny saloons and 
vestibules, sylvan galleries and closets! Some of these recesses, 
which unlink themselves as fluently as snakes, and unexpectedly as 
the shyest nooks, watery cells, and crypts, amongst the shores of a 
forest−lake, being formed by the mere caprices and ramblings of 
the luxuriant shrubs, are so small and so quiet that one might fancy 
them meant for boudoirs. (202) 
 
Memories and remembrances housed in recesses can “unlink themselves,” and, as this passage 
demonstrates can gather around centers of meaning. De Quincey returns to the objectivity of 
time in life’s memory palace (“verdurous walls,” saloons and vestibules, sylvan galleries and 
closets,” “recesses”) with the images of the network (“wandering line of distribution”). He adds  
the caduceus (“unlink themselves as fluently as snakes,” as entwined on the caduceus, and 
“formed by the mere caprices and ramblings of the luxuriant shrubs”), now tinged with the 
traumas of memory (“shyest nooks, watery cells, and crypts,” invoking Savannah-La-Mar as 
well). This clustering node reveals traces of the layers beneath (or before) narrative, 
remembrances “umbrageously embay[ed]” until loosed into the maelstrom. The temporal power 
De Quincey demonstrates collapses his images and metaphors as if remoulding his earlier 
portions of Suspiria. 
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 The labyrinthine network reveals the involute’s impact on linearity. Though based on a 
line rather than an involute curve, Ricoeur’s sense of trajectory and oscillation for narrative 
dialectic provides some insights into dialectical, appositional progressions for De Quincey—De 
Quincey’s will additionally recourse, involve. Narrative’s temporal dialectic permits De 
Quincey’s merger of images and memory layers and selves. In “The Human Experience of Time 
and Narrative” Ricoeur first explained that, “[e]very narrative combines two dimensions in 
various proportions, one chronological and the other nonchronological.”444 In “Narrative Time” 
Ricoeur describes narrative’s two dimensions as “the episodic dimension, which characterizes 
the story as made out of events,” and, “the second is the configurational dimension, according to 
which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events.”445 The network of “scattered 
events” seems an appropriate way to explain the clustered nodes rendered in the memory palace 
De Quincey describes and renders in the constituent parts of Suspiria. Ricoeur notes that he 
borrows “the notion of a configuration act” from Louis O. Mink, “which he [Mink] interprets as 
a ‘grasping together,” or construing that Ricoeur recognizes as “the act of the plot, as eliciting a 
pattern from succession.”446 As De Quincey retraces events of his life, his narrative permits plot-
like construing—De Quincey’s term for a stage of translation interpreting or decoding when 
suspending a past moment alongside the present. De Quincey’s digressions re-collect the 
significant elements for a sense of whole-ness. The obvious attention De Quincey draws to the 
intervals of time passing between drawing back the theatrical draperies suggests meaning in what 
is shown and what is revealed to have occurred between scenes. When links are not immediately 
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apparent, reflecting a plotting that is not entirely conscious, De Quincey provides recursive 
associations.  
 De Quincey’s succession of episodic portraits brings his description back to the core of 
Suspiria, the coining involute:   
Here is one that in a less fickle climate would make the loveliest of 
studies for a writer of breathings from some solitary heart, or of 
suspiria from some impassioned memory! And, opening from one 
angle of this embowered study, issues a little narrow corridor, that, 
after almost wheeling back upon itself, in its playful mazes, finally 
widens into a little circular chamber; out of which there is no exit 
(except back again by the entrance), small or great; so that, 
adjacent to his study, the writer would command how sweet a bed-
room, permitting him to lie the summer through, gazing all night 
long at the burning host of heaven. How silent that would be at the 
noon of summer nights, how grave-like in its quiet! And yet, need 
there be asked a stillness or a silence more profound than is felt at 
this present noon of day? (202-203) 
 
De Quincey’s exercise in exploiting narrative time returns to his moment of contracted time and 
his inquest into the dreaming faculty’s temporal powers. The scene provides “the loveliest of 
studies for the writer of breathings from a solitary heart,” claims De Quincey, extending the 
imagery of revival or resuscitation from feelings to the memories themselves, “of suspiria from 
some impassioned memory.” De Quincey’s use of the titular subject is eye-catching but also 
relevant. Slippage from his process and studies to the physical structure, “opening from one 
angle of this embowered study, issues a little narrow corridor,” exemplifies the concrete and 
material structure De Quincey imbues to both his narrative and the memory texts it reproduces. 
The dialectical relationship becomes clear when, “adjacent to his study the writer would 
command how sweet a bed-room”—one not unlike Elizabeth’s of his memory, “permitting him 
to lie the summer through, gazing all night long at the burning host of heaven.” De Quincey, 
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perhaps more for his own benefit than for his imagined audience, assumes the role of reader 
observing his author-self.  
 In reading his memory as a text, De Quincey places particular emphasis on memory’s 
power to re-collect. What Ricoeur calls the “temporal dialectic,” provides a means to understand 
“the basic operation of eliciting a configuration from a succession.”447 The temporal dialectic for 
the reader allows for (re-)constructing a configuration of meaning out of the seeming linearity of 
narrative. De Quincey exposes this as he reads his memory-texts. While recollecting, the 
rememberer reconstructs meaning from chronological, episodic events. Ricoeur elaborates: “The 
configurational dimension, in turn, displays temporal features that may be opposed to these 
‘features’ of episodic time […] the configurational arrangement makes the succession of events 
into significant wholes that are the correlate of the act of grouping together.”448 Ricoeur credits 
this process as a “reflective act—in the sense of Kant’s Critique of Judgement,” which permits 
that “the whole plot may be translated into one ‘thought.’”449 The “thought” or theme, mythos, 
point or so forth, for De Quincey or rather for Suspiria de Profundis is the group of successive 
events that anticipate beforehand and influence after the imagery of the coining involute. From 
the climate of Jerusalem to the profound silence of noon day, De Quincey crystalizes the trance 
in Elizabeth’s bedchamber. The wheeling of memories, the unicursal mazes or circular labyrinth 
is both that of the re-collector-reader and “the writer [who] would command” the contents of his 
memories, the sighs from the depths.  
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 By adapting the issues of narrative to include application to the textual mind, narratology 
provides vital underpinnings for addressing intersections (and involute interactions) in the human 
system. De Quincey’s concerns for narrative parallel his examination of memory—his efforts 
place him in company with philosophies of language and other interdisciplinary work impacted 
by semiotics and philosophy. The control De Quincey attempts for memory, he possesses in 
narrative: “How silent that would be at the noon of summer nights, how grave-like in its quiet!” 
De Quincey oscillates between both positions of the night and noon, the observer and participant 
in the coining remembrance, ultimately asking: “And yet, need there be asked a stillness or a 
silence more profound than is felt at this present noon of day?” De Quincey’s metaphysical 
involute resonates with the roles of interfaces and interaction, providing a unique model to 
inform current new media inquiry. The interdependence of language and materiality in Suspiria, 
resonate with new media and informatics, areas recognizing the embodied processes and 
contexts that information and communication require. N. Katherine Hayles’ contributions to 
scholarship range among cross-sections of science, literature and media, and philosophy in effect 
arguing the cultural connections between these areas; De Quincey differs only in his personal 
focus. Hayles, in How We Became Post-Human, cogently interrogates post-modern conceptions 
of information as disembodied,450 betraying her own influences from both semiotics and material 
philosophy. Hayles argues: 
Words never make things happen by themselves—or rather, that 
the only things they can make happen are other abstractions […] 
They can’t put marks onto paper. They can’t get letters in the mail. 
They can’t bring twenty-five people together at the right time and 
in the right place […] For that, material and embodied processes 
must be used—processes that exist never in isolation but always in 
contexts where the relevant boundaries are permeable, negotiable, 
instantiated [..] information is never disembodied, that messages 
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don’t flow by themselves, and that epistemology isn’t a word 
floating through the thin, thin air until it is connected up with 
incorporating practices.451     
        
 For De Quincey, the embodied memory processes become materially incorporated in his 
narrative. Analogously, Hayles explains the cybernetics dilemma of separating information from 
the embodied media, sender and receiver. The information model serves as a varied 
interdisciplinary model; Greimas, for instance, features it in his semiotics of discourse, an 
“assemblage of structures of signification.”452 De Quincey’s involute model, however, 
approaches the sense of assemblage at the forefront of theory since Deleuze and Guarttari 
established it as collective enunciations depending on redundancy, on language repeating (rather 
than representing), whether “a series of different reactions” or “repeating the same reaction.”453 
In addition to linguistic assemblages, symbolic and based in language, Deleuze and Guattari 
provide literary theory the machinic assemblage for objects, such as texts and technology, 
assemblages of enunciation of “Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines”454—a description fitting 
for De Quincey’s involutes. Applied in their understanding of the body “strata, stratification,” 
(including “[s]edimentation and folding, fiber and infolding”), Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic 
(rather than mechanic) assemblage stresses the entity’s metamorphic processes and multiplicities 
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of self, complimenting their sense of the stratified subject.455 In his crafting involutes through 
both concreteness and abstractions, mathematic objects and linguistic functions, De Quincey 
offers a hybrid or involutely-interlacing matrix of both assemblages. De Quincey’s reciprocally 
defined text and body become sites for and structures of involutes as linguistically functioning 
self-generating machines. 
 The involute site and involute system demonstrates information and media as compound 
and incapable of being disentangled. The “permeable, negotiable, instantiated” boundaries of 
material and embodied processes that Hayles underscores456 are contingent to each other and 
their context: “The displacement of presence by pattern thins the tissue of textuality, making it a 
semi-permeable membrane that allows awareness of the text as an informational patter to infuse 
into the space of representation.”457 De Quincey’s involutes in the caduceus-narrative and 
palimpsest/archive-mind explain the functioning of structure and relations Hayle recognizes—
but a century earlier. This approach to cybernetics and digital media assists, as media 
archeaologist Jussi Parikka argues, in understanding past media: “Through the lenses of the 
digital, we start to see old media anew as well.”458 The digital text, however, resonances with 
interface, temporality, and virtuality in De Quincey’s involute texts only first through the 
intermediate medium of the moving images, or still images in motion throughout the involute 
system. Involutes of language interact and interlace with involute images, each wheeling nexus 
becomes a cyclical figure featured in various tableaus. Images, vital to De Quincey’s narrative 
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episodes, linking mnemonic associations, and conveying the language of dreams all implicate 
memory (short-term and long-term) in the process of narration. 
 Through De Quincey’s relational understanding of the narrative and the subject(s) in 
Suspiria, he reveals a media focus that explains his understanding of narrative as a medium for 
apprehending memory. De Quincey’s interest in images combines Ricoeur’s narrative dialectic 
of time and Deleuze’s distinction of the movement-image (again, the arrow of time) and the time-
image. In his related work on time and its new media implications, Cinema 1 & Cinema 2, 
Deleuze examines time in relation to images.459 De Quincey structures his narrative to exploit the 
montage of moments against their material, spatial representations. Theatrically, or 
cinematically, drawing back the curtain on his memory, the trope of “the young lady in the 
boudoir,” De Quincey indulges in architecturally designing memory as a house, a rhizomatic 
memory-palace, or, more an involute labyrinth. “Opening from one angle of this embowered 
study,” De Quincey suggests of life’s archive—or, what Deleuze would suggest is the 
transcendental form of time in the time-image—“issues a little narrow corridor” of adjacency, of 
tangents, of further involutes. For De Quincey, the structure ultimately involutes back upon the 
self, “a little circular chamber,” mingling the text and the representation of its contents. 
Ricoeur’s narrative approach recognizes that “[t]he plot’s configuration also superimposes ‘the 
sense of an ending’” a sense of ending or resolution to the otherwise “open-endedness of mere 
succession.”460 Relatedly, Deleuze’s attention to cinema (founded strongly on Bergsonisn theory) 
suggests engaging temporal readings of images with internal reflection of concept-images 
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separate from the text (or film) itself. Both material objects of time and in time (narrative-plot or 
film-image), as with De Quincey’s memory study, offer contingent variables of time in their 
formation. Duration’s infinite extension both forward and backward, has a counterpart in the 
succession of events, images, or memories. Contracted and dilated time separate motion from 
space, just as his non-linear digressions violate the linearity of narrative progressing toward an 
end. Narrative, much like memory, is reversionary, beginning at an endpoint, travelling 
backward along the same path while propelling forward. The symbiosis of narrative and memory 
behaves similarly to duration. The child’s imagination in the vast systematic machinery corrects 
time and teleos, even teleology. 
  
Section 2: Relative Experiences in Contracted and Dilated Time/Space 
 
What, more precisely, is the difference between a recollection-image and a 
dream-image? We start from a perception-image, the nature of which is to be 
actual. The recollection, in contrast—what Bergson calls ‘pure recollection’—is 
necessarily a virtual image. But in the first case, it becomes actual in so far as it is 
summoned by the perception-image. It is actualized in a recollection-image which 
corresponds to the perception-image. The case of dream brings two important 
difference to light. On the one hand, the sleeper’s perceptions exist, but in the 
diffuse condition of a dust of actual sensations—external and internal—which are 
not grasped in themselves, escaping consciousness. On the other hand, the virtual 
image which becomes actual does not do so directly, but becomes actual in a 
different image, which itself plays the role of the virtual image being actualized in 
a third, and so on to infinity: the dream is not a metaphor but a series of 
anamorphoses which sketch out a very large circuit.     
    Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, 56 
 
 The memory-recollections and dream-recollections of De Quincey combine, forming a 
complex system in Suspiria de Profundis. Issues of diffusions of conscious and unconscious re-
presentations complicate any reading of semantic layering. The confluence of virtual and actual 
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make the narrative temporal and semiosic, dialectic compelling, yet ultimately indeterminate. In 
the “Finale to Part I” of Suspiria, subtitled, “Savannah-La-Mar,” De Quincey crafts a tableau of 
temporality in memory and narrative. De Quincey envisions Savannah-La-Mar, a Jamaican port 
destroyed by natural disaster in 1780, as a submarine asylum, untouchable in its current depths 
by even time. The notion of the intact city resembles the no less fantastical notion that 
information can remain unaltered, whether digitally or materially stored (both physically located 
somewhere, albeit in different languages). In How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, N. Katherine Hayles surveys interdisciplinary attention 
to informatics as an approach to understanding the human body/mind, noting that, “in fact, a 
defining characteristic of the present cultural moment is the belief that information can circulate 
unchanged among different material substrates.”461 The information model builds into it a need 
for maintaining output integrity (and signal strength). Digital archeology is not unlike textual 
scholarship in scouring an archive of variant or deviant iterations. De Quincey’s re-construction 
of Savannah-La-Mar certainly humors such a sense of invariability, though his representation of 
visiting it is more complicated than it first appears.  
 The seeming paradox of a city effaced yet preserved is De Quincey’s fantasy. De 
Quincey’s preoccupation with the vision connected with Elizabeth, now extends to Savannah-La-
Mar (and even shows traces of linking back to the illustrated nursery bible). As a memory or part 
of self, even an emblem for Elizabeth, the city seems to align with a sense of the immutable, 
pristine message that is incorruptible. Post-modern new media interests in information are just as 
concerned with applying information in the human as in the machine, as well as examining the 
extension of the human as the increasingly blurred boundary between both entities. “As early as 
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the 1950s,” Hayles surveys, “Norbert Wiener proposed it was theoretically possible to telegraph 
a human being, a suggestion underlaid by the same assumptions informing [Hans] Moravec’s 
scenario,” which consisted of downloading human consciousness into a computer.462 Moravec’s 
contributions to the fields of robotic and artificial intelligence offer insights into human neural 
processing,463 and, as with noteworthy discoveries, generates new discussions for several fields, 
practical and theoretical, including information science, the science of processing data for 
storage and retrieval. As media studies notes of contingency between message and medium, the 
issue of medium structure immediately problematizes the ability to translate consciousness 
through binary code. Hayles explains that “much of the discourse on molecular biology treats 
information as the essential code the body expresses, a practice that has certain affinities with 
Moravec’s ideas.”464 Viewing information in this manner seems to miss the generic grammar and 
syntax De Quincey keenly notes of all language. Part of Hayles’s study includes semiotics, 
materiality, and virtuality intersecting various post-/modern fields, yet, part of where she directs 
the conversation is to the unity of material and embodied processes and structures in informatics 
(the applied areas of information engineering) as well as humans. Hayles, as a result, is fairly 
                                                          
462. Hayles, 1999, Post-Human, 1. 
 
463. Hans Moravec lends his name to the Moravec Paradox, discovered by him along with Rodney Brooks and 
Marvin Minsky. The Paradox, as its known, provides the counter-intuitive insights into computational demand for 
higher and lower order tasks. According to their findings, high-level reasoning requires little computation, whereas, 
low-level sensorimotor skills demand vast computational resources. Their findings offer some baring on De 
Quincey’s concept of involutes, much as with Freud’s iceberg as a hierarchical structure of the unconscious—the 
sub-processes operate with greater scope and scale in the pyramid of mental processes. By developing the processes 
and structures of involutes, De Quincey accounts for (and accepts) certain limitations in faint glimpses that the 
conscious mind can trace back to episodes of vivid sensorimotor-intake. For more on the discussion, see discussions 
of Moravec in conjunction with Ray Kurzweil and James Gleick; an insightful survey of these and others can be 
located in: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in the 
Time of Brilliant Technologies. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016). Also see: Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual 
Machines: When We Will Live, Work and Think in the New Age of Intelligent Machines. (New York: Penguin, 
2000).; Hans P. Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).; 
and, James Gleick, The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood. (London: Fourth Estate, 2012).  
 
464. Hayles, 1999, Post-Human, 1. 
274 
 
(and justifiably) dubious of the ambitious aims to transfer consciousness. Even adaptations from 
written text to cinema (arguably related media) must accommodate translating their respective 
languages. De Quincey demonstrates his struggle simply to render a representation of 
consciousness through narrative. The resulting Suspiria is more than stream of consciousness. As 
memory operating in dual trajectories in time, the narrative exposes the patterning between and 
beneath even fleeting moments in narrative. De Quincey does this himself by not simply 
depicting Savannah-La-Mar, but my representing his own habitual visits to the underwater city in 
his mind.  
 The preoccupations with which De Qunicey riddles the latter sections of Suspiria de 
Profundis similarly situate his concerns in relation to other post-modern areas in the wake of 
Bergsonism, quantum mechanics, and systems. These last cross-sections provide the elements 
necessary for applying De Quincey’s own methodology on the three parts that comprise “The 
English Mail-Coach.” To employ de Man’s term aporia, for moments of terminal uncertainty,465 
these sections introduce elements that form a distinct series of recollection-images and dream-
images for “The Dream-Fugue.” Such aporia ultimately demonstrate that the subjects of these 
separate sections are influenced by previous memories; they are but eddies circling back upon 
the maelstrom at the core of Suspiria. De Quincey’s reiterations in narrative showcase involute 
memory in action. Involutes provide a medium that resonates with the historicized notions of the 
spectator and the apparatus Parikka finds among the “alternative practices of cinematic 
experience, mediascape and industry.”466 Parikka explains that “simultaneously modes of 
sensation and perception became embedded in an analytical view that encompasses multiple, 
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non-linear histories.”467 Parrika’s attention not only helps to inform a study of De Quincey’s 
involutes, but locates another manner in which his involutes can assist understanding the 
phenomena new media studies. “Savannah-La-Mar” displays an insightful duality: the 
immutable strata and the multiple, non-linear histories or iterations of self, which may operate on 
different processes. 
 The initial temporal attraction of Savannah-La-Mar is the archeological vision. While 
most Romanticists focus on actual sites and uncovered ruins, De Quincey exalts a place rather 
opposite to the more popular Pompeii, which, according to De Quincey, God claims he did “bury 
and conceal from men through seventeen centuries; this city [Savanna-La-Mar] I will bury, but 
not conceal” (185). “Enshrin[ing] her in a crystal dome of my tropic seas,” is no less fantastical a 
claim for God than De Quincey’s own admission of “oftentimes in dreams did I and the Dark 
Interpreter cleave the watery veil that divided us from her streets” (185-186). The pristine 
condition of visiting the slumbering dead is not only a deep impulse of retrieval or access to 
Elizabeth, but expresses a quite relevant dilemma of archeological excavation. In Gavin Lucas’s 
discussion of the history and developing approaches to archeology in Understanding the 
Archaeological Record, he expresses the key principle archeology must recognize: excavation as 
destruction.468 Lucas explains that “the paradox of excavation” includes “partial or restricted 
excavation on the one hand, and total recording on the other hand.”469 The opposing approaches 
to “site archive” or “preservation by record” exposes excavation while also questioning the 
archive objective and related paradoxes as “anxiety about the incompleteness of the 
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archeological record,” of complete incompleteness in “the total record.”470 Pompeii’s ashen 
imprints offer a particularly vivid and haunting sense of the presence in absence—and one which 
De Quincey discards for the more appealing prospect of the submarine city.  
 De Quincey’s ideal for memory is not to destroy the material substrates, but rather to 
revisit them in hibernation, suspended. Savannah-La-Mar exemplifies immutable information—it 
is a fantastical illusion as much for informatics as for archeology. De Quincey’s preference, his 
ideal archeological site is equally insightful to the problems of the archive for archeologists. 
Lucas explains, “[b]etween present practice and future expectation,” the flaws in one archival 
solution is the archivist’s expectations.471 While dismantling archeologists ought to record 
everything that might be of import in the future, “their criticisms of the mechanical nature of 
recording and, more important, the deferral of interpretation it engendered in many ways 
presented a new paradox which this was supposed to solve.”472 The archivist’s expectations are 
readerly, interpretive expectations. Suddenly the importance of Savannah-La-Mar as De 
Quincey’s ideal memory or archeological site assumes additional weight; it is also the ideal 
archive, the total record that secures information without selective choice. “To defer 
interpretation to some future point,” Lucas argues, “presupposes anticipating all possible 
information that any given future interpretation might make.”473 In effect, archeology’s recording 
archive cannot be disinterested; it must read the archeological record with anticipation. The 
fantastical vision of De Quincey’s Savannah-La-Mar is that it eternally provides a view of the 
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past. The most important remembrances for Suspiria involve a moment encapsulated in time’s 
constraints.474 The section itself proffers to fulfill the gaps of information in De Quincey’s 
trance, first dream-image then recollection-image. One premise Deleuze raises in The Logic of 
Sense, which not only relates to the dueling/dual-ing systems of De Quincey but also to the 
media theory concerns for the relationship between medium and message, is his concept of 
“quasi-causality”: “alogical incompatibilities and noncausal correspondences […] the relations 
of events among themselves.”475 Deleuze, addressing larger historical philosophical issues from 
the Stoics, including materiality and action,476 offers his addition to the idea of event that 
provides insight on his other theories, while assisting our apprehending the role of images and 
materiality for De Quincey. 
 The revisiting of memory or dreams, for De Quincey, are their own experiences, or 
events. Deleuze suggests that events involve causes and effects: “all bodies are causes,” he 
explains, however, “effects are not bodies, but properly speaking, ‘incorporeal entities’” that are 
only “quasi-causal.”477 The Interpreter, a prominent figure in this section of Suspiria, offers a 
distinct figure to the other bodies operating within De Quincey. When De Quincey describes 
“thoughts and feelings” (passing to himself), the idea resembles incorporeal entities or effects 
that are tied and bound to the event. Deleuze’s “quasi-causality” explains how effects only 
partially contribute to other effects or events that are “co-fated.”478 The circumstances of any 
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experience, as a result, operate as other bodies or objects (images, language and so forth) 
interacting with his own. For Deleuze, the event is “subject to a double causality, referring on the 
one hand to mixtures of bodies which are its cause, and on the other, to other events which are its 
quasi-cause.”479 Such an idea of events chained together through the causality of interacting 
bodies and quasi-causal effects assists with understanding the duality of the involute. The 
material or bodily substrates interact alongside immaterial non-bodily psychical associations, 
impressions or spaces. The De Quincey re-collector interacts with the De Quincey within 
memory (or dream); the other self is the layered iteration. Recollection and dreaming—and also 
dream-recollection—each becomes a new event, a further involute. Each time the quasi-causal 
effects—the thoughts and feelings—are new ones, though related or renewed, rewritten, 
reproduced, revived.  
 De Quincey attempts a complete record, for memory and narrative, in the crystalline 
image of Savannah-La-Mar. Significantly, the time captured is post-cataclysmic event. The 
parallel to the core involute is uncanny: his suspension in time during his trance over Elizabeth’s 
body.480 In fact, the near-cinematic handling of the location as a setting for a digression on the 
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measure of time is keenly appropriate for linking temporal images. A major contribution to 
contemporary media theory is the work Deleuze provides (in both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2) on 
the cinematic image, arguing that all the world, ultimately, is no longer a stage but cinema. For 
Deleuze, clearly influenced by modern physics (and Bergson of course), the movement of matter 
conveys best through image; all things are images. The semiotic or figural image has literal 
materiality through the medium—yet this does not discount the significance of De Quincey’s 
images, rather it informs them in retrospect of the newer medium. Part of Deleuze’s extensive 
project brings him to rework Bergson’s understanding of cinema (as advanced by other 
phenomenologists) and its interpretation of motion. Deleuze contests images not as external 
domains, but rather material subjectivity or internal reflections in which the viewing-subject 
“perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself ‘from the inside.’”481 De Quincey’s 
companion, the Dark Interpreter functions in this inverted externalization. Deleuze operates 
within the bodily exteriorization of functions and organs, a trajectory Lucas similarly follows, 
from tools to computers, in the history of material culture.482 Lucas offers post-structuralism’s 
approach to texts, in the wake of departure from nineteenth-century views “drawing on the 
general linguistic turn in the humanities and social sciences at the time,” as opposed to tensions 
between internal thought and external behavior.”483 To some extent this coincides with Deleuze’s 
redirection of the reading of images to the internal, in which the viewing-subject finds refection 
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within images. In a Deleuzian suffusion of past/future, Savannah-La-Mar provides an actual 
image of the virtual time/image of De Quincey’s trance during the coining involute. De Quincey 
is himself the specter of Savannah-La-Mar.  
 Savannah-La-Mar is the epitome of time suspended, a veritable snow-globe or submerged 
time-capsule. The description or actual image De Quincey provides of the city possesses a 
virtual image that shares corresponding imagery with the trance or coining involute involving 
Elizabeth’s body. Deleuze explains what De Quincey might call confluence or combination as 
coalescence: 
We can say that the actual image itself has a virtual image which 
corresponds to it like a double or a reflection. In Bergsonian terms, 
the real object is reflected in a mirror-image as the virtual object 
which, from its side and simultaneously, envelopes or reflects the 
real: there is ‘coalescence’ between the two. There is a formation 
of an image with two sides, actual and virtual.484 
 
Savannah-La-Mar is De Quincey’s fantasy of memory; it materially remains unviolated, like 
sleeping substrates on the palimpsest. The ideal leaves his past selves and experiences intact and 
completely accessible: both his recollection of his idyllic nursery years and his most inner self. 
The coalescence allows for a direct relationship. Within his surveying of the city, he orchestrates 
travelling through the virtual trance, able to examine the large interval of time passing while 
having experienced it contracted into a short one. The materiality of the city as an actual image 
he and the Dark Interpreter enter provides the textual (and typological) venue to embody the 
virtual experience:  
Then, turning to me, he said, “This is sad, this is piteous; but less 
would not have sufficed for the purpose of God. Look here. Put 
into a Roman clepsydra one hundred drops of water; let these run 
out as the sands in an hour-glass; every drop measuring the 
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hundredth part of a second, so that each shall represent but the 
three hundred-and-sixty-thousandth part of an hour. Now, count 
the drops as they race along; and, when the fiftieth of the hundred 
is passing, behold! Forty-nine are not, because already they have 
perished; and fifty are not, because they are yet to come. You see, 
therefore, how narrow, how incalculably narrow, is the true and 
actual present. Of that time which we call the present, hardly a 
hundredth part but belongs either to a past which has fled, or to a 
future which is still on the wing. It has perished, or it is not born. It 
was, or it is not.     (186) 
 
The Dark Interpreter voices the incalculability or indefinability of the present moment. Unlike 
individual grains of sand simply rearranging or re-collecting into a different pile, waterdrops are 
transitory. Waterdrops exist in temporary states between reforming from one body of water 
(“they are yet to come”) into another (“already they have perished”).Water lends a fluidity to 
existence and time, vital to involutes, but also a plasticity to structures, both traits reinforcing the 
stretching or expanding of temporal movement, limited by spatial markers. The drops of the 
clepsydra, a suitable aquatic hour-glass for such a locale, represented in the spatial arrangement 
of the text, parallel the effort of pinpointing the present. De Quincey fancifully asks the reader to 
“behold!” the passing of the “fiftieth of the hundred,” or midpoint of a second, divisible to the 
hundredths when “represent[ed]” by one solitary drop. “Count the drops as they race along,” De 
Quincey prompts his imagined reader, who must imagine the clepsydra. Imaginative thought, 
creative in the sense of production and representation, is the type of seeing De Quincey expects 
for understanding time and involutes: “You see, therefore, how narrow, how incalculably 
narrow, is the true and actual present.” The clepsydra is now an actual image for the virtual 




 Yet, as soon as the Dark Interpreter offers the clepsydra hypothesis, the approximation is 
deemed problematic:  
Yet even this approximation to the truth is infinitely false. For 
again subdivide that solitary drop, which only was found to 
represent the present, into a lower series of similar fractions, and 
the actual present which you arrest measures now but the thirty-
sixth-millionth of an hour; and so by infinite declensions the true 
and very present, in which only we live and enjoy, will vanish into 
a mote of a mote, distinguishable only by a heavenly vision. 
Therefore the present, which only man possesses, offers less 
capacity for his footing than the slenderest film that ever spider 
twisted from her womb.     (186) 
 
The spider web recalls the hidden network—suddenly time presents itself as the hidden mesh, 
the threads binding all matter. The subdivision of fractions or series seems best described in its 
infiniteness through language: “infinite declensions.” Any limitation concerning time or “the 
actual present” is bound to the human, to human perception, and is always an “approximation.” 
De Quincey returns to the image of the spider’s thread—which farther back than the network 
echoes his childhood understanding (“at four years old”) of sparing a spider and seeing “the 
holiness of all life” (160). To spare the spider from a housemaid’s hunt, he “devise[d] plots for 
saving the poor doomed wretch,” revealing additional associations concerning representation: 
“my policy was, to draw off the housemaid on pretense of showing her a picture, until the spider, 
already en route, should have had time to escape” (160). The housemaid eventually sees through 
his stratagem and explains—in a moment in which De Quincey must glance in both directions of 
time—the “many murders that the spider had committed, and next (which was worse) of the 
many that he certainly would commit” (160). “The case of the spider,” for De Quincey, in the 
dilemma of sparing “one spider in order to scatter death amongst fifty flies,” he explains 
“troubled [his] musing mind [. . .] [and] remains thenceforwards even more perplexing to my 
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understanding than it was painful to my heart” (160). The recollected image of the spider, the 
imagined “slenderest film,” ties together finitude in tension with the infinite.  
 The spider, as De Quincey’s recollected image, according to Deleuze’s terminology, re-
links to the disconnected images of the cinematic time-image of Savannah-La-Mar. Deleuze, re-
defining cinema’s movement, refines the empirical form of time (movement-image) by following 
the presentation of time through physical movement in space. The points the Dark Interpreter 
makes concerning time spiral into De Quincey’s musings that return to the key features of 
involutes. Even the circumstances of the coining rise like sighs to the surface of the description:  
Therefore, also, even this incalculable shadow from the narrowest pencil of 
moonlight is more transitory than geometry can measure, or thought of angel can 
overtake. The time which is contracts into a mathematic point; and even that point 
perishes a thousand times before we can utter its birth. All is finite in the present; 
and even that finite is infinite in its velocity of flight towards death. But in God 
there is nothing finite; but in God there is nothing transitory; but in God there can 
be nothing that tends to death. Therefore, it follows, that for God there can be no 
present. The future is the present of God, and to the future it is that he sacrifices 
the human present. Therefore it is that he works by earthquake. Therefore it is that 
he works by grief. 0, deep is the ploughing of earthquake!   (187) 
 
De Quincey invokes theology for distinguishing the temporal scale he examines (though 
arguably also an allusion to Hamlet485). Aligning human geometry’s measurement with the speed 
of an angels thought, De Quincey argues the present is yet an “incalculable shadow.” The 
discussion alludes to his earlier trance and experience of contracted time: “time which is 
contracts into a mathematical point […] All is finite in the present […] even that finite is infinite 
in its velocity of flight towards death.”486 Deleuze distinguishes the pure form of time as three 
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incommensurable points that are nonspatial, which is where De Quincey’s abstractions bring 
him. For Deleuze these points are the passing present, the conservation of the past, and the 
indeterminate protention of the future. Much like Deleuze, De Quincey moves past space to 
empowering thought for perceiving temporal representation. As Deleuze suggests cinema 
redefines how our society sees seeing, when recollection images can expand the present while 
dream images expand the world, De Quincey may indeed be suggesting that involutes redefine 
being and time. Much as De Quincey’s trance brought him in pursuit of an infinitely unreachable 
throne of God, he grants a sense of temporality through the timelessness and everlasting qualities 
of God: “in God there is nothing finite […] nothing transitory […] there can be nothing that 
tends to death.” In terms of communication systems and information or energy death, or entropy, 
De Quincey images God outside of the temporal system: “it follows, that for God there can be no 
present […] the future is the present of God, and to the future it is that he sacrifices the human 
present.” De Quincey rescales his position in relation to the imagined aquatic city (“[t]herefore it 
is that he [God] works by earthquake […] works by grief”) as a deistic spectator in relation to 
saving and excavating his own memories: “O, deep is the ploughing of the earthquake.” The 
issue of involutes, however, implicates not the salvage of experiences but the motion of thought 
or conscious mind navigating between or along curved lines of memories and remembrances, the 
movement in the maelstrom of recollection, and apprehending the ephemeral present and 
presence of thought. 
 Efforts to disentangle the chains of associations in De Quincey extensive study of time 
would be futile, even antithetical to his project. His discussion more than alludes to previous 
moments, it embodies them. Joining with Deleuze’s cinema-eye, the more physics and 
                                                          
other ongoing phenomenological discussions, see: Neal DeRoo, Futurity in Phenomenology: Promise and Method in 
Husserl, Levinas, and Derrida. (Bronx: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
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mechanics based attention to motion and time offered by Norbert Wiener487 (a key figure in 
interdisciplinary informatics, addressing the difference in Newtonian and Bergsonian time) 
suggests a framework for recognizing the course(s) or meshing of De Quincey narrative layering. 
The temporal mechanics De Quincey outlines resonate with Wiener’s discussion of film’s 
capturing the differences of time in the motion of astronomical and meteorological time. Wiener 
explains: “if we were to take a motion picture of the planets, speeded up to show a perceptible 
picture of activity, and were to run the film backward, it would still be a possible picture of 
planets conforming to the Newtonian mechanics.”488 With Wiener’s distinction of 
meteorological time, anticipation works chronologically but not in reverse: “On the other hand, if 
we were to take a motion-picture photograph of the turbulence of the clouds in a thunderhead 
and reverse it,” in terms of Newtonian mechanics, “it would look altogether wrong.”489 The 
comparison of astronomical and meteorological behavior in time concerns the complexities of 
the two system. As with De Quincey’s involute systems, his narrative progression is a product of 
the complex system. 
 In Suspiria de Profundis De Quincey celebrates sighs, the emanating upward to the 
surface those hibernating, yet reverberating, experiences: deep memory or involutes that suspend 
memories in time and to the past and the future. The image Wiener proposes of contrasting time 
systems assists in isolating the properties of the complex system at work in the temporal 
functioning of Suspiria. Wiener offers a detailed description of meterological time: “We should 
see downdrafts where we expect updrafts, turbulence growing coarser in texture, lightning 
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preceding instead of following the changes of cloud which usually precede it, and so on 
indefinitely.”490 Reversing the film positions the observer in the role of re-collector, yet as with 
the trajectory of De Quincey’s narrative recollection, Wiener posits the question: “What is the 
difference between the astronomical and the meteorological situation which brings about all 
these differences, and in particular the difference between the apparent reversibility of 
astronomical time and the apparent irreversibility of meteorological time?”491 Wiener’s answer is 
the components of the systems, which in turn dictate the structural functioning: “In the first 
place, the meteorological system is one involving a vast number of approximately equal 
particles, some of them very closely coupled to one another.”492 The description sounds 
applicable to involutes and the system(s) of memory for De Quincey. An underlying order, an 
unseen algorithm, a mysterious structure, the involute offers cohesion. 
 Involute coupling provides a viable explanation for the movement and progressions of De 
Quincey’s narrative. Wiener elaborates the coupling factor in behavioral and visual effects: “The 
astronomical system of the solar universe contains only a relatively small number of particles, 
greatly diverse in size and coupled with one another in a sufficiently loose way,” clarifying that, 
“the second-order coupling effects do not change the general aspect of the picture we observe, 
and the very high order coupling effects are completely negligible.”493 Extrapolating the sense of 
high order coupling effects and second-order couplings which distinguish the two systems, 
applies to the resurfacing of echoes among De Quincey’s visual-linguistic systems in Suspiria. 
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The vast number of approximately equal elements are so closely coupled to one another that the 
variability resembles meteorological time and motion. Concerning time, Wiener concludes that, 
much as with “a system starting from an unknown position […] we are directed in time, and our 
relation to the future is different from our relation to the past.”494 To appeal to uncertainty, an 
attempt to pinpoint any one position of his various voices would be to lose sight of the 
movement of his narrative-recollections, and vice versa. The involute as a mechanism that is 
nevertheless “mechanism-independent” adheres to the virtual processes DeLanda aligns with 
“intensities” or dynamical differences.495 DeLanda appeals to mathematic vector fields as well as 
information theory to arrive at “the plane of consistency” he uses to reinforce the philosophical 
concepts of non-actualized or virtual “chaotic attractors.”496 Moreover, applying a general sense 
of physics’ complementarity, the images De Quincey offers behave as both recollection and 
experience, both virtual and actual, depending on what the observer appeals to in explaining the 
phenomena.  
 The system of Suspiria de Profundis is both a narratological system and a representation 
of De Quincey’s memory system. The progression, narratological as well as chronologically, 
demonstrates the significance of involute experiences. Any teleological progression in narrative, 
De Quincey thwarts with his retrospective awareness of the fruitifications already come to bear. 
When De Quincey begins to conclude the Savannah-La-Mar temporal discussion, he notes God’s 
out of time-ness in such a manner: “But in God there is nothing finite; but in God there is 
nothing transitory; but in God there can be nothing that tends to death. Therefore, it follows, that 
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for God there can be no present. The future is the present of God, and to the future it is that he 
sacrifices the human present” (187). The authorial self “is always already textualized in the 
Derridean sense,” as Hayles reminds us; “in writing about a ‘real’ self,” it is “a self that is 
essential in fact but one posited within the text as beyond the reach of textuality.”497  De Quincey 
correlates the city with himself: 
Therefore it is that he works by earthquake. Therefore it is that he 
works by grief. […] Upon a night of earthquake he builds a 
thousand years of pleasant habitations for man. Upon the sorrow of 
an infant he raises oftentimes from human intellects glorious 
vintages that could not else have been.     (187) 
 
De Quincey’s self-text positions itself somewhere between archive and cinema. The smitten city 
stands in for the grief, the child self, the elevated fruitifications that grow upward, the adult 
surveying the site.  “Such a self is itself a fabrication of the text,” continues Hayles, explaining 
for narrative, that “the ‘real’ self, manifesting itself within the text as absence, rupture, or gap, 
further complicates the linear flow of the narrative and punctuates the accretion of the inscripted 
self, rendering its evolution discontinuous or indeterminate.”498 Hayles argues, in a manner that 
speaks to De Quincey, that “the sequence reestablished by this suturing is not a smooth 
continuum,” elaborating that, “although the suture succeeds in stitching past to present, it also 
leaves a visible scar, testimony to the depth of the rupture.”499 The lack of continuum, De 
Quincey’s accreted archive-self demonstrates the iterations stored, both in stasis and in flux.  
                                                          
497. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 64. Hayles offers a reading in her chapter “The Necessary Gap: The Education of 
Henry Adams,” that is strikingly appropriate for De Quincey: “confronting the possibility that the multiplicity he 
[Adams] has always fought against is not just an external force but an internal one as well” (65). 
 
498. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 64-65. 
 




 De Quincey provides the fantasy of fixture while mindful of plasticity’s practicality. The 
growth and change retains its roots, similar to firmware or software updates, making the digital 
(computer-cybernetic) model a useful parallel.  Parikka explains the move from cinema “to 
digital becomes itself an epistemological switch, which can be used to investigate ruptures and 
continuities, intermedial relations and parallel histories”; though the media-archeological 
perspective also means “looking at the precinematic technologies and practices as one resource 
for rethinking our current visual and media field.”500 With the involute as the basic unit of both 
systems, the sense of coupling within and between both systems stresses the combination and 
entanglement—the incapability of disentangling the elements of involutes again prefiguring a 
vital quantum mechanics principle; strongly correlated systems possess correlations and 
interactions between particles, that once separated retain evidence of their cohesion.   
 
Section 3: Involute Reading: The Wandering or Suspension of the Mind 
 
 
The archive – one key institutional ‘site’ of memory with an intertwined history 
with modernity and the birth of the state apparatus, but which now is increasingly 
being rearticulated less as a place of history, memory and power, and more as a 
dynamic and temporal network, a software environment, and a social platform for 
memory – but also for remixing. The archive is becoming a key concept for 
understanding digital media culture, and its practices are worthy of investigation 
in the context of media archaeology as well. This means bringing media 
archaeology into proximity with the archive as a key site of digital software 
culture, as well as – through that agenda – bringing media studies ideas into 
proximity with key non-academic institutions involved in cultural heritage in the 
digital age. 
   Jussi Parikka, What is Media Archeology? 15 
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 The study Suspiria de Profundis presents includes one separate yet rather contingent part: 
“The English Mail-Coach, or the Glory of Motion.” It is often considered a distinct work for 
having been published on its own under that title in 1854, despite the fact that five years earlier 
the amalgamated essay was divided into two “essays” in Blackwoord’s Edinburgh Magazine 
during the last quarter of 1849. Addressing the “The English Mail-Coach” text as one cohesive 
study, the first “half” (with the same title) contains a second part, “Going Down with Victory,” 
which though concerned with war tidings, certainly precipitates elements of the second. “The 
Vision of Sudden Death” includes the “Dream-Fugue: on the Above Theme of Sudden Death” 
and together they comprise the recollection of a near-miss collision between the coach and a gig, 
followed by a dream-sequence concerning his uncertainty of the female passenger’s fate. Yet, the 
total of four parts argues for their relation to Suspriria more than in De Quincey’s presumed 
intention.501 
 The involute, first as a theory, then the core component of De Quincey’s philosophies of 
language, narrative, time and memory—and the interconnection of these systems—provides a 
methodology for examining “The English Mail-Coach.” In it, De Quincey returns to the memory 
archive as, to employ Parikka’s phrase, a dynamic and temporal network. The mail-system offers 
a communications backdrop to the transit (and transitory) systems the coach and De Quincey 
travel. The added complexity of recollections and dreams assists to model duration, the 
expanding of time and its experience/representation. The suspended fate of the female figure, her 
indeterminate state, embodies De Quincey’s temporal focus as a participant in each level of the 
memory-text. De Quincey’s systems have archeological tendencies but more complexity than 
mere strata.  
                                                          




 De Quincey’s involutes in memory and narrative—like language—share the qualities of 
autopoeisis or self-generation and recursion that position them in the company of his 
contemporary William Paley’s machine making machines (1802) through to more modern 
examples, such as Stephen Kleene’s recursion or computability theory (1930s).502 Each involute 
memory functions as a self-generating machine, but also as a unit in the language or processes of 
thought. The sequence of the coach and gig collision offers a crystalline image of the space 
between two wheeling systems, operating at different velocities, and their parallel 
correspondence. The fact that these two wheels, unlike the proper functioning of involute gears, 
fail to intersect provides the moment of trauma, the suspension between two states that 
proliferates into De Quincey’s dream fugue. The geometric fractal provides a compelling sense 
of the shifting scale of involutes in memory and narrative. Fractals, a curve or geometric figure, 
possesses in each part the same statistical character as the whole. Fractal geometry, though 
coined by Benoit Mandelbrot, spans back to British cartographers to express scale for complex 
irregular forms. Episodes in Suspiria are not linked by theme but by resurfacing and reviving 
images. With similar principles to concrete universals, fractals return to the mathematic practices 
key for De Quincey’s involutes. The concern for scale, in relation to time, reinforces the fractal 
property of patterns that recur on progressively larger or smaller scales, such as crystal growth, 
or the types of phenomenon captured in the recurring memory imagery that orders seeming 
random or chaotic digressions.  
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Pythagoras Tree with symmetry and asymmetry503 
 
 De Quincey’s impulse to revisit the sequence to locate a relationship between the order 
and disorder of the system, which he describes in organic functioning, invites reading the study 
as a juncture of text and externalized memory. The combination resonates in the movement from 
cinema to newer media of the digital age, particularly those digital texts that embed or en-script 
user experience/memory, often multiple iterations, the most notable example being video games. 
Memory in such a medium, applicable to Suspiria, operates as a system with interconnections 
between natural processes and media technologies or the human and non-human domains 
Parikka emphasizes in the leakage of media into human communications, particularly in A 
Geology of Media (2015).504 Digital texts share characteristics of De Quincey memory system, 
they contain their own past iterations. Participatory digital texts, might offer a useful comparison 
of the two matrixes of memory (human and medium) in Suspiria. Several genres of video games 
archive save files of user-game play. Suddenly the human experience and medium create a 
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matrix of dialectic exchange. The movement among theory, technology, and culture underlie 
“The English Mail-Coach, or the Glory of Motion” as the capstone of Suspira de Profundis.  
 The English mail system offers De Quincey an actual image of the mysterious network, 
the spider-web of his childhood anxieties. The (sub-)title, “The Glory of Motion,” balances, if 
not redirects, the shared interests of the study to moving through and within such a system. De 
Quincey’s amusing opening does well to situate himself in relation to his first subject:  
Some twenty or more years before I matriculated at Oxford, Mr. Palmer, M. P. for 
Bath, had accomplished two things, very hard to do on our little planet, the Earth, 
however cheap they may happen to be held by the eccentric people in comets: he 
had invented mailcoaches, and he had married the daughter of a duke. He was, 
therefore, just twice as great a man as Galileo, who certainly invented (or 
discovered) the satellites of Jupiter, those very next things extant to mailcoaches 
in the two capital points of speed and keeping time, but who did not marry the 
daughter of a duke.   (408-409) 
 
“Speed and keeping time,” provide a distinct understanding of distance for De Quincey but also 
the relationship of space and time. The contrast offered, of Palmer to Galileo, is doubled: “twice 
as great a man as Galileo.” Palmer exemplifies, more importantly than the distinction of having 
“invented (or discovered),” two significant accomplishments of mobility or motion: mail coaches 
(physical) and marriage (social). The accomplishments are “very hard to do on our little planet, 
the Earth, however cheap they may happen to be held by the eccentric people in comets,” 
bemuses De Quincey while at the same time offering a view from those heights and the future. 
The “satellites of Jupiter,” images of cyclical orbit akin to the circulation of systems and the 
concentricity of network are “those very next things extant to mail-coaches in the two capital 
points of speed and keeping time.” De Quincey stresses the priority of velocity with time, 
“keeping time” foregrounded before space. 
 Suspiria establishes time as a principle of organization for De Quincey, evident as he 
elaborates their relevance both in his present narrative’s system and his internal system: “these 
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mail-coaches, as organized by Mr. Palmer, are entitled to a circumstantial notice from myself 
having had so large a share in developing the anarchies of my subsequent dreams” (409). These 
“anarchies” might suggest the same motion or agitations De Quincey features in the rest of 
Suspiria; yet, the implication is one that reconciles chaos and order, rather than establishing 
disorder as an antagonist. To survey the elements within the scholarship of chaos and order, the 
interdisciplinary aims of Hayles provides an accessible view that also accommodates the two 
opposing approaches to chaos/order in ways quite useful for De Quincey. Additionally, 
DeLanda’s sense of “The Actualization of the Virtual in Time” offers another view to reconcile 
dynamic and non-linear or heterogeneous continuums as a plane of consistency505—and 
recognize De Quincey’s application of involutes as not only a philosophy but a method of 
analysis. Where De Quincey implicitly presents a new way of thinking in the world, he is 
particular in explicitly stating Suspiria de Profundis as a project, a study, external to the mind, 
yet within the mind. 
 
“The indeterminate and mysterious” Coach-Gig-Passage: “Obvious, but yet not strictly 
defined” 
No dignity is perfect which does not at some point ally itself with the 
indeterminate and mysterious. The connection of the mail with the state and the 
executive government a connection obvious, but yet not strictly defined gave to 
the whole mail establishment a grandeur and an official authority which did us 
service on the roads, and invested us with seasonable terrors. But perhaps these 
terrors were not the less impressive, because their exact legal limits were 
imperfectly ascertained. 
   Thomas De Quincey, “English Mail-Coach,” 414 
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 De Quincey explains that mail-coaches, “organized” as they are, shared “in developing” 
the content of “subsequent dreams.” An additional and related factor is certainly his awareness of 
the form and behavior of “anarchies.” The mail-coach, for De Quincey, provides an image of 
synthesis of time: in a Deleuzian sense wherein past and future contract into a lived present. It is 
also an emblem of past/news. “Indeterminate and mysterious,” the message and the network 
have “a connection obvious” as much as the institutions in place behind “the whole mail 
establishment”—though, as De Quincey stresses, the connection is “yet not strictly defined.” The 
result is both “grandeur” and “terrors” for De Quincey. The breakdown De Quincey offers of the 
mail outlines the properties:  
An agency which they accomplished, first, through velocity, at that 
time unprecedented; they first revealed the glory of motion: 
suggesting, at the same time, an undersense, not unpleasurable, of 
possible though indefinite danger; secondly, through grand effects 
for the eye between. Lamp-light and the darkness upon solitary 
roads; thirdly, through animal beauty and power so often displayed 
in the class of horses selected for this mail service; fourthly, 
through the conscious presence of a central intellect, that, in the 
midst of vast distances, of storms, of darkness, of night, overruled 
all obstacles into one steady cooperation in a national result.  (409) 
 
“Unprecedented” velocity reveals “the glory of motion”—which connects the near-cinematic 
effect of oscillating “lamp-light and the darkness.” The “undersense, not unpleasurable, of 
possible though indefinite danger,” strikes inadvertently upon the indeterminacy of position and 
velocity, though the last two on his list stress the organic elements of the technological wonder. 
The horses provide a sense of the body/tool extension while the “conscious presence of a central 
intellect”—the spider/core/self—“in the midst of vast distances, of storms, of darkness, of night,” 
anthropomorphizes the system. The human network “overruled all obstacles into one steady 
cooperation,” resembling De Quincey’s previous descriptions of both self and narrative. The 
involute of the mail-coach, its turbulence as a specific self-replicating machine (an involute) 
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brings these four properties as an immediate ring of associated connotations—additional chains 
emanate outward from each node. The involution, wreathing entanglements, are as De Quincey 
notes, the subject more so than the axis on which they rotate, the shaft or topic they eddy. The 
involute as a geometric fractal suggests the scope or scale of view which permits patterns to 
emerge.  
 
 Fractals resulting in the “chaos game”— algorithm M. Barnsley describes in 1988506 
 
 The narrative, following the law of its subjects, resembles the organization of the system 
consisting of both order and chaos. Hayles offers a concise sense of the stakes:  
Within chaos theory, two general emphases exist. In the first, chaos is seen as 
order's precursor and partner, rather than as its opposite. The focus here is on the 
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spontaneous emergence of self-organization from chaos; or, in the parlance of the 
field, on the dissipative structures that arise in systems far from equilibrium, 
where entropy production is high. The realization that entropy-rich systems 
facilitate rather than impede self-organization was an important turning point in 
the contemporary reevaluation of chaos  […] The second branch emphasizes the 
hidden order that exists within chaotic systems. Chaos in this usage is distinct 
from true randomness, because it can be shown to contain deeply encoded 
structures called "strange attractors." Whereas truly random systems show no 
discernible pattern when they are mapped into phase space, chaotic systems 
contract to a confined region and trace complex patterns within it.507 
     
The sense of precursor and successor—from chaos to order—has some bearing on the basis in 
establishing the mail coach system where there was none, yet there remains “anarchies” 
systemically. Entropy is the thermodynamics concept, just as relevant to informatics, that 
(thermal) energy or (informational) signal may decline into disorder, meaning either the system 
reaches the point of unavailability for mechanical work or the transmission of a signal degrades 
when overwhelmed by the disruptive noise corrupting it. As Hayles notes, those systems 
maintaining the most autopoesis are actually “entropy-rich”508 (which brought about the 
contingent concept of negentropy). The “anarchies” De Quincey senses do in fact facilitate their 
reproduction and self-organization in his dreams. Moreover, the second approach appeals to a 
sense of mysterious or indiscernible order, “distinct from true randomness” that only appears 
chaotic without the proper perspective or decoding. “Strange attractors” is a suitable term for the 
manner in which involutes of human sensibility entangle in the mind. 
 The complex patterns are only ever traces for De Quincey. Traces, however, provide a 
glimpse at organizational patterns, a chaotic order. This applies to all systems at work in De 
Quincey and Suspiria. He offers the analogy of musical discordant harmony to explain the order 
in chaos:     
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To my own feeling, this post-office service recalled some mighty orchestra, where 
a thousand instruments, all disregarding each other, and so far in danger of 
discord, yet all obedient as slaves to the supreme baton of some great leader, 
terminate in a perfection of harmony like that of heart, veins, and arteries, in a 
healthy animal organization. But, finally, that particular element in this whole 
combination which most impressed myself, and through which it is that to this 
hour Mr. Palmer's mail-coach system tyrannizes by terror and terrific beauty over 
my dreams, lay in the awful political mission which at that time it fulfilled. The 
mail-coaches it was that distributed over the face of the land, like the opening of 
apocalyptic vials, the heart-shaking news of Trafalgar, of Salamanca, of Vittoria, 
of Waterloo. (409) 
 
Music provides an ancient, cosmological sense of order to the chaos of the universe; and, here, 
provides De Quincey a segue into comparisons with the human biological system. The 
“perfection of harmony” De Quincey sees in the post service is “like that” of the circulatory 
system. “heart, veins, and arteries, in a healthy animal organization.” The image, besides having 
a central regulator in its web, provides the interface and interlacing spaces (here cellular) vital to 
De Quincey’s other images of branching structures; here the cellular interface between systems 
leaving and returning to the heart complicates an otherwise straightforward sense of cyclicality. 
The orchestra produces something transitory. De Quincey’s description provides a keen example 
of extensive time, for DeLanda in building upon Deleuze’s sense of passive synthesis. The 
“dream fugue” crystalizes De Quincey’s appeal to music for offering pattern where other lenses 
might fail to discern successive, developing, and interweaving parts—or harmonies, like phrases 
and images, introduced and self-generating. The contrapuntal, or musical counterpoint, seems in 
accord with the dialectic of semantic discourse but even more so as a way of understanding the 
relationship between chaos and order: perceivable counterpoints or combinations incapable of 
being disentangled.  
 The links and associations for the work’s subject(s) combine in multiple systems of 
memory that are paralleled in narrative. The mission of the mail-coach, “as the national organ for 
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publishing these mighty events,” is primarily to disseminate news of war, victory, and death 
(409). The post is an institutionalized messenger service, delivering news and revelation (as with 
the nurse announcing his sister’s impending death), and the spider in the center of it is Hermes-
Mercury.  De Quincey explains the post’s mission as the most striking feature: “finally, that 
particular element in this whole combination which most impressed myself […] and through 
which it is that to this hour Mr. Palmer’s mail-coach system tyrannizes by terror and terrific 
beauty over my dreams, lay in the awful political mission which at that time it fulfilled.”  The 
mail-coach, “a spiritualized and glorified object to an impassioned heart,” De Quincey admits 
impresses him as it distributes, over “the face of the land, like the opening of apocalyptic vials, 
the heart-shaking news,” seem incapable of separating emotion and thought (409). Again, the 
discord is not necessarily chaos; and, the associations here, like strange-attractor involutes, 
reveal traces of his childhood afflictions. Hayles explains: “The strange-attractor branch differs 
from the order-out-of-chaos paradigm in its attention to systems that remain chaotic […] for 
them the focus is on the orderly descent into chaos rather than on the organized structures that 
emerge from chaos.”509 His first-hand travel on the mail-coach is due to travel during school 
breaks, which further attracts involute associations of home and holiday.510 The routine 
establishes a temporal pacing for De Quincey: it “became a point of some interest with us, whose 
journeys revolved every six weeks on average, to look into the executive details of the system” 
(410). His interest in the concealed ordering of the system are inextricably entangled with time. 
Rather than contrast the valid points of each area of chaotic systems, their commonalities prove 
beneficial to examining De Quincey’s tensions over order and chaos. Hayles notes that “despite 
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510. De Quincey explains:“'short terms;' that is, the four terms of Michaelmas, Lent, Easter, and Act, were kept 
severally by a residence, in the aggregate, of ninety−one days, or thirteen weeks” (410). 
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the breach” among chaos branches, “it is possible to identify several characteristics that chaotic 
systems share.”511 By interspersing discussions of each characteristic, consisting of nonlinearity, 
scale, and recursive symmetries, with examples from “The English Mail-Coach” (somewhat 
corresponding with the ordering of sections) a distinct harmony emerges informed by involutes.  
 The first chaotic system shared characteristic is nonlinearity. “With linear equations, the 
magnitudes of cause and effect generally correspond,” in other words, correspondence is 
proportional, Hayles explains.  “Small causes give rise to small effects, large causes to large 
effects,” in linearity: “equations that demonstrate it [magnitude correspondence] can be mapped 
as straight lines or planes.”512 Involutes, however are manifold and spherical. De Quincey’s 
systems that operate on involutes adhere to the non-linear. “Nonlinear functions, by contrast, 
connote an often startling incongruity between cause and effect, so that a small cause can give 
rise to a large effect”513: a phenomenon of germination and fruitification operating in the 
remolding in dreams a seemingly transient moment. Hayles notes that, “there is a good reason 
why linear equations have dominated the study of dynamical systems; nonlinear differential 
equations do not generally have explicit solutions.”514 Chaos theory reveals that nonlinearity “is 
the rule of nature” and linearity “the exception.”515 Not only does De Quincey express the 
incongruity between causes and effect, he outlines nonlinearity concerning the mail coach 
system in several ways, but most consistently in his need to count time, even to hundreds of 
seconds, not solely as a measure of the coach’s motion.  
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 During his “earliest and boyish acquaintance with the mails,” and in his droll courtship of 
Fanny on the Bath road, he explains the phenomena of associations: “but alike the gayest and the 
most terrific of my experiences rose again after years of slumber, armed with preternatural power 
to shake my dreaming sensibilities” (416). Such is the example of Miss Fanny: “the slight case” 
(as opposed to monumental) and one that only resonates “through some causal or capricious 
association with images originally gay, yet opening at some stage of evolution into sudden 
capacities of horror; sometimes through the more natural and fixed alliances with the sense of 
power so various lodged in the mail system” (416-417). Part of the sense of power is time—but a 
very particular pattern or system of time. “Did I then make love to Fanny? Why, yes,” De 
Quincey explains through the span he had available: “as much love as one can make whilst the 
mail is changing horses, a process which ten years later did not occupy above eighty seconds; but 
then, viz., about Waterloo, it occupied five times eighty” (418). For his audience he clarifies that, 
“four hundred seconds offer a field quite ample enough for whispering into a young woman's ear 
a great deal of truth; and (by way of parenthesis) some trifle of falsehood” (418). He offers more 
numeric particulars—for instance, the number of her suitors—yet this portion prepares for the 
fastidious counting he performs during the threat of collision and sudden death later.  
 The power and non-linear causality, akin to metaphor for cognitive semantics, as well as 
strange attractors bring Fanny and the fleeting time along with her in association with the horses 
and the system itself:  
The modern modes of travelling cannot compare with the mail-coach system in 
grandeur and power. They boast of more velocity, but not however as a 
consciousness, but as a fact of our lifeless knowledge, resting upon alien 
evidence; as, for instance, because somebody says that we have gone fifty miles 
in the hour, or upon the evidence of a result, as that actually we find ourselves in 
York four hours after leaving London. Apart from such an assertion, or such a 
result, I am little aware of the pace. But, seated on the old mail-coach, we needed 




Not entirely influenced by his preference to sit outside of the coach beside the driver, De 
Quincey explains from the perspective of “modern modes” and locomotives, that he is not 
concerned with velocity as fact but experience: “as a consciousness” or life-filled, empirical 
knowledge that does not require “alien evidence.” The pace and velocity are sensory in the mail-
coach. “On this system the word was− Non magna loquimus, as upon railways, but magna 
vivimus,” De Quincey claims. And his scientific observer feels the participation as much as the 
agents in the pace: “the vital experience of the glad animal sensibilities made doubts impossible 
on the question of our speed; we heard our speed, we saw it, we felt it as a thrilling”; he claims, 
moreover, for seeing it in the horse, for “this speed was not the product of blind insensate 
agencies, that had no sympathy to give, but was incarcerated in the fiery eyeballs of an animal, in 
his dilated nostril, spasmodic muscles, and echoing hoofs” (417). De Quincey need not rely on 
“somebody” saying “that we have gone fifty miles in the hour,” but the embodied energy and 
work of the system operates before his eyes: “This speed was incarnated in the visible contagion 
amongst brutes of some impulse, that, radiating into their natures, had yet its centre and 
beginning in man” (417). Metaphoric exchange as a kinetic network seems evident here as well, 
along with images of the symbolic order or the analytic unconscious containing interlinked 
signifiers. Yet De Quincey’s study suggests avoiding reliance on psychoanalytical readings; even 
Lacan’s linguistic attention seems too separate from the material and concrete concerns of De 
Quincey. Metaphor makes concrete abstract relations. And language, for De Quincey, has 
concreteness and materiality. De Quincey outlines his various systems—dreams, memory, 
language, narrative, self—in actualities, images, concrete events. Experience and remembrance 
are texts and intertextual systems. 
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 The intelligent center of this system is man; but what differs from the train is the 
evidence in the perception by the horse (vehicle) conflated with the message it carries:  
The sensibility of the horse, uttering itself in the maniac light of his 
eye, might be the last vibration of such a movement; the glory of 
Salamanca might be the first but the intervening link that 
connected them, that spread the earthquake of the battle into the 
eyeball of the horse, was the heart of man kindling in the rapture of 
the fiery strife, and then propagating its own tumults by motions 
and gestures to the sympathies, more or less dim, in his servant the 
horse […] But now, on the new system of travelling, iron tubes and 
boilers have disconnected man's heart from the ministers of his 
locomotion. (417) 
 
The power of the communication, the news, conveys in the pace and velocity of the horse and 
mail-coach. When De Quincey sublimely states that the heart of man, is “the intervening link 
that connected” the strength of the battle into the eye of the horse, he recognizes the influence of 
contexts for communication and for information. The pace of the horse, the energy and work 
behind dissemination, is part of the message. “Propagating its own tumults by motions and 
gestures to the sympathies” of the horse, yet “the last vibration of such a movement” remains a 
“servant” to the man-driven system. De Quincey anchors his systems in the body and the 
embodied. The internal clock, his inner counting, makes him a contingent participant in the 
experience—this, in turn, marks moments on the mail-coach for his dreams.  
 De Quincey’s sense of time, or rather re-presentation of time, during his recollections 
showcases his preoccupation with the bodily experience but also with narrative. In the defining 
the moment and the vision of sudden death, De Quincey will innumerate the seconds for the on-
coming gig’s occupants, the two lovers, their momentous experience: “Between them and 
eternity, to all human calculation, there is but a minute and a half” (440). In such a brief span, De 
Quincey not only recalls Achilles’s shout in Illiad in order to prompt his calling out—twice—to 
the couple, but the minutiae—mere intervals of seconds—of the driver’s reaction and attempts to 
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right their gig and his female companion to safety. Much as the war news conveyed or rather 
“propagat[ed] its own tumults by motions and gestures to the sympathies,” De Quincey positions 
thought between the systems of memory that unite literary allusion to contextual circumstances. 
De Quincey connects “man’s heart” with “the ministers of his locomotion,” both physical and 
internal.  
 In the narratological expansion of the short interval of near-collision, intensive time 
assists in understanding the involute as De Quincey’s model for the virtual or non-actualized 
systems of memory. DeLanda explains intensive time as sequences oscillating between critical 
points or singularities that complicate “the metrization or quantization of time.”516 Parallel 
sequences can mesh into heterogeneous assemblages; the process of stimulus-independence is 
the “signature of the virtual” or traces left in the intensive.517 De Quincey describes the on-
coming driver’s realization with a mixture of sensorimotor functions and figuration: “He saw, he 
heard, he comprehended, the ruin that was coming down: already its gloomy shadow darkened 
above him; and already he was measuring his strength to deal with it” (440). De Quincey 
compares courage on a scale: “Ah! what a vulgar thing does courage seem, when we see nations 
buying it and selling it for a shilling a day: ah! what a sublime thing does courage seem, when 
some fearful crisis on the great deeps of life carries a man, as if running before a hurricane, up to 
the giddy crest of some mountainous wave” (440). Upon that “mountainous wave” De Quincey 
positions the driver, “from which accordingly as he chooses his course, he describes two courses, 
and a voice says to him audibly, ‘This way lies hope; take the other way and mourn for ever’” 
(440). From the internal conversation, manifesting extensive time, as if with another dark 
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interpreter (whether in Savannah-La-Mar’s earthquake destruction or within the eddies of the 
maelstrom), the driver is “yet, even then, amidst the raving of the seas and the frenzy of the 
danger, the man is able to confront his situation −is able to retire for a moment into solitude with 
God, and to seek all his counsel from him!” (440-441). Much like the clepsydra and his trance of 
contracted time, the figure of a consciousness outside of time presents a contrast for humans in 
duration. De Quincey slows time in the manner of counting it:  
For seven seconds, it might be, of his seventy, the stranger settled his countenance 
steadfastly upon us, as if to search and value every element in the conflict before 
him. For five seconds more he sate immovably, like one that mused on some great 
purpose. For five he sate with eyes upraised, like one that prayed in sorrow, under 
some extremity of doubt, for wisdom to guide him towards the better choice. 
Then suddenly he rose; stood upright; and, by a sudden strain upon the reins, 
raising his horse's forefeet from the ground, he slewed him round on the pivot of 
his hind legs, so as to plant the little equipage in a position nearly at right angles 
to ours. Thus far his condition was not improved; except as a first step had been 
taken towards the possibility of a second. If no more were done, nothing was 
done; for the little carriage still occupied the very centre of our path, though in an 
altered direction. Yet even now it may not be too late: fifteen of the twenty 
seconds may still be unexhausted; and one almighty bound forward may avail to 
clear the ground. (441) 
 
De Quincey’s keeping time and segmenting the seventy seconds remaining for the driver’s 
reaction offers little sense of the fairly inconsequential spatial span: time measures and “value[s] 
every element in the conflict before him,” including velocity, distance, and their possible “ruin.” 
Underlying the description of the relationship between the two vehicles is De Quincey’s 
geometrical eye to the angles and tangents of intersection. The velocity and duration of the 
sequence take on their separate trajectories.  
 The briefest sequence, as De Quincey assigns the time span, expands into “The Vision of 
Sudden Death,” then the “theme” of the fugue. The collision sequence provides De Quincey an 
example of fleeting moments that can be revisited, or re-played, an intact enshrined city-like 
memory-text. The short intervals involving Fanny clearly involute, or strangely attract, to this 
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episode, yet so too do previous figures in Suspiria, particularly other females, most significantly 
those tied to trance of contracted time. By correlating any (or all) of the parallel episodes to the 
coach-gig-passage, an important sense of scale emerges. A key part of how Hayles outlines the 
shared characteristics of chaotic systems is that their complex forms “lead to a new awareness of 
the importance of scale”:  
The new models ring into question an assumption so deeply woven into classical 
paradigms that it is difficult to see that it is an assumption. In classical physics, 
objects are considered to be independent of the scale chosen to measure them. A 
circle is assumed to have a set circumference, whether it is measured with a 
yardstick or with a ruler an inch long. Classical paradigms grant that smaller 
rulers may yield more precision than larger ones. But these differences are 
considered to be merely empirical variations that do not affect the existence of a 
"true" answer. This assumption works well for regular forms, such as circles, 
rectangles, and triangles. It does not work well for complex irregular forms—
coastlines, for example, or mountain landscapes, or the complex branchings of the 
human vascular system. Here measurements on scales of different lengths do not 
converge to a limit but continue to increase as measurement scales decrease.518 
 
De Quincey offers scaled reiterations of events just as he measures on scales of different length 
the courage bought cheapy by nations daily with that discovered in the gig’s driver. The 
geometry concerned with the scale complexities of chaotic systems adds a further appreciation 
for the behavior De Quincey assigns the structure-processes or concrete-virtual object-events he 
calls involutes. De Quincey’s involute is a complex irregular form—and one ever entangling and 
entwining. The multiple and multi-faceted systems of De Quincey are complex irregular forms, 
built upon involute experiences. Reading for these structural and processing patterns is one step 
toward involute analysis. 
 De Quincey models the procedures for involute analysis rather than formally delignating 
methodological steps or rules. The precision De Quincey offers his readers in reproducing the 
                                                          




intervals of the near-collision represents the sense of scale he requires for conveying the intensity 
and quality of dream reproduction. In the Deleuzian vein, De Landa suggests the virtual possess 
fixed sets of definite properties both “extensive” and “qualitative.”519 De Quincey reproduces or 
recreates the virtual moment attending to such particulars—even those allusions and associations 
drawn up then, in time, to entangle previous involutes, or form a type of assemblage.  In this 
way, the episode showcases the virtual’s possession of an indefinite set of “affordances” to affect 
and be affected by other virtual memories or non-actualized multiplicities.520 The capacities in 
De Quincey’s description of the urgency—or intensity—of the “emergent” properties DeLanda 
suggests are relational.521 Reading for intensity and scale directs reading Suspiria’s entangling of 
involute layers as possessing such emergent properties that interconnect.   
 Remembrance recollects or reproduces sedimentary levels that provide the 
dimensionality involutes possess beyond the contoured two-dimensional fractal. Involutes span 
outward, inward, but also upward and downward. De Quincey demonstrates interlocking 
affordances in reproducing, in narrative, a sense of presence to convey the significance of time: 
“Hurry then, hurry! for the flying moments they hurry! Oh hurry, hurry, my brave young man! 
for the cruel hoofs of our horses they also hurry! Fast are the flying moments, faster are the hoofs 
of our horses” (441). The flight of moments, even in memory, stresses the trauma of failure, of 
sustained indeterminacy, of known unknowability. The aftermath of the driver’s course-
correction leaves De Quincey in a position to know that the horse and “the larger half of the little 
equipage had then cleared our over-towering shadow: that was evident even to my own agitated 
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sight,” yet to remain in doubt: “But it mattered little that one wreck should float off in safety, if 
upon the wreck that perished were embarked the human freightage” (441). He reproduces the 
rather uncertain result in the question: “The rear part of the carriage was that certainly beyond 
the line of absolute ruin?”—but one he is unable to answer definitively, opening the moment to 
emergent properties of other iterations of unknowability or uncertainty:    
What power could answer the question? Glance of eye, thought of man, wing of 
angel, which of these had speed enough to sweep between the question and the 
answer, and. divide the one from the other? Light does not tread upon the steps of 
light more indivisibly, than did our all-conquering arrival upon the escaping 
efforts of the gig […] We ran past them faster than ever mill-race in our 
inexorable flight. Oh, raving of hurricanes that must have sounded in their young 
ears at the moment of our transit! Either with the swingle-bar, or with the haunch 
of our near leader, we had struck the off-wheel of the little gig, which stood rather 
obliquely and not quite so far advanced as to be accurately parallel with the near 
wheel. The blow, from the fury of our passage, resounded terrifically. I rose in 
horror, to look upon the ruins we might have caused. From my elevated station I 
looked down, and looked back upon the scene, which in a moment told its tale, 
and wrote all its records on my heart for ever. (441-442) 
 
The eye, man, angel assigned a glance, thought, and wing, respectively, each provide different 
time scales in addition to their other properties. De Quincey aptly equates the “indivisibility” of 
light with time. With the coach’s “inexorable flight” and “the fury of our passage,” De Quincey 
assigning the resounding power of his motion and movement onto the figures in the other vehicle 
as much as on the “records” of his heart, further invoking his core involute remembrance. De 
Quincey bares striking similarities to DeLanda’s description of actualization in A Thousand 
Years of Nonlinear History: “there were coexisting motion of destratification of intermediate 
intensity which connected these flows, generating meshworks of different kinds.”522 (267). 
DeLanda’s meshwork resembles the permeable textuality and embodiment Hayles announces of 
the present—meshwork approaching a more concrete entity (“consisting of spaces and interstices 
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between the threads”523), though not one as complex as De Quincey’s involute. “A world in 
which geology, biology, and linguistics are not seen as three separate spheres, each more 
advanced or progressive than the previous one,” DeLanda explains, is the advantage of 
“heterogeneous mixtures,” here specifically, “three perfectly coexisting and interacting flows of 
energetic, replicative, and catalytic materials.”524 The qualitative multiplicity or plane of 
consistency the scenario holds for De Quincey is a meshwork of all these involute systems, 
sharing qualities of virtual, chaotic, dynamic systems. 
 Besides the image-sets belonging to the patterns of Suspiria, De Quincey’s narratological 
expansion of the fleeting moments from minutes to seconds demonstrates the recursive 
symmetries that reproduce the nested sets of associations in the sequence. Contributing to the 
discussion of scale, Hayles explains the difficulties of fractal properties: 
Nonlinear dynamics, another important area within the sciences of chaos, is akin 
to fractal geometry in that it posits a qualitative and not merely a quantitative 
difference between linear and complex systems. Turbulent flow, for example, 
possesses so many coupled degrees of freedom that even the new supercomputers 
are inadequate to handle the required calculations. Since doing more of the same 
kind of calculations that one would use for laminar flow does not usually yield a 
solution, the difference between turbulent and laminar flow amounts to a 
qualitative distinction, an indication that another kind of approach is needed. An 
essential component of this approach is a shift in focus from the individual unit to 
recursive symmetries between scale levels.525 
 
The recursivity of patterns or symmetries even in different scales, like a bi-recursive algorithm, 
suggests the relationship of actual to virtual, in which differentiation manifests key aspects of the 
non-actuality. The involute moment, here concerning the coach-gig-passage, and its qualitative 
distinction may indeed be its own virtual moment, its own dynamic system, complicated further 
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when rendered in narrative. Yet, the sequence suggests a teleological positioning that could make 
it significant for De Quincey because it simultaneously actualizes other virtual moments, 
differentiation of past involutes. Symmetries manifest in the imagery and descriptions. The 
fractal replicable pattern emerges. De Quincey describes the fate, as best as he knows, of the 
other carriage with a narrative voice that easily blurs with the man who just struggled to steer the 
gig to safety:    
The horse was planted immovably, with his fore-feet upon the paved crest of the 
central road. He of the whole party was alone untouched by the passion of death. 
The little cany carriage-partly perhaps from the dreadful torsion of the wheels in 
its recent movement, partly from the thundering blow we had given to it as if it 
sympathized with human horror, was all alive with tremblings and shiverings. 
[…] The young man sat like a rock. He stirred not at all. But his was the 
steadiness of agitation frozen into rest by horror. As yet he dared not to look 
round; for he knew that, if anything remained to do, by him it could no longer be 
done. And as yet he knew not for certain if their safety were accomplished. But 
the lady—  (442) 
 
The abrupt suspension of the final thought of the paragraph provides a brilliant expression of the 
scene. The “thundering blow” recalls the nurse’s announcement that his sister must die; De 
Quincey and the young man share “the steadiness of agitation frozen into rest,” not unlike the 
sunken city. “The passion of death” places the passage sequence parallel with the nursery 
readings and afflictions. The situation De Quincey narrates assumes a place on the continuum, a 
recursive pattern, a plane of consistency. 
 Even when the next paragraph resumes the thought concerning “the lady,” the 
placeholder for concluding the thought is the same emphatic dash to convey separation, 
suspension, and possibly a shaft or sullen shape around which his thoughts swirl and entwine. 
Now, he adds an exclamation for a combined punctuation that forms a visual diagram of her 
possible states. De Quincey’s oblique description of the lady’s suspended fate is the closing 
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image of a “umbrageous aisle” or region of deep total shadow in the tract of road, complete with 
recursive imagery:  
  
But the lady −! Oh heavens! will that spectacle ever depart from my dreams, as 
she rose and sank upon her seat, sank and rose, threw up her arms wildly to 
heaven, clutched at some visionary object in the air, fainting, praying, raving, 
despairing! Figure to yourself, reader, the elements of the case; suffer me to recall 
before your mind the circumstances of the unparalleled situation. From the silence 
and deep peace of this saintly summer night from the pathetic blending of this 
sweet moonlight, dawnlight, dreamlight  from the manly tenderness of this 
flattering, whispering, murmuring love suddenly as from the woods and fields 
suddenly as from the chambers of the air opening in revelation suddenly as from 
the ground yawning at her feet, leaped upon her, with the flashing of cataracts, 
Death the crowned phantom, with all the equipage of his terrors, and the tiger roar 
of his voice. 
      
The moments were numbered. In the twinkling of an eye our flying horses had 
carried us to the termination of the umbrageous aisle; at right-angels we wheeled 
into our former direction; the turn of the road carried the scene out of my eyes in 
an instant, and swept it into my dreams for ever. (440-441) 
 
The “saintly summer night” returns to the nursery and “murmuring love suddenly as from the 
woods and fields” evokes Fanny; then a trance reappears of “the chambers of the air opening in 
revelation suddenly” with the funeral image of the “ground yawning.” In this convergent 
moment, “with the flashing of cataracts,” De Quincey sees the young woman raise her “arms 
wildling to heaven” performing the supplication he imagined in Elizabeth’s upturned palms. In 
“the silence and deep peace” De Quincey provides the temporal measure he lacked during his 
trance, apprehending then that all “moments were numbered”—an aptly ambiguous statement 
that speaks to several layers and trajectories of counting and re-counting. The moment of 
“termination” at the open-endedness of the scene “swept it into [his] dreams for ever.” Much as 
with digressive tangents, “at right angles [the coach] wheeled into our former direction” and with 
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“the turn of the road” the scene only temporarily closes.526 Her fate oscillates, much as intensive 
time, between similar critical points, creates an interplay of singularities and affects. The parallel 
sequences of Suspiria form an involute assemblage. His uncertainty over the resolution mirrors 
the uncertainty that oscillates between the numbering in time, during recollection or narrative.  
 Suspiria oscillates indeterminately between the system of memory represented and the 
narrative produced.  The final aspect to consider in respect to De Quincey’s involute system(s) 
for cognition, memory, and narrative is the role of feedback for trans-coding between systems, 
but also in actualization (pre-actualization and counter-actualization). In terms of chaos, Hayles 
clarifies feedback’s role: 
Other characteristics that complex systems share are feedback mechanisms that 
create loops in which output feeds back into the system as input. In certain 
chemical reactions, for example, a product may also serve as a catalyst for the 
reaction, driving it to generate more product, which in turn becomes more 
catalyst. The resulting dynamics are instrumental in explaining why organized 
structures can spontaneously emerge from initially small perturbations in the 
solution. In computer modeling of mathematical functions, iteration operates 
according to a similar principle, the output of one calculation serving as input for 
the next. When the function is strongly nonlinear, small fluctuations in the data 
are not smoothed out as iteration proceeds.527 
 
Hayles’ is a concise overview. Entropy has different relationships to chaos and order. Wiener 
points to Gibb’s view that closed systems in the universe “tend naturally to deteriorate and lose 
their distinctiveness, to move from the least to the most probable state, from a state of 
organization and differentiation in which distinctions and forms exist to a state of chaos and 
sameness.”528 Of course, the sets of organization/differentiation and chaos/sameness are nearly 
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the exactly opposed pairings for a system operating by principles of virtual space-time. De 
Quincey’s “The Dream-Fugue,” compared to the narratological and teleological order of “A 
Vision of Sudden Death,” might appear to deteriorate into chaos—but that would fail to account 
for the position of De Quincey as both the sender and receiver of the signal.  
 De Quincey occasionally personifies the communicative partner, the coupling in his 
system of memory, as the Dark Interpreter—though the figure need not be recognized formally 
to still be present here. When in the guise of a persona, this curative agent—both restorative and 
custodial, as the Latin curare is the root of cure, curate and curator529—in De Quincey offers 
objectivity from a perspective distinct from the lived events to which De Quincey seems bound. 
The Dark Interpreter and interpretation provide De Quincey’s involute systems their vital 
procedures of restoration and archiving. Brockden reveals he is ever-present within time (and De 
Quincey); Savannah-La-Mar demonstrates that he is privy to an outside or without-time 
perspective, similar to God’s. Deleuze’s “dark precursor” seems uncannily similar530 to the role 
of De Quincey’s Dark Interpreter: their shared characteristic of dialectic and difference within 
the virtual-actual. By correlating their properties in the emergence of system, these two dark 
figures assist to reconcile the two approaches to entropy (or negentropy) in chaotic systems. 
Hayles juxtaposes Claude Shannon’s entropy with Léon Brillouin’s negntropy: “when 
information could be conceived of as allied with disorder, a passage was opened into the new 
paradigm of chaos theory.”531 The issue becomes one of perspective, Hayles explains succinctly: 
                                                          
529. OED, s. v. “curator, n.”.  
 
530. For an insightful discussion of the pivotal figure, see: Eleanor Kaufman, Deleuze, the Dark Precursor: 
Dialectic, Structure, Being. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 
 
531. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 58. 
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“Entropy correlates with uncertainty.”532 “The crucial differences revealed by the heuristics are 
two opposite ways of valuing disorder,” Hayles clarifies; “Shannon considers the uncertainty in 
the message at its source, whereas Brillouin considers it at the destination.”533 In other words, 
“different attitudes toward the chaos by their orientations toward the message,” demonstrates that 
uncertainty of the message can be on both ends of the communication, simultaneously.534 Hayles 
diffuses the conflict concisely: “disorder is not necessarily bad, and the void is not always 
empty.”535 As DeLanda develops Deleuze’s dark precursor different trajectories of actualization 
follow the orientation or perspective difference of Shannon and Brillouin. Furthermore, bearing 
in mind that the communications here transcode between distinct languages in the systems of 
memory, the complexity and ordered disorder of De Quincey’s dream-fugue—and involute—
become more apparent. 
 
Fugues, Shadow Selves, and the Ordered Chaos of Involutes and Involute Systems 
 
 The musical fugue is, in structure and processes, quite similar to De Quincey’s involute. 
The idea of counter points or dual melodies intertwining and being woven successively into a 
network of parts invokes the narrative caduceus, the elusive web, and discursive palimpsests in 
the virtual archive. Music also offers an appropriate temporality and textuality, simultaneously 
two distinct entities eternal and transient while embodied and incorporeal. The fugue provides an 
interesting view of the Dark Interpreter and the communication between iterations of De 
                                                          
532. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 58. 
 
533. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 58. 
 
534. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 59. 
 
535. Hayles, 1994, Chaos Bound, 60. 
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Quincey, those remembering-reading selves, accreted alongside their involutes of experiencing 
remembrance/re-experiencing (movements of actualization and counter-actualization), all 
operating in virtual space-time. DeLanda’s development of Deleuze’s dark precursor helps to 
position the uncertainty of perspective for De Quincey rendering the dynamics of the systems at 
work.  
 Rather than surveying extensively the full imagery of the section, which resonates with 
the larger Suspiria, De Quincey’s discussion of the formal movement of the fugue offers insight 
into the processes that manifest the content of the narrative, as well as rendered dream(s) and 
memories. Employing the terms that appeared earlier, “agitations,” “infinite,” “unfathomable,” 
“agony” and “passion” for the manifest content of the dream, the slippage applies to fugue 
system as well: 
Then rose the agitation, spreading through the infinite cathedral, to 
its agony; then was completed the passion of the mighty fugue. 
The golden tubes of the organ, which as yet had but sobbed and 
muttered at intervals gleaming amongst clouds and surges of 
incense threw up, as from fountains unfathomable, columns of 
heart-shattering music. Choir and antichoir were filling fast with 
unknown voices. (448) 
 
The image of columns that shatter the heart and tubes reaching the clouds recall the image-set or 
semes of the core involute; yet, just as relevant are the sounds “sobbed and muttered at intervals 
gleaming,” the oscillated appearance of the images. The choir returns to his memories of music 
on Sunday mornings, in which, “oftentimes in anthems, when the mighty instrument threw its 
vast columns of sound, fierce yet melodious over the voices of the choir, when it rose high in 
arches, as might seem, surmounting and overriding the strife of the vocal parts, and gathering by 
strong coercion the total storm into unity” (149). The parallels with the wind that assists in 
inducing his trance are clear: “sometimes I seemed to walk triumphantly upon those clouds 
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which so recently I had looked up to as mementos of prostrate sorrow, and even as ministers of 
sorrow in its creations; yes, sometimes under the transfigurations of music I felt of grief itself as 
a fiery chariot for mounting victoriously above the causes of grief” (149). When this returns in 
the dream fugue, it manifests as the tension of the two melodies, the “choir and anti-choir.” 
These are not simply narrative echoes, nor the cogito and anticogito. There is a “quasi-causal 
operator,” the dark precursor, which DeLanda explains as performing both “counter-
actualization” and “pre-actualization.”536 The dialogue of De Quincey’s dynamic complex 
system is of distinctions of trajectory between the virtual and actual. In counter-actualization, 
according to DeLanda, advancing Deleuze’s idea of the line of flight, virtual multiplicities arise 
from the intensive traces. In such a process, all actual events derive the virtual, which in De 
Quincey’s case explains the repetition as those multiplicities extracted from the pattern of his life 
experiences. For a system that includes the communication exchange between dreams and 
memory, De Quincey moves away from privileging one as a reading of the other. Rather than 
crystallization in dreams, in a psychoanalytical reading, De Quincey displays the effect of a line 
of flight from actuality to the virtual.  
 Counter-actualization may operate in both memory and dreams, but appears to be 
requisite for connecting involutes in the high intensity nonlinear system of memory. With each 
event or experience, De Quincey redefines the relevant, through anticipation but also interpreting 
the virtual node, or involute, at the center of the web. Relatedly, pre-actualization, DeLanda 
explains, is Deleuze’s plane of consistency, the instantaneous continuum emerging from the 
virtual, “unfolding into past and future, a time where nothing ever occurs but where everything is 
                                                          
536. DeLanda, 2002, Virtual Philosophy, 198-200. 
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endlessly becoming in both unlimited directions at once.”537 Suddenly a heterogenous 
assemblage of differentiation and repetition, dreams reproduce. The dream-fugue exemplifies 
this:  
Thou also, Dying Trumpeter! with thy love that was victorious, and thy anguish 
that was finishing, didst enter the tumult: trumpet and echo farewell love, and 
farewell anguish rang, through the dreadful sanctus. We, that spread flight before 
us, heard the tumult, as of flight, mustering behind us. In fear we looked round for 
the unknown steps that, in flight or in pursuit, were gathering upon our own. Who 
were these that followed? The faces, which no man could count whence were 
they? 'Oh, darkness of the grave!' I exclaimed, 'that from the crimson altar and 
from the fiery font wert visited with secret light that wert searched by the 
indulgence in the angel's eye were these indeed thy children? Pomps of life, that, 
from the burials of centuries, rose again to the voice of perfect joy, could it be ye 
that had wrapped me in the reflux of panic?' What ailed me, that I should fear 
when the triumphs of earth were advancing?     (448) 
 
The conflation of time as well as the temporal ties of each image demonstrates the dual trajectory 
of the involution. Self-organization ties actual instances to entangled virtual multiplicities or 
mental markers, yet, the reflexivity differentiates to self-generate dreams that actualize. That the 
imagery coincides so fittingly with the geometric topology of virtual philosophy demonstrates 
shared roots in philosophy and mathematics.  
 As De Quincey resumes the culmination of the fugue, the movement of actualization 
either from or to the virtual seems as uncertain as the perspective of the sender and receiver. It is 
not memory or dreams that can be assigned either actualization or counter-actualization, but 
rather the temporal position of the self, the teleological orientation in both systems. In 
recollection the observer looks back from the end of the continuum. Re-collection suggests 
making actual what has already been actual, but only through the conversion or transcoding 
through the virtual storage of memory. To narrate dreams is the same re-collection; to dream, 
                                                          
537. DeLanda, 2002, Virtual Philosophy, 122. 
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however, like encoding into memory, archives the actual by intensive organization, locating the 
virtual. DeLanda would point out that high intensity nonlinear systems, such as this, move 
toward the virtual—in a similar sense as entropy. Non-actualized attractors direct this 
organization, just as the dark precursor is the quasi-causal operator of these processes.  
 De Quincey is aware of the approximate autonomy of these process, dictated as they are 
by the structure of the human system. The Dark Interpreter, as with the dark precursor, is an 
effect not a cause, an only quasi-causal operator. De Quincey’s term seems more suitable for 
underscoring both linguistics and informatics. The precursor may be ever elusive, yet, the 
interpreting roles are apparent and available for analysis. Influenced by the communications 
model, events arise directly by two bodies interacting. The interpreter, effect and by-product of 
colliding memories or communicating iterations, demonstrates the entanglement of involutes. 
The scope now exceeds the smitten, submarine Savannah-La-Mar, but the whole expanse of 
time:  
Ah! Pariah heart within me, that couldst never hear the sound of joy without 
sullen whispers of treachery in ambush; that, from six years old, didst never hear 
the promise of perfect love, without seeing aloft amongst the stars fingers as of a 
man's hand, writing the secret legend −' Ashes to ashes, dust to dust!' wherefore 
shouldst thou not fear, though all men should rejoice? Lo! as I looked back for 
seventy leagues through the mighty cathedral, and saw the quick and the dead that 
sang together to God, together that sang to the generations of man ah! raving, as 
of torrents that opened on every side: trepidation, as of female and infant steps 
that fled ah! rushing, as of wings that chased! (448-449) 
 
De Quincey can simultaneously be the narrator and the six-year old, two simultaneous events of 
experience and recollection. The uncertainty over the fate of the young woman on the mail-road, 
not dissimilar to his construing Elizabeth’s sleep-like appearance in death, extracts a counter-
actualization of the multiplicity he apprehends as the paradox of presence in absence. 
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Simultaneously the line of flight (to virtual) and plane of consistency (to actual) operate, 
interpret themselves, in each direction of transcoding.  
 De Quincey’s interpreter manifests out of the hardware of involutes as much as the 
firmware of self or the software of conscious states. The apparatus of the mind, that permits 
storage of involutes for their entangling functions, is the hardware and machinery consisting of 
such gears. The software, the programs and operating information of involute language, 
functions and discourses between the states that permanently imprint the self or read-only 
firmware. The term wetware, in fact, attempts the organic analogy of the brain to the 
interconnected systems within computers. The interpreter operates in the spaces between these; 
the interpreter is process. The level of communication-event between actualized or re-produced 
recollections operates in tandem with intersystem dialogue or the movement from actual to 
virtual (and vice versa) within encoding and recall. De Quincey, following the fugue outline, 
creates entwined trajectories. The merger of the church choir, the trance, the mail-coach and 
Savannah-La-Mar are just the more obvious iterations. His memory-images and dream-images 
dialogue for revelatory reassurance: 
But I heard a voice from heaven, which said −'Let there be no reflux of panic let 
there be no more fear, and no more sudden death! Cover them with joy as the 
tides cover the shore!' That heard the children of the choir, that heard the children 
of the grave. All the hosts of jubilation made ready to move. Like armies that ride 
in pursuit, they moved with one step. Us, that, with laurelled heads, were passing 
from the cathedral through its eastern gates, they overtook, and, as with a 
garment, they wrapped us round with thunders that overpowered our own. As 
brothers we moved together; to the skies we rose to the dawn that advanced—to 
the stars that fled; rendering thanks to God in the highest that, having hid his face 
through one generation behind thick clouds of War, once again was ascending—
was ascending from Waterloo in the visions of Peace: rendering thanks for thee, 
young girl whom having overshadowed with his ineffable passion of death 
suddenly did God relent; suffered thy angel to turn aside his arm; and even in 
thee, sister unknown! shown to me for a moment only to be hidden forever, found 




The ascension and enveloping imagery recurs back to the structure of the dreaming faculty, the 
depths of psyche, to reinforce the excavations issue heavenward the sighs, silent signals, 
communications from the encrusted strata. De Quincey’s use of repetition and “reflux” conveys a 
sense of haste and recursion or reversion. The apparent pattern is one of vision and concealment, 
like the ineffability of God, yet, obviously evoking Elizabeth: “sister unknown! shown […] for a 
moment only to be hidden forever.” The cathedral recurs to God “work[ing] by earthquake” (“his 
voice swelled like a sanctus rising from the choir of a cathedral) with Savannah-La-Mar, which 
in turn returns to the rituals of Elizabeth’s burial. The enveloping course of thought renders in 
disjunctive syntax, “was ascending—was ascending from Waterloo in the visions of Peace,” 
movement from the general node of meaning vital to his involute memory to specifics pinning 
him to the later layer of the mail-coach sequence. The varied perspectives collide (“As brothers 
we moved together”) and extract a virtual paradigm, a multiplicity to be formed into a 
heterogeneous continuum.  
 The interpretations operating the movement from virtual to actual and vice versa are the 
self-organization and autopoiesis of involute systems. The emergence of self-organization from 
the seeming chaos of narrative demonstrates the processes of involutes. De Quincey provides a 
textual rendering of the externalization of memory within memory:  
A thousand times, amongst the phantoms of sleep, has he shown thee to me, 
standing before the golden dawn, and ready to enter its gates with the dreadful 
word going before Thee with the armies of the grave behind thee; shown thee to 
me, sinking, rising, fluttering, fainting, but then suddenly reconciled, adoring: a 
thousand times has he followed thee in the worlds of sleep through storms; 
through desert seas; through the darkness of quicksands; through fugues and the 
persecution of fugues; through dreams, and the dreadful resurrections that are in 
dreams only that at the last, with one motion of his victorious arm, he might 




De Quincey’s closing portion settles with “the phantoms of sleep,” displayed in dreams now with 
the “dreadful word going before”—a moment of time suspension “suddenly reconciled.” The 
“thousand times,” repeated here, repeats the repetition of dreams for those suffering at opium’s 
hands; yet, opium is but the coefficient making evident the operations of the human system. 
“Through dreams, and the dreadful resurrections that are in dreams,” the past revives, re-
produced, re-interpreted, re-actualized. The “fugues and the persecution of fugues” provide the 
final sense of the tensions of dual (and dueling) systems, interacting and communicating, 
coupled and operating in tandem. The agitations of the human system are only the more evident 
exacerbated by opium and the impact of his nursery afflictions. Between the materiality of 
informatics and the semiotics of virtuality, De Quincey maps the human system with the 
involute, carving out a post-human adaption of digital-cyber mechanisms with only the available 
technics of his time. The spontaneous emergence, “only that at the last, with one motion of his 
victorious arm, he might record and emblazon the endless resurrections of his love,” completes 
the narratological, dreamed and immemorial self-organization of the involute-self from the 
seeming chaos of the spiraling, layered, entangled characteristics of the involute systems 
operating within and without. The informational processing of the human mind-body at stake for 
De Quincey permits the text of the mind to exceed the clepsydra and even the text he renders it 
through. 
 Suspiria de Profundis stands, with all its appendages, tangents, and eddies, as a model 
and a study that defines De Quincey’s senses—contingently defined—of mind and text. Through 
current developments of theory and technology, the sciences and the arts that branch out 
common concerns for philosophy and mathematics in De Quincey’s writing, the shared interests 
between De Quincey and memory as system(s), virtuality cum archive, linguistics, and textuality 
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become apparent. De Quincey’s parallel ideas place him within several trajectories of thought. 
Yet, while current semiotics, media theory, and philosophy offer avenues to appreciate De 
Quincey’s commonality, they also distinguish his additions to each as contributions that can 
inform current thought. Reading Suspiria de Profundis with De Quincey’s involutes in mind 
transforms the act of reading to a set of processes that do not reduce a text to a single, 
homogenous meaning. Rather, reading for De Quincey, is a translation, is communication, is 
recollection, is process. Involute methodology is reading for the transformative act of involution, 
of entangling actuals around nodes of virtual, indeterminate signification and archiving each 





















The Past is Now 
 Through this dissertation, I hope to secure a place for De Quincey’s metaphysical 
involute in the two fields he hoped to merge: literature and philosophy. Now, the involute 
belongs as much to systems theory and media studies. Involutes also evolve archive theory 
through the premises of virtuality.  
 Involute analysis is the formal method I propose for Thomas De Quincey’s involute 
reading practices. De Quincey reads his memory-text with the recursion of involutes. Rather than 
static images or cinematic frames, involutes are dimensionally compound and perplexingly 
entangling objects for ordering existence. They pattern themselves, as do fractals, into larger 
formations. Yet, even as De Quincey recognized memory and narrative intersecting at points of 
meaning, the systems of interaction are not always apparent. Associations and meaning may 
interplay through juxtaposition by elusive agencies, entangle with oscillating undercurrents, and 
recur elsewhere with algorithmic functioning. From De Quincey’s reading of his memory-text, 
all texts become viable objects for the same analytical method. Involutes invite new layers for 
interdisciplinary inquiry. I anticipate involutes speaking to newer textualities of media (including 
the social and communal ephemera media) and the adapting experiences that accompany them.
 I invite developments to involute analysis that assist our evolving understandings of 
human interaction with an increasingly technologically textual world. Involutes help reimagine 
the site of textual interface, having restructured both the text and the reader. The structural 
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implications of involute systems form the basic methodological level of involute analysis. The 
untraceable tethered properties De Quincey locates in his own readerly associations demonstrate 
the layered and dueling trajectories within any node of meaning or signification. De Quincey 
revises the typical literary figuring of antagonism as relations, contradictions even, that are not 
oppositional but complementary. The involute system accommodates multiple trajectories from 
interacting systems and sub-systems. As a medium, involutes impact their procedures and 
formulaic analysis of their functioning. Involutes operate the systems without and within the text 
and the reader. I trust that by recognizing involute processing, our apprehension of the 
increasingly rapid currents of technological acceleration can locate new cross-currents of inquiry. 
  As a methodology for literary readings this means that when we read we must remain 
mindful of the systematic suspensions of current passages in the literary text alongside past ones. 
Noteworthy passages are relative and fluidly reassessed by automatic subroutines of 
correspondence and congruence, of genre, of grammar and syntax, of general and specific 
discourses and so forth. We translate as we read. We interpret as we translate. Reading, as with 
memories and experiences, are dually virtual and actual, continually actualizing and 
counteractualizing. At each moment, the text is a text within a series. We suspend points in the 
recursive sequence. Each text is a reiteration from two directions: informed by its present 
addendum and readerly anticipations, interests. To recollect, to read, moves simultaneous in two 
directions, suspending and oscillating the conscious mind in space and time. The text is always 
multiple. We counteractualize the virtual text and multiplicity (of texts) in our reading. Our 
interest is rapid and simultaneously and continually actualizing the virtual of the text(s). And all 
this occurs—not in a vacuum—but in tandem with our readerly pasts and reading process, within 
our layered pasts made present in memory. All this occurred in the compositional process. All 
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remains ongoing in the virtual-actualization processes of reading, recollecting, rereading. The 
involute offers a placeholder for archiving as much of these processes of process as possible.  
 Involute analysis provides for our locating collapsing lines of remembrance and lines of 
experience. Involute moments in a textual reading pinpoint moments of intersection and 
recursion within reading. The foliated involute point permits one textual point to become several, 
one reading course to become layered as multiple. After isolating a textual involute (or Ti) as a 
remembrance involute (or Ri), analysis can then trace various recollection points (Rp), returning 
to the lines of the text leading toward and issuing from the involute point (Ip).  Revisiting an 
involute sequence locates the relationship between order and disorder of the textual system. 
Reading is a juncture of text and virtual memory, a crosscutting of other points, vectors, and 
involutes juxtaposed in archival memory’s palimpsestuousness. Involute analysis may have a 
clearer example in the digital text than the literary text, the former often including an archive or 
log of activity. Newer media forms, with either their own archives of iterations or record of 
user/reader progress help partially document the two systems merging in involute reading. Or, 
maybe this simply offers additional textual layers? Memory in such a medium, applicable to 
Suspiria, operates as a system with interconnections between natural processes and media 
technologies or the human and non-human domains emphasizes in the leakage of media into 
human communications. The notable texts that embed or en-script user experience/memory, 
often multiple iterations, also develop meta-awareness, even commentary on, the places and 
spaces of interface, the interactions of the involute system.  
 Between the materiality of informatics and the semiotics of virtuality, De Quincey maps 
the human system with the involute. With the technics of his time he locates a post-human ahead 
of current digital-cyber mechanisms. Thomas De Quincey’s involute and involute analysis 
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provide a bridge to the non-specialized principles of science. Non-causal entangling, 
gravitational manipulation, and perception distortion are just as relevant for De Quincey’s study 
of memory and narrative as the physics of the universe. Recent years, even the past few months, 
continue to provide evidence and studies of Einsteinian physics in action, many of which 
scientists, including Einstein, thought unprovable. The non-causal behavior of quantum 
mechanics, the gravitational power of comic bodies on light, even the power of extreme light to 
alter its behavior on objects are just a sampling of the areas yielding advanced data about the 
universe. The specialized focus of these fields seldom suggests application in the study of 
literature, or more largely language. De Quincey’s method appreciates language, literature, and 
the mind as related subjects for which scientific tenets are valuable—moreover, their study in 
this manner even yields reciprocal benefit.  
 
New Game Mode 
 Imagine, if you will, that you could go back in time and bring useful objects back with 
you—but this processes requires you to suspend time (and yourself in it), keep your thoughts 
oscillating in both states, so that you can locate objects of use to you now and in the past/for the 
future.  
 This is not a description of reality based on the laws of involutes. Rather this is the meta-
gameplay of a participatory digital text that demonstrates how relevant involute analysis is for 
our modern understanding. A recent puzzle video game, Braid (2009), includes a unique and 
defining feature involving the protagonist’s movement and progression during gameplay. The 
player possesses the power to manipulate time, to reverse the movement of the world or rewind 
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their such actions of their own as evading enemies or various puzzle solving —this power is in 
fact a required mechanic the game demands be used in order to progress. 
 You advance forward and survey the environment before you pause and rewind yourself 
at a different speed than the continuing velocity of certain spaces and objects around you, 
applying your cognizance of what already happened—a suspended state—to undo (yet, not un-
experience) your re-engagement with the world around you. You can go backward, most of the 
world can regress too, physically, though your consciousness progresses forward along with 
strategic objects. Some things you can bring back with you, artifacts of the world that 
emblematize your effaced experiences. Then you send time forward yet again in a newly 
established layer of experience, informed by effaced knowledge. You alter velocity or position 
from your previous path; now you’re elsewhere and else-when than you are/were.  
 The blatant distortion of space-time is the main mechanic of the video game Braid (2008) 
that asks players to undo their actions in order to manipulate certain objects and bring them 
backward to different points in time/space, to moments and places other and before. Clearly, 
storytelling in this form interrogates the basic principles of physics in ways that speak to 
humanity’s yearning for power over time (and space). Braid suggests a self-conscious text, 
utilizing its media for commentary on form. The meta-mechanic of Braid collapses the notion of 
replay, particularly the replay-ability required of some games in the hopes of improving 
performance through layered experience. Several genres of video games archive save files of 
user game-play. 
 Typical meta-game mechanics expect players to recognize successful completion; a save 
file, a historical record of performed experiences, can trigger “new game mode” that alters the 
game world or objectives to offer a new experience. Electronic media is aware of its medium. 
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Braid expects players to overtly perform as an external memory for the game itself—rather than 
the other way around. Participatory digital texts, might offer a useful comparison of the two 
matrixes of memory (human and media) in Suspiria. Suddenly the human experience and 
medium create a matrix of dialectic exchange, privileging neither and demanding simultaneity of 
remembrance. 
 We’ve reached a moment in which a digital text can ask its user to provide it external 
mnemotic aid. Reading Suspiria de Profundis with De Quincey’s involutes in mind transforms 
the act of reading from one that does not reduce a text to a single, homogenous meaning. Rather, 
reading for De Quincey, is a translation, is communication, is recollection, is process. Involute 
methodology is reading for the transformative act of involution, of entangling actuals around 
nodes of virtual, indeterminate signification and archiving each experience as a distinct 
iteration—but ever further and ceaselessly involuting. 
 
An Inter-net of Involute Texts 
 “Pics or it didn’t happen”, proclaims (rather unoriginally, albeit succinctly) one internet 
meme. Yet it’s oddly profound. Approaching two centuries of photography’s existence, visual 
media reign; Deleuze avers we now think cinematically; and, certainly, this is all just an 
extension—surely not the pinnacle?—of external memory storage that Socrates cautioned 
against. The concept of (digital) memory storage is so common-place even those not intimately 
aware of the process, or even willing to comprehend translating anything into zeros and ones, use 
the terminology daily and without a second thought. But what does it mean for a society (and 
culture) when occurrences or experiences rely on photo evidence? Why must experiences have 
visual representation in order to have happened? What does it mean for experiences to have 
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external (perhaps even autonomous?) existence within time and space? These are hardly the only 
concerns that plague me as a part of a generation whose first experience of digital storage was 
not the personal computer per se but rather video game save data. (Was there not an NES in the 
“average” household long before there was a PC?) At once there is both a personal memory and 
an external record of events a player can load or delete—and, if unintentionally overwritten, the 
blurred space of that virtual experience is suddenly gone, gone somewhere. I’d like this 
dissertation to contribute to the discussion of what some media theorists call our 
“mnemotechnolical milleu” by studying the conceptual implications of storing experience and 
perhaps structuring memory to fit given housing parameters and to operate accordingly. And 
perhaps this goes for experiences as well. The ephemerality yet permanence of the internet, of 
new media, of memes and video games, demonstrate that not only do must we expand our 
definitions of text and narrative, but we must adapt to new forms and behaviors of discourse. 
 Interestingly, a Romanticist offers some provocative questions, if not a few answers, to 
these very concerns. Brilliant and overlooked, De Quincey introduces a sense to the term 
“involute” that resonates with our digital experiences and may even illuminate a paradigmatic or 
philosophical anticipation of how we think, a century ahead of schedule. It was kismet 
encountering Thomas De Quincey and his intoxicating work Suspiria de Profundis—and now I 
can’t get him or his concepts out of my head, literally (and I do mean literally, for reading can 
impact brain connectivity, though metaphorically as well). In the early 1800s De Quincey not 
only has the impulse to render—in narrative—the visual detail of a poignant memory but to 
conceptualize that memory as physically stored in the brain. What is truly provocative is not so 
much this sense of memory storage but his concept of experience as a physical and visual object. 
Suddenly the meme takes on new meaning when experiences start out as concrete objects rather 
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than abstract and internal “thoughts and feelings”—it didn’t happen if you only think it or feel it, 
somehow these are incomplete or untrustworthy.  
 Provide pics, proof, physical presence or it didn’t happen. Thomas De Quincey’s 
involutes complete the narratological, dreamed and immemorial self-organization of the 
involute-self from the seeming chaos of the spiraling, layered, entangled characteristics of virtual 
experience. Involute analysis suggests one way to understand our evolving priorities, presences, 
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